People Flow

Managing migration in a New European Commonwealth

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Theo Veenkamp is a senior serving civil servant at the Dutch Ministry of Justice. He writes here in a personal capacity.

1. Introduction

People have been on the move throughout human history. The instinct to migrate between different environments is part of our inheritance. Whenever our basic security and opportunities are seriously threatened, many of us would rather take the risk of moving than stay where we are. There is no absolutely clear distinction between negative pressures and positive attractions: we are complex beings with multiple motives. But most of us would agree that migration is, at root, a powerful sign of human vitality.

Estimates suggest that around 170 million people live outside their country of birth. This number has doubled over the last 30 years, and is likely to grow further. Contrary to many people's belief, most migration takes place between developing countries. But migration to Europe has also grown to the point where migrants make up around 20 million of the EU's 380 million people. 'Illegal' or unauthorised migrants are estimated to make up 10–15 per cent of the total already in Europe, and 20–30 per cent of incoming flows.

As communications and transport costs fall, people flow will increase. International migration should be understood, in this sense, as part of an overall growth in mobility and in the interconnections between different parts of the world. The growing range of *routes* and *means* of migration means that these patterns of movement will become more complex and more diverse. As the EU enlarges, policing borders and people movement across member states will become more difficult.

The strong forces that trigger migration make governments and political leaders nervous. Immigration has become an increasingly visible and explosive issue in many Western European nations. New political groups and leaders have challenged traditional settlements. Immigration has become a rallying point for growing public concern about other issues, including terrorism and global insecurity.

Migration policy is difficult because it is directly connected to many other basic and controversial areas of politics: wealth and work, welfare, security and identity. This makes it an especially difficult area to reform, for both logistical and emotional reasons. Because of its peculiar characteristics it acts as a focus for very deep currents of hope and fear.

One result is that national governments are increasingly concerned to show that they have illegal migration and the growth in asylum seekers 'under control'. Several countries, including the UK, have also sought to expand their 'managed' migration channels to allow greater flows of economic migrants, using quotas and skill requirements as filters. Intergovernmental initiatives have focused on increasing border security, particularly since September 11th 2001.

Over the last two decades, the EU has moved gradually towards common policies on immigration and asylum. The European Commission is currently seeking to finalise and implement common rules and procedures on the handling of asylum seekers, family reunification and quota-based management of economic migration. While some progress has been made towards establishing shared arrangements across EU member states, it has been slow and uneven.

The 'open method of coordination' used means that national governments are responsible for finding ways to bring their own legislative systems closer together with those of others. The resurgence of anxiety and controversy in recent years has made this process more difficult. Supranational law, which establishes freedom of movement across the EU, has combined with intergovernmental decision-making on the control and management of migrants from beyond the EU. The growth in mobility is happening against a

backdrop of painstaking, negotiated compromise between national governments under domestic electoral pressure.

The emerging dilemma

In this pamphlet we argue that Europe's handling of migration flows needs to change radically over the next generation. We start with the proposition that growing political turbulence reflects an underlying dilemma: *control of migration flows seems simultaneously to be more necessary and less feasible than ever before.*

Control appears increasingly necessary because of growing concern about the sustainability of European prosperity and welfare. There is also anxiety about the erosion of traditional identities, and growing fear of instability, violence and conflict spilling into Europe from other parts of the world. More than half the world's population lives in abject poverty. Awareness of the gulf between the world's poor and Western European societies continues to grow as a result of growing communication and travel.

The question is therefore whether a continuing influx of migrants to Europe can be absorbed in mutually beneficial ways. The prevalent feeling is that unless the influx is effectively controlled, it cannot.

Unfortunately, we also have to face the fact that comprehensive control is increasingly difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the attempt produces side effects which further worsen the situation, and undermines one of the key factors in the European success story: its open society.

The detailed reasons for this are brought out in the analysis below. Put briefly, however, a world in which information, goods, money and cultures are increasingly mobile will always have great difficulty in restricting the movement of people and labour selectively. Europe's borders will expand in the next decade in ways which make them virtually impossible to seal off physically.

Managing migration successfully will mean addressing the risks and fears that it provokes among receiving populations, investing in effective integration and coexistence, and smoothing people flows

in ways which enhance their positive effects and diminish their risks.

Our central contention is that when integration and coexistence are managed successfully, the capacity to absorb new arrivals is increased, and that when migration flows are managed smoothly, the willingness and ability to manage integration is increased. The challenge is to create a system that can reinforce the positive relationship between these two goals. Our current categories and management systems cannot hope to do so in their current form.

At the moment, governments are caught in a trap between the short-term demands of an apparently escalating problem and the need for a sustainable, longer-term approach. Escaping this trap requires a vision that is currently beyond the capabilities either of nation states or of the EU, but which could act as a focus for ongoing debate, innovation and reform.

Flow management: outline of a new system

In chapter 2 we set out the main features of a system for managing migration flows that could better achieve these simultaneous goals. The proposed new system springs from two starting points:

- Voluntary migration is evolving over time into self-reliant, transnational mobility.
- Forced migration will continue as a result of upheaval of various kinds displacing and uprooting people from their countries of origin and means of self-reliance.

Given these trends, a system for managing migrant flows effectively needs to:

- respond as closely as possible to the underlying needs of each group of migrants
- eliminate unnecessary complexity
- capitalise on the constructive forces and energies within migration movements.

The five principles for such a system should be to:

- ○ *facilitate* the movement of voluntary migrants together with self-reliant travellers
- ○ *create* opportunities for displaced persons
- ○ *protect* refugees
- ○ *locate* 'flow management' facilities as near as possible to potential migrants
- ○ *prevent* counterproductive differences in the treatment, entitlements or conditions available to different groups of incomers, and between migrants and settled residents.

These principles can be achieved in practice by establishing:

- ○ an international network of European Union mobility service points – playing a key role in facilitating the movement and contributions of voluntary migrants
- ○ international transit centres – providing shelter and perspective for the displaced.

Under this proposed system, anyone in the world wishing to travel to the European Union for whatever reason can, as a first step, visit the nearest EU mobility service point. Once there, they can register on the international mobility website of the EU as either:

- ○ a visitor
- ○ a worker
- ○ a sponsored resident or
- ○ a refugee.

While all entrants will need to register and receive a visa, permission will be granted automatically on fulfilment of certain basic criteria. Freedom to enter and travel across the EU would thus become easier to achieve, and the incentive to register with accurate information would be dramatically increased. But various conditions would be attached.

For example, visitors will have to provide proof of ability to cover travel expenses. Workers will need a job offer from an employer or to qualify under a 'points-based system'. Sponsored residents will have to be vouched for by a naturalised citizen.

Refugee claimants will receive swift and consistent processing of their claims. Their treatment will be identical to that of people who are displaced, without papers, or wanting to enter Europe but not falling into any of the other categories. All these people enter international transit centres.

The international transit centre (ITC) is probably the most radical and ambitious element of the proposed new system. Essentially, it acts as a catchment mechanism, provides temporary shelter, and creates opportunities and directional strategies for people who have been displaced.

Beyond a basic introductory package, no ITC services are unconditionally free. They provide shelter and support, provide interest-free loans, and accept payment in kind through work done by residents during their stay. All users of ITCs, whatever their formal entry status, receive the same level of treatment. All are entitled to personalised programmes of professional advice and support to create 'personal development strategies', linked to specific forms of credit and development assistance.

ITCs will be located close to the sites of displacement and upheaval, and often play a role in the wider coordination of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Some will also exist at key locations on the borders of Europe or near transport hubs. They will not solely assist people in developing strategies for self-reliant migration into Europe, but also support people's redirection or return to their original homes or new locations nearby. ITCs might also provide 'microcredit' facilities, allowing families, villages or other groups to invest in the facilitated mobility of individual migrants as a legitimate alternative to paying large sums to illegal traffickers.

Asylum seekers whose claims are verified and accepted will receive swift access to new passports and European citizenship. While their claims are being processed, they will receive the same support and

entitlements as other residents of ITCs, thereby reducing the current strong incentives to claim asylum for reasons other than those covered by the Geneva Convention.

Investing in peaceful coexistence

The proposed system described above implies more free movement of migrants in and out of Europe. Making such movement sustainable requires an equally concerted investment in strategies for peaceful coexistence. We argue in chapter 3 that the false dichotomy between 'integration' and 'multiculturalism' should be abandoned, and that strategies to promote peaceful coexistence should reflect the following five principles:

○ The more diversity increases, the more strictly we should adhere to a common set of rules embodying democracy, the rule of law, shared freedoms and responsibilities.
○ Support for newcomers who are not self-reliant should be facilitated in customised ways, including new forms of political representation and social participation.
○ Neighbourhood and school management policies should be the major focus for practical efforts to respond constructively to diversity. Schools and local authorities should receive dedicated funding reflecting their efforts to promote positive coexistence.
○ Connections with countries of origin should be strengthened in various ways to encourage reciprocal exchange, shared arrangements for taxation and passport issue, remittances from migrants, and so on.
○ The arts, media, universities and religion should be stimulated to accept shared responsibility for peaceful co-existence and contributing to intercultural understanding.

Societal innovation: security, economy, welfare

These outlines sketch the workings of new strategies for managing both migration and integration. Their success depends on the extent

to which surrounding systems of governance, wealth creation and social welfare can adapt to accommodate their goals.

In chapters 5–7, we explore the possibilities of radical, long-term change, or 'societal innovation', which could increase Europe's capacity to sustain its prosperity, quality of life and openness to the world over the next half century. These chapters are not predictions or even specific recommendations, but instead illustrate the kinds of change it is possible to imagine, on a similar scale to the achievements of Europe and the EU since its postwar inception.

Among the key innovations explored are:

○ the formation of a new, unified military and strategic capacity in Europe as part of the reshaping of the NATO security umbrella

○ the development of new anti-terrorism strategies based on shared intelligence and preventive policing and armed intervention, and fresh approaches to neighbourhood management, anti-crime policies and civic participation

○ the founding of a **New European Commonwealth** – an initiative designed to bring peace and interdependence to the wider European region and to former European colonies by investing in shared projects and infrastructures, from the Northern Cape to North Africa and from Ireland to Russia, underpinned by an expanding zone of free trade agreements

○ new EU governance arrangements creating stronger connections between national and Europe-wide political representation and legitimacy

○ restructuring the euro economy to allow new forms of investment in human capital development and the human services economy, as a way to utilise growing surpluses of human capital and labour and generate output and oppor-tunity for lower skilled people in labour-intensive activities

○ reorganising welfare provision so that beyond guaranteed entitlements for the retired, and others incapable of self-

reliance, welfare investment is structured through the provision of a 'citizenship credit' that entitles the individual to a revolving, interest-free credit facility and a range of personalised support services and opportunities, including various levels of health and social care, education, retraining, and so on. Such services and credit facilities are potentially available on similar conditions to migrant workers and visitors, but very few are available as unconditional benefits.

Developing the agenda

The whole pamphlet aims to set out a challenging, coherent outline of how sustainable management strategies for an era of mass migration might develop, and to focus attention on the major challenges that European societies will have to confront beyond the immediate issues currently crowding the policy agenda.

The ideas and proposals are not presented as immediate proposals for policy, but as the stimulus for an ongoing process of research, policy design, testing and public debate. That said, several of the ideas presented in different chapters do share key features with ideas and proposals beginning to emerge and be put forward in various countries, at EU level and in a wider international context. These include the Athens Migration Policy Initiative, the Declaration of The Hague, the Berne Initiative and the initial proposals presented to the EU by the British Home Secretary, David Blunkett.[1] One focus for bringing together the range of issues that need to be addressed could be the attempt to generate a 'Global Agreement on the Movement of People' to stand alongside existing global frameworks on trade in goods and services.

Our aim is to take forward public debate and dialogue on the need to create new perspectives on migration through an ongoing partnership between Demos and openDemocracy, and to develop a more detailed, empirically robust and comparative programme of work focused on developing and testing the key features of a new migration management system.

2. Constructing a new system for migration management

What we present in this chapter is a prototype for a new, radically reshaped system of migration management. This system must be capable of adapting to the complex reality created by ongoing migration flows, reinforcing the benefits of higher mobility, and encouraging interdependence between sending and receiving countries, long-standing residents and newcomers. The aim is to outline the contours and dominant principles of such a system, in order to show how it could work as a whole. In later chapters, we explore in more detail the reality of current migratory movements and the wider changes in governance, economy and welfare that could help to make them productive, fair and sustainable.

Any successful system for managing the flow of people must indirectly strengthen the social and economic conditions that make European quality of life so widely prized. Openness to the wider world is both inevitable and desirable as part of this quality of life, but it creates major challenges for which our institutions and cultures are not currently equipped. Accepting the reality of higher mobility therefore requires a response which addresses the frictions and problems accompanying the arrival of migrants, as well as smoothing the passage of many.

Any prototype must be thoroughly tested, adapted and improved. This system is not 'policy ready', but we believe it is internally coherent and robust, and could act as a catalyst and a focus for

ongoing debate and development. Our expectations of its effectiveness are conditioned by three working assumptions:

o   Such an approach will never produce perfect results, but has the best chance of optimising positive outcomes.
o   The starting point for a new system is to begin managing the flows and pressures as they are, rather than trying to produce a comprehensive understanding or to address all aspects of migration and integration instantly.
o   The focus should be simultaneously on the pragmatic management of migratory flows and the promotion of peaceful coexistence between newcomers and existing residents.

Shifting from control to 'flow management': why current systems are becoming unworkable

During the second half of the twentieth century a *de facto* settlement in migration policy operated in Western Europe, though it was never made fully explicit. Each major nation accepted a level of influx from poorer countries determined partly by its history, its relationships with former colonies, its national identity and the workings of its own labour market. As pan-European issues grew in significance, 'observance' of common rules became more common, but the management of influx and integration was handled according to significant national variation. Much of the migration that continued was not widely publicised. For example, the UK was relatively generous in the numbers of asylum seekers it accepted in proportion to its population. The UK maintained a relatively flexible labour market, which absorbed migrant workers, including illegal ones, relatively easily. Immigration into Denmark, on the other hand, began as a form of workforce migration in the 1960s bringing mainly young men from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Pakistan, and continued even after a freeze in 1973. The annual number of refugees accepted by Denmark increased fivefold between 1960 and 1984.[2] Italy and Spain became countries of immigration only in the early 1980s,

traditionally having been 'sending' countries. Because of this recent status, their systems have been characterised by porous immigration legislation, easy access and, after a process of policy learning from countries like France and the UK, increasing closure. New immigration flows are partially absorbed by their informal economies, leading to increasing marginalisation of the migrant from the local population.

In the course of the twentieth century, the Netherlands changed from an emigrant to an immigrant country. By 2000, about 1.5 million people living in the Netherlands were either born elsewhere or had at least one parent who had been. Since the mid-1960s, the Netherlands has received a steadily growing number of migrants, especially workers from Turkey and Morocco as a result of immigration from the former Dutch colony of Surinam. Immigrant workers have consistently experienced a weak labour market position.[3] Since 1975, Norway has operated a virtually 'zero quota' of work permits for persons from outside the Nordic area (until 1971 every non-Nordic person offered a job in Norway received a permit almost automatically). Exceptions are made for a small number of outside experts, employees of the oil industry and foreigners already granted residence as refugees or for other reasons.

From the 1970s onward, the European Union (then the EEC) worked gradually towards a common set of policies. For example, while British accession to the EEC required legislation to establish a narrower definition of 'Britishness' and restrict access from those in Commonwealth countries, the management of quotas and arrangements within specific countries remained largely a national affair.

In some countries, voluntary migration was widely understood and accepted, but those arriving voluntarily to seek better circumstances had little access to the full entitlements (or responsibilities) of citizenship. Thus in Germany *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) formed a distinct, second tier of society. They were permitted to live and work but not to access the full benefits of German welfare, and largely were not integrated fully into German

society. This example shows clearly how the civic rights and welfare states of European societies were seen as the inheritance of cumulative investment, indebtedness and commitment over many years by citizens with common loyalties and obligations. It was not obvious that a society's privileges (especially political ones) should be immediately at the disposal of often temporary newcomers who had not made that commitment or contribution and who might not share the same values and loyalties.

For a long time, immigration was seen as assimilation or departure: the success or failure of a newcomer to adjust and integrate, to be accepted by a host society if it chose to, while that host society remained virtually untouched by the process. The 'zero immigration' policies adopted after the first oil shock of 1973 radically restricted the inflow of migrants, but did not stop it. In fact, the new restrictions marked a significant shift in the composition of migrants, towards asylum seekers and family reunification. Ironically, the relatively high barriers to labour migration, combined with lower barriers to asylum and family reunification, have made it more likely that those entering European countries will have low skills and be dependent on welfare provision. The problem of illegal migration, in a Europe of expanding physical borders, information and trade flows, has become far greater.

Since the problem of uncontrolled people movement became more acute following the collapse of the USSR and the state-controlled economies of Eastern Europe, and as the EU moved towards further enlargement, a reappraisal of the problem has taken place. Views of integration changed in the 1990s, towards the expectation that existing citizens will compete with newcomers on an equal basis, an expectation which is almost universally supported by Western governments.[4] However, the new approach to integration has not necessarily resulted in the development of positive attitudes towards migration. When asked, more than half of Europeans point to migration as the cause of domestic problems and a threat to their jobs and wage levels. A similar proportion assume that migrants rely more heavily than existing citizens on welfare payments and therefore

exploit social security systems. Neither of these assumptions is likely to be true.

But as immigration has resurfaced as an issue of intense media debate and political controversy, many national governments have taken up positions designed to allay public concerns, and to reinforce their control over the points of entry and the behaviour and freedoms of new arrivals. As a result, the debate in many countries has focused on identifying, controlling and placing incomers in ways that restrict their impact on the surrounding populations.

It has become increasingly clear that not only is control expensive, but that narrowing the filters through which people can enter and settle legally has the effect of pushing more and more migrants towards hidden and illegitimate avenues of entry. Making it more difficult to enter might act as a deterrent to some, but when both voluntary and forced migration are growing, making legitimate entry more difficult produces the perverse outcome of fuelling the international criminal economy and pushing many migrants to the margins of social and economic life. The restriction of economic migration channels also encourages far higher levels of asylum applications, creating massive overload for the systems needed to process and verify asylum claims. The growth of displaced persons, and the growing risk that they will become 'drifters', lacking both self-reliance and the means to settle and participate constructively in the life of a host society, is acknowledged as a source of major social unease and of perceived fiscal and security problems for European states.

One of the major difficulties for European governments under this framework is that of sorting different groups of migrants into the right categories. This is not just a conceptual problem, but one of data collection, as governments and international organisations struggle to maintain rigid boundaries between categories, with often incompatible databases. Definitions of migration are themselves the result of state policies, introduced in response to political and economic goals and public attitudes. In particular, many have criticised categorisations that attempt to separate migrants into

groups according to their motivation; for example, distinguishing 'political' and 'economic' migrants, that is, between asylum seekers and labour migrants. Overbeek argues that in this mass movement, the 'distinction exists legally and politically but not in social reality'.[5] Others have noted that because the two motivations do not exclude one another, 'political' and 'economic' migration will always overlap.[6]

Where does the dividing line lie between a migrant and a traveller, legal and undocumented, political refugees and economic migrants, push and pull factors? In reality, as we argue in chapter 4, migration flows have become more complex than these categories can allow. Both voluntary and involuntary migration is characterised by a combination of compulsion and choice. Both 'migrants' and 'refugees' are motivated by a mixture of fears, hopes and aspirations. They often follow the same routes and are in constant contact with each other while travelling and after arrival.

