

the power gap  
an index of  
everyday power  
in Britain

---

DANIEL LEIGHTON

DEMOS

## Open access. Some rights reserved.

As the publisher of this work, Demos wants to encourage the circulation of our work as widely as possible while retaining the copyright. We therefore have an open access policy which enables anyone to access our content online without charge.

Anyone can download, save, perform or distribute this work in any format, including translation, without written permission. This is subject to the terms of the Demos licence found at the back of this publication. Its main conditions are:

- Demos and the author(s) are credited
- This summary and the address *www.demos.co.uk* are displayed
- The text is not altered and is used in full
- The work is not resold
- A copy of the work or link to its use online is sent to Demos

You are welcome to ask for permission to use this work for purposes other than those covered by the licence. Demos gratefully acknowledges the work of Creative Commons in inspiring our approach to copyright. To find out more go to *www.creativecommons.org*



---

# contents

---

Acknowledgements	4
Summary	5
Introduction	10
1 Defining power and powerlessness	14
2 Measuring power as capability	27
3 The Power Map	37
4 The power scores	42
5 Power Map constituency rankings	54
Appendix	65
Notes	73
References	76

---

# acknowledgements

---

There are a number of people and organisations that contributed to this research project and report. I would like to thank the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation for their generous generous funding of this project. Particular thanks are also due to Rohit Lekhi and Ricardo Blaug of Research Republic for their ongoing creative input and advice on methodological issues.

At Demos, I am grateful to Richard Reeves for his comments on earlier drafts; to Simon Hampson for his work on the earlier phases of the project; to Giulia Gramola, Maryem Haddaoui and Sarah Kennedy for their invaluable research support; and to Peter Harrington, Beatrice Burks and Claire Coulier for their work on the events associated with the project, publication and press.

Daniel Leighton, December 2009

---

# summary

---

Power is the political currency of the day. All three party leaders now extol the importance of ‘giving power away’, devolving power and empowering people. As Cabinet Office Minister Liam Byrne recently put it: ‘the debate about power and how we create a country of “powerful people” is the real question in modern politics’.<sup>1</sup> David Cameron has pledged a ‘massive, sweeping, radical redistribution of power’.<sup>2</sup> Nick Clegg has written that ‘liberalism’s starting point is the fairer dispersal and distribution of power’.<sup>3</sup>

The animating ideal of this report is that people should have power over their own lives, and the power to shape the society in which they live. But power is unevenly distributed. Britain is divided between those with the financial, educational and political resources to exercise power, and those without. There is a good deal of attention paid to gaps in income, wealth, opportunity and health. Put together, these amount to a gap in power. There are in Britain not one, but ‘two nations’: the powerful and powerless.

League tables of the ‘Most Powerful’ feature regularly in the media: the most powerful people in politics; the most powerful gay people, or Asian women, or in business. There is, it seems, an almost insatiable interest in the power elite. But questions of power and powerlessness are not restricted to the gilded few. Powerlessness disfigures our nation, and weakens our society.

This report and accompanying Power Map (see page 36) measure and map powerfulness and powerlessness in Britain according to parliamentary constituency. The Demos power index will be an open resource for others to undertake their own investigations into the dimensions and distribution of power. Although the range of indicators contained within the index is extensive, it is not exhaustive. A key aim of the research is to inspire others to challenge our definition of power in order to improve collective understanding.

### What makes a person powerful?

There are three key elements in human power: the power to shape one's own life; the power to be resilient in the face of shocks and the arbitrary power of others; and the power to shape the social world. These three elements make up the core *power capabilities* that are measured throughout the power index.

The Power Map—based on the index—illustrates the distribution of eight different indicators of citizens' power gathered into one overall index (for the detailed methodology see pp22-30). The eight power indicators are:

- education
- occupational status
- income
- employment
- freedom from crime
- health
- voter turnout
- marginality of parliamentary seat

A power score is given for each constituency in England, Scotland and Wales. The score is the un-weighted sum of the eight indicators, with a maximum power score of 100. There is also an England power index, which includes three additional factors, for which data only exists in England: perceptions of local influence, a sense of local belonging, and rates of volunteering.

The Power Map depicts the differences in levels of personal power by parliamentary constituency in England, Wales and Scotland. The map provides an overview of the power held by individual citizens. This understanding of power takes in both the power that one has to decide how one's own life will go, as well as power to have a voice in shaping the wider social world. The key concern is people's power to be in control of their own lives.

### Mapping Power

The map illustrates the distribution of power with five bands, ranging from very high to very low levels of power for the people living within each of Britain's 628 constituencies. *Table 1* shows the power scores captured within each band, and the number of constituencies in each band. There will of course be variation within constituencies, but the aggregate

scores show clear patterns that dramatise the power gap, especially between the top and the bottom bands (with 68 and 23 constituencies, respectively).

Table 1 **Constituency power scores by band**

Band	5 Very low	4 Low	3 Medium	2 High	1 Very high
Power score	20-30%	30-40%	40-50%	50-60%	60-70%
No of constituencies	23	116	201	220	68

The power map shows where the most powerful and powerless citizens live; what factors make them score higher; disparities across and within regions; and which political parties represent the powerless and powerful.

### Headline findings include:

- *The Power Gap:* The overall distribution of scores shows a very steep differential, or power gap, at the bottom and the top of the index. Those at the bottom, living in what are, relatively speaking, power deserts, have low overall control over their lives. But those at the very top possess very much more power than not only the least powerful, but also the majority of constituencies that fall in the middle.
- *Power drains and boosters:* the factors that contribute most strongly to draining power away from the low-power areas, and also boosting constituencies up to the top of the power scale, are education, occupational status and political power in the form of seat marginality and voter turnout. Education, workplace power and political power are therefore important areas of focus in terms of moving towards more egalitarian power distribution.
- *Regions:* There is uneven distribution of high power scores in the South East compared with the rest of the UK. The majority of high-scoring constituencies are in the South East, with the home counties figuring particularly strongly at the very top of the first band. However, there are also strong disparities within regions. In contrast, constituencies in the Midlands and North East score consistently in the

lowest two bands, with three Birmingham constituencies appearing in the bottom ten.

- *Political parties:* the Labour party overwhelmingly represents the most powerless areas. Conservative MPs typically represent the most powerful, although there is also a relatively high representation of Lib Dems in the highest-scoring constituencies. There is also a strong relationship between least powerful constituencies and BNP target seats such as Barking, Burnley and Stoke on Trent, all of which score in the low and very low power bands.
- *Lack of local influence:* The key factors that boost power scores are occupation and education. Indeed, there appears to be a negative correlation between perceptions of local influence and overall powerfulness. This suggests that power is about a range of capabilities as much, if not more, as about the encouragement of civic participation at the local level.
- *Voter power:* The disproportionate power given to ‘swing’ voters in marginal constituencies boosts power scores in general. Those living in safe seats that also score poorly in the other categories are subject to a form of double damnation: not only do they lack personal control, they also lack meaningful opportunities to change the wider social and political landscape through a real choice at the ballot box.

Demos is looking at how to close the power gap across its programmes of work — from capabilities and citizenship to the open left and progressive conservatism projects. At a time when all parties pledge to ‘give power away’, the power gap should frame policy making across a number of areas from democratic reform and public health to employee ownership and asset based welfare.

The mission of Demos is to discover and communicate ideas to give more people more power over their own lives and their own environments, and to close the power gap. At a time when all parties pledge to ‘give power away’, the power gap should frame policy across the board. It is easier to talk about devolving or redistributing power. The challenge now, for the whole political class, is to do it.

---

# 1 introduction

---

*Powerlessness is so pervasive in our experience it is rarely noticed as such.*<sup>4</sup> Michael Lerner

The banking crisis and the MPs' expenses scandal symbolise elite power failure: the abuse of and misuse of power by people in powerful positions. Following these events, the devolution of power has become the mantra for all the main party political leaders.

However, thinking about power solely from this elite perspective prevents us from seeing what it means for people to have power in their everyday lives. Indeed, focusing exclusively on the power of elites is disempowering and obscures what might be called the power failures of everyday life. Whether reading the Sunday Times Rich List or Forbes Global Power 100, the effect is of the mass of people gazing through a shop window at a form of power they can never hope to obtain. Power is something 'they have', not something that normal people should worry themselves about. And yet across the UK there are massive disparities in the powers people have to realise their ambitions and aspirations.

The aim of the power index is to democratise ideas of power by looking at the distribution of people's capacities to be the authors of their own lives. To reframe the debate about power—and what constitutes power failure—it is necessary to turn the telescope away from elites to map people's power in their everyday lives. Giving power away has become a welcome pledge from all three parties' leaders. Yet they all speak without a clear notion of people's differential capacities to exercise power in their everyday lives. In the UK's highly centralised political system it is in the gift of government to decentralise its own power, but how does this enhance the power people already possess at home or in the workplace? In an era where social mobility has flat-lined, what capacities do people in different places have to take advantage of the new opportunities for participation and decision-making promised by the all the main parties?

These and other critical questions cannot even be posed where power is exclusively associated with political decision-making and the sole task is that of decentralising government power.

Isaiah Berlin spoke of liberty as a 'protean' concept. The term power is no different; the same word can be used to talk about different things and people inescapably slip from descriptive to ethical claims when talking about power. In the power index, power is defined as the capability to do something – to achieve goals and purposes of one's choosing. Power here concerns people's capacity to be in control of their own lives rather than being totally subject to the vagaries of fate or the arbitrary whims of those with more power.

To ask whether someone is powerful or not is to ask: Are you in control of your own destiny? Power matters because powerlessness has malign and avoidable consequences on people's dignity and physical and mental well-being. This is obvious from a variety of ethical positions and autonomy is a vital principle of most philosophies of justice. Moreover, to be a human agent is to exercise causal powers that produce specific effects in the world; such human powers comprise the transformative capacity that distinguishes humans from animals.

Yet the importance of power and powerlessness is also borne out by the evidence on well-being. Status and control are directly linked to people's life expectancy and susceptibility to morbid disease.<sup>5</sup> Having an internal or external 'locus of control' leads to vicious or virtuous circles; internalising the idea that we cannot control our lives leads to a spiral of disempowerment or 'surplus powerlessness' and the opposite occurs when people think they are powerful, creating 'surplus' power.

The power index draws on the work of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Philip Pettit to anchor its core domains in a set of clear but inclusive values. Sen and Nussbaum have both helped to develop the idea that all people need a basic set of capabilities to lead a dignified, self-authored life. A capability is simply the 'power to do something'. These basic capabilities enable people to pursue their various purposes and conceptions of what makes life valuable, without which that pursuit is frustrated or severely

impeded. Philip Pettit's work on republican conceptions of liberty contributes the complementary insight that everyone would desire to live a non-dominated life – that is a life in which they are free from the arbitrary control of another.

The index is constructed around three core domains to measure people's power: resilience from arbitrary control and unexpected shocks, personal control over our own lives and social control over the environment in which we live. Proxies for powerfulness are developed from a range of different national indicators, the aggregate of which comprises a power score for each constituency. Our focus is on developing proxies for people's power to do things rather than people's power over others, though it is plausible to make a link between the capacity of the most powerful people and those who are in a position to exercise power over others.

The Power Map shows that power is unevenly distributed between and within regions of the UK. This suggests that multiple strategies are needed for helping powerless populations. Those who lack capabilities for resilience are unlikely to have high levels of personal control and even less likely to have capabilities for having a voice in shaping their social world. Like patterns of disadvantage in general, there are 'deserts' of relative powerlessness in too many areas in the UK. It should not be as easy as it is to spot powerlessness on a map. Those at the bottom of the map are blighted because they lack the capability to exercise their power, which negatively reinforces their ability to change their situation.

This power gap raises several questions about approaches to political and socio-economic reform, from localism to equality of opportunity. These include:

- What strategies need to be in place to help 'level up' those who lack power over their lives? How would focusing on raising power capabilities and reducing people's susceptibility to domination differ from existing approaches that focus on income inequality or equality of opportunity?
- What role is there for the state in providing new civic rights to basic power capabilities and what new responsibilities are required of citizens to make these work?
- Should reformers be concerned with reducing the gap between the very bottom and the rest or with the gap between both of these and those at the very top?

- What differences are there between thinking about the problem of the 'super rich' and the 'super powerful? When, if at all, does the power to dominate others result from possessing much higher power capabilities than the rest of the population?
- To what extent does localism and decentralisation help empower those who lack power in core areas of their life such as education and occupation? When do greater opportunities for local participation translate into meaningful forms of power where people are powerless at home and at work?
- Which parties represent the powerful and the powerless and what difference, if any, does this makes to claims to be able to turn around the situation of the powerless?
- How does living in powerless areas increase the attractiveness of extremist parties and what does this tell us about the nature of growing support for them?

---

## 2 defining power and powerlessness

---

*We have a coherent programme to fix our broken politics and drag our democracy into the post-bureaucratic age. It involves a massive, sweeping, radical redistribution of power – from the political elite to the man and woman in the street.*<sup>6</sup> David Cameron

*We should be trying to achieve in Britain a country of powerful people in charge of change; in their communities; in their care; in their self development and the unlocking of their future.*<sup>7</sup> Liam Byrne

Power is a crucial concept for thinking about politics, yet its protean nature makes it an elusive one. Politicians who claim to be ‘empowering people’ can’t be held to account unless the different uses of the term power are clarified. Yet as Steven Lukes, a leading theorist on power, has said, ‘among those who have reflected on the matter, there is no agreement about how to define it... not least because we talk and write all the time in confusingly different ways’.<sup>8</sup>

In daily life people discuss the location of power and its extent, who has more or less, and how to gain, resist, seize, harness, secure, tame, share, spread, distribute, equalise or maximise it. In addition, there are long-running theoretical debates about whether social power should be derived from individual agents or from social structures, and whether it is a ‘zero sum’ game of asymmetrical and conflictual relations between winners and losers, or a ‘plus sum’ communal phenomenon where power is a collective resource more closely related to consensus than conflict.

There are nearly as many different meanings to the word power as there are manifestations of it. How power is defined is controversial and can have significant consequences – it ultimately depends on which specific manifestation of it people are trying to understand.

The Demos power index aims to understand the power people have to be in control of their lives. This entails looking at a particular mode of power — the power of the effective agent to make things happen. This particular usage refers to power in its most generic sense, what Bertrand Russell called ‘the production of intended effects’.<sup>9</sup> For human beings power is at root the ‘ability to pursue and attain goals’.<sup>10</sup> In short, power in social life refers to the capabilities of social agents. A capacious definition that builds on this idea to encompass different modes of power is provided by Lukes, who defines power ‘in terms of agents’ abilities to bring about significant effects, specifically by furthering their own interests and/or affecting the interests of others, whether positive or negative’.<sup>11</sup>

This definition covers three modes of power starting with agents’ capacities to bring about significant effects:

- Power as the capability of an individual or a group to further their own significant interests. This is a form of ‘power to’ achieve a particular goal or objective.
- Power as the authority of an individual, group or organisation to legitimately affect another’s interests. This a form of ‘power over’, which is closely tied to consent, since in advanced western democracies people generally can only legitimately wield power over others with their consent. The standard exception to this is relationships between minors and adults.
- Power of the individual, group or organisation to dominate or subjugate another by arbitrarily and usually negatively affecting their interests. This is a form of ‘power over’ that can occur in asymmetrical relationships between individuals or groups, or between the latter and particular corporate bodies such as the state, churches or business corporations.

