

DEMOS

BEYOND BREXIT

A NEW DEAL FOR
BRITAIN, UKRAINE
AND EUROPE

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The old is dying and the new struggles to be born...

Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 1947

ABOUT THIS ESSAY

This essay makes the case for a new deal for Britain's relationship with Europe and Ukraine. Its author, **Nick Boles**, was the Conservative MP for Grantham and Stamford from 2010-2019 and a minister for planning and then skills in the coalition government. Together with the deputy leader of the Labour Party, Lucy Powell, Nick campaigned in Parliament for a 'soft Brexit' that would have seen Britain join Norway in the European Economic Area when it left the European Union.

Nick argues that Britain's postwar strategy - resting on NATO and European integration - is unravelling as America pivots toward containing China and grows impatient with European allies. He contends that Britain, Ukraine and Europe must urgently forge a New Deal rather than muddle through with piecemeal fixes.

Central to his vision is transforming the existing European Political Community into a new "European Confederation" - a treaty-based body distinct from the EU, open to EU and non-EU states alike. It would offer participation in the Single Market for goods, a shared technology and innovation space, an expansive youth opportunity scheme, alongside NATO-style mutual defence guarantees (mirroring Nato's Articles 4 and 5), without requiring free movement, Schengen membership, or Eurozone entry.

Boles stresses building durable public consent and deeper legitimacy through public deliberation including a citizens' assembly before any UK government seeks a mandate via a general election manifesto, rather than a referendum.

Demos is a cross-party think tank. We work on ways to upgrade democracy to repair the broken relationship between state and citizen through practical solutions to build trust and deliver for people.

This essay is being published at a point where the debate about the future shape of Europe appears to have ground to a halt, but the need for international collaboration is changing and demanding new answers. We hope it acts as a stimulus for wider thinking about new ways for us to look outwards as a country, in order to build security and prosperity in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

Polly Curtis

Chief Executive, Demos

INTRODUCTION

Like many of my generation, I have always been an Atlanticist. I was twenty-two and studying in the United States when President Reagan went to the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and called on Russian leader Gorbachev to “tear down this wall”. Three years later, I was living and working in West Germany, when I travelled to the same spot to witness Germany’s reunification on 3rd October 1990. The Cold War had ended. The free world had won. The alliance between the peoples of Britain, America and Western Europe had achieved its greatest victory.

It is hard not to feel a sense of nostalgia when looking back at those simpler times. But Canadian Prime Minister Carney is right: “nostalgia is not a strategy”. We in Britain, and our friends in Europe and Ukraine, must face the new reality head on and free ourselves of the preconceptions that constrained our actions until now.

We have many problems to solve.

Britain must repair the damage that Brexit did to business investment and trade in goods so it can restore growth in living standards and invest much more in security and defence.

Europe must deregulate its economy and find a way to integrate Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans more fully into its economic and political union without unleashing new waves of migration or undermining European unity.

Ukraine must prevail in its struggle against Russia, rebuild its economy and forge its political future inside Europe.

We must all build a European-led NATO that can survive (but not hasten) an American withdrawal and keep the Russian Empire at bay for another eighty years.

We could decide to address these problems individually and devise solutions piecemeal: associate membership status for future members of the European Union, ‘coalitions of the willing’ for Ukraine’s future security guarantees, successors to the Windsor Framework for closer economic ties between the United Kingdom and the European Union, the appointment of a European Supreme Allied Commander in NATO and an expanded role for the Joint Expeditionary Force to combat threats in the North Sea, the Baltic and the Arctic.

To muddle through is the British way. But I believe that we are more likely to arrive at robust and sustainable solutions if we raise our sights and dare to imagine a more ambitious vision for our shared future - just as our forebears did after the Second World War.

What follows is an attempt to describe such a vision. It involves a New Deal through which Britain, Ukraine and Europe can address the threats and challenges of the future and find a new way of working with our North American allies (both the United States and Canada.) It envisages the establishment of a new European Confederation to give weight and purpose to economic and security collaboration between countries in the European Union and those in Europe’s outer ring.