The increasing obsession with categories is the result of nations searching for increased control over mass migration. But the incompatibility of categories across organisations and countries, the difficulty of identifying migrants and trying to fit their aims and motivations into fixed groups and the cost of maintaining a bureaucratic administration responsible for the enforcement of categorisation and control represent serious and growing challenges to the sustainability and the effectiveness of existing policies.

Flow management: principles of a new approach

The system described in this chapter starts from a different point and is shaped by the need to reduce perverse outcomes and capitalise on the motivations and energies of migrants. Rather than trying to regain control over a complex and rapidly changing situation, it seeks to manage the movement of people by taking their needs and purposes as a starting point, matching them as closely as possible with the system they encounter, and seeking to eliminate unnecessary complexity in the workings of the system itself.

The design process begins with the following basic propositions:

1. Voluntary migration is evolving over time into self-reliant, transnational mobility.
2. Forced migration, to a great extent, remains as the result of international displacement; uprooting people from their home contexts and means of self-reliance.[7]

The first proposition is based on the growing tendency, explored in more detail in chapter 4, for voluntary migrants to inhabit 'multiple worlds', choosing to move between them in new ways. While more traditional forms of migration – temporary working and permanent settlement – still apply to many, 'transnational migration', in which people partially inhabit networks, cultures and activities that span their countries of origin *and* destination, is an increasingly important phenomenon. The simple fact that it is cheaper and easier to move and to communicate makes it more likely that people will do so, and that they will move temporarily between multiple locations and communities, rather than making one-off choices between them. As a result, the distinctions between this category of migrants and other travellers (business, education, arts, tourism) are – *from a strictly managerial point of view* – diminishing. The increasing likelihood that people will move back and forth between destinations therefore needs to be incorporated into the framework for managing migration.

A starting point for designing a new system, therefore, is to base the framework for managing people movement on the common characteristics of those people who move, and to address other differences and complications as secondary issues. This approach stands in contrast to the existing model, which endlessly creates new procedures and categories in its attempt to deal with new groups or new types of movement as they arise.

The second proposition refers to the prospect of international displacement causing forced migration for many decades to come: the continuation of political upheaval, famine, natural disasters and economic collapse, of varying scales, which uproot people from their

countries of origin. This category of displaced people will inevitably include many who have no papers, do not fit easily into existing migration policy categories, and are in danger of losing control over their journeys. Another key trend that the design process tries to take into account is the growing mobility of this category of people. In line with gradually decreasing inequalities of wealth, and the decline in transport and communications costs, their ability to travel over long distances, and to access information about possible destinations, will increase.[8]

Any workable system for managing migration flows must be capable of coordinating its management of both these categories of movement, because the distinction between them is inevitably fuzzy, and because the flow patterns for voluntary and forced migrants are interdependent and will impact on each other. Management decisions taken in one domain would therefore often affect decisions in the other.

This interdependence becomes especially important when we recognise that refugees form an important subgroup, encompassing both voluntary and forced migrants. (For all practical purposes we define the boundaries of this specific category on the basis of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.[9])

We are now able to identify the dominant 'working principles' for dealing with the three main flows of migrants. We are looking for a management system that:

- seeks to respond as closely as possible to the underlying needs of each group of migrants
- eliminates unnecessary complexity
- can capitalise as far as possible on the constructive forces within migration movements.

The five principles for such a system should be to:

- *facilitate* the movement of voluntary migrants together with self-reliant travellers

- ○ *create* opportunities for displaced persons
- ○ *protect* refugees
- ○ *locate* 'flow management' facilities in the vicinity of potential migrants
- ○ *prevent* counterproductive differences in the treatment, entitlements or conditions available to different groups of migrants.

The concept of '*dominant* principle' is essential to the design of a new framework. Each principle carries its own set of consequences for the treatment of a specific category of migrants, and each also creates its own set of complications. For example, if the choice of priority is to 'facilitate' rather than to 'control', the emphasis and consequences of the resulting system are quite different. The symbolic dimension of these choices is also significant, because it provides a psychological tool for steering the development of a system in a positive direction.

The second principle – creating opportunities for displaced persons – demands some clarification. Voluntary migrants maintain a perspective on their circumstances which is basically positive. Those who have been displaced have often become disconnected from such a perspective, though their drive for survival and adaptation remains strong. A system geared towards managing this type of migration sustainably therefore needs to assist in (re)creating positive, mobilising and realistic perspectives and strategies. While we recognise that this is a difficult and uncertain task, it is central to the effectiveness of any management system overall.[10]

Flow management facilities need to be located near to potential migrants in order to eliminate unnecessary complexity. Redirecting migrants who have travelled large distances on the basis of incorrect information and unjustified expectations is much more difficult than facilitating well-founded choices before departure.

The final principle – eliminating counterproductive differences in treatment – may have the most far-reaching consequences. Effective flow management depends on channelling the motivations of potential migrants in accurate and constructive ways. Major differences in

the treatment of various categories of migrant, as we have already seen in the differences between illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, create incentives for migrants to claim the identity that offers the best prospects. This is particularly true of people who have been displaced or fall into the grey areas of 'directionless' migration. Such incentives, and the behaviours they stimulate, undermine the integrity of management systems and damage their capacity to respond closely to underlying needs.

Perhaps even more sensitive, as we will explore in later chapters, is the danger that the treatment of certain groups of migrants will be unjustified in the eyes of existing residents in a receiving country, as well as other newcomers, whether the differences constitute special privileges or punitive measures. The effectiveness of flow management depends directly on the extent to which its consequences are perceived as fair both by potential migrants and by receiving populations.

Using the five principles, a new system for managing multiple migratory flows simultaneously can be created. The system rests on two major institutional innovations:

○ an international network of European Union mobility service points – playing a key role in facilitating the movement and contribution of voluntary migrants
○ international transit centres – providing shelter and perspective for the displaced.

Mobility service centres: facilitated mobility with conditions attached

Under the proposed system, anyone in the world wishing to travel to the European Union for whatever reason can, as a first step, visit the nearest EU mobility service point. Once there, one needs to register on the international mobility website of the EU as either:

○ a visitor
○ a worker

○   a sponsored resident or

○   a refugee.

There are no other categories.

All categories other than refugee claimants are required to have a passport. Workers also need proof of employment, or to qualify through a 'points-based' system that shows their eligibility for certain types of work that are deemed a priority. Sponsored residents must have proof of the support of an accredited sponsor who is a citizen of an EU country. Staff of the EU mobility service point can, if necessary, check with the employer or accredited sponsor.

Visitors must have a first host address, proof of return tickets of transportation and a credit card deposit or equivalent proof of sufficient travel resources. If visitors, workers or sponsored residents provide the required proof and answer a number of additional questions they automatically receive a visa. This means that *all* travellers to Europe need a visa, but that it will be granted automatically and directly when a number of simple criteria are met. All visas are time-limited, with the period varying according to the nature of the visa. Renewal is possible at the nearest mobility service point in the EU.

One crucial aspect of this system is that granting a visa to visitors, workers and sponsored residents is basically a registration and not a selection decision. The system therefore basically relies on the self-regulating capacity of hosts, employers and sponsors, supervised and underpinned by governments (see below). It requires travellers to register in return for the right to travel freely. Such registration does not automatically generate any other rights other than to enter the EU. Only security and health authorities are entitled to use the visa data, through techniques such as data-mining and additional intelligence gathering, in order to identify potential security and public health risks.

The selection and management of migrant flows, as a result, is basically conducted by initial hosts (private and commercial), employers and accredited sponsors. Mobility policy might also

introduce a 'points-based' qualification for people looking for work in key areas of the economy but who have not yet found any. But the need for this kind of intervention would be significantly reduced by the flexibility of registered entry for visitors and sponsored migrants. Under this system, it will be difficult for visitors to renew a visa without finding an employer or sponsor during their initial stay. Employers and sponsors have to report regularly to the mobility authority about the number of foreign workers or sponsored residents that have obtained a visa through their recommendation. Accredited sponsors have to treat their sponsored residents according to a code of conduct to which they commit themselves when registering as a sponsor. Criminal penalties for abuse of this code, and for employing unregistered workers, would be severe. As a result, we move from a situation where illegal entrants currently do illegal work, to one where registered entrants are recognised as being able to do a certain amount of informal work, with safeguards against abuse.[11]

International transit centres: security and support for displaced persons

The second major element of the proposed system is the international transit centre (ITC). The basic idea is to develop a facility which can simultaneously provide temporary shelter and create opportunities for the displaced.

Three operating principles are fundamental to the effectiveness and the credibility of the ITCs.

First, after registration as a temporary resident of the ITC, none of its services are free beyond an introduction package. Shelter and support are either provided through interest-free loans, or as payment in kind for work done (of any kind) by the resident during their stay.

Second, despite differences in formal EU entry status (for example, provisionally accepted refugee claimants, rejected refugee claimants, unregistered entrants to the EU, displaced persons, and so on) all users of ITCs are entitled to the same level of treatment while in them.

Third, all ITC users are entitled to personalised programmes of

professional advice and support to create a 'personal development plan'. These plans would also be linked with the provision of various forms of loan and social credit.

The third element is the central and by far the most ambitious innovation, on which ultimately the effectiveness of the whole proposed multiple flow system rests. It concerns the provision of a set of facilities which must give constructive meaning to the concept of 'transit': a pathway towards a new individual perspective and strategy for each ITC user, not automatically within the EU (which will probably continue to prove tempting as a destination), but most likely for the part of the world to which people feel most strongly connected.

The realisation of such an ambition is only possible if it becomes connected to wider systems of economic development, humanitarian intervention, disaster management and international cooperation. It is increasingly recognised that reducing the worldwide poverty gap depends on sustainable economic development, with international cooperation and aid assistance serving as a targeted set of tools to assist in the processes of infrastructure development, disaster relief, and so on.

Under such a framework, we can envisage economic development, particularly through trade agreements and policies, serving as the main driver of prosperity and a major determinant of migratory patterns. The use of resources and policies for disaster relief becomes a secondary set of tools which can be used in response to specific challenges and emergencies. These will be coordinated by national governments, international organisations like the UN and the EU, in ways which encourage coherence across the overall system for managing mobility.

Targeted interventions to provide immediate assistance in managing displaced populations and reduce the immediate international migration of very large numbers of people would thus become part of a robust, long-term framework designed to manage people flows more sustainably. This would be done by providing realistic information to those considering migration, and linking it to

much wider efforts at development in poorer countries. The idea of this kind of intervention has begun to appear in the debate about how European countries can handle the pressures created by growing flows of displaced migrants without simply closing their doors. The real challenge is to connect it with the kind of overall approach to population mobility that we envisage the international mobility service centres as embodying.

One specific possibility is that ITCs and the agencies associated with them could encourage the provision of 'microcredit' and 'development banking' facilities for potential and actual migrants. At the moment, huge amounts of money are being poured into the hands of illegal trafficking networks, for example when families and whole villages invest in sending individuals to Europe, in the hope of receiving remittances from them once they are settled. What would happen if there were legitimate credit sources and investment opportunities, jointly managed by sending and receiving countries and by development agencies, to encourage both reciprocal economic exchanges between transnational migrants, sending and receiving countries, and sustainable economic development in poorer countries themselves?

The central concept behind the ITC is that creating new and mobilising personal perspectives for displaced persons could help to produce powerful catalysts for grassroots economic development, while simultaneously providing for smoother management of population movement arising from various forms of upheaval. We acknowledge the enormity of this ambition, but see no reason why it should not be attempted. In more developed countries, there is growing experience of providing tailored 'development assistance' for people through the use of personal advisers, mentors, and so on, and the planning of individual pathways through everything from learning to welfare support to offender rehabilitation to clinical care. As recent humanitarian crises have shown, finding effective ways to provide immediate support and redirection of people movement should be a crucial component of any response to major displacement of people.

ITCs as a whole would thus be geared towards:

○ providing shelter and compassion for people who have been uprooted and displaced from their original homes
○ secure and reliable processing of the claims and needs of displaced persons (refugees' needs are addressed below)
○ maximising the positive economic and social contribution that migrants might be able to make
○ generating reciprocal obligations between new arrivals, sending and receiving countries.

Overall, ITCs are designed to play a crucial role in the wider system: they act as a catchment mechanism for flows of displaced migrants who cannot be absorbed by the flow management channels designed to facilitate international mobility (see above). This function has important consequences for their location: preferably near to large concentrations of displaced people, including regions where there is significant upheaval, and also in locations around Europe where significant concentrations of displaced people are likely to turn up.

This role underlines the operational connections between different elements of the proposed system. The channels facilitating mobility will function more effectively and with less cost to the extent that the ITC process is successful in providing support, preventing directionless migration and generating perspectives for those who are determined to enter but cannot do it through an existing track. The whole system is designed to undercut and reduce incentives for unregistered entry and people-smuggling, and to direct the energy of potential migrants towards sustainable perspectives and strategies, instead of drifting from place to place with little hope.

Swift access of accepted refugee claimants to legal protection, civil rights and new passports

Under this system, some special provision still needs to be made for refugee claimants. Our proposal is that they can take a separate track within the overall framework, designed to respect the essential rights

and needs of refugees, while minimising potential abuse of the refugee route by those seeking entry for other reasons. If a claimant has a passport their claim can be provisionally assessed at a dedicated EU refugee claim assessment office. This provisional assessment, on the basis of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol (or their legitimately negotiated replacement), should take no longer than a week. Obviously unfounded claims are rejected. An appeal procedure is possible, but its cost must be paid by the claimant, who is not entitled to a living allowance while waiting in the region of the assessment office for the appeal outcome. As an alternative, free transport to the nearest ICT is possible.

Claimants who pass the first provisional assessment are entitled to free transport to the nearest ITC. Their definitive claim assessment procedure, to be implemented in the ITC, lasts no longer than a year. Acceptance of the claim leads to the right to obtain a passport, preferably of their first, second or third choice, taking into account EU quota arrangements.

A refugee claimant whose claim is rejected can stay temporarily in the ITC on the same conditions as other temporary inhabitants. Refugee claimants without a passport would be regarded as displaced persons and entitled to free transport to the nearest ITC.

The result is that refugees are able to access full legal protection, civil rights and a new passport as quickly as their claims can be verified, and that those claiming refugee status whose claims or identities cannot be easily established are not penalised for their inability to produce documents, but join a processing stream that provides them with temporary basic material security and help with creating a new perspective. Simultaneously, the incentive to claim refugee status as a way of gaining access rather than for protection reasons is massively reduced, because the opportunities that it provides without verification of refugee status are identical to those available to displaced persons anyway.

Implications and complications of the new system

It should be clear by now that the idea of building on migrants'

potential as catalysts of change and development is central to any system of flow management. The expectation is that as the system becomes established a range of credit, educational and other facilities will be offered, both at mobility service centres and in ITCs, reinforcing the potential for all types of migrants to develop their own development strategies, social and economic contributions at the micro level.

It would be unrealistic to expect that this, or any system, would lead to total control over the movements of migrants. However, the system as we have articulated it can substantially reduce the number of unregistered entrants over time. There are several reasons for this. First, otherwise unregistered entrants would have the opportunity to find potential employers or sponsors, via improved and internationalised web communication and through the network of EU mobility service points, before they departed to Europe. Second, many potential unregistered entrants would be unable to meet the criteria imposed by EU mobility service points, and would be increasingly aware that under the new system it is harder to find work as an unregistered entrant.

Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to expect that there would be no migrants who had bypassed the official public procedures for immigration, or who outstayed their visitor's visa. The political credibility of the new system would depend partly on its effectiveness in dealing with the remaining influx of unregistered people. An approach that works in line with the overall thrust of the system is to deny unregistered residents all access to basic facilities like health care, education and social security, while simultaneously creating an alternative route by offering free transport to the nearest ITC for any unregistered entrant who identified themself.

As with any first prototype, there are all sorts of complications to be tackled in several phases of testing, adapting and improving. Here we address only the most crucial complications.

Security is obviously the most sensitive. If people's decisions to come and go from Europe became much more free, and permissions to work were decentralised to employers and sponsors, while those

who went unregistered were not tracked down but persuaded to report for free transport to the nearest ITC, how on earth could security against the import of crime and terrorism be ensured?

Our answer is that, whether we like it or not, the reality in 2003 is that Europe is so complex and open that *control* of access through the grant of visa and border checks is no longer any kind of effective security strategy. Within Europe, it already has a mainly ritual significance. Those criminals and terrorists whom we should fear most are deterred least by passports and borders. We believe that a system designed to encourage self-registration and therefore accurate information about where people are and what they are doing, combined with a new set of strategies to prevent and counter such activity, is preferable to the maintenance of existing control.

The second major complication results from the proposed use of accredited sponsors of temporary foreign residents who are neither visitors nor already employed workers. This actually represents the legalisation of an age-old principle of self-regulating international migration: relatives or friends who have already settled in a receiving country take care of newcomers until they can manage themselves. Such arrangements have operated as a smooth and flexible mechanism, but carry risks; in particular, that if sponsors are burdened with too many temporary dependants their own prospects might be compromised, or, more rarely, that their position gives them the opportunity to exploit new arrivals. One response to this risk is to introduce the condition that only (naturalised) citizens can become accredited sponsors, and that accreditation requires commitment to a code of conduct, regular reporting to and checking by migration authorities.

One difficult question remains, however. To what extent should officially accredited sponsors be allowed to tolerate informal economic activities by residents for whom they are responsible? It is likely that many, if not most, recently arrived sponsored residents will look for and find jobs in the informal sector. A pragmatic answer to this question is that the degree of actual tolerance will vary with the prevailing political and legal culture in different European countries.

However, it is worth asking the question at a deeper level: the problem is an illustration of the way in which informal economies act as a vital bridge between different zones of economic activity, particularly different national economies operating at vastly different levels of wealth and poverty. The underlying question, therefore, is whether we could try to create a more constructive context for the new flow management system by incorporating the informal sector in our economic system in a way which reflects its strategic significance in cushioning the transition of large groups of people between economies in different parts of the world, as well as providing very significant levels of informal social welfare within European economies. This is a question that we address in more detail in chapter 7.

The third major complication arises from the fifth principle of the proposed system, the prevention of unfair differences in treatment and conditions between different groups of people. Differences in the availability of subsistence benefits and public housing are especially important, for two reasons. First, unconditional entitlements may send perverse signals to potential migrants and obscure the knowledge or information needed about the range of genuinely sustainable options for self-reliant personal development. Second, these kinds of differences can greatly reduce the emotional acceptance of newcomers, to the extent that they are perceived as unfair by the receiving population. Such perceptions are a significant barrier to the successful integration of immigrants into European societies. This obstacle to smooth flow management raises a major question about whether we should restructure our social welfare systems in ways that reduce distortions and blockages to the acceptance of migration flows. Again, this question is addressed in chapter 7.

3. Shift from integration to peaceful coexistence: a first prototype

Over most of western Europe, passionate debates are being waged about assimilation and multiculturalism. The dominant political mood seems to shift towards assimilation, stressing obligations and responsibilities among newcomers and protecting national cultures. Those representing the 'we' in these debates feel the need to show their firm grasp on the situation. Those who make up 'them' rightly feel insecure and defensive. While individual countries vary substantially, there is a widespread sense of urgency about getting integration right.