The power index focuses exclusively on the idea of power as the ability of people to further their own interests in order to ‘live a life they value’.<sup>12</sup> Thus the index measures people’s ‘power to’ control their own lives rather than people’s ‘power over’ others. In this sense the power index aims to establish the distribution of power and powerlessness in the UK. This leads us to measure ‘powerfulness’ and ‘powerlessness’ in terms of the capabilities one needs to live a life of one’s own choosing.


The Power Map constructed from the index shows geographical disparities in the power individuals have in the UK. The focus of the Power Map is an overview of the power held by citizens as citizens, rather than the power held as a member of an elite decision-making body. This understanding of power takes in both the power that one has to decide how one's own life will go, as well as power to have a voice in shaping the wider social world. The key concern, then, is not who has power over others, but who has the power to be in control of their own lives.

This focus on powerlessness complements well-known measures that look at the multidimensional nature of disadvantage, notably the index of Multiple Deprivation. However, it has been constructed to look at the relatively powerful as well as the powerless. In turn, by using the term power the aim is to politicise the results — talking of disparities in power rather than deprivation begs question about the distribution of power across society and the role of different institutions and agents in equalising or modifying power capabilities. For this reason, the Power Map analyses power according to Westminster parliamentary constituencies; each constituency is given an overall 'power score'. The higher the score, the more powerful residents are, on average, in this constituency. These scores are then represented visually (by colour coding) on a map of the UK, giving us the Power Map.

As mentioned above, the Power Map is not intended to analyse very powerful elites, or how decisions are made within these elites. Such an analysis would require the kind of methodological analysis of deliberative structures that Robert Dahl pioneered in his *Who Governs?*, and most recently by Bent Flyvbjerg in *Rationality and Power*.<sup>13</sup> In addition there are a wide range of historical and observational research studies of elites such as Anthony Sampson published in his *Who Runs This Place?*.<sup>14</sup>

*Figure 1* provides a conceptual map for thinking about the relationship between different modes of power, encompassing power as capability, power as authority and power as domination. This exemplifies the multidimensional nature of power, while also showing the links between different uses of the term. The power index is concerned with the red boxes in the top half of the diagram rather than the bottom half, whereas a great deal of academic work is usually concerned with the latter.<sup>15</sup>

Figure 1 Different modes of power



The key ingredients to being a powerful person are made up of the power to shape one's own life, the power to be resilient in the face of shocks and the arbitrary power of others, and finally the power to shape the social world. Each of these is expanded further below. Before doing so the concept of powerlessness is clarified.

### Powerlessness

There are two different perspectives when it comes to thinking about powerlessness.<sup>16</sup> The first concerns 'the extent to which citizens have the power to meet their own ends and wants'. The second concerns the extent to which societies 'give their citizens freedom from the power of others'. The first indicates *impotence* or lack of power, the second domination, or being in the power of another. Lack of power and being subject to domination are not the same and need not be found together. It is therefore an error to assume that 'what is wrong if you are powerless is that you are in someone else's power, and that someone else must be responsible for your powerlessness *if you are to have valid complaint*'.<sup>17</sup>

There are multiple reasons why powerlessness — whether in the form of impotence or resulting from domination — is detrimental to human dignity. These can be classified as moral, social and health-related reasons for the malign impact of powerlessness on people. In reality these factors closely overlap.

### Moral reasons

The value of autonomy speaks to the intrinsic worth of treating others as ends rather than means.<sup>18</sup> Numerous philosophers from Kant and Spinoza to John Rawls and Amartya Sen have grounded their accounts of human flourishing in terms of people's capacity for self-determination and self-transformation. Such capacities are viewed across philosophical traditions as a vital component of human identity.

If power is related to capacities for agency, then powerlessness relates to the deprivation of these capacities – whether these are suppressed by another or non-existent in the first place. Michael Lerner encapsulates this notion well when he argues:

*Human beings have a profound need to actualise their capacities for loving, creativity, freedom, solidarity and understanding. People are powerless to the extent that they are prevented either on an individual or social basis, from actualising their human capacities. Real powerlessness refers to the fact that economic, political and social arrangements prevent this actualisation from occurring.<sup>19</sup>*

Lerner makes a useful distinction between real powerlessness and surplus powerlessness. This exemplifies how powerlessness creates vicious circles of disempowerment. Surplus powerlessness refers to the fact that human beings contribute to their existing powerlessness to the extent that their emotional, intellectual and spiritual makeup prevents them from actualising possibilities that do exist. Lerner is clear that surplus powerlessness results from a dynamic relationship with real powerlessness — when people lack power they tend to further disempower themselves by internalising social problems and self-blaming.

Lord Acton's well-known dictum holds that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Yet Lerner argues that powerlessness has its own unique corrupting effects. Power corrupts because it tends to inflate narcissism and hubris, whereas powerlessness corrupts because it deflates people's sense of esteem and tends to lead to alienation, apathy and depression:

*It changes, transforms and distorts us. It makes us different from how we would otherwise want to be. We look at our world and our behaviour, and we tell ourselves that although we aren't really living the lives we want to live, there is nothing we can do about it. We are powerless. In computer language they call this a feedback loop... we who build our own chains are also deeply hurt by them, and truly wish things could be different even as we strengthen those chains.<sup>20</sup>*

### Social reasons

Powerlessness may manifest itself directly in terms of criminal behaviour and alienation toward the social order or more indirectly in terms of mental and physical ailments, which result from the internalisation of blame for what are often socially created problems. The pathologies of surplus powerlessness go beyond the political sphere. They have just as much application to how we might treat someone in a relationship, a stranger on the street or even why there has been so dramatic a rise in cancer and heart disease in the past 50 years.

Take the example of knife crime. A significant number of victims of knife crime have also been perpetrators at some point and the vast majority come from deprived backgrounds.<sup>21</sup> For those that cannot gain status through work and education, being seen as having power

and 'respect' on the street become badges of misplaced pride. Having a knife is perceived as necessary for self-defence and stabbing is seen as a routine aspect of life. Treating other people badly may often be the result of previous surplus powerlessness, particularly the belief that 'everyone will always be hurting each other so we'd better do it first before it is done to us'. But then when we do it first, and other people get hurt, that becomes 'a reason for them to be less trusting, and to act in ways that makes our initial distrust seem justified'.<sup>22</sup> Powerlessness is an important root cause of violent crime creating vicious cycle wherein victims become perpetrators and violence is accepted as a basic fact of life. People adapt to the reality of their situation rather than attempt to change it.

The idea of surplus powerlessness is closely related to the problem of adaptive preferences. This refers to the tendency of people to trim their desires to circumstances rather than shape circumstances according to their desires. Although adjusting aspirations to what is feasible can often be sensible or even desirable, the problem occurs when this is non-autonomous — when a person's shift in desires results from habituation and resignation. This phenomenon was well put by one of Liam Byrne's Hodge Hill constituents: 'When you are stuck in a dead end and not making ends meet, it is impossible to see yourself in a better place.'<sup>23</sup>

Powerlessness is worsened by the fact that in modern societies a normative pressure exists to realise oneself permanently in an original manner. In the highly individualised societies of advanced democracies there is a pressure on permanent self-actualisation, as human beings more than ever before are expected to be the architects of their own fortune. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it, people are increasingly expected to forge 'biographical solutions to socially produced afflictions'.<sup>24</sup> To thrive in a strong culture of individualisation requires 'high degrees of self responsibility and strong belief in available psycho social resources'.<sup>25</sup>

### Health-related reasons

Surplus powerlessness, when internalised, can result in greater stress, and stress can be a direct cause of heart disease and cancer. Work on the social determinants of health shows that the failure to meet fundamental human needs of autonomy, empowerment and human freedom are a potent cause of ill health. The relationship between

low control at work and heart disease provides a profound example of how initial powerlessness can create surplus powerlessness.

Michael Marmot's work on status syndrome demonstrates the impact of powerlessness on health in startling ways. Starting from his study of Whitehall civil servants in the 1980s, he found men second from the top of the occupational hierarchy had a higher rate of heart-related death than men at the top.<sup>26</sup> Men third from the top had a higher rate of death than those second from the top. The perplexing question was 'why, among men who are not poor in the usual sense of the word, should the risk of dying be intimately related to where they stand in the social hierarchy?'

Marmot's work confirmed initial findings from other studies that had disproven the notion that managers at the top of the hierarchy are under more stress than people below them.<sup>27</sup> Evidence showed that stress at work is not caused by how much demand there is, but how much control there is in relation to demand. The key finding was not that those with low control experienced a different physiological stress reaction but that they lacked the capacities to recover from it. Over time the inability to recover from constant stress left lower ranking officials susceptible to fatal heart disease. In later studies Marmot also asked people a question about how much control they had at home. Women who had less control at home had higher risk of heart disease than women with more control. Marmot found this pattern was consistent across different types of occupation and, more surprisingly, across both developed and developing nations.


Both the low-grade civil servant in the UK and the slum dweller in Kenya are more susceptible to fatal disease because they lack control over their lives. Neither has what Amartya Sen calls 'the opportunity to lead lives they have reason to value'. In general, then, social conditions determine the degree of limitation on freedom or autonomy: the greater the limitation, the worse the health.

Improvement of material conditions and basic services explains why the civil servant has better health than the slum dweller. In both cases, however, low social position means decreased opportunity, empowerment and security. Low social position will mean that you will tend to lack whatever is necessary for what Adam Smith called 'taking

your place in public without shame'. What is necessary 'for taking your place in public without shame' could be anything from the right clothes for a job interview, to the type of job one has within an organisation, to having a job in the first place. What is deemed necessary will differ from culture to culture, but the status-based mechanism at work is the same.

A strong link between perceptions of control and subjective well-being has also been made in cross-national studies. People who believe they are able to exert influence over the flow of events show higher levels of self-esteem and perceive their world in a more positive light.<sup>28</sup> In one study adolescents with high levels of control belief reported higher levels of positive attitudes towards life, higher levels of self-esteem and lower levels of depressed mood than did adolescents with lower levels of control expectancy.<sup>29</sup>

Figure 2 **The consequences of powerlessness**



### Other modes of power

#### Authority and domination

In much of the scholarly literature the essence of social power is often taken to be 'power over' — to have power is to have power over another where that power is usually perceived to be exercised in the interests of A over B. Max Weber famously defined social power as 'the probability that one actor within a relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests'.<sup>30</sup>

Yet 'power over' need not always be exercised in a way that is counter to people's interests — think of relationships between parents and children, a judge over

a defendant in court, or the power of a government over citizens elected by a majority of the vote. Part of the problem here is the conflation of power as capability and power as authority with power as domination. The malign and arguably most common connotation of social power – power as domination – refers exclusively to one particular way in which some exercise power over others. This common connotation often obscures the fact that the root meaning of power is simply the ability to produce desired effects in the world.

Power is converted into authority when people recognise its legitimacy – even when it can be exercised in a way that runs counter to their immediate desires. People accept constraints on their own power when they see that constraint issues from a wider principle or set of principles that they agree with. The key example here is that of a losing party in an election accepting the right of the winning party govern. Power and right are here seen as synonymous: power is not only a capacity but a right resting on the consent of those over whom power is being exercised.<sup>31</sup>

The central link between power and the people in a political sense is therefore the extent to which power delegated to representatives is based on the consent of the governed. The Democratic Audit of the UK has sought to establish the extent to which the political system warrants this type of power as authority. The concentration of power in the executive and the distortions caused by the first past the post electoral system are regularly highlighted as issues that question the democratic authority of the UK government.

In contrast to legitimate authority, power as domination occurs when an agent, personal or corporate, is able arbitrarily to exercise intentional influence in helping to shape what some other person or persons do.<sup>32</sup> There is an overlap between domination and authority as both constrain people's choices. The key difference is not the fact of constraint or outside interference in choices but the nature of such interference.

### Power as meaning making

Although power as domination assumes either coercion or compliance, there is a more diffuse but critical modality of power that concerns the creation of meaning and values. This is difficult to measure in an everyday context but an

important exercise of power that affects people in everyday situations. Geoff Mulgan has argued forcefully for the primacy of this dimension of power in reference to the capacity of the state to assume and exercise power, though its primacy arguably applies to any context in which power is exercised:

*The three sources of power (violence, money and trust) together underpin political power, the sovereign power to impose laws, issue commands and hold together a people in a territory... it concentrates force through its armies, concentrates resources through its exchequer and concentrates the power to shape minds, most recently through big systems of education and communication that are the twin glues of modern nation states... Of the three sources of power the most important for sovereignty is the power over the thoughts that give rise to trust. Violence can only be used negatively; money can only be used in two dimensions, giving and taking away. But knowledge and thoughts can transform things, move mountains and make ephemeral power appear permanent.<sup>33</sup>*

Although the inducement one can offer through money should not be underestimated, the capacity to shape meaning and thoughts is undoubtedly the most effective exercise of power. This core insight has been shared by philosophers and political thinkers across centuries. In the sixteenth century Spinoza suggested: 'since as human power must be judged by its strength of mind rather than by vigor of body, it means that those whose reason is most powerful, and who are most guided thereby, are also the most full possessed of their own right'.<sup>34</sup>

The importance of shared meaning for human agency was felt so important by Hannah Arendt that she made a hard conceptual distinction between violence, coercion and power:

*In current usage, when we speak of a 'powerful man' or a 'powerful personality', we already use the word 'power' metaphorically; what we refer to without metaphor is 'strength'. Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated, to begin with (potestas in populo, without a people or group there is no power), disappears, 'his power' also vanishes.<sup>35</sup>*

For Arendt, power is a community resource of shared meanings and values that agents draw on to strengthen the controlled integration of a social group. She argued that tyrannies collapse when the meaning imposed by elites on subordinates breaks down, leading to revolution and the creation of new shared meanings on which a regime is based. A related understanding of power as a shared resource that integrates social order was advanced by the sociologist Talcott Parsons. Parsons argued that consensual power presupposes a shared circulatory medium within the polity, which functions in a manner that is similar to money in the economy.<sup>36</sup> The modern capitalist economy presupposes consensus on meaning of the worth of paper as currency, which facilitates action. At its most basic, the added capacity for action, which actors gain from society, derives from the existence of social order. If social life were entirely a matter of contingency, social power would not exist. If actor A has no capacity to predict the actions of B, then A would be both unable to exercise social 'power over' B or 'power to' act in concert with them.

In the analyses of both Arendt and Parsons, communicative resources are key to the co-production of power in societies. The claims made for the transformative impact of the internet on power refer primarily to a transformation in the distribution of the means of communication. The internet, albeit in a highly uneven manner, facilitates a pluralisation of the capacity for people to articulate new meanings and values, and contest existing ones. Castells argues that when considering communication power in the network society:

*Processes of power making must be seen from two perspectives: on one hand these processes can enforce existing domination or seize structural positions of domination; on the other hand, there also exist countervailing processes that resist established domination on behalf of interests, values and projects that are excluded or under represented in the program and compositions of networks.<sup>37</sup>*

The power of meaning-making has diffused over centuries from the church and the state to the mass media. The most recent shift has occurred within electronic media wherein communication is slowly evolving from messages being sent vertically from the few to the many to people communicating horizontally with each other. The idea of many to many communication is what makes the internet an essentially power spreading rather than power hoarding

mechanism. That said, nearly all media content is still produced by vertically integrated media conglomerates such as those owned by Rupert Murdoch. Moreover such conglomerates not only control content but have significant stakes in the internet service providers and social networking sites that act as gatekeepers in the new world of horizontal, many to many communications. Thus for all its democratising promise, the internet is itself enmeshed in hierarchies of ownership, control and exclusion.