It is no doubt full of flaws - though it has benefited greatly from comments and suggestions by Gordon Brown, Nick Clegg, David Lidington, Amber Rudd, Michael Gove, Olly Robbins, Anne Applebaum and John Bew for which I am hugely grateful. I hope that it triggers a debate, not just in Britain but in Ukraine and across Europe and that others, with greater expertise and political clout than me, will pick up the baton and run with it.

BRITAIN

A NATION ADrift



Over the last thousand years, those who ruled the territories of the United Kingdom have tried many different strategies to deliver security and prosperity for the British people. Economic strategies have ranged from free trade to imperial preference to membership of the European Union's internal market and customs union. The search for security has seen Britain command the world's largest and most powerful navy, invade and conquer parts of every continent and join forces with almost every European power. British history is testament to the success of many of these strategies. But even the most successful of them only succeeded for a time. Inevitably the leaders of other countries have rival strategies that challenge our own. Meanwhile, the tides of technological progress and demographic change render some sources of military or economic strength obsolete and reveal new opportunities and vulnerabilities that did not exist a few decades before.

After the Second World War, as the disintegration of the British Empire gathered pace, the UK's national strategy came to rely on two overlapping sets of alliances. The first encompassed the multinational institutions established in the late 1940s: security was assured by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); economic management by the institutions created at the Bretton Woods Conference - the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Each institution had its specific purposes and particular membership lists. But they all shared a few defining features: they were created by the United States and its allies in the aftermath of the war and in anticipation of the threat posed by Soviet Russia to the security and prosperity of the free world. The US was not only the main author of these institutions but the dominant power within them. Britain played the role of America's principal partner and dependable sidekick.

The second set of alliances grew out of the European Steel and Coal Community that was established in 1951. Once the UK joined the European Economic Community in 1973, integration with Europe became the second major plank of our national strategy. With the conversion of the European Economic Community into a Union, integration with Europe became an ever more important element in Britain's drive for growing prosperity.

This approach reached its pinnacle in the early 1990s. First came the fall of the Soviet Union, and the disappearance of the threat it posed. In 1993 the EU established the European Single Market as the world's largest internal market. In 1995 the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations concluded with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). At the turn of the millennium, Britain's security and prosperity rested on firm foundations.

Twenty five years later, these alliances are fracturing. In 2016, a majority of the British people voted to leave the EU. In 2017, the WTO lost the power to enforce rules governing international trade, when the United States started vetoing the appointment of new judges to its appeal court. In 2020 the United Kingdom exited the EU's Single Market and customs union. In 2024, Donald Trump was elected President for the second time. In 2025 he launched a unilateral global tariff war and threatened to abandon Ukraine to the Russian invader. In early 2026 he declared his determination to annex the territory of a NATO ally and announced the withdrawal of American troops from Germany as punishment for the country's failure to back the United States' war on Iran.

Natural laws of entropy apply to the architecture of international relations as much as to physical structures. We have to prepare for the possibility that the decay of the alliances on which Britain's security and prosperity have been based for the last eight decades will proceed in the same way as bankruptcy in Ernest Hemingway's novel *The Sun Also Rises*: gradually then suddenly. So we must urgently develop a new national strategy to assure our future in a disordered world.



AMERICA

UNEASY HEGEMON


On 8 May 1945, eleven months after President Reagan's 'boys of Pointe du Hoc' scaled the cliffs of the beaches of Normandy as part of the D Day landings, the unconditional surrender of the Nazi regime brought an end to the Second World War in Europe. For the second time in fifty years, the United States had travelled across the Atlantic to rescue Europe from its demons. This time they would stay. Having learned the lessons of the 1920s and 30s, the Americans maintained their financial and military commitment to Europe. Through the Marshall Plan they rebuilt Western European economies and through NATO they built the continent's defence. They did not just do this from the kindness of their hearts - or because so many Americans could trace their roots back to the old continent. They did so because the biggest threat to the security and prosperity of the United States came from Soviet Russia on Europe's eastern border. Until the early 1990s, America's self interest dictated a strong alliance with Britain and the nations of Western Europe.