In the last chapter we suggested that a sustainable system for managing mass migration flows could only work if the goal of peaceful coexistence was pursued simultaneously. Our central argument is that successfully managed integration increases the capacity of host societies to absorb new migrants, while smoothly managed migration flows increase their readiness and ability to manage integration successfully.

While there are many initiatives in this area, the most difficult issues surround not programmes for recently arrived migrants, but policies directed at migrants of the first and second generation whose lives are too often characterised by social, economic and political marginalisation. In too many cases, the approach taken to 'integration' produces resentment and distrust. This reaction, rather than the presence of the actual newcomers, is the biggest problem. Fear of

terrorism and anti-Islamic feeling have exacerbated these polarising processes, which are more and more of a threat to social cohesion.

A revised approach to managing integration is therefore also urgently needed. The basis for such a system, as with migration flows, is the acceptance that the reality of migration will continue to change in complex ways, and to focus pragmatically on peaceful coexistence. The detailed approach to this challenge should rightly vary considerably from country to country, but there are, nonetheless, common challenges.

The reality is that migration will produce continuing increases in diversity, of types of stay, countries and regions of origin, socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, motives and loyalties. We prefer to simply accept this changing reality as a departure point and have no ambition to reshape it fundamentally. From this acceptance logically follows a modest integrative ambition: just to establish and maintain peaceful coexistence would be a significant achievement.

Principles for successful integration and peaceful coexistence

Five dominant principles underpin our design process:

1. The more diversity increases the more strictly we should adhere to a common set of rules embodying democracy, the rule of law and freedom for all.
2. Support for newcomers who are not self-reliant should be facilitated in customised ways.
3. The immediate environments of neighbourhood and school should be the major focus for efforts to respond constructively to diversity.
4. Connections with countries of origin should be established in ways which increase the potential for managing diversity successfully.
5. The worlds of the arts, media, universities and religion should be stimulated to accept shared responsibility for peaceful coexistence.

1. As diversity increases, be stricter with the rule of law

The first principle – be stricter with the rule of law, democracy and basic freedoms, as diversity increases – is the most obvious. It is important, however, to recognise that such strictness would be necessary with or without substantial inflows of migrants because of the social diversification and individualisation of European societies. This means that a growing emphasis on the rights and responsibilities of democratic citizenship, for all, is right and necessary. The various debates on these issues going on across Europe are proof of the vitality of most European systems. In the long term, we can expect legal systems in European nations to move closer together, whether or not this is prompted by top-down 'harmonisation' from EU institutions. Alongside this process, the importance of ongoing experimentation with strategies for promoting and renewing civic engagement, building cultures and norms of democracy through voluntary engagement, cannot be stressed enough.

2. Provide customised support for social participation by vulnerable newcomers

Persistent inequality and disadvantage among different groups of incomers across European societies is too common a phenomenon to ignore. A comprehensive definition of social participation is important here, extending far beyond economic security to cultural confidence and participation: speak the language, know the country and its history, relate with people beyond your immediate ethnic or cultural group. These conditions apply to all. A rich conception of membership and social participation is essential to the prospects for peaceful coexistence. Only in this way can increased international mobility lead, in the end, to increased mutual acceptance, trust and respect. The implication is that such a conception of participation and citizenship should also apply to all members of a society, and not just those who are recent incomers. One particularly challenging element of this process must be the development of effective arrangements for political representation and participation. For example, groups of economically successful Moroccan migrants to

Belgium and the Netherlands are currently working to establish a 'European Arab League' in response to their perceived need for representation and engagement with democratic European politics.

3. Use neighbourhood and school management as tools for peaceful coexistence

This principle offers both a practical focus for efforts to respond constructively to growing social and cultural diversity, and a way to avoid less constructive responses to the growing racial polarisation of many schools and local areas. Rather than trying to intervene directly to relocate different groups of people, we suggest that public funding regimes should encourage best practice by responding to challenges of diversity and benchmarking and rewarding it, including through earmarked funds awarded through open competition. This would be in addition to the core budgets attached to education and neighbourhood management.

In other words, government funding regimes would be based in part on a 'social isolation index', in which segregated provision of all kinds found itself missing opportunities for extra funding, and local government found itself looking to learn from examples of successful diversity management, whether serving predominantly black, white, poor or rich communities. This could mean that successful and prosperous schools and neighbourhoods could find themselves scoring relatively low on indices that, at least partially, impact on the funding available to them, and that the lessons they might need to learn about successful integration and coexistence might be taught by schools and neighbourhoods that cater predominantly for poorer and more recently arrived ethnic and social groups.

4. Connect with countries of origin

The fourth principle – turn multiple loyalties from a threat into an opportunity – addresses the fear that new migrants have divided loyalties when fundamental choices of values or security have to be made. Again, we simply accept the new reality of growing transnational migration leading to multiple belonging. The interdepen-

dence created by this fact means that without effective responses internal conflicts in countries far away could flare within Western Europe, causing unmanageable forms of political conflict and disorder.

The basic message underlying this working principle is therefore that managing civil order – the achievement of peaceful coexistence within national borders – can no longer be separated from its equivalent between countries and regions of the world. Multiple loyalties not only constitute a threat in this respect, but also provide unique opportunities.

5. Share responsibility in the arts, media, universities and religions

The final principle – stimulating the arts and cultural industries, media, universities and religious organisations to accept shared responsibility for peaceful coexistence – is probably the most difficult. All these institutions are powerful creators of knowledge, ideas, emotions, images, symbols and convictions. For that reason, their relationship with governance and public authority has always been ambivalent: those in power often seek control, while creative communities defend their independence fiercely.

However, given the destructive potential of the current situation, and the influence of these institutions, we think it is essential to address this challenge squarely. A set of challenges that can only be addressed by these groups themselves includes:

○ using art and culture to visualise and symbolise the everyday lives of the worlds now being brought into collision with each other

○ for the media: addressing seriously the role of media representation in shaping people's understanding and fear of others, and generating lucid, accurate portraits of the different ways in which people respond to and deal with the growth of social diversity

○ for universities: deepening and broadening the sum of knowledge about how different cultures and religions

      participate in the ongoing historical processes of
      modernisation; generating communities of learning that
      transcend other forms of division

  ○ for religious organisations: addressing directly the
      relationships between organised religion and the state and
      working to refashion them for an era of cultural and
      religious diversity.

Apart from the last, these types of activities are already being undertaken to some extent. We suggest that they should have a much more prominent place. We should not close our eyes to the fact that an unknown proportion of migrants coming to Europe have little real affinity for, or sometimes even hostility towards, democracy, the rule of law and the principle of freedom, and that many are at risk of losing the little affinity they have because of the way they are being treated. Tackling these issues demands that public debate be conducted with high levels of respect for all parties, and depends on leadership from within all communities concerned.

One issue, however, demands a joint approach right from the start: the relationship between organised religion and the state. This challenge cannot be avoided in any European society. Finding a new and sustainable set of arrangements for structuring the relationship between state and religion is an urgent priority. We believe that such discussions should be conducted on the basis that religion is an important force for identity and social cohesion in societies that are becoming more fragmented in many other respects, and that a plurality of recognised religions and religious organisations is a fact of life that should be recognised and celebrated.

Such an approach to managing integration clearly needs much fuller development in order to become workable. But the crucial shift to be achieved lies in overall expectations. The change of language implies moving away both from romantic multiculturalism and dogmatic assimilation, and replacing them with the pragmatic goal of peaceful coexistence. In view of the steady increase of diversity within nations and interdependence between nations, we should let go of the

ambition of 'true' national integration as unrealistic, whether or not it is ultimately desirable.

However, this does not diminish the belief that peaceful coexistence within and between nations is possible with sustained commitment and sophisticated policy-making. It may also be the case that such an approach could provide the foundation for much more positive, complex and fruitful forms of shared identity and mutual understanding to emerge between different communities and social groups over time.

Complications and implications

This brief sketch raises a number of serious complications that should be acknowledged. Several relate to broader institutional changes in the governance and structure of European societies. As we have argued, the management of migration and diversity produces domestic challenges which reflect internally the implications of a new set of external relationships between Europe and the rest of the world. We address how some of these challenges might be met through major societal innovation in later chapters.

Citizenship

The first complication is defining citizenship under circumstances where many people, and not just migrants, inhabit multiple worlds and sustain multiple loyalties. We have argued that such inter-dependence makes common commitment to democracy, certain kinds of freedom and the rule of law more, rather than less, important. Existing concepts of citizenship are all firmly rooted in overarching loyalty to one particular nation state governing one particular territory. The implication of our analysis makes it necessary to redesign what citizenship means. We will address this further in the next section.

Economic integration and opportunity

The second complication is the challenge of ensuring that, in a globalising world, the interaction between economic systems at

different levels of development around the world can be made productive. At the macro level, this is a fundamental challenge. But we must also understand its importance at the micro level, for individuals. If it is not possible for European societies to incorporate migrants, including the most vulnerable ones, into economic life, the overall effectiveness of any approach to integration will be seriously compromised. Strategic adjustment of some key aspects of our economic systems is therefore a necessary condition. We explore what this might mean in the next chapter.

Social welfare

The third complication refers to our social welfare infrastructures. A key element of the new migration flow and integration management system is a personalised approach to participation and development of newcomers. In view of our acceptance of increasing diversity, this is a logical choice. In two respects, however, our social welfare systems have characteristics that hamper the proposed strategy. First, European welfare systems have some in-built tendencies to generate counterproductive forms of dependency. Second, the scope for genuine personalisation of welfare support is limited in most welfare states, given that they were designed and built using principles much closer to those of mass production. These characteristics are central to the ongoing current struggle to reform existing welfare systems for all European citizens, but they are disproportionately negative when trying to provide welfare support for newcomers, because of their potential to undermine the drive and energy that they bring with them. The new framework we propose therefore provides a further stimulus for the redesign of welfare. This challenge is addressed in chapter 7.

Security

Last but not least is the problem of security. A characteristic of the present situation seems to be that unsafe neighbourhoods, unclear loyalties, new terrorist threats and instability in regions bordering Europe merge into a single, diffuse and increasingly dangerous mix of

fear and anxiety. The high visibility of these issues makes them a lightning rod for a much wider population than those who are directly affected by them at the moment. Disentangling this poisonous mixture and addressing each element in a disciplined and effective way, is an absolute precondition of peaceful coexistence. Chapter 6 is dedicated to this challenge.

Before we tackle these wider sets of changes, however, the next chapter sets out in detail a range of empirical evidence on the complexity of contemporary migration flows.

4. The changing reality of migration in a globalising world

At the 2001 OECD Council, international migration was described as an 'increasingly pressing issue, for immigrant and emigrant countries, their governments and the general public. It raises a host of social, economic, development and foreign policy challenges and opportunities.'[12] Events since then have combined to make migration even more pressing, but not necessarily better understood.

According to a recent estimate, there are about 170 million people living outside their country of birth.[13] Amid new forms of 'global interconnectedness', migration has become a highly complex, unpredictable and increasingly transnational phenomenon. Interconnectedness between people in different parts of the world is more extensive and intensive than it has ever been.

> What is new about the modern global system is the spread of globalisation through new dimensions of activity – technological, organisational, administrative and legal, among others – each with their own logic and dynamics of change; and the chronic intensification of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as the modern communications industry and new information technology. Politics unfolds today, with all its customary uncertainty and indeterminateness, against the background of a world shaped and permeated by the

movement of goods and capital, the flow of communication, the interchange of cultures and the passage of people.[14]

The ongoing processes of globalisation have eased access to information and ideas, creating the outline contours of a 'network society'. In so doing, it has made movement easier, though compared with the movement of ideas, money and goods, people movement has remained relatively constrained over the last two decades. However, mass migration is by nature complex, and has always been so. What, if anything, has changed?

For migration to take place there must be *people, motivations and means*.[15] It has always been the case that people will migrate from remote countries where populations are poor, usually numerous and rapidly growing, towards new 'lands of opportunity'. The character and reality of today's migration is changing because of a complication of means and motives. Global interconnectedness has not necessarily provoked an increase in the number of migrants in the world or a globalisation of international migration flows, but the increasing diversity of migrants' nationalities and the migration channels used, as well as the growing proportion of movements of temporary and skilled workers in total migration flows does show that migration is now taking place in the context of economic globalisation.[16]

The patterns of human movement across the frontiers which separate the world's roughly 200 states from one another are continuously evolving. This complicates even further any attempts to encapsulate migration, or to generate a universally valid and sustainable strategy and control or contain flows. The main focus of this chapter is the *evolving complexity* of transnational migration. We argue that this complexity should be understood in terms of an interdependence of *mobility, motives, settlement patterns, identities and routes*. While the key facts and the broad context of migration are essential to understanding the current policy context, it is also essential for the actual European policy context to be founded on a thorough understanding of the changing reality of mass migration.

International migration: the broad context[17]

The current guess is that there are nearly 170 million international migrants who reside outside their countries of birth.[18] This is a significant rise from 1965, when the UN counted approximately 75 million long-term migrants (table 1).[19]

Although the 1980s were characterised by an increase in immigration flows in most OECD countries, a substantial decline in the number of entries was perceptible by 1992–3. This downturn

Table 1 Migrant population by region, 1965 and 1990

	Estimated foreign-born population					
	Millions		Percentage of total population of region		Percentage of migrant stock, world total	
Region	1965	1990	1965	1990	1965	1990
World total	75.2	119.8	2.3	2.3	100.0	100.0
Developed countries	30.4	54.2	3.1	4.5	40.4	45.3
Developing countries	44.8	65.5	1.9	1.6	59.6	54.7
Africa	7.9	15.6	2.5	2.5	10.6	13.1
Asia	31.4	43.0	1.7	1.4	40.8	35.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.9	7.5	2.4	1.7	7.9	6.2
North America	12.7	23.9	6.0	8.6	16.9	20.0
Europe and the former USSR	14.7	25.1	2.2	3.2	19.6	20.1
Oceania	2.5	4.7	14.4	17.8	3.3	3.9

Source: Castles 2000.

Table 2 Inflows of foreigners, 1980–1999

Source: OECD 2001.

continued until 1997–8, after which immigration started to rise again, particularly in Europe and in Japan (table 2).[20]

Despite the rising flow of migrants to the North (table 2), the perception that most migrants migrate towards Europe and North America is not necessarily correct. More than half of the world's 170 million migrants still live and move across developing countries. That said, major flows of international migrants are from LDCs (Less Developed Countries) in Africa, Latin America and Asia to Western Europe, North America, Australia and other developed regions. While there are few reliable estimates of international migration within LDCs, migration from one developing country to another is still thought to be substantial (see table 3).[21]

Although the overall proportion of migrants in the world has not changed dramatically (see table 1) over the past 30 years, statistics

Table 3 Annual net international migration totals and migration rates in the world's major areas, 1990–1995

Net number of migrants
(thousands)

Rate
(per 100,000 population)

Area	Number (thousands)	Rate (per 100,000 population)
Africa	−63	−9
Asia	−1,366	−41
Europe	739	102
Latin America and Caribbean	−392	−85
North America	971	340
Oceania	111	404

Source: UN Population Division, 1996.

show that the geography and destination of migratory movements has changed. While the proportion of migrants is slowly dropping in developing countries, it is rising noticeably in developed countries (from 3.94 to 5.89 per cent). The United States is by far the largest

recipient of international migrants but in recent years Europe has received increasing numbers. About 20 million foreigners live among the 383 million inhabitants of Western Europe. For the EU as a whole, the net migration rate in 2000 was 1.8 per 1000 persons (table 4).[22] This represents a small decrease compared with 1999, and is considerably less than the peak observed in 1992.[23]

What has triggered the increase in flows towards Western Europe? Since the 1980s, migratory movements have occurred within a new and paradoxical context. The worsening of economic disparities between the countries of the North and the South have reinforced the causes of migratory movements. At the same time, the acceleration of globalisation has meant greater opening up of frontiers to trade, a considerable increase in capital flows and further internationalisation of processes of production and capital ownership. This has not necessarily corresponded to a general increase in the movement of people. It has, however, further complicated patterns of travel, motives and routes of migration.

Changing geography of migration to Europe: mobility

For most European countries today, non-EU nationals are the largest group of migrants. Table 5[24] shows that in five EU countries more than half of the total number of immigrants are non-EU nationals, with Italy on top (71 per cent) followed by Austria (66), Germany (57), Sweden (56) and the Netherlands (52).

As table 6[25] suggests, as a result of increased movement of people to Europe, net migration has become a decisive factor behind EU population growth in the year 2000. In contrast with the postwar period, when migration to Europe was typically targeted, originating from countries with links to the ex-colonial powers, today migration destinations have expanded to many 'new' countries. As table 6 shows, countries that had traditionally been countries of emigration – Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland – have now become hosts. New migratory movements have emerged between countries with no particular links (for example, there are large numbers of Moroccans and Filipinos in Italy).

Table 4 Net migration per 1,000 of the population per country, 1990–1994, 1995–1999 and 2000

Legend:
- 2000
- 1995–1999
- 1990–1994

Countries (top to bottom): EU-15, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom

X-axis: -2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12

Source: Eurostat 2002.

Table 5 Immigration by broad groups of citizenship per EU country (total=100%)*

Belgium, 95/99	
Denmark, 95/98	
Germany, 95/99	
Spain, 95/99	
Ireland, 95/99	
Italy, 95/96	
Luxembourg, 95/99	
Netherlands, 95/99	
Austria, 97/99	
Finland, 95/99	
Sweden, 95/99	
United Kingdom, 95/99	

Legend:
- non-EU nationals
- other EU nationals
- nationals

x-axis: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

*No data available for France, Greece and Portugal

Source: Eurostat 2002.

Table 6 Population growth per EU country, 2000

|	Population 1 Jan 2000	Natural increase	Net migration	Total increase	Population 1 Jan 2001	Natural increase	Net migration	Total increase
		x 1,000				per 1,000 population		
EU-15	376,455.2	372.4	680.4	1,052.8	377,507.9	1.0	1.8	2.8
Belgium	10,239.1	10.9	12.1	23.1	10,262.2	1.1	1.2	2.3
Denmark	5,330.0	9.0	10.1	19.2	5,349.2	1.7	1.9	3.6
Germany	82,163.5	−76.2	105.3	29.1	82,192.6	−0.9	1.3	0.4
Greece	10,542.8	−2.0	23.9	21.9	10,564.7	−0.2	2.3	2.1
Spain	39,441.7	27.2	20.8	48.0	39,489.6	0.7	0.5	1.2
France	59,225.7	240.6	55.0	295.6	59,521.3	4.1	0.9	5.0
Ireland	3,776.6	23.1	20.0	43.1	3,819.7	6.1	5.3	11.4
Italy	57,679.9	−17.2	181.3	164.1	57,844.0	−0.3	3.1	2.8
Luxembourg	435.7	2.0	3.6	5.6	441.3	4.5	8.3	12.9
Netherlands	15,864.0	66.1	53.1	119.2	15,983.1	4.2	3.3	7.5
Austria	8,102.6	1.5	17.3	18.8	8,121.3	0.2	2.1	2.3
Portugal	9,997.6	14.3	11.0	25.3	10,022.8	1.4	1.1	2.5
Finland	5,171.3	7.4	2.4	9.8	5,181.1	1.4	0.5	1.9
Sweden	8,861.4	−3.0	24.4	21.4	8,882.8	−0.3	2.8	2.4
United Kingdom	59,623.4	68.7	140.0	208.7	59,832.1	1.2	2.3	3.5

Source: Eurostat 2002.