---

## 3 measuring power as capability

---

*A capability is the power to do something... The success of an economy and a society cannot be separated from the lives that members of a society are able to lead... we not only value living well and satisfactorily, but also appreciate having control over our own lives.*<sup>38</sup> Amartya Sen

If powerfulness is about the capacity to further one's significant interests, the question of what constitutes a 'significant interest' becomes critical. Yet this has proven to be one of the most contentious questions in the literature on power. Who is in the best position to determine what a significant interest consists of—the individual in question, the philosopher, the sociologist, the politicians, the physician or perhaps even the think tank researcher?

As argued above, there are a number of different justifications for objectively specifying certain interests as fundamental to human welfare and human flourishing. This welfare approach holds that, whatever the specific list of interests in question, they are not preference dependent: their status as interests of persons does not derive from their being desired by them. As Lukes puts it, 'conditions that damage your health are against your interests, in this sense whatever your preferences, and even if you actively seek to promote them'.<sup>39</sup> The same could be said for conditions that damage or restrict capacities for autonomy.

The works of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Philip Pettit provide a capacious normative framework for the categories of interest that are measured in the power index. Sen and Nussbaum have developed an approach to human welfare that focuses on the idea of a basic set of capabilities that all people need to lead a dignified, self-authored life. These basic capabilities enable people to pursue their various purposes and conceptions of what makes life valuable, without which that pursuit is frustrated or severely impeded. Pettit's ideal of 'non-domination' helps specify an important class of such impediments: those that stem from being subject to the arbitrary power of others. Both the

capabilities approach and the idea of non domination share the view that it is not enough to leave people alone for them to be free – certain back ground conditions need to be in place if this freedom is to be actualised.

### Capabilities

A capability 'is the power to do something'.<sup>40</sup> Capabilities are perceived to be 'the alternative combinations of things a person is able to do or be'.<sup>41</sup> Sen's approach 'focuses on the ability of human beings to lead lives they have reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have'.<sup>42</sup> Whether an individual can lead the life they value depends on their capabilities.<sup>43</sup> Sen has argued that development should be viewed as a process of expanding the 'real freedom' of people. Real freedom, for Sen, consists in the person's 'capability to achieve valuable human functionings'. Hence measuring real freedom in terms of indicators such as life expectancy, literacy and educational attainments, levels of nutrition, access to health care, employment, social respect and political participation are central to assessing how individuals and societies are faring.

Sen's 'real freedom' approach differs from conventional liberal approaches that focus on formal or negative rights without paying attention to people's capability requirements and their material and welfare conditions, which are essential to make an effective use of their rights. The right to free speech and political participation, for instance, would be rendered meaningless if people are uneducated and illiterate. The right to employment would continue to remain a formal right when it is not accompanied by a matching level of skills and talents to derive benefits from it. It therefore becomes imperative to distinguish between having a formal right to something and having the required capacities and conditions to exercise that right effectively in protecting one's interests or pursuing one's goals. In this sense one can argue that capacities are powers to do things rather than merely rights to things. In turn measuring people's power can be seen as the same as measuring certain capabilities.

Capabilities are determined by various factors including personal characteristics and social arrangements. Sen advocates an agent-orientated perspective, as 'with adequate social opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other'.<sup>44</sup>

How an individual chooses to use their capabilities 'is for them to decide'.<sup>45</sup>

But, these opportunities and the capabilities that a person actually has to begin with are very much a matter for social institutions. Sen notes:

*Responsible adults must be in charge of their own well-being; it is for them to decide how to use their capabilities. But the capabilities that a person actually does have... depend on the nature of the social arrangements, which can be crucial for individual freedoms. And there the state and society cannot escape responsibility.*<sup>46</sup>

Sen does not attempt to specify a core list of capabilities valid for all societies as he believes they are context dependent and liable to change over time. However, Martha Nussbaum has constructed a list which she feels is universally necessary for human dignity in contemporary societies. Components from this list of core capabilities have been used to inform the core domains for the power index specified below. The most relevant capabilities from Nussbaum's list for thinking about what it means to be a powerful person include:

- *Bodily health.* Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately nourished... being able to have adequate shelter.
- *Bodily integrity.* Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault... having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
- *Practical reason.* Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life. (This entails protection for liberty of conscience.)
- *Affiliation.* Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognise and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having the capability for both justice and friendship... Being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.

- *Control over one's environment.* (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the rights of political participation, free speech and freedom of association. (B) Material: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others.<sup>47</sup>

### Non-domination

Philip Pettit's ideal of non-domination complements the capabilities approach in that it specifies the need for certain conditions to be in place for people to lead dignified lives: namely what is necessary to prevent someone from what Rousseau called 'living at the mercy of another'. Drawing on the republican tradition of political freedom, Pettit argues that domination *is arbitrary rather than justified interference in people's choices*. Non-arbitrary interference consists in 'tracking the avowable interests' of those it affects. Avowable interests are those that we would offer if we had to justify them in public. The smoking ban in public places is a good example of this type of interest tracking 'power over' others. The upshot of this distinction is that not all forms of interference are arbitrary: domination is a specific, malign form of 'power over' wherein we are subject to the arbitrary whims of another.

Domination may be more or less intense, depending on the ease and severity and arbitrariness of the interference available, and it may be more or less intense, depending on the range of choices affected. When such power is exercised it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties (a boss and employee, a husband and wife, a local gang and local residents) — each will know that the person is dominated and each will know that each knows this. This insight relates to the tendency for asymmetric power relationships to create 'anticipatory reactions' in the weaker party<sup>48</sup> and adaptive preferences.<sup>49</sup>

Importantly, Pettit argues that domination in this sense may occur without actual interference: 'it requires only the capacity for interference' and knowledge that that capacity could be actualised at any moment. The effect of this uncertainty on behalf of the dominated is that they will adapt their choices in a way that anticipates the actions of the stronger party. Those subject to potential interference quickly learn that they need to 'tread a careful path in the neighborhood of the strong'.<sup>50</sup> This concept has important

implications for the notion of power as capability, namely the capabilities needed to ensure robust freedom from the dominating power of others. Such ‘non-domination’ may be advanced in a society either through ‘people coming to have equal powers or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating one another in turn’.<sup>51</sup> As important as removing the capacities of the powerful to dominate can be in equalising power relationships, the focus of the power index is on the capacities people need in order not to make them subject to domination in the first place.

### The power index: domains and indicators

Drawing on Nussbaum and Pettit, three core capability domains are used to construct the power index, with a series of indicators to represent the different facets of the capability they fall under. It is important to keep in mind that the indicators used are proxies for a wider range of capabilities that relate to the power of citizens. They are thus intended to have wider relevance than those that they directly represent, as is shown below. Further information of data sources and the way the data has been used are contained in *Table 1* and in greater detail in the appendix.

#### Power as control over the course of one’s own life

Broadly, this category of power relates to ‘autonomy’, one’s ability to be ‘author of one’s own life’. This incorporates both the power to decide what to do in one’s ‘leisure time’, and the power and autonomy one has in the workplace – over the tasks performed and the conditions of work. The key indicators that act as proxies for this domain are:

- *Education: the level of academic qualifications achieved among working-age population*  
One’s level of education relates to the power that one has to choose the course of one’s own life in two main ways. First, education opens up opportunities, widening the set of options, particularly with regard to careers from which individuals can choose. Second, education also teaches us how to choose prudently between options, and to formulate and pursue rational plans of life.
- *Power in the workplace*  
Most people spend most of their adult lives in a workplace, and so the power that they have in this workplace must be

central to any understanding of the power that individuals have over their lives. This power includes the autonomy over the tasks one performs in work, as well as power over their workplace conditions. Data on the proportions of people in professional and managerial roles compared with those in lower-skilled and 'elementary' work was used to construct this data. However, it must be emphasised that such data can only be used a proxy for workplace power. Our assumption, grounded in the demand-control model, is that those in professional and managerial work will be able to exercise greater autonomy in the workplace, compared with those in unskilled work. Although it seems plausible that this relationship will hold in many cases, it is by no means universally true. For example, some higher professionals may work to very constrictive guidelines from their managers, with very little workplace autonomy despite their high pay and status within their organisation. Yet even in this case such professionals are likely, given their experience, to have the option of moving to another job, which gives them greater autonomy – an opportunity that a worker in a low-skilled or elementary job is unlikely to have.

The data was broken down into nine variables which represent the percentage of working-age constituency population who are working in:

- management or as senior officials
  - professional occupations
  - associate professional and technical occupations
  - administrative and secretarial occupations
  - skilled trades
  - personal service occupations
  - sales and customer service
  - process, plant and machine operative occupations
  - elementary occupations
- *Income: the average household income in a constituency*  
One's level of income is a central determinant of one's choices about the course of one's life. Generally, having more income expands one's set of options. Here the focus is on household income, rather than individual earnings, as this provides a better guide to the personal capabilities and options available to household members (for example, an adult member of a rich household may receive very little income from earnings, but still enjoy a number of options and opportunities as to how they live their life, as a result of the high incomes received by other household members, and shared among the household).

A feminist critique of household-income measures of income level should be noted here; household incomes are not always shared equally among household members, with many female spouses of households being relatively disadvantaged in terms of income compared with their spouses, who remain disproportionately the chief 'bread winners'. Granting the truth in this critique, however, household income still seems a better measure of aggregate and shared consumption opportunities than do individual earnings.

This indicator can also be used as a proxy for other resources, aside from income, which also impact on one's personal power. For example, wealth tends to track income; those households with higher incomes tend to save and invest more. We lack data on the average wealth of households in each parliamentary constituency, but we can use income levels as a proxy for wealth holdings. Wealth tends to increase the power that individuals have to choose their course of their own life; it allows them to borrow more money, using their wealth as collateral, and also to take risks, using their wealth as security in case the risk does not pay off. So although we lack constituency levels of wealth, we can use household income as a rough proxy to fill this 'gap' in our measures of power.

### Power as resilience

This power relates to one's vulnerability to unexpected shocks and crises, and one's ability to withstand them. Closely related to this understanding of power is the extent to which one depends on the arbitrary will of others; if one is very dependent on others, one is more vulnerable to unexpected shocks and crises (for example, what if their support for us, on which we rely, is withdrawn? What if they misuse the power they have over us, on which we depend?)

The key indicators that act as proxies for this domain are:

- *Health: the incidence of work-limiting illness or disability*  
Being ill and disabled to a degree that limits one's ability to work severely limits one's power as resilience for two reasons. First, being long-term ill or disabled is itself a major crisis, and so the differential rates of long-term illness and disability across the country give some indication of the risk of incurring this disadvantage. Second, having a work-limiting illness or disability is likely to make one highly

dependent on others, either individuals (such as carers) or institutions (such as the state). This form of deep dependency further increases one's vulnerability to shock and crises (what if, for example, one's carer becomes ill? Or if the state reduces the benefits that one relies on?)

- *Crime: the incidence of violent crime in each constituency*  
One experiences a major personal shock and crisis if one is the victim of a violent crime. Also, the perpetrator-victim power relationship is an extreme case of the exercise of arbitrary power, with the victim vulnerable to the perpetrator's will. Faced with the huge number of varieties of crime, we have chosen to use the figures for violent crimes against the person. This is not to say, of course, that *only* this crime represents a 'crisis'. Rather, this is used as a clear indicator of a crime which, uncontroversially, *does* pose a great threat to 'resilience'. Including other measures of crime would both complicate the indicator, making it less clear, and make the indicator more contentious; weightings for the relative disempowerment caused by various crimes would have to be calculated, which would be unavoidably controversial.
- *Unemployment: the percentage of working age population of constituency who are unemployed*  
Becoming unemployed is often felt as a major personal crisis, and hence rates of unemployment give some indication of the prevalence and risk of such crises within a constituency. Furthermore, becoming unemployed often places one in a relationship of dependence with either another individual (such as the 'bread winner' in one's household) or the state, and such deep dependencies lead to further vulnerabilities to 'shocks' and to the exercise of arbitrary power (the state may remove or reduce one's benefits, for example, and being economically dependent on a 'bread winner' makes one vulnerable to them being unable to work, or leaving the household).

### Power to shape the social world

Whereas the previous categories focused on the power to shape how one's *own* life goes, this category looks at one's ability to shape the wider social and political environment, which affects both the course of one's own life and the lives of others. This power may be exerted through formal politics (such as voting in a general election) or via other means (such as taking part in demonstrations, or volunteering). The key indicators that act as proxies for this domain are:

- *Marginality of parliamentary seats*  
The marginality of one's constituency partly determines how much power one has in formal politics; the voters in more marginal seats have much greater influence over which party forms the next government. Because of this, parties often tailor their manifestos to appeal to voters in marginal seats (for example, the race to win the vote of 'Worcester Woman' in the 1997 general election).
- *Voter turnout in general elections*  
Voter turnout is used as a measure of how far citizens are using their democratic powers; having power over the social world is not simply a matter of having the formal opportunities for influence, but also a matter of taking advantage of these opportunities. If some groups of citizens do not vote, then this gives politicians less incentive to advance policies that would meet these groups' interests. Thus, low voter turnout among some groups can diminish their opportunities for influence and power over the social world.

Furthermore, voter turnout could also be used as a proxy for more general political engagement, and hence a wider exercise of social power. However, one must be careful here, as many citizens may refrain from engaging in formal politics (such as voting), but nevertheless be very active in informal politics and efforts to change the social world (for example, through political demonstrations, boycotts or volunteering).

---

## 3 the power map

---


The Power Map uses a 'composite indicator', bringing the different indicators of citizens' power together into one overall index. The power score for each constituency is the weighted sum of the eight indicators. The maximum possible power score is 100, and the lowest possible is 0.

In the index, power is analysed along the three categories adumbrated above. Each indicator is placed within one category only. However, the boundaries between the categories are to some extent ambiguous, and it will often be contentious as to which category an indicator belongs to. Placing the indicators into different categories is intended to emphasise the multilayered aspects of power in a clear and intuitive way- how the indicators interrelate within categories, and the how they differ between categories. *Table 2* (p39) summarises the domains, indicators and metrics that constitute the power index.

One of the most contentious aspects in the construction of composite indicators is the weighting given to the various indicators and categories. To some degree, the choice of weightings is unavoidably normative and political, reflecting value-based judgements on the relative importance of the indicators.

The Power Map uses the 2005 constituency boundaries, as the most up-to-date data sets use these boundaries. However, the latest review of Westminster constituency boundaries was completed in 2007, and the boundaries will change substantially in England and Wales in the 2010 general election. Thus, it may be necessary to revise the Power Map according to these new constituency boundaries after June 2010.