After the Soviet Union's collapse, America's commitment to Europe lost its strongest motor. For a few decades, America's leadership of the international system of alliances and institutions continued, but largely as a product of inertia. As the only superpower, the US did not face an existential threat from any other nation state. Then in 2001 the rise of Al Qaeda and the incidence of spectacular acts of Islamist terrorism on American, British and European soil briefly united the West in a cause which replaced anti-communism. The post war system of alliances received a new injection of purpose which enabled it to continue into the new millennium.

In recent years, the ties that bind the Western allies together have begun to fray. For the British and almost all Europeans, Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine is an existential threat. President Putin is the single greatest enemy of British and European security and prosperity. Denying him victory in Ukraine is the top priority for our governments. For the United States the war is a sideshow - appalling maybe but fundamentally a distraction from their chief concern.

America once again has a serious economic and military rival: the People's Republic of China. This was true for President Biden. It is true today for President Trump. In 2030 it will be true for the next President whether Democrat or Republican. It is the single fact that will do most to shape American policy and behaviour in the next twenty years. From now on, all American presidents will expect Britain, Ukraine and the countries of Europe to take the lead in defending their own people and territory. We can hope that President Trump's successors will restore some civility and respect to their handling of relations with their allies. We can also hope that they will rediscover the value of their European bases and recognise the truth that the United States is the greatest beneficiary from a global system of free trade in goods and free flows of capital.

But from now on, as the American struggle with China heats up, our interests and concerns will increasingly take a back seat in Washington. As Prime Minister Carney said in Davos, "In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or combine to create a third path with impact." We in Britain, Ukraine and Europe must get ready to fight our own corner so our security and prosperity are not sidelined in the struggle between two rival hegemonies.



EUROPE

CHAINED GULLIVER

For most of the last 50 years, any demand by a European politician (usually French) for Europe to develop greater “autonomy” from the United States caused their British counterparts to roll their eyes and warn about the risks of undermining the Americans’ commitment to NATO. German politicians usually kept their counsel but privately were no more enthusiastic.

The arguments first articulated sixty years ago by French President de Gaulle, and repeated across the decades by his successors from Mitterand to Macron, now seem far-sighted. With an aggressive Russia on the rampage on Europe’s eastern frontier, and a distracted American president looking for an excuse to pull back from NATO so he can focus on containing the rise of China, the need for Britain, and Europe to take charge of their own defence is now hardly disputed. Everyone agrees that it is time to “unchain Gulliver” (to borrow EU Commission President Delors’ famous phrase.) Where a debate still rages is on the question of how quickly the transition can be managed - and how to pay for it.

We should be grateful that the crisis in transatlantic relations has happened now and not at any time in the last couple of decades. Fifteen years ago, during the Greek financial crisis, Europe was in a battle to ensure the survival of its new single currency and in no fit state to take on an even bigger challenge. Ten years ago, it was wrestling with the implications of Brexit. Five years ago, it was dealing with Covid and the massive economic costs it imposed on every member state. If President Trump had won re-election in 2020 and taken the same attitude to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as he does now, Britain and Europe would not have been able to sustain Ukraine in its battle against Russia and the crisis of security that we now face would be immeasurably greater. Four years on, Ukraine has fought Russia to a near standstill in the Donbas and taken the offensive to energy infrastructure deep inside Russia. Meanwhile Britain and Europe have developed a steely resolve to resist Trump's impatient drive for a deal with Putin and keep Ukraine in the fight.

In the longer term, if Europe is to be able to step up to its new responsibilities and together with Britain and Ukraine assume the burden of assuring the continent's future security, it will require an economy productive enough to generate the resources to pay for much higher spending on defence. It is very far from having that at present. Despite the advantages of the Single Market and the customs union, the economies of Germany, France and Italy have barely grown at all in the last few years. Among the larger member states, only Poland and Spain show the kind of dynamism that Europe as a whole requires.

The challenges European economies face are daunting. Some are external. Its traditional industrial champions face ruthless competition from an unrepentantly mercantilist China. Its nascent tech businesses have to compete with the enormous financial resources and bullying tactics of the tech titans of America.