Changing motives and categories of migration

Migrants' reasons for moving have become more diverse. Traditionally, labour shortages in the host countries, environmental degradation, political persecution and poverty have been among the main factors behind the decision to move. Today, however, economic migration has been supplemented by different types of migration, more temporary and challenging for governments in the countries of destination: asylum and family reunification.

Table 7[26] shows that family reunification in Europe today represents a significant percentage of the total migration flow. The increase in family reunification is particularly significant because of the consequent 'feminisation' of migration. The OECD observes that, since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a change in the composition of migrant categories, with the result that family reunification, temporary migration and refugee migration now constitute the main bulk of international migration flows. In France, for example, family reunification accounts for 75 per cent of inflows in 1999, the highest level ever and an increase of nearly 23 per cent over 1995. In the Nordic countries this component of migration is also increasingly significant, partly due to the fall in refugee inflows (eg Sweden, Denmark).[27] Temporary economic and low skill migration, which is determined by a fixed term of work contract and which covers activities that are temporary by definition (eg agriculture), has also become more prominent in Europe. Asylum seeking, as the third category of migration on the increase, has also seen an upturn in applications.

According to the UNHCR, the number of people seeking asylum dropped slightly between 2000 and 2001 (from 1,092,000 in 2000 to 923,000 in 2001).[28] Between 2001 and 2002 the UNHCR's estimates of the total number of 'persons of concern', falling under its mandate fell sharply to just under 20 million (see table 8).[29] Europe is still a major recipient of asylum applications (table 9) although, according to the UNHCR, the number of applications in the EU in 2001 fell by 2 per cent compared with 2000 (from 391,460 to 384,530).[30]

Table 7 Permanent or long-term immigration flows into selected OECD countries by main categories[1] in 1999

Slovak Republic

Switzerland

Australia[2]

Portugal

United Kingdom[3]

Norway

Canada

France[4]

Denmark

United States[5]

Sweden[6]

| | 0 | 20 | 40 | 60 | 80 | 100 |

Workers ☐   Family reunification ■   Refugees ■

Sources: National Statistical Offices.
Note: Countries are ranked by decreasing order of the percentage of workers in total inflows. Categories give the legal reason for entering the country. A worker who has benefited from the family reunification procedure is regrouped into this latter category even if he has a job in the host country while entering. Family members who join a refugee are counted among other refugees.

1. For Australia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Sweden, data concern acceptances for settlement. For Denmark, France, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland, entries correspond to residence permits usually delivered for a period longer than one year. For the United Kingdom, data are based on entry control at ports of certain categories of migrants (excluding EEA citizens). For Australia, 'Workers' include accompanying dependents who are included in the category 'family reunification' for all other countries.
2. Data refer to fiscal year (July 1998 to June 1999). Category 'Workers' includes accompanying dependents. Excluding citizens from New Zealand who don't need a visa to enter the country.
3. Passengers, excluding EEA citizens, admitted to the United Kingdom. Data only include certain categories of migrants: work permit holders, spouses and refugees.
4. Entries of EU family members are estimated. Excluding visitors. Among those who benefited from the regularisation programme, only those who received a permit under the family reunification procedure are counted. The 'family' category also includes spouses of French citizens who received the new permit 'vie privée et familiale'.
5. Data refer to fiscal year (October 1998 to September 1999). Excluding immigrants who obtained a permanent residence permit following the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
6. Excluding Nordic and EEA citizens.

Source: OECD 2001.

Table 8 Estimated number of persons of concern who fall under the mandate of UNHCR (by region)

Region	1 January 2001	1 January 2002
Asia	8,449,900	8,820,700
Africa	6,060,100	4,173,500
Europe	5,578,500	4,855,400
Northern America	1,051,700	1,086,800
Latin America/Caribbean	575,500	765,400
Oceania	84,500	81,300
Total	21,800,300	19,783,100

Source: UNHCR 2002 (figures presented as available in the UNCHR statistics).

The dominance of family reunification, temporary and unskilled worker mobility, and asylum as categories of current migration has important implications for host governments and for this reason needs to be understood. However, table 10[31] shows that migration of highly skilled workers is still a recognised and favoured category of migration in Europe.

Changing identities and transnationality

The temporary nature of much contemporary people flow means that migration has become more of a transnational phenomenon. The high occurrence of asylum, temporary workers' schemes and family reunification in Europe, for example, has led to the increasing maintenance of strong links with the countries of origin. The term 'transnational' refers to communities (individuals or groups) settled in different national societies, sharing common interests and references – territorial, religious, linguistic – and using transnational networks to consolidate solidarity beyond national boundaries.[32] Transnationalism leads to forms of 'multiple belonging', fostered by increased mobility and communications and contributing to the formation and maintenance of relations that transcend national

**Table 9   Asylum applications submitted in selected industrialised countries**

(in 2001 countries with more than 10,000 applications)

Country of asylum	Main countries of origin	Total
United Kingdom	Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia	88,300
Germany	Iraq, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Russian Fed.	88,290
United States	Mexico, China, Colombia, Haiti, Armenia	86,180
France	Turkey, D.R. Congo, China, Mali, Algeria	47,290
Canada	Hungary, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, China	44,040
Netherlands	Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Iran, Guinea	32,580
Austria	Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, India, Yugoslavia	30,140
Belgium	Russian Fed., Yugoslavia, Algeria, D.R. Congo, Iran	24,550
Sweden	Iraq, Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russian Fed., Iran	23,520
Switzerland	Yugoslavia, Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, FYR Macedonia	20,630
Czech Republic	Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Viet Nam, India	18,090
Norway	Russian Fed., Croatia, Somalia, Iraq, Ukraine	14,780
Denmark	Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Somalia	12,400
Australia	Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Indonesia, Fiji	12,370
Ireland	Nigeria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russian Fed.	10,330

Source: UNHCR 2002.

boundaries and create a transnational space of cultural, economic and political participation. Richmond describes this ability to move from one country to another and back again as 'transilience'.[33] Its concrete manifestations are high rates of:

Table 10 Share of non-nationals in highly skilled employment, European countries

%
10

■ Share in highly skilled employment

● Share in total employment

Finland | Italy | Greece | Denmark | France | Netherlands | EU–14 | Sweden | Germany | United Kingdom | Belgium | Austria | Luxembourg

Source: OECD Policy Brief 2002.

○ migrants' returns to home countries
○ family reunification and the maintenance of strong family networks
○ remittances sent from the migrants to their families in the country of origin
○ applications for dual citizenship.

Recent estimates show that in 1998 India received US$9.5 million in remittances, Turkey $5.3 million and Nigeria $1.5 million.[34]

The implication of increased transnationality is greater

interdependence between sending and host countries. As the OECD observes, the debate is no longer about the impact of migration on the respective countries but has become inseparable from the issue of human rights, the political and economic development of the country of origin and the national cohesion and future of the welfare state in the host societies.[35]

Changing routes and means

Identities, destinations and categories are not the only variables of change in today's mass migration. Change in the *means* through which migration takes place – that is, in the routes and networks through which migrants move – is also fundamental. Salt and Stein have argued that if, traditionally, migration was regarded as a relationship between the individual or household moving for either permanent settlement or work and a government acting as a gatekeeper for entry into a country and acquisition of its citizenship, today's migration should be regarded as a '*diverse international business*, with a vast budget, providing hundreds of jobs and managed by a set of individuals and institutions, each of which has an interest in how the business develops'.[36] The main dilemma in the current setting is that, while more people now move towards the North, barriers to free movement across borders between high and low income countries have persisted. Migration as a business therefore becomes a rational strategy introduced by criminal rackets to exploit the closure of borders, the existence of inequalities and the ever-growing demand of migrants to move.

Trafficking in human beings is now the fastest-growing business of organised crime, to the extent that 'people smuggling has become the preferred trade of a growing number of criminal networks worldwide which are showing an increasing sophistication with regard to moving larger numbers of people at higher profits than ever'.[37] According to recent estimates, more than 700,000 people are trafficked each year for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour. Europol estimates that the industry is now worth several billion US dollars a year. Trafficking in human beings is not limited to

exploitation in the sex industry. The UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) reports that children are trafficked to work in sweatshops as bonded labour and men work illegally in the 'three D-jobs': dirty, difficult and dangerous.[38] UNICEF estimates that more than 200,000 children are enslaved by cross-border smuggling in West and Central Africa.[39] The children are often 'sold' by unsuspecting parents who believe their children will be cared for, learn a trade or obtain a better education. According to the NGO Terre des Hommes,[40] more than 6,000 children between the age of 12 and 16 are trafficked into Western Europe each year to work in prostitution, drug rings or as beggars.

Looking for better opportunities and easier 'ways in', migrants become instead entangled in a circle of exploitation and abuse. As Castells[41] and Richmond[42] recognise, organised crime linked to money laundering, drug trafficking and arms-dealing constitute the 'dark side' of globalisation. Trafficking and smuggling of immigrants across European borders adds a new level to the already multilayered explanations of migration mechanisms and movements. Because of its unpredictability, lack of transparency and exact estimates, this aspect of migration into Europe is one of the most difficult challenges for governments to overcome. The business behind international migration is not yet fully understood, while the disruptive effects of globalised criminal networks can be observed in the dramatic cases of trafficked migrants that arise in the world media (for example 'boat people' and urban prostitution, though only a small proportion in reality actually comes to light) and in the increase in illegal immigration in Europe over the past few years. A recent report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)[43] estimates the upper limit of unauthorised migrants in Europe at 3 million in 1998, compared with less than 2 million in 1991. Depending on the calculation methods used, illegal migrants are thought to represent between 10 and 15 per cent of migrants already present and between 20 and 30 per cent of inflows.[44]

> ***Main characteristics of changing migration patterns***
>
> ○ Overall, migration flows to Europe are not rising dramatically compared with past periods of influx.
> ○ Globalisation and increased mobility mean that the range of routes and destinations is becoming rapidly more diverse.
> ○ While there has been some increase in managed economic migration for highly skilled people, the dominant share of current flows is created by family reunification and asylum seekers, creating a significant 'feminisation' effect.
> ○ Applications for asylum across the EU are currently running at around 400,000 per year.
> ○ The IOM estimates that there are more than 3 million illegal migrants in Europe, compared with an estimated 2 million in 1991.
> ○ Unauthorised migrants are estimated to account for 10–15 per cent of those already in Europe, and 20–30 per cent of new influx.

Understanding the policy context

Understanding evolving complexity has become the key to mass migration management today. Complexity, understood here as the new interdependence of *mobility, motives, settlement patterns, identities and routes*, constitutes a major challenge for governments and governance. The pressure to manage migration effectively (and to 'reduce' it) has led to calls for international agreements and regional cooperation initiatives. But even then, how can governments effectively manage such a complex and unpredictable phenomenon?

Cooperation and will to develop common initiatives to control and manage a 'shared challenge' (as in the case of Europe and the proposal of a common immigration policy for all EU countries[45]) have not moved very far towards an innovative, more effective approach to mass migration. A better understanding of the changing reality needs

to be incorporated into strategies aimed at reducing its negative effects and managing it sustainably. Is it possible for European governments to create clear and helpful routes for unskilled workers and family members alongside the newly created routes for skilled workers? How can governments ensure protection for the increasing numbers of vulnerable migrants (asylum seekers, women, etc) while simultaneously ensuring social cohesion, public tolerance and fiscal sustainability? Can the dilemma of closed borders versus the growth of trafficking and illegal immigration be overcome by twenty-first century migration policies? How far does the need to protect national security conflict with the promotion of the human rights of migrants?

The complexity of these challenges helps to bring out the motivations behind some of the design features of the new system we proposed in chapter 2. Our belief is that new management systems will only work if they work with the grain of people flows, and capitalise on the energies and aspirations of those who move. But such systems could not function successfully without relying on change in the broader systems of governance, wealth production and social welfare that migration policy is inevitably caught up in. In the following chapters we therefore focus on the possible outlines of long-term change in these areas. The analysis is partly illustrative; that is, it is designed to help show how a combination of evolutionary change and political decision-making could produce radical adaptations of our existing institutional frameworks. In many cases, such radicalism will be necessary with or without migration, for example to respond to changing demographic structures. But in articulating possible directions of longer-term change, we are also seeking to extend and open up the range of conversation about current European dilemmas.

5. Societal innovation and democratic governance: a New European Commonwealth

Europa was the subject of one of the most venerable legends of the classical world. Europa was the mother of Minos, Lord of Crete, and hence the progenitrix of the most ancient branch of Mediterranean civilization. …In Metamorphoses of the Roman poet, Ovid, she is immortalised as an innocent princess seduced by the Father of the Gods. Wandering with her maidens along the shore of her native Phoenicia, she was beguiled by Zeus in the guise of a snow-white bull . . . .

The legend of Europe has many connotations. But in carrying the princess to Crete from the shore of Phoenicia (now south Lebanon) Zeus was surely transferring the fruits of the older Asian civilizations of the East to the new island colonies of the Aegean. Phoenicia belonged to the orbit of the Pharaohs. Europa's ride provides the mythical link between Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece. Europa's brother Cadmus, who roamed the world in search of her, was credited with bringing the art of writing to Greece.

Europa's ride also captures the essential restlessness of those who followed in her footsteps. Unlike the great river valley civilizations of the Nile, of the Indus, of Mesopotamia, and of China, which were long in duration but lethargic in their geographical

and intellectual development, the civilization of the Mediterranean Sea was stimulated by constant movement. Movement caused uncertainty and insecurity. Uncertainty fed a constant ferment of ideas. Insecurity prompted energetic activity. Minos was famed for his ships. Crete was the first naval power. The ships carried people and goods and culture, fostering exchanges of all kinds with the lands to which they sailed. Like the vestments of Europa, the minds of these ancient mariners were constantly left 'fluttering in the breeze'.

Europa rode in the path of the sun from east to west . . . . At the dawn of European history, the known world lay to the east. The unknown waited in the west, in destinations still to be discovered. Europa's curiosity may have been her undoing. But it led to the founding of a new civilization that would eventually bear her name and would spread to the whole Peninsula.

(Norman Davies, 1999)[46]

The need for societal innovation

Why does the prospect of mass migration create such fear and anxiety in today's Europe? In one sense, we should find it amazing that the issue is not addressed with greater confidence. Why are so many Europeans apparently afraid of being '*swamped*', of losing our identity, at a time when Western Europe is safer and wealthier than ever before? In principle, we should be more capable and confident about handling the challenges presented by growing mobility.

This lack of self-confidence arises from a deep sense of uncertainty about the foundations of Europe's postwar security and wealth. Compared with the US, Western Europe's economic and social success over the last 50 years rests on foundations which are not deeply ingrained in geography or history. Instead, it rests on three relatively recent 'societal innovations':

o   the security umbrella provided by NATO

     ○   the European market and national welfare states
     ○   the EU.

While the traditional European nation state, latterly shorn of its colonial role, remains a fundamental part of governance and identity in Europe, its ability to remain peaceful and prosperous, at least within western European borders, has rested on the encompassing framework that these three sets of institutions have created.

For various obvious reasons, the stability and future form of each of these is now widely accepted as uncertain, and subject to intense debate. But the external pressure of migration reveals an additional weakness: as cornerstones of European governance and prosperity, each was constructed in an inward-looking, exclusive manner, not designed to absorb new flows of people easily or to bridge the gap with former European colonies.[47]

As a result, we argue, migration is disproportionately frightening because it helps to make visible the need for other fundamental changes. Western Europe has emerged from the shadow of the internal warfare that dominated its history for centuries before 1945. The Cold War provided a place for it in a clearly polarised global geopolitics. But the end of the Cold War and the advent of the twenty-first century have made much starker the question of how Europe can sustain its prosperity, its quality of life, and its legitimacy in the wider world.[48]

Many Europeans implicitly resist such change because it threatens aspects of life that we hold dear. It is difficult to recognise the need for a second generation of formative, Western European, societal innovations. It is even more difficult to imagine what such innovations would look like, or that they might increase our levels of confidence and capacity in handling the challenges presented by rising levels of mobility. To do so in the current atmosphere of international crisis, division and insecurity may seem impossible. But as we will argue, it is often crisis that produces the kind of innovation we need to envisage.

Unfortunately, public appetite for major societal innovation seems

to be decreasing. It is difficult to read the mood underlying a string of recent elections in Western Europe, but the desire to return to traditional values and security seems to be a strong undercurrent. This desire seems to be coupled with declining confidence in the effectiveness of government and public institutions. A sense of lack of control and paralysis in governance permeates many major policy areas, but comes to the surface nowhere more dramatically than when governments seem unable to control migration flows and manage the integration of newcomers. This significantly deepens the dilemma with which we began: the fact that control of migration flows seems to be simultaneously more necessary and less feasible than ever before.

At the deepest level, this dilemma touches the shifting sands on which our identities are grounded. The steady arrival of new people with unfamiliar habits and alien faiths in our cities and on our streets provides the most dramatic focus for the anxiety and unease about the ways in which the world around us is changing. This gradual process of alienation probably creates the most sensitive single factor preventing politicians from adopting a pragmatic and innovative approach to migration.

In what follows we propose 'simply' to take this loss and try to turn it into a gain by letting go of an identity that has escaped us anyway. Instead, we focus on the crucial question of who we want to be. One consequence of this decision is that Europeans find themselves suddenly in the same boat as the many newcomers, torn as they are between clinging to past identities and exploring new ones. The process of transition is not driven solely by loss. In fact, there is good evidence that the steady growth of prosperity and social diversity is a basic driver of declining attachment to traditional party, political and institutional identities.[49]

In the next three chapters we explore the different ways in which Europe might evolve to become stronger, better connected with the rest of the world, and more able to turn the perceived threat of mass migration into an opportunity. The narrative we present is not a prediction, or a set of recommendations, but a set of tentative, long-term explorations.

The goal of this section is to help stimulate imagination about what Europe could become over the next half century. In the process, we hope to explore and clarify how different aspects of societal change could support each other in meeting the challenges we set out earlier.

New governance for an expanding Europe

The central governance problem in Europe lies in understanding the relationship between national governments, the EU and a wider European region. Only in this context can the changing nature of national governance, and the difficulties facing elected leaders, be properly addressed.

In order to understand why these relationships are so important, we have to recall the genesis of the three pillars of postwar Europe. The scale of the Second World War's destruction inspired un-precedented political vision. On 19 September 1946 Winston Churchill called for a radical renewal of the European community of nations, based on reconciliation between France and Germany. He was followed by Robert Schumann, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer and others. On 5 June 1947 George Marshall, US Secretary of State, initiated a visionary plan for aid to all European countries, including the communist countries and Turkey, on the condition that they also created economic cooperation and development among themselves. The withdrawal of communist countries into an alternative bloc eventually triggered, on 4 April 1949, the founding of NATO, to provide mutual assistance and defence among member states, and in particular the US.

In the 50 years that followed, the countries to the west of the Iron Curtain were successful in creating a safe and prosperous space based on the rule of law. The implosion of the USSR created the opportunity for the reunification and enlargement of Europe, including the eventual inclusion of Turkey, a founder member of NATO.