The first step in the construction of the index is to 'normalise' the data - to rescale the data for each indicator so it can be compared across indicators. This is necessary because the data in the various indicators is of very many different types, from percentages (voter turnout or



unemployment rates, for example) to average totals (household income), to aggregated 'scores' (as for education levels and social 'grading' of professions). Further details on how the composite index was constructed are contained in the appendix.

### England only indicators

The Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG's) Place Survey 2008-09 provides valuable data on citizens' power at a local level. Unfortunately, the data only fully covers England, and there is a lack of fully comparative data for Scotland and Wales. Because of this, we have constructed an 'England power index'. This is intended to accompany the main Power Map, which covers the whole of Great Britain. The England power index allows us to tell a richer, more detailed story about power disparities within England.

The England power index is constructed in the same way as the index for the main Power Map; the only change is that two more indicators are added to the 'Power over the social world' category, and one more indicator is added to the 'Power as resilience' category. The category weights remain equal, and sum to 1, and indicator weights within each category are also equal and sum to 1. The indicator values are normalised and aggregated in the same way as in the index for the main Power Map.

The three extra indicators which are added to the index to give us a separate England power index, are detailed below. To avoid the confusion of having two separate maps, the power map is based only on the UK-wide indicators. However, as the full data set is being made publicly available so more in-depth correlations can be made by those with interests in specific power categories.

### Power as resilience category

- *Belonging: where citizens feel they 'belong in their immediate neighbourhood'*

This indicator is used as a proxy for two aspects of being (and feeling) resilient to unexpected shocks and crises: having wide, informal social networks in one's neighbourhood that one can rely on in a crisis, and feeling that one can trust those in one's immediate neighbourhood. Of course, this indicator is only a rough proxy for these two

aspects of power as resilience. In some cases, one may feel very little sense of 'belonging' yet may still trust one's immediate neighbours, and also have informal networks (perhaps outside one's immediate neighbourhood) to support oneself if one experiences an unexpected shock.

However, this granted, it still seems plausible that feeling a sense of belonging in one's immediate neighbourhood would also tend to correlate with having extensive informal networks of support in that neighbourhood (those whom one felt a sense of 'belonging' with), and would also tend to correlate with trusting those in one's immediate neighbourhood. Although having such trust and informal networks does not require that one feels a sense of 'belonging', feeling this sense of 'belonging' will tend to *enhance* such trust and informal networks. Indeed, a sense of belonging, trust and having informal networks of support are all complementary: having more of one tends to lead to us having more of the others.

**In the 'Power over the social world' category:**

- *Local influence: whether people feel they can influence decisions in their local area*  
Having power over the social world is not simply a matter of having a voice and influence in national politics. This indicator measures another important aspect of having power over the social world: the extent to which one is able to influence local decisions. Note that this indicator is a measure of influence in a wide sense—it does not simply apply to formal politics, such as elections. One might feel that one has an influence over local decisions through political campaigns or demonstrations, just as much as through local elections. One of the limitations of the indicators used in this category in the main Power Map is that they are too narrowly focused on formal politics; this addition goes some way to rectifying this limitation.

*Data source: Place Survey 2008-09, carried out by the Department of Communities and Local Government.*

*Data used: Percentage of people who feel that they can influence decisions in their local area.*

- *Volunteering: rates of volunteering activity in constituencies.* This indicator is used as a proxy for rates of involvement in efforts to change and improve the social world, be it one's immediate neighbourhood, or in a wider national context. This indicator measures those aspects of exerting influence over the social world that go beyond formal politics, as having power over the social world involves much more than voting. This indicator therefore helps to balance the indicators on voter turnout and marginality of seats, which measure citizens' power over the social world via formal politics.

Table 2 **Power index domains, indicators and metrics**

Domains	Indicator	Sources	Metric
<b>Personal power</b>			
This power relates to 'autonomy'; one's ability to be 'author of one's own life'.	Education; the level of academic qualifications achieved among working-age population. Used as proxy for critical thinking and choice of occupation.	2008 Annual Population Survey.	The data was broken down into five variables of percentage of working-age constituency population, from those with NVQ 4 qualifications equivalent to a BTEC Higher National Certificate or Higher National Diploma or above – such as, for example, a university degree).or above to those with no formal qualifications.
	Income: Used as proxy for wealth and control over personal decisions making.	2008 Annual Population Survey.	Annual average household incomes for each Westminster parliamentary constituency.
	Occupational: seniority and position used a proxy for control in the workplace.	2008 Annual Population Survey.	The data was broken down into 9 variables covering occupational categories from managers and senior officials and professional to customer service and machine operatives.

Table 2 Power index domains, indicators and metrics (contd)

Domains	Indicator	Sources	Metric
<b>Resilience</b>			
This power relates to one's vulnerability to unexpected shocks and crises, and one's ability to withstand them. Closely related to this understanding of power is the extent to which one is dependent on the arbitrary will of others;	Health: the incidence of work-limiting illness or disability.	Census for England and Wales 2001 and Census for Scotland 2001	Percentage of people in constituency without a work-limiting illness or disability; so a higher percentage will give a higher power score.
	Crime: the incidence of violent crime in each constituency.	Home Office figures for recorded crime in 2008-09; General Register Office for Scotland figures for recorded crime in 2008-09	Recorded violent crime against the person per 1,000 of the population. We subtract the figure for the rate of violent figure from 1,000, so that a higher figure represents lower crime (and hence a higher power score).
	Unemployment; percentage of working age population of constituency who are unemployed.	Annual Population Survey 2008	Percentage of constituency's working age population who are unemployed. This figure is subtracted from 100, so that the higher the figure, the higher the Power Score for this constituency.
	Belonging: where citizens feel they 'belong in their immediate neighbourhood'.	Place Survey 2008-09	Percentage of people who feel that they belong in their immediate neighbourhood.
<b>Social power</b>			
This power relates to one's ability to shape the wider social and political environment. This power may be exerted through formal politics (eg voting in a general election) or via other means (eg taking part in demonstrations or volunteering).	Marginality of parliamentary seats.	The New Economic Foundation's index of Democratic Power	index of Democratic Power scores for each parliamentary constituency in Great Britain.
	Voter turnout in general elections.	Voter turnout figures collated at <a href="http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout05.htm">http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout05.htm</a>	Voter turnout by constituency (% of registered voters who voted) at 2005 general election.
	Local influence: whether people feel they can influence decisions in their local area.	Place Survey 2008-09	Percentage of people who feel that they can influence decisions in their local decisions.
	Volunteering: rates of volunteering activity in constituencies.	Place Survey 2008-09	Percentage of people who have volunteered unpaid help at least once a month in the past 12 months.

---

## 4 the power scores

---

The Power Map is divided into five bands with headline categories to describe the power situation of those living in constituencies that fall under each one. It is of course an exaggeration to say that all residents will experience the same power situation and have identical scores for each power category. However, the aggregate scores show clear patterns across constituencies that are cause for concern, especially given the vast disparities between the top and the bottom leagues. The full list, which includes rankings and MPs for all 628 constituencies, is contained at the end of this chapter. *Table 3* provides an overview of the number of constituencies within each band.

Table 3 Overview of power scores by band

Band	5 Very low	4 Low	3 Medium	2 High	1 Very high
Power score	20-30%	30-40%	40-50%	50-60%	60-70%
No of constituencies	23	116	201	220	68

The overall distribution of the power scores is shown in *Figure 3*. This shows a very steep differential at the bottom and the top of the index, suggesting that those at the bottom possess low overall control over their lives whereas those at the very top possess much more control over their lives than those who fall in the middle. For example, Glasgow North East and Birmingham Hodge Hill score under 22 per cent, whereas Richmond Park and Guildford score over 70 per cent. It is to be expected that constituencies with wealthier residents are likely to score higher: the link between wealth and power is not a novel finding. Yet the geographical skew is clear with the majority of constituencies in the top two bands being in the South East, the home counties scoring especially highly. In turn the Midlands and the North East overwhelmingly populate the lowest two bands. The number of constituencies that fall under each band is shown in *Figure 4*.

Figure 3 Overall distribution of power scores





Figure 4 Number of constituencies per power band



The Power Map clearly shows where in Britain citizens can most effectively exercise their power and where they can't. *Tables 4 and 5* show the ten lowest and highest-scoring areas.

Table 4 Ten lowest scoring constituencies


Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Glasgow North East	0.2069	628	Willie Bain (Lab)
Birmingham, Hodge Hill	0.2157	627	Liam Byrne(Lab)
Nottingham North	0.2193	626	Graham Allen (Lab)
Birmingham, Ladywood	0.2199	625	Clare Short (Ind)
Liverpool, Walton	0.2209	624	Peter Kilfoyle (Lab)
Glasgow South West	0.2274	623	Ian Davidson (Lab)
Liverpool, Riverside	0.239	622	Louise Ellman (Lab)
Manchester, Blackley	0.24	621	Graham Stringer(Lab)
Middlesbrough	0.2423	620	Sir Stuart Bell (Lab)
Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small Heath	0.244	619	Roger Godsiff (Lab)

Table 5 Ten highest scoring constituencies

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Bristol West	0,6703	10	Stephen Williams (Lib)
Maidenhead	0,6759	9	Rt Hon Theresa May (Con)
Monmouth	0,6889	8	David Davies (Con)
South East Cambridgeshire	0,6897	7	James Paice (Con)
Wimbledon	0,6915	6	Stephen Hammond (Con)
East Dunbartonshire	0,7021	5	Jo Swinson (Lib)
South West Surrey	0,7053	4	Jeremy Hunt (Con)
Richmond Park	0,7166	3	Susan Kramer (Lib)
Cheadle	0,724	2	Mark Hunter (Lib)
Guildford	0,7346	1	Anne Milton(Con)


The Map also makes clear which parties represent the powerful and most powerless constituencies. *Figure 5* shows the distribution of parties according to power score band. Labour overwhelmingly represents the powerless and the Conservatives the most powerful, with the Liberal Democrats also representing a significant proportion of the powerful given their overall number of seats. There is also a strong relationship between the least powerful constituencies and BNP target seats such as Barking, Burnley and Stoke on Trent, all of which score in the bottom two bands.

Figure 5 Distribution of parties according to power score



The largest anomaly is voting power as measured by marginality of seat. The disproportionate power given to swing voters will boost power scores in general and appears to be absent in the majority of less powerful constituencies. This clearly relates to the fact that the majority of seats in the very low and low power bands are in Labour’s heartlands. Yet those living in safe seats that score poorly in the other categories are subject to a form of double damnation: not only do they lack personal control, they also lack meaningful opportunities to change the wider social and political landscape through a real choice at the ballot box. The marginality scores for the top and bottom ten constituencies are shown in *Figure 6*. This shows that although the Conservatives clearly dominate the most powerful band in the highest-scoring constituencies they are under challenge from Liberal Democrats. One possible hypothesis that would need testing is that party loyalty is weakest among the most educated sectors of the electorate. Given the link between education, occupation and high power scores this may mean the part loyalty plays dissipates as people become more powerful.

Figure 6 Marginality scores of ten lowest and highest constituencies



Greater light can be shed on the nature of the disparities between the extremes of the power index by comparing the top and bottom ten constituencies across some of the key indicators that make up the power score. *Figure 7* compares a range of indicators across personal control and resilience power capabilities, including vulnerability to violent crime, health, educational qualification and power at work as represented by occupation. *Figure 8* compares the same constituencies for their power to shape the social world as represented by marginality and turnout. Together these show particularly large power gaps across control at work, education capability and the use and impact of the power of the vote.

Figure 7 **Comparing personal control and resilience indicators for top and bottom ten constituencies**





Figure 8 **Comparing political participation and marginality in top and bottom ten constituencies**



Although it is clear that the South East is the most powerful region in the UK, there are large disparities within as well as across regions. This can be shown by comparing the overall distribution of scores within regions and looking at extremes within both groups. *Figures 9 and 10* do this for London. *Figure 10* shows that the distribution in London differs from the overall distribution of power scores across the UK, with only one constituency, Tottenham, appearing in the very low band and 14 constituencies falling in the very high band.

Nonetheless there are significant disparities within London. The nature of these disparities is seen in *Figure 10*, which shows that power gaps in London follow a similar if less extreme pattern for the country as a whole: that key factors that enable personal control such as education and type of occupation are much lower, and susceptibility to debilitating illness and violent crime are higher in the bottom ten constituencies. Likewise, as is shown in *Figure 11*, the pattern between low-scoring constituencies, safe seat and turnout replicates itself in London.

Figure 9 **Distribution of power scores in London**




Figure 10 **Comparing personal control and resilience indicators in top and bottom London constituencies**





Figure 11 **Comparing political participation and marginality in top and bottom London constituencies**



The intra-regional findings from London are similar to those in Yorkshire and the Humber (*Figures 12 and 13*). The key difference is in the overall distribution of scores, which shows that Yorkshire and the Humber has significantly more constituencies falling into the low and very low power bands. The breakdown of the highest and lowest ten constituencies' power scores by the same indicators above shows that the disparities within the region closely follow the basic pattern seen in London and elsewhere. This suggests that although there may be fewer powerless people in the South East, the experience of powerlessness is similar no matter where you live.

Figure 12 **Distribution of power scores in top and bottom ten constituencies in Yorkshire and the Humber**




Figure 13 **Comparing personal control and resilience indicators in top and bottom constituencies in Yorkshire and the Humber**





Figure 14 **Comparing political participation and marginality in top and bottom constituencies in Yorkshire and the Humber**



An additional finding concerns the near negative correlation between perceptions of local influence and overall power scores in certain constituencies at the opposite end of the power spectrum. For example, Tottenham, which ranks 608th, scores nearly 80 per cent on perceptions of local influence, whereas Kensington and Chelsea, which ranks 16th, scores just under 60 per cent. This pattern repeats itself in other high and very high-scoring constituencies showing that constituents in lower-scoring areas tend to think they have greater influence than those in higher-scoring ones. One possible reason for this is that more educated citizens are more critical and demanding of the level of influence they think they should have. Tied to this is the possible perception that local government itself lacks power in relation to central government. Regardless of what is causing it, this suggests that focusing empowerment strategies on local participation will not compensate for power gaps in key capacities for control at work and over one's own life in different domains.