But most of Europe's challenges are homegrown. There are lots of reports analysing what ails European economies and sketching out roadmaps for the reforms that they need to embrace. Producing them has become a cottage industry for Italian former Prime Ministers of a technocratic bent. What is less evident is the sustained political resolve at both the national and European level to identify specific regulations that should be repealed and push a change in mindset through their bureaucracies. As ever, the drive for reform is frustrated by the European Union's need to bring all 27 member states along with every major initiative. That is why there is increasing recognition among European leaders that smaller groups of member states must be allowed to forge ahead in some areas while others hang back and catch up later.

The EU must also deal with the difficult question of how to bring new countries into the club without undermining the integrity of EU rules or unleashing a controversial new wave of migration from East to West. Whatever solution they come up with for the most urgent case, Ukraine, will also need to address the legitimate aspirations of West Balkan nations like Serbia and Albania. They also need to develop a clearer vision for the future of the EU's relationships with Canada and Turkey (both important NATO allies but one sitting on the other side of the Atlantic and the other rejecting the democratic values that are central to Europe's political identity.)

A NEW DEAL

In this time of dangerous flux, the leaders of the United Kingdom, Ukraine and Europe should negotiate a New Deal with each other, and with the leaders of the United States and Canada, to assure the future security and prosperity of the western hemisphere.

THE NEW DEAL SHOULD:

- i. recast NATO as a European-led alliance in which the UK and European powers assume ever greater responsibility for providing key defence capabilities **in exchange for** a long term agreement on tariff-free trade between the United States, Canada and their European allies
- ii. entrench Europe-wide defence commitments by the most important non-EU countries (the UK and Ukraine) **in exchange for** full participation in the European Single Market for goods, specifically:
 - o the commitment by the UK to invest at least 3.5% of GDP in the renewal of its naval strengths to defend Europe's western sea frontier and to extend across the continent (including, in time, Ukraine) the protection of its independent nuclear deterrent
 - o the commitment by Ukraine to maintain a large permanent army to defend Europe's eastern land frontier and to share its world-leading defence technologies with its European allies
- iii. invite non-European 'middle power' nations that share democratic values and a commitment to free trade (Canada, Japan, South Korea, India) to join in agreements covering the defence of critical chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz, the supply of critical minerals and components and other issues of shared concern like AI security.

A New Deal of this nature is likely to involve one or more treaties setting out the commitments of the different countries involved. It may also give rise to the establishment of new institutions. In particular, it is clear that a new organisation will be required to entrench the new economic and security commitments binding European countries and the EU with the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR BRITAIN, UKRAINE & EUROPE

The British mind has an instinctive preference for ad hoc arrangements. We've muddled through pretty well for the best part of a thousand years without a written constitution and find it hard to understand why others can't do the same. These pragmatic instincts lie at the root of our historic frustration with the bureaucratic legalism of the European Union.

The incompatibility of British and European mindsets partly explains why pro-Europeans on both sides of the English Channel are more nervous than excited about the idea of the UK rejoining the EU. Even if all parties entered into negotiations with the best of intentions, and a genuine desire to find common ground, how long would it take? And what is to stop it ending in tears again? Do we in Britain really want to plunge the country back into the political psychodrama that paralysed us for so many years? Do our European friends really want to bend over backwards to take us back in, and then spend the next twenty years wondering if we will stay the course? And even if the UK does eventually rejoin the European Union, how does that address the urgent security challenge of a revanchist Russia and an America in retreat?

We face new problems so we need new answers. And we need them soon. For this reason, the leaders of Britain, Ukraine and Europe should prioritise the creation of a new structure which gives equal weight to both security and prosperity, which is open to all Europeans whether inside or outside the EU, and which seeks close involvement by Canada and Turkey. From the outset, it should be designed according to principles which will help avoid some of the pitfalls of previous arrangements.

This new structure should:

- i. be inclusive not exclusive and welcome new members and new associations
- ii. value the different contributions that different countries can make to the benefit of all and provide flexibility to accommodate diverse national sensitivities and preferences
- iii. respect the importance of sustaining existing EU and NATO institutions and treaties and seek to complement not undermine them as they evolve.