Probably the most important challenge to existing governance frameworks is a fundamental change in the global security situation.

The nature of this change is threefold: first, the relative ease with which it is now possible to kill large numbers of people; second, the growth of illegitimate violence focused around organised crime, weak and collapsed states, transnational networks and political terror; third, the rise of a new values-based conflict, driven by the clash between Islamic radicalism and US dominance, which is polarising large parts of the world and putting civilian populations at risk of terrorist violence.

For the third time in a century, it appears that a large part of the world is confronted with a brand of utopian fundamentalism bent on mass destruction. The first, communism, mobilised the suffering caused by industrialisation and colonisation. The second, fascism, mobilised disappointment with nationalist dreams and democratic ideals. The third, Islamist radicalism, takes advantage of the bitterness caused by the marginalisation and oppression of many Muslims, and the perception that this suffering is primarily caused by the hegemony of the West, led by the US. All three seem to stem from the difficulty for people and their governments of responding in humane and constructive ways to the ongoing historical processes of modernisation.

Radical Islam does not present the threat of total war or global expansion that either fascism or Soviet communism constituted. Nonetheless, it has the potential to become a dominant political force in many states in the Middle East and Asia. The real nature of the threat to Europe lies in the potential for asymmetric attacks and internal conflict, that European populations, among others, are vulnerable to large-scale attacks that can be mounted without conventional military capacity.

In 2003, it is also fairly clear that the role and standing of the US, the world's single dominant military power, is also a crucial factor in the potential for widespread conflict and destabilisation, as well as a fundamental pillar of any refashioned international system. The efforts of many countries and leaders to find ways to engage the US constructively in a newly interdependent world have so far produced uncertain results. The longer-term prospects will turn in part on the evolution of America's own national identity, and the extent to which

it is reinforced by dependence on fiercely polarised opposition to the threats that it faces.

It is not surprising that governments have no ready response to this changing security situation, or that many are falling back on old reflexes. The real nature of the threat is that state monopoly over the use of violence – a vital tool of modernisation – is being eroded. While Western Europe might have established its own, 'postmodern' form of governance, the realisation is growing that it cannot insulate itself from the threats of instability, disorder and violent conflict both within and beyond its borders.

The change in the security situation is also taking place against a backdrop of destabilisation and insecurity in European domestic politics, including:

○ political and party disengagement and the growth of unpredictable, independent blocs of voting behaviour producing more volatile electoral outcomes
○ continued interethnic unrest in many European cities, combined with ineffective government control of the influx of illegal immigrants
○ the discovery of Islamist terror cells firmly embedded in many European countries
○ widespread uncertainty across the European and world economies
○ fear that one of the great postwar European inventions – modern social security – cannot survive without painful restructuring
○ growing concern among new member states in central and Eastern Europe that joining the EU could destabilise their democracies because they will not be allowed sufficient time and space to redevelop national identity, civil society and democratic governance
○ continued ambivalence in Turkey and many other countries about the long-term implications of interdependence with the rest of Europe.

All these factors reinforce the need for a reappraisal of European and national governance – why we need it, and how it should work.

In the long term, three clear priorities stand out:

○ developing new governance arrangements for an expanding EU
○ reconnecting with the wider region in order to create stability, interdependence and shared interests
○ regrounding national democracies as foundations of a sustainable European process in the decades ahead.

As part of such a reappraisal, we cannot escape the conclusion that the incremental growth of the EU has produced two unwelcome side-effects. The first is a lack of clarity about its real nature and status as a set of institutions, leading to a questioning of its authority among both citizens of EU countries and non-EU governments. The second is a lack of anchorage in the national democracies of member states, creating the familiar 'democratic deficit'.

In the past, national governments have too often failed to consult their parliaments and citizens properly about major EU decisions. It is too easy for politicians elected by national constituencies to blame 'Brussels' for regulations to which they themselves have contributed. The incremental growth of the EU has created a fuzzy cluster of semi-governmental organs, sometimes suggesting something like a European government, while often being overruled on crucial issues by the joint action of national governments. In fact, the only European organ with a clear identity and authority seems to be the European Court.

The European Convention has very visibly grappled with the challenge of constructing new governance arrangements that can be sustained in an expanding Europe. But it has focused mainly on the institutional structures and processes needed to prevent EU decision-making from being paralysed by the growth in member states, and not on the wider processes needed to strengthen democratic participation or relegitimise either national governments or the EU as

a whole. Whatever the outcome of the historic Convention process, we believe that ongoing, parallel processes are also needed. The main dimensions of this broader task are:

○ to stimulate, clarify and build commitment to a long-term vision of the EU and its role, recognising that another 50 years of development may be needed to achieve its full potential

○ to reinvent the governance of nation states, and introduce more direct connections between democratic processes at national and European levels

○ to renew, reshape and revitalise working models of democracy itself, and find new ways to achieve legitimacy and citizen participation in political decision-making.

These processes could imply many different means and outcomes, and we will not attempt to spell them out comprehensively. But there are various ideas and suggestions that could help point to ways in which they could actually happen.

The first challenge, of generating longer-term visions of Europe, depends primarily on political and intellectual leadership. On a series of issues, including economic development, environmental sustainability, new forms of technological risk and opportunity, and social cohesion and quality of life, it is possible to map the outlines of long-term change. Probably the most compelling rationale for the further development of an integrated capacity for Europe-wide action is in the realm of security and military strategy. This may seem counter-intuitive at a time when the recent efforts to generate a common European security policy appear to be in tatters. But the single most important factor behind European nations' current divisions over military intervention is the difficulty of responding coherently to the USA's overwhelming military dominance.

However difficult in the short term, the eventual outcome of this dilemma has to be some kind of unified European capacity for strategic action. This is the only way that Europe can exert its full

potential influence on the wider world. The question of how such an influence might be exerted, and to what ends, brings us directly back to whether or not Europe can define and project a distinctive vision of democracy, freedom and quality of life which is firmly rooted in its own politics and capable of being projected coherently into its relations with other regions.

Half a century ago, the scale of Europe's achievements through the EU would have been difficult to imagine, as would the extent of mutual interference that different member states now tolerate in each others' domestic governance. The reunification of Europe represented by the current period of EU enlargement opens up a new set of challenges which, when combined with the changing global security situation, are as great as any that the EU has met so far.

The original goals of the EU were a shared commitment to peace and prosperity. We would suggest that these would serve just as well in a new century, although the goal of sustainable development might be acknowledged as a crucial dimension of both.[50]

It is important to remember that the original vision of a unified Europe arose from a crisis of unprecedented proportions. Europe needs to find an equivalent from its current circumstances. But for such a vision to have any real purchase on European politics requires acknowledgement that dealing with such a fundamental set of challenges will take at least another half century. Creating a governance framework that can bring peace, prosperity and legitimacy to a greater Europe in the twenty-first century is a task which will require time horizons that long.

To link European and national political decision-making in new ways, we need a range of measures that could, over time, create constructive forms of interconnection. Examples of such measures might include the gradual synchronisation of all parliamentary elections across the EU, national and European, and the creation of 'dual representation' so that one chamber in every national parliament included additional seats for national representatives in the European Parliament. Another is the creation of genuinely pan-European party systems for relevant elections.[51] This would enable

electorates to vote directly for representatives with a double mandate to act in both national and European legislatures, perhaps with a right of initiative to propose policies and decisions dedicated to creating European peace and prosperity. Similarly, all national constitutions could, over time, incorporate a clause or article setting out shared ambitions and conditions for the next stages of the European process. In parallel, national parliaments might become able to demand from their governments annual reports on the state of the EU and to hear from EU Council members or officials, especially in those cases where the Council had decided with a qualified majority against the wish of the involved national government.

All these illustrative measures are examples of changes that could enhance the direct democratic legitimacy of the EU and its decisions, while at the same time anchoring EU policies and politics more firmly in national legislatures and political debates.

Reinvigorating national democracies

There is a strong case for arguing that, while the EU must become the main focus of combined strategic and military power in Europe, as well as the focus of an expanding zone of economic prosperity and decision-making, it must be rooted in the primary authority of elected national governments vis-à-vis their own citizens.

However, to make this case in any long-term sense also requires recognition that models of national democracy in most of Europe are also undergoing major transition, and may need radical reform in order to recover their own legitimacy. The growth of citizen 'disengagement' and the decline of party affiliation have become issues of widespread concern across Europe in recent years. Developing democracies in Central and South-eastern Europe share a common problem with the 'older' Western European democracies in this sense.

It is quite possible to imagine that the nation state would remain the most important source of political and democratic authority, while at the same time recognising that the form and function of such states would change radically. As Robert Cooper has argued, the

emergence of the EU implies 'a new form of statehood', in which security is attained not through a balance of power but through transparency, interdependence, mutual surveillance and interference, not just in military affairs but also on a broader field.[52] The form of the nation state and domestic governance is tightly linked to the shape of a wider international order and the dominant methods of warfare, as Philip Bobbitt and Michael Howard recently made clear.[53]

The real nature and characteristics of the reshaped nation state in a 'postmodern' era are in many respects still unclear. But it is clear that new approaches to democratic decision-making, accountability and participation will be essential. The design of formal institutions and decision-making structures is only one dimension of democratic systems of governance. The relationship between citizen and state created through public service provision is another. The qualities of civic and media culture are also hugely important.

To aid the task of reinvention, we propose the creation of a *European Democratic Observatory*, a kind of 'clearing house' for democratic renewal, whose task would be to assist in identifying and understanding innovation in democratic practice, and to promote the spread of knowledge and capacity widely across Europe, at all levels of governance. This institution would not be purely academic. It would be concerned with the 'trial and error' processes from which new democratic practices emerge, and with building practical capacity. For obvious reasons, such a centre could be based in Athens. One central task for it would be to assist in the process of redefining citizenship in a larger, more open Europe. In taking up this role, a Democratic Observatory might draw in and build on the existing efforts of bodies such as the Council of Europe, which currently exist on the margins of European political decision-making.

A New European Commonwealth

Islam's impact on the Christian world cannot be exaggerated. Islam's conquests turned Europe into Christianity's main base. At

the same time the great swathe of Muslim territory cut the Christians off from virtually all direct contact with other religions and civilizations. The barrier of militant Islam turned the Peninsula in on itself, severing or transforming many of the earlier lines of commercial, intellectual, and political intercourse. In the field of religious conflict, it left Christendom with two tasks – to fight Islam and to convert the remaining pagans. It forced the Byzantine Empire to give lasting priority to the defence of its Eastern borders, and hence to neglect its imperial mission in the West. It created the conditions where the other, more distant Christian states had to fend for themselves, and increasingly to adopt measures for local autonomy and economic self-sufficiency. In other words, it gave a major stimulus to feudalism. Above all, by commandeering the Mediterranean Sea, it destroyed the supremacy which the Mediterranean lands had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Peninsula. Before Islam, the postclassical world of Greece and Rome, as transmuted by Christianity, had remained essentially intact. After Islam, it was gone forever. Almost by default, the political initiative passed from the Mediterranean to the emerging kingdoms of the north, especially to the most powerful of those kingdoms in 'Francia'.

In the course of that eighth century, therefore, when Europe's Christians were digesting the implications of the Islamic conquests, the seeds of a new order were sown. The Bishop of Rome, deprived of support from Byzantium, was forced to the Franks, and to embark on the enterprise of the 'Papacy'. The Franks saw their chance to back the Pope. Indirectly, Charlemagne was the product of Muhammed . . . .

To talk of Muhammed and Charlemagne, however, is not enough. Islam affected Eastern Europe even more directly than it affected Western Europe. Its appearance set the bounds of a new, compact entity called 'Christendom', of which Constantinople would be the strongest centre for some time to come. It set a

challenge to the pagans of the eastern fringes of Christian–Muslim rivalry, who henceforth faced the prospect of choosing between the two dominant religions. Above all, it created the cultural bulwark against which European identity could be defined. Europe, let alone Charlemagne, is inconceivable without Muhammed.

Christianity's rivalry with Islam raised moral and psychological problems no less profound than those already existing between Christianity and Judaism. Both Christians and Muslims were taught to regard the other as the infidel. Their misunderstandings, antagonisms and negative stereotypes were endless. It was never popular, least of all among the clergy, to stress how much the three great monotheistic religions held in common. As a result, a strong dichotomy developed between the Christian 'West' and the Islamic 'East'. Medieval Europeans commonly referred to Muslims as 'Saracens', an epithet derived from the Arabic word sharakyoun or 'easterner'. Among those Westerners who have imagined themselves to be the bearers of a superior civilization, there has been a long tradition of viewing the Muslim East with mindless disdain.

(Norman Davies, 1999)[54]

Innovation in governance at EU and national level is familiar ground, already covered by myriad experts and proposals. But a further dimension of Europe's identity and governance, fundamental to its older history but largely missing from the postwar experience, also needs to be addressed.

In chapter 2 we argued that establishing connections between Europe and a wider set of migrant-sending countries is essential for the sustainable management of migration flows. The difficulty of implementing such a principle becomes obvious when we look at the unease created by the prospect of Turkey joining the EU.

This unease is partly the result of centuries of mutual disdain between 'Christian West' and 'Muslim East', and is also fuelled by

Europe's lack of success in responding to the fact that 20 million of its inhabitants are Muslim. Large parts of the Muslim population in Europe, whether or not they arrived recently, are not fully integrated into European society or citizenship. The question of Turkey thus raises a broader challenge. Europe, as it enlarges, will have to find better ways of structuring its relationships with the Middle East, with Russia and other former Soviet Republics, with North Africa. A wider network of former colonies outside this zone could emerge over time.

The migration debate also helps to lay bare the fact that many Western European powers now enjoy profoundly ambivalent relationships with their former colonies. While their direct responsibilities were largely shed in the postwar years, the maintenance of cultural, economic and institutional links has become a strong priority for several nations. Several, including France and Britain, remain partially committed to resolving conflict and managing refugee flows from places such as Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Algeria. The maintenance of these half-obligatory historical relationships has become intertwined over time with the complex politics and contours of the international aid and development systems. But the relationship between national legacies, EU regional policies and a global infrastructure of mulitateral institutions like the UN and the World Bank remains muddy and often ineffective.

Our argument is that, if Europe in its newly enlarged form is to find a unified strategic role, it must also find a way to extend a zone of positive interdependence and mutual understanding across and beyond the wider European region.

We therefore propose the launching of a European Commonwealth process, underpinned by long-term support from the European Union and member states, and dedicated to a range of projects which would be led both by governments and by civil organisations. The overall purpose of these projects would be to extend peace and prosperity across the wider region and encourage the positive reshaping of colonial legacies and relationships, encouraging more concerted joint investment in the evolution of democratic governance. This framework would rest on a much older

definition of Europe, creating opportunities for governments to participate voluntarily in relationships that assist in creating infrastructure which supports societal development.

A European Commonwealth could extend from the Arctic Circle to North Africa, and from Eire to Russia, as well as to a wider network of former colonies wishing to join.

How might such an initiative work?

The first step would be to establish a Commonwealth Office, supported by several national governments and by the EU as a voluntary initiative. The European Commonwealth would be underpinned by the steady development of trade, aid and knowledge-sharing agreements designed to encourage economic exchange and interdependence. But it could also take on other projects addressing a broader range of challenges.

A European narrative project

One kind of project could be to find ways to unearth some of the forgotten chapters of European history, in order to clarify and deepen public understanding of the many tensions and conflicts that run across the wider region.

For example, the EU could support a unique, ongoing project, much as the mapping of the human genome became a hugely symbolic process of enquiry and intellectual innovation, as well as generating concrete applications that will change European societies directly. Europe as a whole could commission historians, film-makers and artists to create the materials for a new European narrative, historical and cultural resource for the twenty-first century.

Such a narrative would have to begin in former Mesopotamia, lying partly in Syria and partly in Iraq, thus demanding an inclusive concept of Europe, spanning the many civilisations that have shaped its development.

The headquarters of the project could be in Istanbul, witness to almost all the waves of people and change that have swept through European history. The first set of project participants would be invited in two ways: from all countries between the Ural, the Atlantic,

the North Cape and the Mediterranean and from all former European colonies. Films and records could be made of the process itself. The psychological impact of such an initiative by the EU could be enormous. In the longer run it could stimulate a range of more concrete projects focused on conflict resolution and truth and reconciliation in various places.

High speed rail networks for the European region

A narrative project would focus on Europe's cultural and historical infrastructure. Equally important would be the creation of physical infrastructure that reflected new forms of regional interdependence. One such project would be the construction of a high speed rail network connecting London, Amsterdam, Berlin, Moscow, Istanbul, Cairo, Milan, Paris, Barcelona and Casablanca. This core network could be the basis for integrated transport networks extending much further than the core cities. Elements of the project might be financed by a special European Commonwealth levy, prompt payment of which could be linked to discounted travel on the new railway and special visits to the European History Studios in Istanbul, a centre that could come to rival Disneyland in public popularity.

A new knowledge infrastructure

Alongside such high-profile projects, the European Commonwealth Office could also play an important role in coordinating the creation of the region's infrastructure for knowledge, learning and innovation, including research, industrial innovation and collaborative university networks, building cumulatively on the Lisbon process established in 2000.

A European Commonwealth volunteer reconstruction corps

Perhaps the most eye-catching proposal is to create a European Commonwealth volunteer reconstruction corps, open to qualified young people from all participating countries. Such a force could become an essential part of Europe's capacity to resolve conflict and contribute to humanitarian development, while at the same time

providing a channel for the energy and commitment of European young people. It would become a civil complement to the refashioning of European military capacity in the light of the emergent security and reconstruction challenges of the twenty-first century.

The cumulative effect of this kind of investment, which would inevitably unfold over a generation or more, would be to add a new layer to the wider Europe's economic, cultural, physical and human tapestry. Though it would inevitably overlap in many ways with the tiers of governance that already exist, and would have to evolve in many unplanned ways, we believe that the case for developing this wider umbrella of relationships is becoming compelling.

6. Keeping Europe safe: the changing security context

Since September 11th 2001 it has become increasingly obvious that security is intertwined with many of the issues covered elsewhere in this pamphlet, and not exclusively an issue for foreign or military policy in the traditional sense.

The question facing Europe is how it can take a clear first step towards developing an EU-wide responsibility for sustaining its own security.

As we suggested in chapter 3, a sustainable security strategy depends on disentangling the different elements of the threat and producing coherent responses to them.

Regional instability: European security forces and intervention

We have already suggested that some version of an integrated European defence and strategic capability is an essential part of the region's development, however difficult it is to imagine in current circumstances.

The kind of capability that might be envisaged, however, is more than simply the capacity for unified foreign policy decisions and military deployment. First, the capacity for military intervention would be combined with a much wider set of tools and resources for reconstruction, conflict resolution and societal development. Second, the repertoire of military, policing and intelligence-led strategies for

countering terrorism and reducing political instability would also be expanded over time.

Europe's ambition to remain a major source of influence in the wider world has come to depend on the development of a security strategy that brings together the military and diplomatic capabilities of individual nations. While the military strength of the US has become impossible to match, Europe's strategy should be based on its ability to provide stability and proactive development support, alongside the capacity for targeted military intervention in specific conflicts.