# 5 power map constituency rankings

## Band 5 Very Low scores

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Glasgow North East	0.2069	628	Willie Bain (Lab)
Birmingham, Hodge Hill	0.2157	627	Liam Byrne (Lab)
Nottingham North	0.2193	626	Graham Allen (Lab)
Birmingham, Ladywood	0.2199	625	Clare Short (Ind)
Liverpool, Walton	0.2209	624	Peter Kilfoyle (Lab)
Glasgow South West	0.2274	623	Ian Davidson MP (Lab)
Liverpool, Riverside	0.239	622	Louise Ellman (Lab)
Manchester, Blackley	0.24	621	Graham Stringer (Lab)
Middlesbrough	0.2423	620	Sir Stuart Bell (Lab)
Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small Heath	0.244	619	Roger Godsiff (Lab)
Sheffield, Brightside	0.2474	618	Rt Hon David Blunkett (Lab)
Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle	0.2557	617	Rt Hon Alan Johnson (Lab)
Stoke-on-Trent Central	0.2587	616	Mark Fisher (Lab)
Glasgow East	0.2618	615	John Mason (Lab)
Liverpool, West Derby	0.264	614	Robert Wareing (Ind)
Glasgow Central	0.2699	613	Mohamad Sarwar (Lab)
Bootle	0.2723	612	Joe Benton (Lab)
Kingston upon Hull East	0.2784	611	Rt Hon John Prescott
Manchester Central	0.2796	610	Tony Llyod (Lab)
Birmingham, Erdington	0.2804	609	Sion Simon (Lab)
Tottenham	0.2891	608	David Lammy MP (Lab)
Kingston upon Hull North	0.2894	607	Diana Johnson (Lab)
Wolverhampton South East	0.2973	606	Rt Hon Pat McFadden

## Band 4 Low Scores

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Barnsley East and Mexborough	0.3001	605	Jeff Ennis (Lab)
Easington	0.3031	604	John Cummings (Lab)
Great Grimsby	0.3041	603	Austin Mitchell (Lab)
Barnsley Central	0.3081	602	Eric Illsley (Lab)
Blackpool South	0.3101	601	Gorden Marsden (Lab)
Doncaster North	0.3104	600	Rt Hon Ed Miliband (Lab)
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	0.3109	599	Dai Harvard (Lab)
Manchester, Gorton	0.3118	598	Rt Hon Sir Gerald Kaufman ( Lab)
West Bromwich West	0.3139	597	Tom Watson (Lab)
Walsall North	0.3153	596	Adrian Bailey (Lab)
Tyne Bridge	0.3159	595	David Clelland (Lab)
Leicester East	0.3159	594	Rt Hon Keith Vaz (Lab)
Stoke-on-Trent North	0.3162	593	Joan Walley (Lab)
Bradford North	0.3165	592	Terry Rooney (Lab)
Pontefract and Castleford	0.3171	591	Rt Hon Yvette Cooper (Lab)
Salford	0.3178	590	Rt Hon Hazel Blears (Lab)

Leicester West	0.3178	589	Rt Hon Patricia Hewitt (Lab)
Poplar and Canning Town	0.3186	588	Jim Fitzpatrick (Lab)
Doncaster Central	0.3186	587	Rt Hon Rosie Winterton (Lab)
Birkenhead	0.3193	586	Rt Hon Frank Field
Airdrie and Shotts	0.3242	585	Rt Hon John Reid (Lab)
West Bromwich East	0.3246	584	Rt Hon Tom Watson
East Ham	0.3252	583	Rt Hon Stephen Timms (Lab)
Sunderland South	0.3257	582	Chris Mullin (Lab)
Brent South	0.3267	581	Dawn Butler (Lab)
Hartlepool	0.3283	580	Iain Wright (Lab)
Barking	0.3283	579	Margaret Hodge (Lab)
South Shields	0.3295	578	Rt Hon David Miliband (Lab)
Sunderland North	0.3298	577	Bill Etherington (Lab)
Wolverhampton North East	0.3304	576	Ken Purchase (Lab)
Rhondda	0.3344	575	Chris Bryant ( Lab)
Bolton South East	0.3368	574	Dr Brian Iddon(Lab)
Blaenau Gwent	0.3372	573	Dai Davies (Ind)
Nottingham East	0.3384	572	John Heppell (Lab)
Ashton under Lyne	0.3404	571	David Heyes (Lab)
Coventry North East	0.3423	570	Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth (Lab)
Birmingham, Perry Barr	0.3432	569	Khalid Mahmood (Lab)
St Helens South	0.344	568	Rt Hon Shaun Woodward (Lab)
Bolsover	0.3444	567	Dennis Skinner (Lab)
Warley	0.346	566	Rt Hon John Spellar (Lab)
Burnley	0.3469	565	Kitty Usher (Lab)
Motherwell and Wishaw	0.3478	564	Frank Roy (Lab)
Erith and Thamesmead	0.3479	563	John Austin (Lab)
Liverpool, Wavertree	0.3479	562	Rt Hon Jane Kennedy (Lab)
Rotherham	0.3482	561	Rt Hon Denis MacShane (Lab)
Dagenham	0.3485	560	Jon Cruddas (Lab)
Houghton and Washington East	0.3487	559	Fraser Kemp (Lab)
Plymouth, Devonport	0.3495	558	Alison Seabeck (Lab)
Halton	0.3496	557	Derek Twigg (Lab)
Bradford West	0.3502	556	Marsha Singh (Lab)
Swansea East	0.3507	555	Siân C. James (Lab)
Stoke-on-Trent South	0.351	554	Robert Ffleo (Lab)
Knowsley North and Sefton East	0.3519	553	Hon George Howarth (Lab)
Cynon Valley	0.3527	552	Rt Hon Ann Clwyd (Lab)
Knowsley South	0.3537	551	Edward O'Hara (Lab)
Oldham West and Royton	0.3539	550	Rt Hon Michael Meacher (Lab)
Bradford South	0.3542	549	Gerry Sutcliffe (Lab)
Feltham and Heston	0.3547	548	Alan Keen (Lab)
Blackburn	0.3548	547	Rt Hon Jack Straw(Lab)
Great Yarmouth	0.3565	546	Anthony Wright (Lab)
Wythenshawe and Sale East	0.3577	545	Rt Hon Paul Goggins (Lab)
Southampton, Itchen	0.3582	544	Rt Hon John Denham (Lab)
West Ham	0.3584	543	Lyn Brown (Lab)
Ogmore	0.3593	542	Huw Irranca-Davies (Lab)
Eccles	0.36	541	Ian Stewart (Lab)
Caerphilly	0.361	540	Wayne David (Lab)
Glasgow North West	0.3616	539	John Robertson (Lab)
Luton South	0.364	538	Margaret Moran (Lab)
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	0.3646	537	Rt Hon Tom Clarke CBE (Lab)
Torfaen	0.3663	536	Rt Hon Paul Murphy (Lab)
Sheffield, Attercliffe	0.3667	535	Clive Betts (Lab)
Leeds East	0.3684	534	George Mudie (Lab)
Waveney	0.3696	533	Bob Blizard (Lab)
Walthamstow	0.3724	532	Neil Gerrard (Lab)
Bishop Auckland	0.3724	531	Helen Goodman (Lab)
Leicester South	0.3732	530	Sir Peter Soulsby (Lab)
Walsall South	0.3737	529	Rt Hon Bruce George (Lab)
Aberavon	0.3737	528	Dr Hywel Francis (Lab)
Mansfield	0.3739	527	Alan Meale (Lab)
Bethnal Green and Bow	0.3742	526	George Galloway (Respect)

Nottingham South	0.3753	525	Alan Simpson (Lab)
Camberwell and Peckham	0.3758	524	Rt Hon Harriet Harman QC (Lab)
Redcar	0.3758	523	Vera Baird QC (Lab)
Hemsworth	0.3765	522	Jon Trickett (Lab)
Leeds West	0.378	521	Rt Hon John Battle (Lab)
Hyndburn	0.3786	520	Greg Pope (Lab)
Stockton North	0.379	519	Frank Cook (Lab)
Birmingham, Northfield	0.3804	518	Richard Burden (Lab)
Glasgow South	0.3833	517	Tom Harris (Lab)
Stalybridge and Hyde	0.3835	516	Rt Hon James Purnell (Lab)
Leeds Central	0.3841	515	Rt Hon Hilary Benn (Lab)
Wigan	0.3856	514	Neil Turner (Lab)
Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend	0.3862	513	Rt Hon Nicholas Brown (Lab)
Inverclyde	0.3864	512	David Cairns (Lab)
Luton North	0.3865	511	Kelvin Hopkins (Lab)
Ashfield	0.3866	510	Rt Hon Geoff Hoon (Lab)
Scunthorpe	0.3867	509	Rt Hon Elliot Morley (Lab)
Denton and Reddish	0.3879	508	Andrew Gwynne (Lab)
Cannock Chase	0.3888	507	Tony Wright MP (Lab)
Gateshead East and Washington West	0.3896	506	Sharon Hodgson (Lab)
Newport East	0.3897	505	Jessica Morden (Lab)
St Helens North	0.3898	504	Dave Watts (Lab)
Hackney South and Shoreditch	0.3901	503	Meg Hillier (Lab/Co-op)
Makerfield	0.3903	502	Rt Hon Ian McCartney (Lab)
Edmonton	0.3903	501	Andy Love (Lab/Co-op)
Islwyn	0.3905	500	Rt Hon Don Touhig (Lab/Co-op)
Glenrothes	0.3915	499	Lindsay Roy (Lab)
Don Valley	0.3915	498	Rt Hon Caroline Flint (Lab)
Heywood and Middleton	0.3928	497	Jim Dobbin (Lab/Co-op)
Hayes and Harlington	0.3947	496	John McDonnell (Lab)
Bristol South	0.3949	495	Rt Hon Dawn Primarolo (Lab)
Thurrock	0.3956	494	Andrew Mackinlay (Lab)
Jarrow	0.3963	493	Stephen Hepburn (Lab)
Blyth Valley	0.3996	492	Ronnie Campbell (Lab)
Rochdale	0.3979	491	Paul Rowen (LD)
Preston	0.3981	490	Mark Hendrick (Lab/Co-op)

### Band 3 Medium scores

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Bassetlaw	0.4001	489	John Mann (Lab)
Sheffield Central	0.4006	488	Rt Hon Richard Caborn (Lab)
North Ayrshire and Arran	0.4012	487	Katy Clark (Lab)
Carlisle	0.4014	486	Eric Martlew (Lab)
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	0.4017	485	Sandra Osborne (Lab)
Sedgefield	0.4024	484	Phil Wilson (Lab)
Amber Valley	0.4025	483	Judy Mallaber (Lab)
Blackpool North and Fleetwood	0.4028	482	Joan Humble (Lab)
Birmingham, Yardley	0.403	481	John Hemming (LD)
Slough	0.4082	480	Fiona Mactaggart (Lab)
Liverpool, Garston	0.4088	479	Maria Eagle (Lab)
Telford	0.4104	478	David Wright (Lab)
Derby South	0.4117	477	Rt Hon Margaret Beckett (Lab)
Bolton North East	0.412	476	David Crausby (Lab)
Croydon North	0.4128	475	Rt Hon Malcolm Wicks (Lab)
Vale of Clwyd	0.4136	474	Chris Ruane (Lab)
Lincoln	0.4143	473	Gillian Merron (Lab)
South Staffordshire	0.4145	472	Sir Patrick Cormack (Con)
Hackney North and Stoke Newington	0.4146	471	Diane Abbott (Lab)
Worsley	0.4147	470	Barbara Keeley (Lab)
North Tyneside	0.4148	469	Rt Hon Stephen Byers (Lab)
Wentworth	0.4156	468	Rt Hon John Healey (Lab)
Dudley North	0.4157	467	Ian Austin (Lab)
Newport West	0.4158	466	Paul Flynn (Lab)

Glasgow North	0.416	465	Ann McKechnin (Lab)
Huddersfield	0.4161	464	Barry Sheerman (Lab/Co-op)
Barnsley West and Penistone	0.4171	463	Michael Clapham (Lab)
Wallasey	0.4172	462	Angela Eagle (Lab)
Neath	0.4179	461	Peter Hain (Lab)
Aberdeen North	0.418	460	Frank Doran (Lab)
Halifax	0.4183	459	Linda Riordan (Lab/Co-op)
Newcastle upon Tyne North	0.4194	458	Doug Henderson (Lab)
Dundee West	0.4196	457	Jim McGovern (Lab)
Plymouth, Sutton	0.4205	456	Linda Gilroy (Lab/Co-op)
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	0.4215	455	Rt Hon Des Browne (Lab)
Bristol East	0.4223	454	Kerry McCarthy (Lab)
Louth and Horncastle	0.4231	453	Peter Tapsell (Con))
Warrington North	0.4231	452	Helen Jones (Lab)
Wakefield	0.424	451	Mary Creagh (Lab)
North West Durham	0.4251	450	Rt Hon Hilary Armstrong (Lab)
Weaver Vale	0.4256	449	Mike Hall (Lab)
Bristol North West	0.4258	448	Doug Naysmith (Lab/Co-op)
Basildon	0.4262	447	Rt Hon Angela, E. Smith (Lab/Co-op)
Coventry North West	0.4264	446	Geoffrey Robinson (Lab)
Rother Valley	0.4267	445	Rt Hon Kevin Barron (Lab)
Workington	0.428	444	Tony Cunningham (Lab)
Livingstone	0.429	443	Jim Devine (Lab)
Swansea West	0.4291	442	Rt Hon Alun Williams (Lab)
West Dunbartonshire	0.4292	441	Rt Hon John McFall (Lab/Co-op)
Harwich	0.4296	440	Douglas Carswell (Con)
Vauxhall	0.4296	439	Kate Hoey (Lab)
Paisley and Renfrewshire South	0.4299	438	Rt Hon Douglas Alexander (Lab)
Bedford	0.43	437	Patrick Hall (Lab)
Crawley	0.4302	436	Laura Moffatt (Lab)
Wansbeck	0.4304	435	Denis Murphy (Lab)
Southampton, Test	0.4317	434	Dr Alan Whitehead (Lab)
Birmingham, Hall Green	0.4321	433	Stephen McCabe (Lab)
North Thanet	0.4321	432	Roger Gale (Con)
Cleethorpes	0.4324	431	Shona Imlsaac (Lab)
Portsmouth South	0.4328	430	Mike Hancock CBE (LD)
Sheffield, Heeley	0.4329	429	Meg Munn (Lab/Co-op)
Bury South	0.4332	428	Ivan Lewis (Lab)
Newcastle-under-Lyme	0.4335	427	Paul Farrelly (Lab))
Lewisham West	0.4336	426	Jim Dowd (Lab)
Holborn and St Pancras	0.4344	425	Rt Hon Frank Dobson (Lab)
Meirionnydd Nant Conwy	0.4349	424	Elfyn Llwyd (PC)
Rochford and Southend East	0.4349	423	James Duddridge (Con)
Peterborough	0.4375	422	Stewart Jackson (Con)
North Southwark and Bermondsey	0.4378	421	Simon Hughes (LD)
Darlington	0.4379	420	Rt Hon Alan Milburn (Lab)
Dewsbury	0.438	419	Shahid Malik (Lab))
Sherwood	0.4381	418	Paddy Tipping (Lab)
South Holland and The Deepings	0.4385	417	John Hayes (Con)
Clwyd South	0.439	416	Martyn Jones (Lab)
Banff and Buchan	0.439	415	Rt Hon Alex Salmond (SNP)
Norwich South	0.4391	414	Rt Hon Charles Clarke (Lab)
West Lancashire	0.4405	413	Rosie Cooper (Lab)
Bournemouth West	0.4411	412	Sir John Butterfill (Con)
North West Norfolk	0.4419	411	Henry Bellingham (Con)
Conwy	0.4419	410	Betty Williams (Lab)
Llanelli	0.4419	409	Nia Griffith (Lab)
Central Ayrshire	0.4419	408	Brian H. Donohoe (Lab)
South West Norfolk	0.4422	407	Christopher Fraser (Con)
Wyre Forest	0.444	406	Richard Taylor (Ind)
Dudley South	0.4445	405	Ian Pearson (Lab)
Ipswich	0.4451	404	Chris Mole (Lab)
Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland	0.4453	403	Ashok Kumar (Lab)
Rutherglen and Hamilton West	0.4455	402	Rt Hon Thomas McAvoy (Lab/Co-op)
Northampton North	0.4458	401	Sally Keeble (Lab)
Brent East	0.4465	400	Sarah Teather (LD)
Streatham	0.4471	399	Rt Hon Keith Hill (Lab)