This argument is underlined by our recognition that European regional stability depends on the availability of well-trained, rapidly deployable multipurpose troops, equipped for both long and short stays and aided by a variety of sophisticated land, air and sea weapons. A string of local European conflicts has demonstrated that aerial bombardment cannot produce sustainable conflict resolution. More effective intervention strategies rely on a multifaceted approach to establishing peace and security and developing democratic governance. The ability to deploy various kinds of troops, special forces and auxiliaries, some focused on policing and development rather than on fighting, and supplemented by the new European volunteer reconstruction corps, is therefore decisive in reducing the threat of conflict and increasing Europe's political credibility in the wider world.

This argument suggests that Europe as a whole needs to develop a new kind of expertise, whether working in partnership with UN agencies, NGOs, or other governments, in supporting sustainable development. These issues burst regularly into mainstream political debate at key moments of military conflict, for example in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and, most recently, in Iraq. But they quickly slide down both the media and political agendas. Creating a stronger and more consistent basis for humanitarian intervention and development assistance is a precondition of a more coherent strategic role for Europe. Part of this capacity must also include the determination to address and help resolve a series of violent conflicts, some of which have persisted for centuries in and around Europe.

Other aspects of security

This kind of broad framework for military and diplomatic security also depends on forms of intervention that strengthen security by other means. Although it is not the main focus of this pamphlet, we should also refer to the growing international consensus on how to combat terrorism directly:

○ pursue and prosecute terrorists
○ destroy their networks
○ confront related criminal organisations
○ identify and eliminate the production of weapons of mass destruction
○ isolate and contain states that sponsor terrorists and produce or collect weapons of mass destruction
○ break up illegal markets for weapons of mass destruction and their components
○ disturb informal networks of supportive scientists
○ marginalise preachers of hate.

Developing the strategies and institutions most capable of pursuing this agenda is an important part of the wider security debate.

Unsafe neighbourhoods

In one sense this is the most straightforward problem. Specific neighbourhoods within European cities become a focus of wider insecurity if their problems of crime and violence are allowed to persist. Tackling this problem requires sustained, evidence-informed and pragmatic commitment to crime reduction and prevention. This includes focusing on specific concentrations of crime in different locations and communities. We cannot escape the conclusion that such an effort would be expensive and time-consuming, but it is clearly a crucial element of a wider strategy for enhanced security.

Unclear loyalties

The perception that some groups of European immigrants might have divided loyalties probably contributes more to a sense of insecurity than to any real problem. But such feelings can easily trigger hostility, and are increasingly dangerous. Given that multiple loyalties are likely to become more common over time, one form of positive response is to look for new symbols of belonging and affiliation.

Three specific recommendations would contribute to the management of multiple loyalties and commitments in ways that also strengthened democracy, transparency and civic culture in Europe.

The first would be to ensure that any kind of visitor to Europe was issued with a multimedia-based information package on European civic resources and traditions and on aspects of European democracy.

The second is the development of national citizenship programmes, designed to reflect genuine differences in civic culture and history, but also acting as part of a Europe-wide effort to support the integration of newcomers. Migrants wishing to become citizens could take courses in language, history and other key areas of civic knowledge, culminating in a naturalisation ceremony on Citizenship Day, which would be celebrated each year on the same day across the EU. In general, this kind of measure would form part of an approach to citizenship that explicitly emphasises the importance of civic identity, responsibility and participation precisely because of growing diversity, but seeks to work with the grain of that diversity.

The final recommendation works in a similar way. This suggests that those issued with dual passports because of their heritage or specific situation, whose numbers would grow under the system we envisage, would be responsible for signing a statement to be included in a public register. This would be certified by both governments involved, setting out the arrangements for fulfilling civic obligations like military service, paying taxes, and so on in the two countries of membership. These agreements would be developed bilaterally, but their development and refinement might also become a focus for the European Commonwealth.

7. Repositioning European economic and welfare systems

In chapters 2 and 3 we presented systems for managing migration flow and integration which are based as closely as possible on the underlying needs of each category of migrants, and therefore able to capitalise constructively on the energy and motivations they bring with them. In the process, we stumbled across a key characteristic of Western European economic systems which acts as a barrier to this kind of flow management: the marginal, usually illegal position of the informal economic sector. This sector of activity acts as an indispensable bridge between regions of the world divided by huge inequalities of wealth and poverty. In other words, our economic system does not facilitate smooth interaction between premodern, modern and postmodern modes of economic activity.

It is striking that the world economy has a hugely developed infrastructure for managing the movement of capital and goods through global trade rules, but that the movement of people is far more restricted. As we noted earlier, this is partly because of the extent to which national sovereignty has rested on control of territorial borders. Equally, the welfare systems developed during the twentieth century by European nations have rested explicitly on restricted access to their entitlements in order to make them affordable.

Continued migration pressure forces us to address this imbalance, though in any case the sustainability of our economic system

demands re-examination because of other changes. These are, in particular, the growth of international interdependence through communications and economic integration, and the massive structural surplus of human resources seeking productive economic activity.

While economic growth remains primarily driven by technological innovation, the challenge of absorbing and investing in human capital will remain a fundamentally difficult one. The relative marginalisation of informal economic activity in Western Europe, combined with the inflexible nature of our welfare states, makes this challenge particularly pressing in Western Europe. As we saw in chapter 3, social security regimes can prevent realistic decisions by migrants in assessing their own economic prospects and strategies, while at the same time increasing the defensiveness of European populations towards newcomers. The great challenge facing European welfare is to find ways of adapting to changing social and macro-economic conditions while retaining the forms of mutual support and social equity that it was built to embody. Germany, the twentieth-century engine of the European economy, is the major current illustration of this problem.

These challenges point to the need for a major structural shift in the way that wealth is generated and shared. Such a shift is partly implied by the EU's commitment to the 'Lisbon Process', following the European Summit of 2000, which committed member states to becoming part of the most dynamic knowledge economy in the world, and to achieving various targets for economic development and integration, using the benchmarking and comparison of European nations on a series of key measures as part of its method. But this agenda is only the beginning of the kind of shift that is needed if European prosperity is to be sustained in the longer run.

In what follows we tentatively explore the overall shape of such a transition, repositioning the European economy in ways which would increase its adaptability in the face of change, create more productive bridges with other economic regions and with the informal sector, send more constructive signals to potential migrants, and retain the essence, albeit in different forms, of the social welfare economy.

The key elements of this exploration are:

○ transforming the market economy into a 'multiple economy' capable of maximising investment in good governance and human capital
○ converting the welfare state into a 'social facilitator' state.

From market economy to multiple economy

The first element of this transition implies the most fundamental change. It means abandoning the idea that there is a single, dominant mode of wealth creation – via profit-oriented, technology-driven market forces – which generates the surplus of resources that can be used to create other kinds of value, for example public institutions and good government.

It is becoming well known that other forms of productive investment, for example public investment in education and intellectual capital, or voluntary, family-based investment in social and human capital through child-rearing, are equally important in sustaining the capacity to generate wealth. It is a very old principle that markets are institutions requiring their own rules and social conditions to enable them to function effectively. But new conditions of societal interdependence and complexity are forcing this recognition in quite new circumstances. Equally important is the continued growth of international interdependence and the extent to which national prosperity is influenced by wider economic conditions, for example the regional economic cycle. This implies not only greater risk of negative trends spreading from country to country, but also greater availability of international funds for investing in economic, social and public development within nations. EU rules and programmes on economic discipline and development, while imperfect in their current form, embody this long-term trend.

Our argument is that Europe, over the next half century, will need to find ways of incorporating all major modes of wealth creation – private, public, non-profit, and possibly others – into one comprehensive conceptual framework, a 'multiple economy'. While this

concept is clearly underdeveloped, one way to illustrate what it might mean is that it would include the challenge of integrating sustainability into the rules governing economic development, by learning to incorporate and invest in the various kinds of values that make it possible to renew and sustain prosperity.

While the overall framework is fuzzy, it provides some striking possible perspectives on specific challenges. For example, it helps to substantiate the need for multiple forms of investment finance as preferable to the limitations of short-term, shareholder-driven financing. In turn, it might lead us to explore new formulae for developing stakeholder-driven, output-oriented financing, including an appropriate fiscal system and use of public spending, as potential alternatives to the classical shareholder-driven, profit-based financing methods. Finally, these kinds of possibilities might also lead us to re-examine the idea that taxation is the chief method for financing public wealth (see below).

Even more important, potentially, is the impact of such a framework on the way that economies treat the issue of resource utilisation. The achievements of modern economies are essentially founded on technology-driven growth, making innovative use of physical resources. The role of knowledge and therefore of human capital has become increasingly important, and as a result the focus of more explicit investment and development by both firms and governments. But under the current model, human resources have followed this longer-term dynamic, playing the role of a flexible but expendable instrument of wealth creation.

Western European welfare states have softened the impact of 'creative destruction' in the economy by providing basic forms of security and risk-pooling to those whose livelihoods disappear. More recently, they have begun to focus more explicitly on investing in skills and human capital, and on actively providing support to re-engage people with labour markets and social participation.

The framework of a 'multiple economy' might help us to address the question of human capital and its relationship to wealth creation in a new way. Might it become possible to view human resources as a

source of economic wealth in their own right? This would mean that they were treated not just as a factor input into the production process, but also as a potential form of output, however measured and quantified.

In this context, it is possible to imagine that investment markets might be developed on the basis of available human resources, rather than just financial capital, material resources and technological capacity.

Part of the answer to why this has not already occurred is that profits could never be as high for these kinds of human resource investments, because the productivity increases from human- or service-based activities can never be as great as those based on physical resources and production processes. That is why the productivity of service-based activities grows more slowly than manufacturing or purely information-based ones.

But why should it not be possible for a macroeconomic framework to contain two sets of legal, fiscal and financing support structures? Under this hypothetical framework, it would be possible to attract funds to more than one kind of enterprise: shareholder-financed, profit-driven companies, and stakeholder-financed, output-oriented ventures. Such an option echoes the many different forms of social investment and mutual ownership currently being experimented with on a small scale across Europe, which carry a long and rich history.

The significance of this possibility is that it offers a way to sustain a labour-intensive, socially important tier of activity within European economies that are simultaneously becoming more competitive and knowledge-intensive. As such, it could significantly reduce the strain of using taxation-financed welfare support systems to meet the costs of economic dislocation and marginalisation. Moreover, it could become an important addition to the economic toolbox, especially for economies which are poor in physical and abundant in human resources.

The other crucial possibility that arises from such an approach is that migrant inflows, even where they are not 'high skill' in the

current sense of the term, could be an important source of factor inputs for a sustainable, human resource-driven set of industries.

Welfare: towards the facilitating state

The most difficult, and controversial, element of the transition we are exploring concerns the role of the welfare state. The goal of this system remains to alleviate the most extreme forms of disadvantage and marginalisation, without obstructing the adaptive flexibility of the economy or producing perverse incentives, either for potential migrants or for existing citizens.

The central question, on which we can only touch in this discussion, is the relationship between the provision of security and insurance against risk through unconditional entitlements, and the provision of a wider range of differentiated services and supports based in part on financial contribution and reciprocal obligation, or other conditions.

Before we address the core questions of restructuring welfare provision itself, we should briefly touch on the changing nature of 'public wealth' or 'public value'. In the postwar period, European investment in social goods and wealth distribution revolved mainly around the uses of general taxation and social insurance. But the last two decades have seen growing recognition of two central insights. First, good governance extends beyond maintaining the rule of law, civil order and external security into 'softer' resources such as trust, public legitimacy and satisfaction in key institutions. Second, the financing of public elements of the economic infrastructure, whether healthcare systems, transport, energy, and so on, can take place via a growing number of means, including private financing via capital markets and investment from international institutions. The use of these means varies widely according to political and policy choice.

For our purposes, the major implication of these two shifts is that both 'good governance' and core infrastructure depend on a much wider set of inputs than simply patterns of nation state investment through taxation. Public value and the maintenance of public goods like trust, clean air and so on depends as much on citizen behaviour

as on levels of state spending. Infrastructure development and economic stability are recognised as beneficial to the stability of the world economy as a whole, and are subject to growing international scrutiny as a result. In that sense, we need to recognise that the general benefits of 'good governance' should be treated as a free and universal public good for both citizens and visitors alike, rather than somehow being the exclusive preserve of individual nations and their citizens. This does not remove the need for debate about how best to sustain and renew governance systems and economic infrastructures. It merely shows that their health is already influenced by interdependent systems that extend far beyond national boundaries.

Equally, the argument does not eliminate political choices for governments and citizens about the provision of other public goods, including whether or not education and healthcare are provided free for citizens, foreign residents, visitors and so on. The terms on which such services would be offered might continue to be influenced by competition for scarce human resources. Under this scenario it would also be open to EU member states to choose how far they wanted to harmonise the financing and management of key public services and infrastructure.

As far as welfare systems themselves are concerned, the central changes that deserve further exploration are the following:

- ○ Those who are retired, disabled or permanently dependent on public care for other reasons should be guaranteed a minimum level of basic shelter, care and income.
- ○ Others, when they either reach adulthood or become naturalised, should be entitled to a basic 'citizenship credit'.
- ○ This credit would be linked, on demand, to a range of personal development packages, services and opportunities, made available on a customised or personalised basis.

The second and third points imply a radical change in European welfare – an unequivocal farewell to the idea that the state will provide unconditional care for its citizens whenever they might need it.

The message which replaces it is that, for those citizens capable of self-reliance and social contribution, the state will provide a basic, interest-free, revolving financial credit, combined with personalised facilities and support for identifying a pathway of personal development. This entitlement would be granted to all adult citizens or naturalised incomers on the basis of a civil covenant, setting out the rights and responsibilities of the creditor and the range of ways in which the credit can be repaid, which could include payment in kind, through certain kinds of work or other contribution.

'Personal development' pathways encompass the range of goods and services that an individual might access in order to increase their own wellbeing, including education, healthcare, labour market support, family services and so on. The concept underlying it stresses that the state does not in any way take on people's responsibility for their own wellbeing, but continues to recognise the importance of social investment, public support and active facilitation in contributing to opportunity and wellbeing for all.

This kind of framework does not prevent governments from making universal investments in certain services or citizen capabilities, from subsidising key public goods, or from creating differentials to reflect the patterns of risk and vulnerability across populations. It does not imply that governments should retreat from welfare spending or social investment, but that it needs to find new vehicles for doing so. It is also potentially compatible with welfare which invests in creating capital assets for people, to be spent across a range of pathways, or activities, appropriate to particular life circumstances.

This might also reflect an approach which reflects more accurately the risks and responsibilities attached to specific life stages, including childhood, adolescence, parenthood and so on, but seeks to provide more flexible integration of the various resources and credits that government and the public realm are able to provide. In concrete terms, the various funds and entitlements for educational investment,

unemployment insurance, time out of the labour market for parenting, retirement saving and so on would become part of an integrated range of supported schemes, based on a combination of contribution, risk-pooling and repayment.

Alongside the goals of flexibility and fiscal sustainability, however, the crucial point is that while such a framework leaves governments free to make universal or targeted welfare investments, it also helps to reduce the barriers created between insiders and outsiders through their 'all or nothing' qualification for welfare entitlements through citizenship.

Giving nothing for free is a sign of respect for potential capacities and responsibilities of citizens, whatever their personal circumstances, as long as they are permitted to meet their obligations in ways that correspond to their own abilities and potential contribution to wealth creation. The detailed arrangements for providing personal development opportunities and repayment should flow from diverse organisations, including private and not-for-profit 'output banks' operating in the human resource economy. In such a context it is not hard to imagine various social activities, such as parenting and childcare, constituting a form of repayment.

One advantage of such a system would be that it would eliminate distortions arising from differences in treatment between European citizens and the support available to displaced persons in ITCs. The basic entitlement, and the means of treatment, would essentially be the same, although this does not preclude differences in the pricing of services or the range of provision offered to different people in different places.

Overall, such a system would emphasise equality of treatment where possible between citizens and newcomers, alongside the central principle of reciprocal obligation. The state is prepared to invest in the individual, and works actively to create and maintain various kinds of opportunity, but the design of the systems through which this is achieved also reflects the need for ongoing contribution and active social responsibility by citizens in, residents of, and visitors to any society.

This kind of system would also provide important opportunities for investing in citizenship, for example by creating joint ceremonies on a Europe-wide Citizenship Day both for 18-year-olds acquiring adult status and for naturalised citizens.

One final, and intriguing, possibility, is that within this kind of framework it is possible to imagine welfare benefits accumulated through contribution becoming portable so that, for example, European citizens who retired to other countries, as significant numbers now do, might be able to take their pensions or health insurance with them.

The outlines of a mid twenty-first century European economy and society that we have presented in the last three chapters are necessarily broad and experimental. The point of the analysis has not been to predict, or even necessarily to advocate, specific versions of the changes we have discussed. Instead, we have sought to show how the conditions needed for higher flows of people in and out of Europe to become sustainable and productive could be met through interconnected change in our economic, social and governance arrangements. It is not impossible to imagine that these kinds of changes could come about. They are no more radical than the transformations that have been achieved in Western Europe over the last half century.

The real questions are twofold: can our political and public policy processes find ways of addressing issues as broad, and as complex as these in ways that might generate credible solutions? Does Europe have sufficient capacity for 'research and development' on challenges of societal innovation, as compared with more traditional forms of technological and industrial change?

8. From fresh thinking to sustainable migration management

This pamphlet has been a first attempt to explore new ways through which Europe could deal with migration, as the nature of both changes in fundamental ways. Our main focus has been to generate the outlines of a system that could respond productively to the inevitability and positive potential of growing human mobility. In terms of public policy analysis, we have taken a fairly unconventional route, designing 'prototype' systems for flow and integration management, and exploring the contours of very broad, long-term change as a way of locating them in a future context.

Our aim has been to provoke fresh thinking about the possibilities for migration policy, and to help extend the horizons within which current policy-making at both national and European levels is conducted.

To have any real impact, these outlines of a new system will need to be developed, debated, tested and adapted in the light of detailed evidence and diverse experience. The problem, however, is that as societies we are now better at designing things like the next generation of mobile phones than we are at designing new and complex institutional systems. This is mainly because it is far easier to redesign technical processes than behavioural processes and the cultural change needed for societal innovation.

That said, in the two years of thinking and research that has led to this pamphlet, migration has become a far more central and

controversial political concern across Europe, and several new and imaginative directions for policy have begun to emerge. Alongside the emphasis in several countries on much tighter control and exclusion of unwanted and illegal migrants, there are new possibilities for flow management, legal economic migration, integration of migrants and new approaches to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. At European level, the Athens Migration Policy Initiative looks set to make significant progress in raising the profile of coordinated European strategies on migration, and encouraging the idea that migration flows can be managed to economic and social benefit. The idea of producing an annual European migration report, and even of incorporating migration issues into the Lisbon process, raises the prospect of a new phase in European policy-making and cross-national cooperation. In the UK, fresh lines of thought about how to reduce the pressure of asylum applications and unauthorised migration through more proactive and humanitarian intervention in situations likely to produce large numbers of displaced persons have also begun to appear. Though the kinds of 'flow-management' systems that we have envisaged are unlikely to emerge from this kind of process in the short term, the movement in the debate should encourage us to think that longer-term thinking could become productive relatively quickly.