Rossendale and Darwen	0.4472	398	Janet Anderson (Lab)
Lanark and Hamilton East	0.4477	397	Jim Hood (Lab)
North East Cambridgeshire	0.4484	396	Malcolm Moss (Con)
Dunfermline and West Fife	0.4487	395	Willie Rennie (LD)
Portsmouth North	0.4489	394	Sarah McCarthy-Fry (Lab)
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	0.4496	393	Jim Cousins (Lab)
Mitcham and Morden	0.4504	392	Siobhain McDonagh (Lab)
Stockport	0.4504	391	Ann Coffey (Lab)
Leigh	0.4514	390	Rt Hon Andy Burnham (Lab)
North West Leicestershire	0.4514	389	David Taylor (Lab/Co-op)
Batley and Spen	0.4515	388	Mike Wood (Lab)
Barrow and Furness	0.4524	387	Rt Hon John Hutton (Lab)
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	0.4529	386	Rt Hon Gordon Brown (Lab)
Linlithgow and East Falkirk	0.4538	385	Michael Connarty (Lab)
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East	0.4543	384	Rosemary McKenna (Lab)
Paisley and Renfrewshire North	0.4546	383	Jim Sheridan (Lab)
Harrow East	0.4547	382	Rt Hon Tony McNulty (Lab)
Milton Keynes South West	0.4549	381	Dr Phyllis Starkey (Lab)
Cardiff West	0.4551	380	Kevin Brennan (Lab)
Torbay	0.4554	379	Adrian Sanders (LD)
Halesowen and Rowley Regis	0.4555	378	Slyvia Heal Lab
Ilford South	0.4556	377	Mike Gapes (Lab)
North Cornwall	0.4558	376	Daniel Rogerson (Lib Dem)
Morley and Rothwell	0.4562	375	Colin Challen (Lab)
Wrexham	0.4562	374	Ian Lucas (Lab)
Pontypridd	0.4573	373	Kim Howells (Lab)
Leyton and Wanstead	0.4573	372	Harry Cohen (Lab)
Cardiff South and Penarth	0.4585	371	Alun Michael (Lab)
North Durham	0.4592	370	Kevan Jones (Lab)
Nuneaton	0.4593	369	Bill Olnier (Lab)
Sheffield, Hillsborough	0.4601	368	Angela Smith (Lab)
Hastings and Rye	0.4619	367	Michael Jabez Foster (Lab)
Midlothian	0.462	366	David Hamilton (Lab)
Normanton	0.4622	365	Edward Balls (Lab)
Greenwich and Woolwich	0.4627	364	Nick Raynsford (Lab)
Coventry South	0.4628	363	Jim Cunningham (Lab)
Scarborough and Whitby	0.463	362	Robert Goodwill (Con)
Kingswood	0.4631	361	Roger Berry (Lab)
Pendle	0.4631	360	Gordon Prentice (Lab)
Ellesmere Port and Neston	0.4632	359	Andrew Miller (Lab)
Morecambe and Lunesdale	0.4633	358	Geraldine Smith (Lab)
Staffordshire Moorlands	0.464	357	Charlotte Atkins (Lab)
Lewisham East	0.464	356	Bridget Prentice (Lab)
Islington North	0.4641	355	Jeremy Corbyn (Lab)
Bridgend	0.4646	354	Madeleine Moon (Lab)
Burton	0.4649	353	Janet Dean (Lab)
Brent North	0.4655	352	Barry Gardiner (Lab)
Montgomeryshire	0.4661	351	Lembit Öpik (Lib Dem)
Stretford and Urmston	0.467	350	Beverley Hughes (Lab)
Falkirk	0.4676	349	Eric Joyce (Lab)
Copeland	0.4679	348	Jamie Reed (Lab)
North East Derbyshire	0.4679	347	Natascha Engel (Lab)
Birmingham, Edgbaston	0.4683	346	Roger Godsiff (Lab)
Ealing North	0.4684	345	Stephen Pound (Lab)
Harlow	0.4696	344	Bill Rammell (Lab)
Lewisham, Deptford	0.47	343	Joan Ruddock (Lab)
Islington South and Finsbury	0.4701	342	Emily Thornberry (Lab)
Crewe and Nantwich	0.4708	341	Edward Timpson (Con)
Alyn and Deeside	0.4715	340	Mark Tami (Lab)
Oldham East and Saddleworth	0.4717	339	Phil Woolas (Lab)
Blaydon	0.4721	338	David Anderson (Lab)
Gravesham	0.4736	337	Adam Holloway (Con)
Havant	0.4754	336	David Willets (Con)
Regent's Park and Kensington North	0.4768	335	Karen Buck (Con)
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	0.4772	334	Nick Gibb (Con)
Leominster	0.4773	333	Bill Wiggins (Con)

Brighton, Kemptown	0.4775	332	Desmond Turner (Lab)
Erewash	0.4784	331	Liz Blackman (Lab)
Derby North	0.4787	330	Bob Laxton (Lab)
Reading West	0.4792	329	Martin Salter (Lab)
Ealing, Southall	0.4794	328	Virendra Sharma (Lab)
Aldridge-Brownhills	0.4796	327	Richard Shepherd (Con)
Boston and Skegness	0.4809	326	Mark Simmonds (Con)
Hazel Grove	0.4822	325	Andrew Stunell (Lib Dem)
East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow	0.4824	324	Adam Ingram (Lab)
South Swindon	0.4826	323	Anne Snelgrove (Lab)
Birmingham, Selly Oak	0.4828	322	Lynne Jones (Lab)
Isle of Wight	0.4835	321	Andrew Turner (Con)
Chatham and Aylesford	0.4841	320	Jonathan R Shaw (Lab)
Hendon	0.4843	319	Andrew Dismore (Lab)
Eltham	0.4845	318	Clive Efford (Lab)
Oxford East	0.4852	317	Andrew Smith (Lab)
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	0.4854	316	Michael Moore (Lib Dem)
Gloucester	0.4869	315	Parmjit Dhanda (Lab)
East Worthing and Shoreham	0.4876	314	Tim Loughton (Con)
North Warwickshire	0.4885	313	Mike O'Brien (Lab)
East Devon	0.4887	312	Hugo Swire (Con)
North Shropshire	0.4901	311	Owen Paterson (Con)
Falmouth and Camborne	0.4908	310	Julia Goldsworthy (Lib Dem)
East Lothian	0.4922	309	Anne Moffat (Lab)
Loughborough	0.4923	308	Andy Reed (Lab)
Norwich North	0.4923	307	Chloe Smith (Con)
Richmond (Yorks)	0.4927	306	William Hague (Con)
Edinburgh East	0.4927	305	Gavin Strang (Lab)
Romford	0.4929	304	Andrew Rosindell (Con)
North Swindon	0.4939	303	Michael Wills (Con)
South East Cornwall	0.4949	302	Colin Breed (Lib Dem)
Broxbourne	0.4951	301	Charles Walker (Con)
Sittingbourne and Sheppey	0.4953	300	Derek Wyatt (Lab)
Chesterfield	0.4953	299	Paul Holmes (Lib Dem)
Bournemouth East	0.4959	298	Tobias Ellwood (Con)
Fylde	0.4961	297	Michael Jack (Con)
City of York	0.4971	296	Hugh Bayley (Lab)
Stevenage	0.4984	295	Barbara Follett (Lab)
South Norfolk	0.4989	294	Richard Bacon (Con)
Bridgwater	0.499	293	Ian Liddell-Grainger (Con)
Brigg and Goole	0.499	292	Ian Cawsey (Lab)
Dover	0.4992	291	Gwynn Prosser (Lab)
South Thanet	0.4993	290	Stephen Ladyman (Lab)
City of Durham	0.4997	289	Roberta Blackman-Woods (Lab)

## Band 2 High Scores

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Orkney and Shetland	0.5002	288	Alistair Carmichael (Lib Dem)
Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush	0.5016	287	Andrew Slaughter (Lab)
Berwick-upon-Tweed	0.5017	286	Alan Beith (Lib Dem)
Caernarfon	0.5019	285	Hywel Williams (PC)
Stockton South	0.502	284	Dari Taylor (Lab)
Worcester	0.502	283	Michael Foster (Lab)
Colchester	0.5021	282	Bob Russell (Lib Dem)
Bury North	0.5021	281	David Chaytor (Lab)
Carshalton and Wallington	0.5028	280	Tom Brake (Lib Dem)
Worthing West	0.5032	279	Peter Bottomley (Con)
Tamworth	0.5034	278	Brian Jenkins (Lab)
Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross	0.5038	277	John Thurso (Lib Dem)
South Dorset	0.5039	276	Jim Knight (Lab)
Medway	0.5045	275	Robert Marshall-Andrews (Lab)

Southend West	0.5062	274	David Amess (Con)
Delyn	0.5066	273	David Hanson (Lab)
Torrige and West Devon	0.5077	272	Gary Streeter (Con)
Meriden	0.5084	271	Caroline Spelman (Con)
Wolverhampton South West	0.5086	270	Rob Marris (Lab)
Devizes	0.5091	269	Michael Ancram (Con)
Bexhill and Battle	0.5112	268	Gregory Barker (Con)
Brighton, Pavilion	0.5112	267	David Lepper (Lab)
East Yorkshire	0.5115	266	Greg Knight (Con)
Poole	0.5122	265	Robert Syms (Con)
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire	0.5137	264	Nick Ainger (Lab)
Manchester, Withington	0.514	263	John Leech (Lib Dem)
West Suffolk	0.5145	262	Richard Spring (Con)
Leeds North East	0.515	261	Fabian Hamilton (Lab)
Eddisbury	0.5159	260	Stephen O'Brien (Con)
Bolton West	0.516	259	Ruth Kelly (Lab)
Keighley	0.5162	258	Ann Cryer (Lab)
Newark	0.5174	257	Patrick Mercer (Con)
Wellingborough	0.518	256	Peter Bone (Con)
Somerton and Frome	0.5181	255	David Heath (Lib Dem)
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale	0.5195	254	David Mundell (Con)
Sleaford and North Hykeham	0.52	253	Douglas Hogg (Con)
Ashford	0.5202	252	Damian Green (Con)
Chorley	0.5204	251	Lindsay Hoyle (Lab)
Tatton	0.5208	250	George Osborne (Con)
Yeovil	0.5215	249	David Laws (Lib Dem)
Grantham and Stamford	0.5221	248	Quentin Davies (Lab)
Brentford and Isleworth	0.5227	247	Ann Keen (Lib Dem)
Gosport	0.5229	246	Peter Viggers (Con)
Gainsborough	0.5232	245	Edward Leigh (Con)
Penrith and The Border	0.5238	244	David McLean (Con)
Truro and St Austell	0.525	243	Matthew Taylor (Lib Dem)
Billerica	0.525	242	John Baron (Con)
Corby	0.5252	241	Phil Hope (Lab/Co-op)
New Forest West	0.5256	240	Desmond Swayne (Con)
Salisbury	0.5257	239	Robert Key (Con)
Faversham and Mid Kent	0.5259	238	Hugh Robertson (Con)
Fareham	0.526	237	Mark Hoban (Con)
Tynemouth	0.5264	236	Alan Campbell (Lab)
St Ives	0.5274	235	Andrew George (Lib Dem)
Ryedale	0.5277	234	John Greenway (Con)
Aldershot	0.5277	233	Geread Hovarth (Con)
South Ribble	0.5282	232	David Borrow (Lab)
North West Cambridgeshire	0.5288	231	Shailesh Vara (Con)
Dartford	0.5297	230	Howard Stoate (Lab)
Gower	0.5298	229	Martin Caton (Lab)
North Essex	0.5299	228	Bernard Jenkin (Lab)
Vale of Glamorgan	0.5307	227	John Smith (Lab)
Enfield North	0.5318	226	Joan Ryan (Lab)
Gillingham	0.5327	225	Paul Clark (Lab)
Stafford	0.5328	224	David Kidney (Lab)
Edinburgh South West	0.5337	223	Alistair Darling (Lab)
North West Hampshire	0.5339	222	George Young (Con)
Southport	0.5345	221	John Pugh (Lib Dem)
Macclesfield	0.5347	220	Nicholas Winterton (Con)
Exeter	0.5348	219	Ben Bradshaw (Lab)
Folkestone and Hythe	0.5361	218	Michael Howard (Con)
Christchurch	0.5366	217	Christopher Chope (Con)
High Peak	0.5369	216	Tom Levitt (Lab)
Selby	0.537	215	John Grogan (Lab)
Ceredigion	0.5375	214	Mark Williams (Lib Dem)
Argyll and Bute	0.5379	213	Alan Reid (Lib Dem)
Dulwich and West Norwood	0.5379	212	Tessa Jowell (Lab)
Cities of London and Westminster	0.5379	211	Mark Field (Con)

Croydon South	0.5384	210	Richard Ottoway (Con)
Epping Forest	0.5385	209	Eleanor Laing (Con)
North East Fife	0.5386	208	Menzies Campbell (Lib Dem)
Stone	0.5387	207	Bill Cash (Con)
Central Suffolk and North Ipswich	0.5388	206	Michael Lord (Con)
Redditch	0.5399	205	Jacqui Smith (Lab)
Lichfield	0.54	204	Michael Fabricant (Con)
Chingford and Woodford Green	0.5407	203	Iain Duncan Smith (Con)
Tewkesbury	0.5409	202	Laurence Robertson (Con)
Mid Worcestershire	0.5415	201	Peter Luff (Con)
Perth and North Perthshire	0.5428	200	Peter Wishard (Scottish NP)
Pudsey	0.5435	199	Paul Truswell (Lab)
Bosworth	0.5436	198	David Tredinnick (Con)
South West Devon	0.5436	197	Gary Streeter (Con)
Moray [and Nairn]	0.544	196	Alex Pollock (Con)
Rayleigh	0.5441	195	Mark Francois (Con)
Gedling	0.5446	194	Vernon Coaker (Lab)
Hove	0.5448	193	Celia Barlow (Lab)
Huntingdon	0.5451	192	Jonathan Djanogly (Con)
Croydon Central	0.5457	191	Andrew Pelling (Con)
Spelthorne	0.5459	190	David Wilshire (Con)
Wycombe	0.546	189	Paul Goodman (Con)
Cotswold	0.5468	188	Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Con)
Chichester	0.5472	187	Andrew Tyrie (Con)
The Wrekin	0.5477	186	Mark Pritchard (Con)
Warrington South	0.5478	185	Helen Southworth (Lab)
Preseli Pembrokeshire	0.5486	184	Stephen Crabb (Con)
Shipley	0.5496	183	Philip Davies (Con)
Watford	0.5497	182	Claire Ward (Lab)
Banbury	0.5498	181	Tony Baldry (Con)
Bromsgrove	0.5499	180	Julie Kirkbride (Con)
Crosby	0.5504	179	Claire Curtis-Thomas (Lab)
Stirling	0.5507	178	Anne McGuire (Lab)
Eastleigh	0.5509	177	Chris Huhne (Lib Dem)
Gordon	0.5512	176	Malcolm Bruce (Lib Dem)
Ilford North	0.5518	175	Lee Scott (Con)
South Derbyshire	0.5518	174	Mark Todd (Lab)
Rugby and Kenilworth	0.552	173	Jeremy Wright (Con)
North East Bedfordshire	0.552	172	Alistair Burt (Con)
Hemel Hempstead	0.5522	171	Michael Penning (Con)
Harborough	0.5531	170	Edward Garnier (Con)
Blaby	0.5538	169	Andrew Robathan (Con)
Leeds North West	0.5542	168	Greg Mulholland Lib Dem
Rutland and Melton	0.5546	167	Alan Duncan (Con)
Eastbourne	0.5546	166	Nigel Waterson (Con)
City of Chester	0.5552	165	Christine Russel (Lab)
Mid Norfolk	0.5556	164	Keith Simpson (Con)
West Derbyshire	0.5559	163	Patrick McLoughlin (Con)
North Devon	0.5562	162	Nicholas Harvey (Lib Dem)
Tonbridge and Malling	0.5565	161	John Stanley (Con)
Maldon and East Chelmsford	0.5566	160	John Whittingdale (Con)
Maidstone and The Weald	0.5567	159	Anne Widdecombe (Con)
Northampton South	0.5574	158	Brian Binley (Con)
Lewes	0.5575	157	Norman Baker (Lib Dem)
Stourbridge	0.5581	156	Linda Walther (Lab)
Suffolk Coastal	0.5587	155	John Gummer (Con)
Reading East	0.5591	154	Rob Wilson (Con)
Uxbridge	0.5594	153	John Randall (Con)
Edinburgh North and Leith	0.5594	152	Mark Lazarowicz (Lab)abor Co-op
Tunbridge Wells	0.5596	151	Greg Clark (Con)
Cambridge	0.5596	150	David Howarth (Lib Dem)
Clwyd West	0.56	149	David Jones (Con)
Bromley and Chislehurst	0.5606	148	Bob Neill (Con)
Congleton	0.561	147	Ann Winterton (Con)
Teignbridge	0.5611	146	Richard Younger-Ross (Lib Dem)
Castle Point	0.5613	145	Bob Spink (Ind)

Harrow West	0.562	144	Gareth Thomas (Lab/Co-op)
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	0.5621	143	Charles Kennedy (Lib Dem)
East Surrey	0.5622	142	Peter Ainsworth (Con)
Bury St Edmunds	0.5624	141	David Ruffley (Con)
Hornsey and Wood Green	0.5625	140	Lynne Featherstone (Lib Dem)
Reigate	0.5625	139	Crispin Blunt (Con)
Hertsmere	0.5627	138	James Clappison (Con)
Colne Valley	0.5633	137	Kali Mountford (Lab)
Cheltenham	0.5635	136	Martin Horwood (Lib Dem)
Aylesbury	0.5637	135	David Liddington (Con)
New Forest East	0.5639	134	Julian Lewis (Con)
West Chelmsford	0.5647	133	Simon Burns (Con)
Charnwood	0.5649	132	Stephen Dorrel (Con)
North East Hampshire	0.5651	131	James Arthbutnot (Con)
Sutton Coldfield	0.5655	130	Andrew Mitchell (Con)
Ynys Mon	0.5665	129	Albert Owen (Lab)
Hornchurch	0.5679	128	James Brokenshire (Con)
Daventry	0.568	127	Tim Boswell (Con)
Witney	0.5683	126	David DaCameron,T
North East Milton Keynes	0.5685	125	Mark Lancaster(Con)
Westbury	0.5686	124	Dr Andrew Murrison (Con)
Solihull	0.5689	123	Lorely Burt (Lib)
Ruislip-Northwood	0.5697	122	Nick Hurd (Con)
Aberdeen South	0.5699	121	Anne Begg (Lab)
Totnes	0.5703	120	Anthony Steen (Con)
Forest of Dean	0.5708	119	Mark Harper (Con)
Vale of York	0.5715	118	Anne McIntosh (Con)
Cardiff North	0.5717	117	Julie Morgan (Lab)
Tiverton and Honiton	0.5718	116	Angela Browning (Con)
Calder Valley	0.5725	115	Chris McCafferty (Lab)
Basingstoke	0.5731	114	Maria Miller (Con)
Bath	0.5733	113	Don Foster (Bath)
Wealden	0.574	112	Charles Hendry (Con)
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr	0.5743	111	Adam Price (Plaid Cymru)
Bracknell	0.5744	110	Rt Hon Andrew MacKay (Con)
East Hampshire	0.5746	109	Rt Hon Michael Mates (Con)
Stratford-on-Avon	0.5757	108	John Maples (Con)
Enfield, Southgate	0.5782	107	David Burrowes (Con)
Buckingham	0.5804	106	Rt Hon John Bercow (Speaker)
Old Bexley and Sidcup	0.5819	105	Derek Conway (Indep Con)
Elmet	0.5819	104	Colin Burgon (Lab)
West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine	0.5822	103	Sir Robert Smith (Lib)
Angus	0.5824	102	Mike Weir (SNP)
Wirral West	0.5827	101	Stephen Hesford (Lab)
Broxtowe	0.5829	100	Dr Nick Palmer (Lab)
Windsor	0.5833	99	Adam Afriyie (Con)
Surrey Heath	0.5833	98	Michael Gove (Con)
Northavon	0.5835	97	Prof Steve Webb (Lib)
Hampstead and Highgate	0.584	96	Glenda Jackson (Lab)
Wells	0.5856	95	Rt Hon David Heathcoat-Amory (Con)
Braintree	0.5859	94	Brooks Newmark (Con)
Horsham	0.5861	93	Rt Hon Francis Maude (Con)
Harrogate and Knaresborough	0.5862	92	Phil Willis (Lib)
South West Bedfordshire	0.5869	91	Andrew Selous (Con)
Woking	0.5872	90	Humfrey Malins (Con)
Lancaster and Wyre	0.5872	89	Ben Wallace (Con)
Wirral South	0.5874	88	Ben Chapman (Lab)
Beaconsfield	0.588	87	Dominic Grieve (Con)
Dundee East	0.5887	86	Stewart Hosie (SNP)
South Suffolk	0.5891	85	Tim Yeo (Con)
Tooting	0.5911	84	Rt Hon Sadiq Khan (Lab)
North Norfolk	0.5917	83	Norman Lamb (Lib)
Mid Sussex	0.5936	82	Hon Nicholas Soames (Con)
Runnymede and Weybridge	0.5938	81	Philip Hammond (Con)
Arundel and South Downs	0.5938	80	Nick Herbert (Con)
Kettering	0.594	79	Philip Hollobone (Con)

Edinburgh West	0.5941	78	John Barrett (Lib)
Oxford West and Abingdon	0.5947	77	Dr Evan Harris (Lib)
Hereford	0.5953	76	Paul Keetch (Lib)
Wansdyke	0.5959	75	Dan Norris (Lab)
Mid Bedfordshire	0.5964	74	Nadine Dorries (Con)
Stroud	0.5975	73	David Drew (Lab)
Warwick and Leamington	0.5978	72	James Plaskitt (Lab)
Beverley and Holderness	0.5983	71	Graham Stuart (Con)
Weston-Super-Mare	0.5992	70	John Penrose (Con)
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	0.5997	69	Danny Alexander (Lib)

### Band 1 Very High Scores

Constituency	Score	Position	MP
Beckenham	0.6001	68	Jacqui Lait (Con)
Finchley and Golders Green	0.6006	67	Dr RudWi Vis (Lab)
Ribble Valley	0.6015	66	Nigel Evans (Con)
Hertford and Stortford	0.6018	65	Mark Prisk (Con)
Kingston and Surbiton	0.6019	64	Edward Davey (Lib)
Ochil and South Perthshire	0.6039	63	Gordon Banks (Lab)
Bexleyheath and Crayford	0.6043	62	David Evennett (Con)
West Worcestershire	0.6044	61	Sir Michael Spicer (Con)
Henley	0.6045	60	John Howell (Con)
Dumfries and Galloway	0.6053	59	Russell Brown (Lab)
Taunton	0.6059	58	Jeremy Browne (Lib)
Sutton and Cheam	0.6071	57	Paul Burstow (Lib)
Canterbury	0.6096	56	Julian Brazier (Con)
Woodspring	0.6101	55	Dr Liam Fox (Con)
Epsom and Ewell	0.611	54	Chris Grayling (Con)
North East Hertfordshire	0.6124	53	Oliver Heald (Con)
Saffron Walden	0.6126	52	Rt Hon Sir Alan Haselhurst (Con)
North Dorset	0.6148	51	Robert Walter (Con)
Ludlow	0.6162	50	Philip Dunne (Con)
Edinburgh South	0.617	49	Nigel Griffiths (Lab)
Upminster	0.6185	48	Angela Watkinson (Con)
Westmorland and Lonsdale	0.6212	47	Tim Farron (Lib)
Esher and Walton	0.6213	46	Ian Taylor MBE (Con)
East Renfrewshire	0.6214	45	Rt Hon Jim Murphy (Lab)
Chipping Barnet	0.6215	44	Theresa Villiers (Con)
South West Hertfordshire	0.6215	43	David Gauke (Con)
Cardiff Central	0.6217	42	Jenny Willott (Lib Dem)
Wantage	0.6221	41	Ed Vaizey (Con)
Skipton and Ripon	0.6228	40	Rt Hon David Curry (Con)
Battersea	0.6251	39	Martin Linton (Lab)
Winchester	0.6275	38	Mark Oaten (Lib)
Orpington	0.6277	37	John Horam (Con)
Sheffield, Hallam	0.628	36	Rt Hon Nick Clegg (Lib)
Na h-Eileanan An Iar	0.6281	35	Angus MacNeil (SNP)
Hitchin and Harpenden	0.6289	34	Rt Hon Peter Lilley (Con)
Rushcliffe	0.6293	33	Gillian Merron (Con)
Sevenoaks	0.6312	32	Michael Fallon (Con)
Brecon and Radnorshire	0.6312	31	Roger Williams (Lib)
Shrewsbury and Atcham	0.6316	30	Daniel Kawczynski (Con)
Chesham and Amersham	0.633	29	Cheryl Gillan (Con)
Putney	0.6332	28	Justine Greening (Con)
Romsey	0.6401	27	Sandra Gidley (Lib)
Brentwood and Ongar	0.6405	26	Eric Pickles (Con)
North Wiltshire	0.6416	25	James Gray (Con)
Mid Dorset and North Poole	0.6432	24	Annette Brooke (Lib)
Altrincham and Sale West	0.645	23	Graham Brady (Con)
Welwyn Hatfield	0.645	22	Grant Shapps (Con)
Twickenham	0.645	21	Dr Vince Cable (Lib)

---

West Dorset	0.6473	20	Rt Hon Oliver Letwin
Hammersmith and Fulham	0.6483	19	Greg Hands (Con)
Haltemprice and Howden	0.6497	18	Rt Hon David Davis (Con)
Hexham	0.6543	17	Peter Atkinson (Con)
Kensington and Chelsea	0.656	16	Rt Hon Sir Malcom Rifkind
St Albans	0.6578	15	Anne Main (Con)
South Cambridgeshire	0.6602	14	Andrew Lansley (Con)
Wokingham	0.6604	13	Rt Hon John Redwood (Con)
Mole Valley	0.6668	12	Sir Paul Beresford (Con)
Newbury	0.6691	11	Richard Benyon (Con)
Bristol West	0.6703	10	Stephen Williams (Lib)
Maidenhead	0.6759	9	Rt Hon Theresa May (Con)
Monmouth	0.6889	8	David Davies (Con)
South East Cambridgeshire	0.6897	7	James Paice (Con)
Wimbledon	0.6915	6	Stephen Hammond (Con)
East Dunbartonshire	0.7021	5	Jo Swinson (Lib)
South West Surrey	0.7053	4	Jeremy Hunt (Con)
Richmond Park	0.7166	3	Susan Kramer (Lib)
Cheadle	0.724	2	Mark Hunter (Lib)
Guildford	0.7346	1	Anne Milton(C)

---

# appendix

---

## Sources for Indicators

### Great Britain

#### Power as resilience category

**1. Health:** the incidence of work-limiting illness or disability.

*Data source: Census for England and Wales 2001, and Census for Scotland 2001.*

*Data used: Percentage of people in constituency without work-limiting illness or disability; thus, a higher percentage will give a higher power score.*

**2. Crime:** the incidence of violent crime in each constituency.

*Data sources; Home Office figures for recorded crime, 2008–09. General Register Office for Scotland figures for recorded crime, 2008–09.*

*Data Used: Recorded violent crime against the person per 1000 of the population.*

We subtract the figure for the rate of violent figure from 1,000, so that a higher figure represents lower crime (and hence a higher power score).

*Other methodological issues:* The data recorded is for local authorities, rather than parliamentary constituencies. For constituencies that contain more than one local authority, we have taken an average for all the local authorities that a constituency overlaps with. We do not take a weighted average according to the proportion of the constituency's population in each local authority area, partly because we do not have the breakdown of figures which would allow such a weighted average to be calculated.

However, with this indicator this is less of a serious problem than it might be. This is because the crime indicator is used as a proxy for how vulnerable people are to violence and crime in their immediate environment, but in many cases, their environment extends beyond where they live — they may commute to work, across local authority

boundaries, and spend their leisure time in different local authority areas. Therefore, weighting the average figure according to where people live is not the most appropriate step. Although the use of local authority data mapped onto constituencies is not perfect, it provides a proxy of the vulnerability to crime most of us will be exposed to, in our immediate area.

**3. Unemployment:** percentage of working age population of constituency who are unemployed.

*Data source:* Annual Population Survey 2008.

*Data Used:* Percentage of constituency's working age population who are unemployed. This figure is subtracted from 100, so that the higher the figure, the higher the power score for this constituency.

#### Power over the course of one's own life category

**4. Education:** the level of academic qualifications achieved among working-age population

*Data Source:* Annual Population Survey 2008.

*Data Used:* The data was broken down into five variables, identifying the percentage of the working-age constituency population with:

- no formal qualifications
- NVQ 1 qualifications or above (equivalent to three or four GCSEs at D-E grade, or above)
- NVQ 2 qualifications or above (equivalent to five GCSEs A-C, or above)
- NVQ 3 qualifications or above (equivalent to two or more A-levels)
- NVQ 4 qualifications or above (equivalent to a BTEC Higher National Certificate or Higher National Diploma or above — for example, a university degree)

*Data Coding:* The data was coded as a five-point scale, running from 0 to 4:

- 4 for NVQ4+
- 3 for NVQ3+
- 2 for NVQ2+
- 1 for NVQ1+
- 0 for no formal qualifications.

The percentages of the working-age population within each variable were then multiplied by the relevant code and summed together, giving a maximum possible 'score' of 1,000 (100 per cent of population with NVQ 4 qualifications and above, as well as with all the other lower qualifications listed).

### **5. Power in the workplace**

*Data Source:* Annual Population Survey 2008.