For this kind of thinking to contribute to robust and workable policies, we need a second stage of analysis, development, institutional design and testing. This will involve more detailed research and analysis, focusing on a series of concrete issues touched on in the analysis, including:

○   the emergence of 'transnational' migration, its manifestations and strategies for developing its positive potential
○   more detailed understanding of the role of economic migration in European labour markets
○   the effectiveness of different approaches to integration and peaceful coexistence

○ the prospects for 'international transit centres' and the kinds of capabilities and resources needed to make them effective

○ the possibility of genuine innovation in various aspects of European governance and welfare

○ constructive approaches to managing the informal economy.

These specific themes must intertwine with the existing challenges of making European migration policies, particularly that of finding the right combination of EU-wide rules and standards, national approaches and collaboration with other international institutions.[55] One focus for establishing such a mix could be the attempt to generate a 'Global Agreement on the Movement of People' to stand alongside existing global frameworks on trade in goods and services.

While all of these, and more, should be the subject of detailed research and design, we also believe that a sustained, pan-European public debate is needed as part of any process designed to help create new possibilities for the way that migration is managed. That is why Demos and openDemocracy are working together to create an opportunity for ongoing, moderated discussion of the central issues and ideas we have presented, and to encourage the formation of new partnerships and networks interested in pursuing these questions further.

Appendix
Emerging European migration policy: struggling with dilemmas

Immigration is one of the most challenging issues in the history of European integration. National governments on the receiving end of migration flows find themselves under increasing pressure to show that they can control migration. New laws have required governments everywhere to regulate migration in an era of increased population mobility. These measures only rarely appear to achieve their intended aims and, over the past decades, rising unauthorised immigration and the failed attempt to create a 'fortress Europe' have generated the need for extensive cooperation on immigration. Inevitably, and particularly after the Treaty of Amsterdam, the need to establish a common EU immigration policy to replace fragmented and inconsistent national regimes has been recognised.

Establishing cooperation on immigration is not a simple process and presents a number of challenges and dilemmas. Despite the recent developments of EU cooperation on asylum and immigration, the road towards the achievement of a common policy still reflects the existing ambiguity of relations between the member states. The recurrent swing between the conceptualisation of immigration as a transnational phenomenon and the reluctance with which member states adjust their national policies to enable agreement to be reached on a common policy is one of the main dilemmas faced by Europe in the attempt to manage immigration.

As chapter 4 shows, international migration has become more

global and complex than ever, during a period when it has also become more controversial within national polities.

This appendix shows how, despite the diversity of the migration experience in EU countries, immigration has nonetheless become a pan-European phenomenon and a priority for most European governments. This means that a common European approach to immigration and asylum is probably inevitable. However, we argue that the present development of European cooperation on immigration is still characterised by the production of conventional and temporary measures surrounded by deep-seated ambiguity. The inadequacy of current policy responses is clearly reflected in the preponderance of security measures (often resulting in the crim-inalisation of the migrant) and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in the European member states. The essence of our project lies in the question: can the existing approach result in a sustainable and fair management of mass migration or should the European Union and the member states change direction? We hope that our account provides the substantive basis for judgement.

A European preoccupation

Dossier Statistico suggests that the major European historical tendencies towards immigration can be identified in three phases.[56]

The first, from 1945 to 1960, the postwar period, is characterised by a generally liberal attitude towards immigration aimed at meeting the needs of postwar reconstruction. The main countries of origin at that point were Mediterranean, but flows from Algeria to France, from the Commonwealth to the UK and from Turkey to Germany also increased. European countries encouraged temporary migration that targeted particular sectors of the labour market. Contrary to governmental intentions, people granted labour permits often became settled. The second phase covers the 1960s and 1970s. The oil crises of 1971 and 1973 negatively affected the global economy and created a situation where Mediterranean countries, which had been exporters of labour, began to receive migration flows. From then on, those countries became ideal destinations for immigration because of

their favourable geographic positions and because of scarce frontier controls. In this period there was a shift from a permissive and liberal migration policy to a control-oriented, restrictive regime, stimulated by a desire to protect the socioeconomic rights of domestic workers during a period of labour market transition. In the third and last phase, which covers the 1980s until today, immigration has become more complex because of an increase and a diversification in the countries of origin and destination. Migration has become a subject of policy debates focused on protecting public order and preserving domestic stability.

Despite the widespread political push for reduced immigration, firmer controls and closed borders enacted since the 1970s, European Union members continue to be countries of immigration. Net flows of extra-Union immigrants rose through the 1980s and peaked in the early 1990s, driven by the fall of the Iron Curtain and a number of wars and ethnic conflicts, which led to an increase in the number of asylum seekers fleeing their countries of origin (and mainly directed to Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Since then, tighter controls on entry have led to a decline in legal arrivals. The closure-oriented reaction of the member states and their politics of zero immigration led to a radical decrease in the number of work and residence permits granted and a rapid increase in the percentages of undocumented migrants crossing the borders into Europe.

Today, much regular labour migration favours highly skilled professional or business migration, especially intercompany transfers, which are generally welcomed as economically beneficial. Exceptional demand in some sectors, notably IT, might justify specific measures, such as those extended by the UK and German governments. In some unskilled sectors, the use of illegal labour is characterised by low wages and low levels of job protection. Before the 1970s, the flow of immigrants to most European countries had been driven primarily by regular labour demand. Since the 1970s, immigrant flow has mainly comprised spouses, dependants, students, asylum seekers. In France, for example, family reunification accounts for three-quarters of the

overall number of new arrivals, usually women – leading to new, 'feminised' migration flows.

In general, Europe has been receiving variable but large net immigration flows, both regular and undocumented, for many years. Dealing with the concept of 'Europe' means dealing with a range of diverse and historically different realities. Many European countries have sustained a historically stable pattern of migration from their ex-colonies, a flow that was often encouraged by legal concepts of shared citizenship and rights of residency or by the receiving country's need for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Other countries such as the so-called 'Mediterranean pole' and Ireland have instead switched fairly recently from being countries of emigration to being countries of immigration. In the case of Italy, for example, it has been estimated that in 1998, 9,200 people were granted Italian citizenship.[57] This may not seem such a significant number of people when compared with other European countries but, if the novelty of the immigration phenomenon into the Mediterranean pole is considered, the importance of immigration in terms of identity and social stability cannot be underestimated.[58]

The number of source countries for migrant arrivals has also increased in almost all European countries and their distribution differs considerably across countries. The largest group of foreigners to arrive in Germany, for example, are of Turkish or Eastern European origin. In Italy, the recent inward flow is mainly of Albanian, Eastern European and North African origin and in France and the UK, people from former colonies and territories form an important group of source countries. Cross-country difference in source countries still reflects geographical and historic links but the composition of immigrants by nationality of origin has also changed compared with past migration patterns. Chinese migrants, for example, now constitute a large part of migrants in the European countries. This has clear implications for the prospects of integration. Different groups of migrants will integrate differently in different countries. As a result of this, the European pattern is not completely predictable, first, because of considerable diversity in the ethnic

origin of migrant groups in a given country (which often depends on language, historical links or on the existence of settled family networks) and, second, because of the potential for these groups to integrate within the society of a given country (which depends on both the willingness of the migrant communities to integrate and participate and the willingness and capacity of the receiving country).[59]

As a consequence of the transnational character of immigration and the nature of European borders after the Schengen Agreement (whereby the management of entry and admission in one member state ultimately affects the rest of Europe), new forms of cooperation have been sought. However, European policies on immigration face numerous dilemmas arising from the complexity of international migration as a whole and the complexity of regulating the interests and relations between European member states.

The emergence of European cooperation on immigration and asylum matters

The development of cooperation among EU member states on the matter of immigration is a very recent phenomenon. Before 1974 (at the occasion of the European Council in Paris), immigration matters remained outside the policy domain of the European Union. Intra-Union migration (the free movement of EU citizens to other EU countries) was mentioned in treaties while immigration from extra-Union countries (of third country nationals) was still the domain of nation states and fully regulated by domestic legislation. The move towards increased cooperation started between 1975 and 1985. During this ten-year period, the first glimpses of an increasing dialogue between EU countries on migration policy issues could be observed.

In 1975, the TREVI working group was set up to discuss problems such as terrorism and cross-border criminal activities, with the stated aim of creating a new form of intergovernmental cooperation between the Home Affairs ministers of the member states. The working group was organised outside both the European

Commission and European Parliament framework and was not concerned with further Europeanisation of immigration policy. In 1985, however, the first steps towards intergovernmental cooperation in immigration were taken. In a communication by the European Commission to the European Council, 'Guidelines for a Community Policy' were established and proposed for the first time. In response to the EC communication, on 16 July 1985, the Council published the resolution that increased consultation and cooperation among the member states and the Commission was to be sought regarding migration policy. The importance of this document was reinforced by the European Court of Justice's pronouncement that the Commission could adopt a binding decision in order to organise a consultative procedure. The new resolutions and the creation of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration in 1986 set the background for cooperation and dialogue among the member states. The activities of the Ad Hoc Group, however, were still predicated on the 'threat' posed by asylum seekers, international migrants and transnational criminal activities and focused on the 'securitisation' of immigration.[60] The Ad Hoc Group not only brought together the Justice and Home Affairs ministers of the EU countries to discuss immigration and border control policies but also saw, for the first time, the participation of the European Commission as a supranational observer.

Increasing dialogue led to the formulation of a number of policy recommendations and intergovernmental agreements. Among the most important were the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and the Dublin Convention for asylum and visa issues in 1990. While the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of controls at the common EU borders was only fully implemented in 1995 (because of the challenges in including the most 'porous' borders of Europe – Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal), the Dublin Convention, which made the state responsible for examining asylum applications lodged in one of the member states, proved incredibly difficult to implement because of the lack of full commitment and organisation of member states. After its introduction in 1998, it was replaced by new rules. Meanwhile, the emphasis on borders and external controls brought to

the fore by the Schengen Agreement facilitated the perception of immigration as a destabilising and dangerous challenge to Western Europe. The explicit privileging of EU nationals in contrast to third country nationals, and the generally restrictive regulation of migration, also contributed to a wider process which 'delegitimised' the presence of immigrants and asylum seekers.[61]

Despite the establishment of dialogue and consultation, substantive cooperation between member states on immigration made little progress. The first stages of European intergovernmental dialogue also assumed a rather one-sided structure. As a result, security and technology discourses permeated the Europeanisation of migration policy, concentrating on the emergent threat created by mass migration, with little consideration for the human rights of immigrants. Security policy often revolves around an approach to 'mediated belonging', strengthening and shaping identity by posing the existence of an 'existential threat' and then regulating it, and the identity which opposes it, through clearly defined boundaries.

New developments in intergovernmental cooperation: Maastricht

The 1992 Treaty on the European Union (TEU, the Maastricht treaty) formalised European cooperation on immigration matters. Title VI of the Treaty brought immigration policy into the institutional structure of the European Union. The TEU was organised in a system of three 'pillars' in order to preserve the intergovernmental nature of sensitive policy areas while at the same time incorporating them into a 'European' framework.[62] Through the TEU, EU competence was established in the field of justice and home affairs, which covered nine areas of extreme sensitivity that were identified as in the 'common interests' of the member states (immigration policy, combating drugs and fraud, asylum, external borders policy on third country nationals, customs cooperation and police and judicial cooperation).[63] The inclusion of immigration alongside illegality and criminal activities demonstrates how, since its inception, the European policy discourse on immigration has been shaped by security concerns.

The Treaty, rather than placing immigration within the already existing framework of the EC, created a new third pillar that was more intergovernmental in nature. (The second pillar was 'a common foreign and security policy'.) In the third pillar, the Commission's and Parliament's roles were somewhat restricted to the provision of recommendations and decisions rather than directives. However, the Commission's role was new in that it shared a right of initiative in a considerable portion of Justice and Home Affairs matters. This allowed the EC to be represented in deliberations and engage in policy discussions rather than acting purely as an observer. Despite the higher level of involvement of the Commission, however, national resolutions were dominant and decisions were to be adopted by unanimity (which made deliberation and decision-making much more difficult).

Among the measures adopted in the area of justice and home affairs was an agreement on the interpretation of the definition of refugee of article 1A of the Geneva Convention (1996);[64] resolutions on asylum procedures and concepts of safe countries to which to return asylum seekers (1992); attempts to harmonise measures to combat undocumented immigration and illegal employment. The effectiveness and strength of these measures, however, was disputable. Intergovernmental decision-making very often brings about policies that are the result of hard fought compromises between conflicting interests rather than strong, targeted and long-term policies.

Despite the clear step forward made by the Treaty of Maastricht, progress towards the Europeanisation of immigration matters has continued to be undermined by the difficulties of implementation. The TEU's main innovation – intergovernmental decision-making – soon became the main obstacle to the process of decision-making itself. Bureaucratic inertia, conflicting interests and priorities, lack of commitment to the proposed measures and difficulty in reaching agreements meant that the EU immigration policy regimes lacked a series of clear objectives and an effective timetable for implementing the proposed measures. The unanimity rule, in particular, rendered the decision-making process time-consuming, and often impossible.

As member states' priorities differed considerably, their commitment to cooperation was also diverse.

The dissimilar national approaches to cooperation on immigration matters derived from the different national needs and diverse status of immigration in the member countries. The diversity of migration patterns and their unpredictability provoked a similar diversity in the elements of migration policy. There were also divergent national aims, not necessarily contradictory, in national policy in Europe and other developed countries. While France was concerned with integration, multiculturalism and the gradual rise of the far right, the UK was reluctant to cooperate, keen to preserve national decision-making powers and sovereignty on the right of admission and management of border control. The new countries of immigration (Italy, Spain, Ireland and Greece), on the other hand, were struggling to create efficient policies with which to respond to the new immigration flows from the South and the East. As a consequence, most member states voiced the concern that the new model of intergovernmental negotiations might not have been the solution and necessitated revision: lack of transparency[65] and democratic deficit were among the criticisms made. Not surprisingly, the debate on supranational decision-making versus intergovernmental decision-making arose, and was transformed into the question of how far a Europeanisation of immigration could or should eventually extend.

The road towards a Communitarisation of migration matters – from Amsterdam to Laeken

In order to address the new challenges at hand, the negotiations of 1996–7 (the Amsterdam treaty) decided for the inclusion of migration policies into the treaty as title IV: 'Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons'. This meant that immigration and asylum were switched to the first pillar and became subject to EU procedures for cooperation. The strengthened cooperation established by this treaty demonstrated the increased will of the member states to work together, and shifted migration policy from national domain to supranational objective.

The European Parliament was also to play a more extensive role. The UK, Denmark and Ireland[66] were the 'opt-outs' to the cooperation in the area of free movement, asylum and immigration although they retained the right to opt in to any measures. Despite the fact that, in principle, a movement was made from intergovernmental cooperation to actual supranational governance, intergovernmental decision-making nonetheless remained the *modus operandi* (and will be until at least 2004). The dilemma created by the dual character of the European Union, the national and the transnational, was graphically illustrated.

Following the Amsterdam treaty, TEU states that it is the aim of the EU to 'maintain and develop the Union as an area of *freedom, security and justice*, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum [and] immigration' (article 2). The emphasis on borders was clear in the Amsterdam treaty and the association of asylum and immigration with border controls and security strengthened the ongoing process of securitisation of the immigration policy discourse in Europe. The Amsterdam treaty called for the establishment of measures on the crossing of external borders, on temporary protection of refugees, conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals, asylum procedures, and on combating undocumented immigration. Measures related to Schengen were also incorporated in the treaty (a common visa list, abolition of internal border checks, etc). The strengthened cooperation was said to be established in order to face a 'major public concern' given the rising number of immigrants and asylum seekers landing on European shores but was also an attempt to strengthen European identity and bring the activities of the Union closer to European citizens. The association of European identity and regulation of immigrants' entry was a key feature of the treaty. The re-establishment and strengthening of European and national identity politics in opposition to the threatening presence of foreigners underscored the rhetoric of security, inclusion and exclusion.

Despite correcting some of the inconsistencies of the Maastricht

treaty, the Amsterdam treaty still kept the role of the European Court of Justice on immigration and asylum matters powerless and dependent on national provisions. The attempt to establish an area of 'freedom, security and justice' seemed to focus mainly on security and control, reflecting the existing national policy preferences of the European countries with older traditions of immigration control. At the same time, however, the treaty strengthened the public perception of immigration as a threat. Migration has become a meta-issue, a phenomenon that could be referred to as the cause of many problems.[67] Heightened economic and social fears among Europeans justified the adoption of a certain type of discourse. Control (both within the country of destination and at the European borders) and integration soon became the main concerns of European policy-makers.

The measures proposed at Amsterdam were subsequently transformed into an action plan adopted at the Vienna European Council in 1998.[68] The more influential role of Justice and Home Affairs, upgraded to a Directorate General, was to be seen in the following period when more significant steps towards cooperation were made.

In 1999, the Tampere European Council on Justice and Home Affairs became a landmark in the development of a common EU policy. The European Council and member states committed themselves to maintain the objectives set by the Amsterdam treaty and the Vienna action plan and identified the following elements as central to a common EU policy on immigration and asylum.

1. Partnership with countries of origin

Partnership with third countries and respect of human rights and development issues in the countries of origin of the migrants are seen as successful elements in the establishment of a policy aimed at promoting codevelopment. Through the work of the High Level Working Group, action plans for cooperation were developed with numerous sending countries.

2. A common European asylum system

The Council called for the application of the Geneva Convention to provide a uniform status for those who are granted asylum. New provisions were 'common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of the refugee status'.[69]

3. Fair treatment of third country nationals

The Council called for a better integration policy aimed at granting third country nationals who are legally resident in EU territories rights comparable to those of EU citizens. Member states were encouraged to draw up national programmes against racism and xenophobia and to approximate their national legislations on the legal status of long-term residents from third countries to that of the member states' nationals. Finally, the Council requested rapid decisions by the Council (on the basis of the Commission's proposals) on the admission and residence of third country nationals, taking into account the individual situations of each member state and of the country of origin of the migrant.

4. Need for a more efficient management of migration flows

The Council called for the development (in cooperation with sending countries) of information campaigns aimed at discouraging illegal immigration and campaigns against trafficking and human smuggling. It also called for increased cooperation at the external borders.

Two years after the Tampere discussions, significant agreements were reached. In the area of asylum, the European Refugee Fund was established to support member states in their efforts to receive asylum seekers, to facilitate the integration of refugees and assist with voluntary return. From the point of view of the security rationale, these three activities of the Refugee Fund are essential to maintaining international control over the current flows of refugees. The bases for the development of EURODAC, a centralised system for comparing

fingerprints of asylum seekers were also laid out. Legislation was adopted to establish a system for sharing responsibility for refugee protection in situations of mass influx (and exemplified by the Dublin Convention). In 2001, the European Parliament committed 10 million euros to implementing the action plan. A number of individual countries have become engaged in providing assistance to sending countries; for example, Italy and Albania have been cooperating to reduce illegal immigration across the Adriatic Sea through joint patrols, apparently with some success: 46,000 unauthorised migrants were detected arriving in Italy in 1999; 18,000 in 2000; and 7,500 in 2001.[70]

Other proposals were put forward and are still subject to negotiation. Integration policies, better apparatus for processing and comparing information and assistance with voluntary return were part of the new security dialogue between the European Union and member states. Quotas and explicit closure (characteristic of national governments' responses to immigration) were no longer the leitmotif of immigration policy discourse. European responses tended instead to focus on mechanisms for control. The security discourse on immigration changed focus, but overall remained the same.

In November 2000, The European Commission published separate Communications on a common asylum policy and on implementing a more proactive common immigration policy focused on the need for additional labour migration to the EU.[71] In the latter, the Commission presented detailed proposals for conditions of entry, residence and employment of third country nationals. It also proposed social, demographic and economic criteria on the basis of which each individual member state should make its decisions on the quotas of labour migrants needed for a given year. This proposal aimed to balance the individual needs of member states against the reality of growing numbers of migrants entering the EU every year, and to establish a model of managed labour migration which favoured entry via legal routes. At the same time, conditions of entry and residence for people migrating for family reunification were set out.

The implication of the shift was that labour shortages and the demands of competitiveness were challenging the dominance of security and control. The policy framework means that workers are allowed to enter, if skilled or temporary, according to strict national quotas and within a background of increased security and closure. In both policy areas, the Commission proposed an 'open method of coordination' that will provide 'the necessary policy mix to achieve a gradual approach to the development of an EU policy, based in a first stage at least on the identification and development of common objectives to which it is agreed that a European response is necessary'.[72] The method entails the Council's adoption of common guidelines on policy, and leaves responsibility for implementation with individual member states approximating national legislation. Common policies will therefore only emerge through the convergence of national policies.

This method of coordination probably reflected a realistic assessment of member states' willingness to allow national policies to be shaped by an EU-wide framework. While the policy represented a significant step forward, the processes through which genuine collaboration in the management of migration flows could develop remained as unclear as ever. The harmonisation of national policies remains difficult to achieve, given the complexity of the changes needed and the sensitivity of the issues.

For example, whose responsibility is it to decide who is admitted and who is refused entry within individual countries? Conditions of entry have always been the domain of nation states, and shifting national control to supranational governance is proving to be a complex issue. An open method of coordination would determine that, once common guidelines are agreed, nation states would still be able to decide on the quotas of migrants to admit and to exercise the guidelines in their own ways. However, national choices about who to admit and how to do so will inevitably impact on other member states, while anxieties about the loss of national sovereignty persist. As a result, the road to Europeanisation seems highly uncertain.

The resurgence of security concerns

It is worth noting that cooperation in the area of combating undocumented immigration and human trafficking has been very active, particularly since September 11th 2001. Those events have exacerbated social fears about security and identity generated by the presence of undocumented migrants. For example, COM(2001) 743 final expresses the need to regulate the link between immigration (in particular asylum) and terrorism in the aftermath of September 11th.[73] The paper aims to 'assess the adequacy of the internal security related provisions in EC legislation and (future) Commission proposals for Directives in the Asylum and Immigration field'.[74] It argues:

> Conclusion 29 invites the Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding *internal security* and complying with *international protection* obligations and instruments . . . . It is legitimate and fully understandable that Member States are now looking at reinforced security safeguards to prevent terrorists from gaining admission to their territory through different channels. These could include asylum channels, though in practice terrorists are not likely to use the asylum channel much, as other illegal channels are more discreet and more suitable for their criminal practices. Any security safeguard therefore needs to strike a proper balance with the refugee protection principles at stake [emphasis added].[75]

If the conceptualisation of immigration as a threat to security was already a feature of European debate, September 11th has helped to ensure that 'securitisation' of migration and combating illegality have become top priorities.[76] Recent estimates claim that up to 500,000 foreigners a year enter the EU illegally, and there are believed to be three million unauthorised foreigners living in Europe.[77] In September 2001, a French proposal to establish common penalties for traffickers was accepted and adopted by the Council. Plans to combat trafficking have been established through initiatives such as the

Blair–Amato plan (trafficking in the Balkans) and have enjoyed the approval of most European leaders. At the Seville Summit in June 2002, 'securitisation' of immigration was high on the agenda.

> Border controls are bound up with asylum policies, *security* is linked to ensuring *fair treatment* for all, and the effectiveness of various decisions and measures within the EU depends on relations with non-member countries and on development cooperation too.
>
> (Romano Prodi, speech at the Seville Summit, June 2002)

In addition to measures aimed at curbing illegal immigration and developing a common asylum policy, EU policy-makers at Seville also endorsed a study from the Italian government on closer cooperation among the national border guards in the member states.

Where are we now?

The measures arising from Amsterdam and Tampere, and the new legislative instruments that they imply, point towards important new forms of collaboration between member states and the EU. But the open method of coordination combined with the requirement of unanimity in intergovernmental decision-making has made progress very slow. At the Laeken European Council in 2001, members agreed on the need to accelerate progress towards a common policy. But the proposals put forward simply rehearsed familiar issues, particularly security, but declaring a renewed interest in curbing illegal immigration, determining refugee status, applying the Dublin Convention, agreeing common standards on family reunification and asylum procedures and generating plans to combat the emergence of xenophobia.

The Laeken proposals were, in effect, a restatement of the Tampere deliberations. They did not suggest tangible solutions to the problem of generating faster and more effective agreements. Commitment to progress in immigration management survives but substantive changes in decision-making procedures, such as a move towards Qualified Majority Voting, have not yet been made.

These issues have received active attention from the Greek presidency of the EU (during the first half of 2003), which has established an Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI) to generate new ideas and seek ways to progress the agenda. The Greek foreign minister, George Papandreou, recently described the need to 'control borders' but also observed that the European Union should outline the value of 'controlled immigration'. He said the presidency's target would be the creation of 'a single set of uniform practices thus ensuring a balanced and long-term management of the immigration phenomenon'.[78] This more recent agenda highlights the growing importance of an agenda for *managing* migration flows for the sake of social and economic benefit, and the simultaneous difficulty of doing so in the context of current concerns for security. The attention paid by the Greek presidency may produce some real progress on issues like family reunification.

In 2004 (after the five-year trial period set by the Amsterdam treaty) the Commission may find itself having a greater impact on setting the agenda and initiating policy. Currently both Commission and member states are complaining about the fact that the present shared right of initiative has produced a 'ballooning' of initiatives, many of which are incompatible with each other. The basic problem seems to be that effective cooperation and diverse initiatives are unlikely to combine successfully without *a shared vision*.[79] A growing number of member states may be persuaded that giving exclusive right of initiative to the Commission is increasingly desirable. The Commission may well push for qualified majority decision-making in order to play its own brokering role more successfully. Whether or not this occurs, the end of the five-year trial period is likely to result in more sweeping changes to the whole field of immigration policy.

Prospects of success: Europe's longer-term dilemmas

The shift towards a stronger pan-European approach towards migration is not in doubt. It is occurring, although often in very gradual and faltering ways. The real question is not whether Europe

will ultimately become the main actor in the management of migration flows, but how successfully it will do so. The detailed history of European policy helps to show that passing new laws and reaching common framework agreements may do little in reality to create organisational systems actually capable of handling the complexities and dilemmas presented by European migration. In a situation where Europe's physical borders are expanding, and the complexity of migration flows is increasing simultaneously, European policy-makers face five main challenges.

1. The ambiguity of national versus transnational management

Despite the proposed common immigration and asylum policy, the reality of decision-making is paradoxical. The duality of European integration – the mix between intergovernmental decision-making and supranational law – has developed so that, on the one hand, the supranationalisation of free movement has limited the competence of nation states while, on the other, intergovernmental decision-making on immigration and asylum has strengthened the authority of national executives because of the flexibility of coordination and the requirement of unanimity. The combined effect may be to reinforce the tendency towards a national emphasis on control because of ever-increasing mobility and unrestrained movement, while limiting the potential for promising methods of joint management to emerge. One challenge, therefore, is to understand how new combinations of common standards and organisational flexibility might actually begin to work in practice.

2. Unpredictability of key trends

The unpredictability, diversity and transnational character of immigration has made the existing policy labels and categories increasingly irrelevant. The effect is often to clog up judicial systems and undermine instruments for returning migrants to countries of origin. The absence of clear understanding of transnational migration and the urgency of establishing 'control' over short-term flows creates

major difficulties in balancing human rights against security, and in maintaining the credibility of existing management systems.

3. The criminogenic side-effects of official policies

Growing emphasis on the *securitisation* of immigration is leading to the development of increasingly efficient mechanisms of control, but has also led to an increase in clandestine migration. Some critics now argue that European governments have made legal migration beyond certain very narrow groups 'virtually impossible'.[80] However, widespread condemnation goes nowhere if it does not produce alternatives. The real question is how a more comprehensive approach to handling voluntary migration flows and protecting human rights might help lessen the underlying pressure on security and control systems, rather than simply replace it as a concern. Policies need to contain and gradually reduce fear if sustainable long-term management of immigration is to be achieved.

4. Adjustment of national health systems

The approximation of national health systems to accommodate the needs of migrants and asylum seekers is increasingly important. New health hazards have been introduced to Europe with increased flows of people and national health systems are often not equipped to deal with them. In 1999, the Directors-General of the World Health Organization and the International Organisation for Migration signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Geneva to strengthen collaboration aimed at improving the health of migrants. National governments, however, are still struggling to approximate health systems, guarantee basic health services to new migrants and cope with the health hazards introduced by new flows of people. Recent media coverage has underlined the increasing threat of epidemics created by migration flows, perhaps in irresponsible ways.[81]

5. Increased complexity of the European context

Enlargement of the EU and the accession of Malta, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and

the Slovak Republic in 2004 will exacerbate the dilemmas of cooperation, agreement and sovereignty even further, while probably contributing to higher rates of people flow, though not as much as some are currently predicting.

The European approach to migration – a combination of intergovernmental decision-making and supranational law – has produced an uneasy mix of interdependence and de facto national control. Migration exemplifies the struggle to find common responses to increasingly diverse phenomena across the whole of Europe, without succumbing to the rigidity of traditional governance methods. If Europe wants to grow in economic dynamism and positive influence in the wider world, it has to be able to manage its various kinds of interaction at very high volumes, including people flow. Only when the dilemma of higher mobility leading to greater desire for national boundary control is resolved will it be possible for Europe and European governments to shift from temporary measures and efforts at control towards more proactive and holistic policies capable of managing mass migration and encouraging peaceful coexistence simultaneously.

Notes

1 'The Declaration of The Hague on the Future of Refugee and Migration Policy' offered to Kofi Annan in autumn 2002 by the Netherlands Chapter of the Society of International Development; the Berne Initiative, the International Symposium on Migration in Berne, 14–15 June 2001, organised by the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees; the Athens Migration Policy Initiative, initiated by the Greek Foreign Ministry as part of Greece's EU Presidency during 2003; the proposals for new 'protection zones' developed by the British government and put forward in early 2003 ('UK asylum proposals draw mixed response', *Financial Times*, 29 and 30 Mar 2003).

2 S Pedersen, 'Migration to and from Denmark during the period 1960–97' in D Coleman and E Wadensjo (eds), *Immigration to Denmark* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1999).

3 JC Van Ours and J Veenman, *The Netherlands: old emigrants – young immigrant country*, Discussion Paper 80 (Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour, 1999).

4 Coleman and Wadensjo, *Immigration to Denmark*.

5 H Overbeek, 'Toward a new international migration regime: globalisation, migration and the internationalisation of the state' in R Miles and D Thranhardt (eds), *Migration and European Integration: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion* (London: Pinter Publ., 1995), p15.

6 H Mattila, 'Protection of migrants' human rights: principles and practice', *International Migration*, 38(6) (2000): 53–71.

7 The term 'internationally displaced person' is not an established definition in the migration debate. We use it in a similar sense to that of 'internally displaced person', meaning somebody who has been forced to leave their home because of environmental disruption, economic crisis or other events,

but who has crossed an international border in so doing. Refugees, whose definition is founded on a fear of persecution, are therefore an important subset of this group, but this group may also overlap with the flows of voluntary migrants following self-directed, self-reliant paths.

8   B Santel, 'Loss of control: the build-up of European migration and asylum regime' in Miles and Thranhardt, *Migration and European Integration: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion.*

9   A refugee is understood to be a person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular political organisation.

10 As head of the Netherlands Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers I saw too many asylum seekers who entered our centres as proud, self-reliant and energetic people, despite the trauma or disorientation caused by their experiences, gradually lose self-respect and self-confidence and become increasingly dependent on aid workers and doctors. Not being

able to channel your energy and talents into creating a new perspective for oneself and one's family can rob many men and women of their physical and mental health. Being unable to prevent this was the most difficult aspect of a wonderful job (Theo Veenkamp).

11 The role of the informal economy is explored further in chapter 7.

12 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001. Available at: www.oecd.org.

13 UN Population Division. Available at: www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm.

14 D Held, 'Democracy: from city-states to a cosmopolitan order?' in RE Goodin and P Pettit (eds), *Contemporary Political Philosophy: an anthology*, Part 1 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997).

15 Coleman and Wadensjo, *Immigration to Denmark.*

16 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Trends in International Migration: continuous reporting system on migration, annual report,* Sopemi edn (Paris: OECD/OCDE, 2001), p13.

17 An important premise to this section, however, needs to be that international migration statistics are very often scattered, of varying degrees of reliability and subject to problems of comparability. These difficulties mainly derive from the diversity of migration systems and legislations on nationality and naturalisation, which reflect the

individual history and circumstances of each country.

18 UN Population Division.

19 S Castles, 'International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century: global trends and issues', *International Social Science Journal*, 52(165) (2000): 269–81.

20 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trends in International Migration*, pp17–18.

21 UN Population Division, *International Migration Policies 1995* (New York: UN, 1996).

22 Eurostat, 'Migration keeps the EU population growing' in *Statistics in Focus: population and social conditions* (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 2002).

23 3.7 per 1,000 persons – *Eurostat Yearbook* (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2001).

24 Eurostat, 'Migration keeps the EU population growing'.

25 Ibid.

26 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trends in International Migration*, p21.

27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Trends in International Migration*.

28 UNHCR 2002. Available at: www.unhcr.ch.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Policy Brief, *International Mobility and the Highly Skilled* (Paris: OECD, 2002). Available at: www.oecd.org/pdf/M00033000/M00033638.pdf.

32 T Faist, 'Transnational social spaces out of international migration: evolution, significance and future prospects', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 39(2) (1998): 213–47.

33 A Richmond, 'Globalisation: implications for immigrants and refugees', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25(5) (2002): 707–27.

34 *OECD Observer*, Oct 2002. Available at: www.oecdobserver.org.

35 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: The case of central and eastern Europe*, Sopemi edn (Paris: OECD, 2001).

36 J Salt and J Stein, 'Migration as a business: the case of trafficking', *International Migration*, 35(4) (1997): 467–94, cited from p467 (emphasis added).

37 Interpol. Available at: www.interpol.int.

38 UN Office on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Available at: www.unodc.org/odccp/index.html.

39 UNICEF. Available at: www.unicef.org.

40 International Organisation of Migration, *Trafficking in Migrants.* Special issue for the European Conference on Preventing and Fighting Trafficking in Human Beings, Sept 2002. Available at: www.iom.int.

41 M Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell Publications, 1996).

42 Richmond, 'Globalisation: implications for immigrants and refugees'.

43   International Organisation of Migration, *World Migration Report* (Geneva: IOM, 2000).

44   European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Available at: www.ecre.org.

45   See Appendix for a more detailed analysis.

46   N Davies, *A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

47   T Veenkamp, 'Into the third millenium: the need for societal innovations'. Unpublished paper prepared for the symposium Europe into the Third Millennium organised by the University of Exeter, 9–12 April 1992, under the auspices of UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the Vienna Academy for the Study of the Future.

48   R Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (London: Demos and the Foreign Policy Centre, 2001).

49   For example, see T Bentley, B Jupp and D Stedman Jones, *Making Sense of Depoliticisation* (London: Demos, 2000).

50   I Christie, *Sustaining Europe: a common cause for the European Union in the new century* (London: Demos and Green Alliance, 1999).

51   M Leonard, *Politics Without Frontiers: the role of political parties in Europe's future* (London: Demos, 1997).

52   R Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order*.

53   P Bobbitt and M Howard, *The Shield of Achilles: war, peace and the course of history* (London: Knopf, 2002).

54   N Davies, *A History*.

55   These challenges are explained in detail in the Appendix.

56   Caritas Roma, *Dossier Statistico: emigrazione* (Roma: Nuova Anterem SAS, Oct 2002).

57   Ibid.

58   One could also consider that the small percentage of migrants in Italy (ca. 2.2% of the overall population) coupled with the high percentage of migrants' entries into Italy (documented and undocumented) could be explained by the fact that many migrants see Italy as a passage to the North, to France and Germany and, ultimately, Britain.

59   J Coppel, J Dumon and I Visco, *Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences*, Economic Department Working Papers, no. 284 (Paris: OECD, 2001). Available at: www.oecd.org/eco/eco.

60   J Huysmans, 'Migrants as a security problem: dangers of "securitising" societal issues' in Miles and Thranhardt, *Migration and European Intergration*.

61   J Huysmans, 'The European Union and the securitisation of migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5) (2000): 751–77.

62   The Treaty of Maastricht, which came into effect in 1993, set up the European Union comprising three pillars, which are the categories encompassing the various areas where the Union is active to varying degrees and in different ways. Pillar One – the European Community and its legislation (those policy areas which remain subject to

unanimity and which include taxation, industry, culture, regional and social funds and the framework programme for R & D). Pillar Two – a common foreign and security policy (which comes under article V of the EU Treaty) and Pillar Three – cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (article VI of the EU treaty). Pillars Two and Three are based on intergovernmental cooperation – the Council is the decision-maker as well as the promoter of initiatives.

63 The ninth area, visa policies, was included in the first pillar.

64 According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is a person who 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country'.

65 S Collinson, *Europe and International Migration* (London: Pinter Publ., 1993).

66 Denmark is a Schengen signatory but is in opposition to the potential for supranationalisation in the new title IV while the UK and Ireland are not signatories to Schengen.

67 J Huysmans, 'The European Union and the securitisation of migration'.

68 The Treaty of Vienna came into force in 1999.

69 Presidency conclusions, Oct 1999. Available at:

http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/Load Doc.asp?BID=76&DID=59122&f rom=&LANG=1.

70 *Migration News*, 2002. Available at: http://migration.ucdavis.edu/ mn/index.html.

71 This time we see the security concern being articulated through the use of the 'legal/illegal' dichotomy and other linguistic classifiers of migrant typologies.

72 COM(2001)387 final, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy*, 11 July 2001, p5. Available at: www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/ com/pdf/2001/com2001_ 0387en01.pdf.

73 COM(2001) 743, Commission Working Document, *The Relationship Between Safeguarding Internal Security and Complying with International Protection Obligations and Instruments* (European Commission, Brussels, 5 Dec 2001). Available at: www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/ committees/econ/20020319/7437 43en.pdf.

74 Ibid., p6.

75 Ibid.

76 Though it is worth asking to what extent the *securitisation* of migration discourse itself provokes fear, thus creating the potential for a vicious cycle.

77 *Migration News*, May 2002. Available at: http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/ index.html.

78 Available at: www.greece.gr.

79   E Ucarer, 'From the sidelines to the Centre stage: sidekicks no more? The European Commission in Justice and Home Affairs', *European Integration Online Papers*, 5(5) (2001). Available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/.

80   N Harris, *Thinking the Unthinkable: the immigration myth exposed* (London: I.B. Tauris Publisher, 2002).

81   A Browne, 'The secret threat to British Life: New Labour has been importing killer diseases', *Spectator*, 25 Jan 2003: 12–13.