*Data Used:* The data was broken down into nine variables, identifying the percentage of working-age constituency population who are working in:

- management or as senior officials
- professional occupations
- associate professional and technical occupations
- administrative and secretarial occupations
- skilled trades
- personal service occupations
- sales and customer service
- process, plant and machine operative occupations
- elementary occupations

*Data coding:* The data was coded in a five-point scale running from 0 to 4:

- variable (i) coded 4
- variables (ii)–(iii) coded 3
- variables (iv)–(v) coded 2
- variables (vi)–(viii) coded 1
- variable (ix) coded 0

The percentage for each variable is multiplied by the relevant code, and the figures derived are then summed together. This gives a maximum possible 'score' of 400 (that is, if 100 per cent of the constituency's working-age population are managers or senior officials).

The coding of the different professional categories is unavoidably a contentious matter, and no such scoring can accommodate the variety of experiences of workplace autonomy within and between such professional categories. However, our coding is intended to give a rough approximation of who are likely to have at least the option of great power and autonomy in the workplace (managers and professionals), who are likely to enjoy less autonomy in the workplace (such as administrative staff and 'personal service

workers' – hairdressers and flight attendants, for example) and those who are likely to lack even minimal autonomy of the tasks they perform and how they perform them (those in elementary occupations such as mining, and also factory production-line workers, for example).

**6. Income:** the average household income in a constituency

*Data Source:* Annual Population Survey 2008

*Data Used:* Annual average household incomes for each Westminster parliamentary constituency.

### Power over social world category

#### **7. Marginality of parliamentary seats**

*Data source:* The New Economic Foundation's index of Democratic Power. This assigns a score to each parliamentary constituency in Great Britain, constructed by multiplying the potential of the seat to change hands by an adjustment for the size of the constituency (on the basis that in larger constituencies each voter has a smaller share of electoral power). The potential of a seat to change hands is calculated using data on the marginality of the seat, and regression analysis to track how the marginality of the seat correlates with seats changing hands in the last general election.

*Data used:* index of Democratic Power scores for each parliamentary constituency in Great Britain.

#### **8. Voter turnout in general elections**

*Data source:* Voter turnout figures collated at [www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout05.htm](http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout05.htm).

*Data used:* Voter turnout by constituency (% of registered voters who voted) in the 2005 general election.

### England only

#### Power as resilience category

**1. Belonging:** where citizens feel they 'belong in their immediate neighbourhood'

*Data source:* DCLG Place Survey 2008–09

*Data used:* Percentage of people who feel that they belong in their immediate neighbourhood.

#### Power over the social world category

**2. Local influence:** whether people feel they can influence decisions in their local area.

*Data Source:* DCLG Place Survey 2008–09.

*Data Used:* Percentage of people who feel that they can influence decisions in their local decisions.

**3. Volunteering:** rates of volunteering activity in constituencies*Data Source:* DCLG Place Survey 2008–09*Data Used:* Percentage of people who have volunteered unpaid help at least once a month in the past 12 months.

One of the limitations of this data is that ‘volunteering’ is such a broad category. Although this data is more fine-grained than much survey data on volunteering, as it gives the percentage of people who volunteer *at least once a month*, this can still contain great differences in the levels of volunteering activity, as well as the kinds of volunteering that are undertaken. In one respect, this broad scope can be seen as an advantage; there are countless ways to exercise power over the social world outside formal politics, and hence narrowly focusing on just one form of volunteering would be inappropriate. However, that the data does not tell us about the levels of volunteering activity undertaken (such as hours per week spent volunteering) is a significant limitation, but one unavoidable at present; more fine-grained national surveys on volunteering do not allow us to compare differences between local authorities or constituencies.

**Methodological issues regarding aggregation**

The Power Map is a weighted sum of the various indicator values. By adding the indicator values together to derive the overall power score we are taking the indicator values to be *substitutable*; that is, a high score on one indicator can make up for a low score on another. This is known as ‘linear aggregation’.

An alternative way to aggregate the indicator values would be to multiply them together (after adjusting them according to their weights). This is known as ‘geometric aggregation’. Geometric aggregation is appropriate when indicators are taken to be ‘complements’ rather than substitutes — when, that is, how much one has of one indicator matters for how much one has of another indicator. For example, if being powerless in one respect was taken also to reduce one’s power in another respect, then these two aspects of power would be ‘complements’, and there would be a case for geometric aggregation, rather than linear aggregation.

With regard to the indicators used in the Power Map, the clear-cut distinction between ‘substitutes’ and ‘complements’ partially breaks down. In some respects, one’s power along one indicator certainly does impact on the power that one has along another indicator. For example, if one is highly educated but lives in an area of very high unemployment, then one of the chief ‘empowering’ effects of education – that of widening employment opportunities – will be also diminished. However, as mentioned in the preceding section, in the Power Map we also focus on how different aspects of power can ‘pull apart’; given the complex and multifaceted nature of power, one might be powerful in one respect but far less powerful in another respect (as brought out by the example of economically powerful people in a very safe seat). Because of this, we use linear rather than geometric aggregation in the Power Map. A further advantage to this method of aggregation is that it makes the power scores intuitively clear, as scores out of 100.

### The power score

Each indicator is calculated from its underlying metric by subtracting the minimum score achieved by any constituency and dividing by the range:

$$I_{cdi} = \frac{(M_{cdi} - M_{min})}{(M_{max} - M_{min})}$$

$$M_{min} = \min ([M_{cdi}]) \quad \forall_c, \text{ fixed } d, i$$

$$M_{max} = \max ([M_{cdi}]) \quad \forall_c, \text{ fixed } d, i$$

This normalises the data so that, for each indicator, the highest value has an indicator value of 1, and the lowest an indicator value of 0. The other values are distributed within this range, according to their distance from the highest and lowest values. One advantage of using this normalisation method is that it gives a very clear representation of the disparities in power both within and across indicators. The most powerful and least powerful constituencies along each indicator can be easily identified.

This normalisation method rescales data to show the size of disparities within the indicator values; it tells us nothing of their *absolute* level. There is a disadvantage to this. For example, all constituencies may have high absolute levels of power in a particular indicator – voter turnout might be high in all constituencies. However, on the data normalisation method we use in the Power Map, the constituency with the lowest turnout would still have an indicator score of 0, obscuring its high absolute level of turnout and the high absolute level of citizens’ political power in this constituency. Nor can absolute *increases* in the power of citizens be measured using this normalisation method; only changes in the *rankings* of constituencies relative to each other can be tracked over time. However, the main aim of the Power Map is to show *present-day* inequalities in power across the UK, and hence this data normalisation method is appropriate.

Normalising the data gives us the ‘Indicator Value’ (I) for each constituency (c) within each indicator (i) and category (d). In the formulae below, this is written as  $I_{cdi}$ .

A constituency’s overall ‘power score’ ( $P_c$ ) is found by multiplying each indicator value by its category weight ( $W_d$ ) and indicator weight ( $W_i$ ), summing these together, and then multiplying by 100:

$$P_c = (\sum W_d W_i I_{cdi}) \times 100$$

This gives each constituency a power score out of a maximum 100.

---

# notes

---

- 1 L Byrne, *Power Failure* (London: Demos, 2009).
- 2 D Cameron, 'We need a redistribution of power', *Guardian*, 25 May 2009.
- 3 N Clegg, *The Liberal Moment* (London: Demos, 2009).
- 4 M Lerner, *Surplus Powerlessness: The psychodynamics of everyday life and the psychology of individual and social transformation* (Oakland, CA: Institute for Labor and Mental Health, 1986).
- 5 M Marmot, 'Health in an unequal world', *Lancet* 368 (2006).
- 6 Cameron, 'We need a redistribution of power'.
- 7 Byrne, *Power Failure*.
- 8 S Lukes, *Power: A radical view* (London: Macmillan, 2004).
- 9 B Russell, *Power: A new social analysis* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- 10 M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- 11 Lukes, *Power*.
- 12 A Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (London: Penguin, 2009).
- 13 R Dahl, *Who Governs: Democracy and power in an American city* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961);  
B Flyvberg, *Rationality and Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
- 14 A Sampson, *Who Runs This Place? The anatomy of Britain in the 21st century* (London: John Murray, 2005).

- 15 See for example the 'community power' debates that took place in the USA in the post-war period, particularly C Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); F Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); Dahl, *Who Governs?*; P Bachrach and MS Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Lukes, *Power*.
- 16 Lukes, *Power*.
- 17 P Morriss, *Power: A philosophical analysis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
- 18 I Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- 19 Lerner, *Surplus Powerlessness*.
- 20 Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, *Knife Crime: A review of evidence and policy* (London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2007).
- 21 Lerner, *Surplus Powerlessness*.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Byrne, *Power Failure*.
- 24 Z Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
- 25 E Diener and EM Suh (eds) *Culture and Subjective Well-being* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
- 26 Marmot, 'Health in an unequal world'.
- 27 Lazurus et al.
- 28 Diener and Suh, *Culture and Subjective Well-being*.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 M Weber, *Economy and Society: An outline of interpretative sociology* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1978).
- 31 B Hindess, *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

- 32 P Pettit, *Republicanism: A theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 33 Quoted in M Castells, *Communication Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
- 34 Quoted in Lukes, *Power*.
- 35 H Arendt, *On Violence in Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt, 1976).
- 36 M Haugaard, 'Reflections on seven ways of creating power', *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, no 1 (2003).
- 37 Castells, *Communication Power*.
- 38 A Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999).
- 39 Lukes, *Power*.
- 40 Sen, *The Idea of Justice*.
- 41 A Sen, 'Capability and well-being' in M Nussbaum and A Sen, *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Sen, *Development as Freedom*.
- 45 Sen quoted in J Derbyshire, 'The NS profile: Amartya Sen', *New Statesman*, 23 Jul 2009.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 M Nussbaum, *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 48 Scott (2004).
- 49 Lukes, *Power*.
- 50 P Pettit, *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 51 Ibid.

---

# references

---

Arendt, H (1976) 'On violence' in H Arendt, *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt Publishers, 1976).

Bachrach, P, and Baratz, MS, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

Bauman, Z, *Liquid Modernity*, (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).

Byrne, L, *Power Failure* (London: Demos, 2009).

Cameron, D, 'We need a redistribution of power', *Guardian*, 25 May 2009.

Castells, M, *Communication Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, *Knife Crime: A review of evidence and policy* (London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2007).

Clegg, N, *The Liberal Moment* (London: Demos, 2009).

Dahl, R, *Who Governs? Democracy and power in an American city* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961).

Derbyshire, J, 'The NS profile: Amartya Sen', *New Statesman*, 23 Jul 2009.

Diener, E and Suh, EM (eds) *Culture and Subjective Well-being* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).

Flyvberg, B, *Rationality and Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

Haugaard, M, 'Reflections on seven ways of creating power', *European Journal of Social Theory* 6, no 1 (2003).

- Hindess, B, *Discourses of Power: from Hobbes to Foucault* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
- Hunter, F, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
- Kant, I, *Critique of Practical Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- Lazarus, R, and Folkman, *Stress, Appraisal and Coping* (New York, Springer Publishing: 1984)
- Lerner, M, *Surplus Powerlessness: The psychodynamics of everyday life and the psychology of individual and social transformation* (Oakland, CA: Institute for Labor and Mental Health, 1986).
- Lukes, S, *Power: A radical view* (London: Macmillan, 2004).
- Mann, M, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
- Marmot, M, 'Health in an unequal world', *Lancet* 368 (2006).
- Mills, C, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
- Morriss, P, *Power: A philosophical analysis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
- Nussbaum, M, *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Pettit, P, *Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- Russell, B, *Power: A new social analysis* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- Sampson, S, *Who Runs This Place? The anatomy of Britain in the 21st century* (London: John Murray, 2005).
- Sen, A, 'Capability and well-being' in M Nussbaum and A Sen, *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Sen, A, *Development as Freedom*  
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999).

Sen, A, *The Idea of Justice* (London: Penguin, 2009).

Weber, M, *Economy and Society: an outline of interpretative sociology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978).

## Demos – Licence to Publish

The work (as defined below) is provided under the terms of this licence ('licence'). The work is protected by copyright and/or other applicable law. Any use of the work other than as authorized under this licence is prohibited. By exercising any rights to the work provided here, you accept and agree to be bound by the terms of this licence. Demos grants you the rights contained here in consideration of your acceptance of such terms and conditions.

### 1 Definitions

- A **'Collective Work'** means a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology or encyclopedia, in which the Work in its entirety in unmodified form, along with a number of other contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole. A work that constitutes a Collective Work will not be considered a Derivative Work (as defined below) for the purposes of this Licence.
- B **'Derivative Work'** means a work based upon the Work or upon the Work and other pre-existing works, such as a musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which the Work may be recast, transformed, or adapted, except that a work that constitutes a Collective Work or a translation from English into another language will not be considered a Derivative Work for the purpose of this Licence.
- C **'Licensor'** means the individual or entity that offers the Work under the terms of this Licence.
- D **'Original Author'** means the individual or entity who created the Work.
- E **'Work'** means the copyrightable work of authorship offered under the terms of this Licence.
- F **'You'** means an individual or entity exercising rights under this Licence who has not previously violated the terms of this Licence with respect to the Work, or who has received express permission from Demos to exercise rights under this Licence despite a previous violation.

### 2 Fair Use Rights

Nothing in this licence is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use, first sale or other limitations on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright law or other applicable laws.

### 3 Licence Grant

Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to exercise the rights in the Work as stated below:

- A to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works;
- B to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly, perform publicly, and perform publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. All rights not expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.

### 4 Restrictions

The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited by the following restrictions:

- A You may distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform. You may not offer or impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence or the recipients' exercise of the rights granted hereunder. You may not sublicense the Work. You must keep intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties. You may not distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work with any technological measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner inconsistent with the terms of this Licence Agreement. The above applies to the Work as incorporated in a Collective Work, but this does not require the Collective Work apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create a Collective Work, upon notice from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collective Work any reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
- B You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital file sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works.
- C If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or any Collective Works, You must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the Original Author credit reasonable to the medium or means You are utilizing by conveying the name (or pseudonym if applicable) of the Original Author if supplied; the title of the Work if supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will appear where any other comparable authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as such other comparable authorship credit.

### 5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer

- A By offering the Work for public release under this Licence, Licensor represents and warrants that, to the best of Licensor's knowledge after reasonable inquiry:
  - i Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder and to permit the lawful exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any obligation to pay any royalties, compulsory licence fees, residuals or any other payments;

ii The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights or any other right of any third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other tortious injury to any third party.

- B except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by applicable law, the work is licensed on an 'as is' basis, without warranties of any kind, either express or implied including, without limitation, any warranties regarding the contents or accuracy of the work.

## 6 Limitation on Liability

Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability to a third party resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will licensor be liable to you on any legal theory for any special, incidental, consequential, punitive or exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the work, even if licensor has been advised of the possibility of such damages.

## 7 Termination

- A This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach by You of the terms of this Licence. Individuals or entities who have received Collective Works from You under this Licence, however, will not have their licences terminated provided such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any termination of this Licence.

- B Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor reserves the right to release the Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing the Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw this Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms of this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated above.

## 8 Miscellaneous

- A Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence granted to You under this Licence.

- B If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.

- C No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with such waiver or consent.

- D This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work licensed here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that may appear in any communication from You. This Licence may not be modified without the mutual written agreement of Demos and You.