These principles naturally lead to the revival of an old idea first proposed by French President Mitterand in his New Year's Eve Address on 31st December 1989 and launched at a conference in Prague in June 1991 by Mitterand and Czechoslovak President Havel: the creation of a European Confederation. Although it did not gain traction in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was more recently revived by former Italian Prime Minister Letta following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In Mitterand's original conception the European Confederation would "associate all states of [the] continent in a common and permanent organisation for exchanges, peace and security." He envisaged the Confederation offering Central and Eastern European countries an organic link with western Europe in the interim period before they were ready to join the European Economic Community (as it then was) and abide by its strict rules. When Letta revived the idea, he saw it as a "second circle" of European organisation that would focus on shared rules for living together and security guarantees, while the European Union would remain the "core".

A few days after Letta's intervention, President Macron suggested a similar but even looser concept, the "European Political Community" (EPC), which was established later in 2022 and brings together the leaders of 47 European countries to coordinate responses to shared challenges like security, energy and illegal migration. In the immediate aftermath of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with President Biden strongly committed to American leadership of NATO, and Britain having only just left the EU, it made sense for the EPC to be set up as a forum for leaders' discussions with no permanent organisation, budget or founding treaty. Four years later, the rapid shift in American policy towards the security of Europe means that it is time for the EPC to evolve into something more ambitious and more muscular. In short, the EPC should become the European Confederation.

THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION

The British prime minister, the Ukrainian president, the leaders of European Union and European Economic Area governments, the Swiss government and the governments of the Western Balkans as well as the presidents of the EU Council and Commission should establish by treaty the European Confederation, which will exist separately and operate independently but in close partnership with the European Union and NATO, and have as its purpose the advancement of the security and prosperity of all of its members.

The European Confederation will advance the prosperity of its members through:

i. participation in the European Single Market for goods

Expanding the number of countries that participate in the European Single Market for goods will increase the benefits of trade throughout Europe. Participation by countries which are not members of the EU will require their commitment to dynamic regulatory alignment with EU rules on goods (after appropriate consultation when significant changes are proposed as is currently the case for members of the European Economic Area who are not members of the EU.) The EU will also insist that the European Court of Justice has primacy in interpreting those rules, and new participants in the Single Market for goods will probably need to agree a contribution to European cohesion funds on the Swiss model.

ii. participation in a new European technology and innovation space

The EC should lead the creation of a European technology and innovation space through which members pool talent, capital and research so that all can benefit from individual members' independent strengths in AI, robotics, quantum computing and biosciences. The role of the

EC should be to coordinate the efforts of its members to develop sovereign capabilities in as many as possible of the most critical areas, to identify where targeted investment or regulatory action by the EU or national governments could improve sovereign capabilities and to assist the EU and national governments in developing resilience strategies to minimise dependence and maximise competitive choice in areas where the dominance of the US and China is overwhelming and European sovereignty out of reach.

iii. participation in a new European youth opportunity scheme

The EC should lead the creation of a European youth opportunity scheme that gives young people from all member states the chance to live, work and study for a limited period of time anywhere in the EC, and enshrines the right of students from any member country in the EC to be charged the same fees as home students at any university or technical college in the EC.

The European Confederation will advance the security of its members through:

- i.** the adoption of exact replicas of NATO Articles 4 (mandating EC member countries to convene for emergency consultations whenever any member feels their 'territorial integrity, political independence, or security' is threatened) and 5 (stating that an armed attack against one member of the EC is considered an attack against all and committing members to take 'such action as it deems necessary', including military force to assist the ally attacked)
- ii.** an agreement to delegate the operational execution of these security provisions to NATO and only to develop an alternative operating system and command structure in the event of NATO becoming incapacitated (e.g. by the refusal of one of its members to honour its treaty commitments)
- iii.** participation in the EU's SAFE scheme for defence procurement in exchange for a reasonable financial contribution.

Membership of the European Confederation would not entail membership of the European Monetary Union, acceptance of the EU right of free movement of people or membership of the Schengen Area.

The EC would become the natural home of more flexible, ad hoc coalitions of European countries who wish to act in concert in an area which the EU is not ready to act. The key principle of any such initiatives taking place under the auspices of the EC would be that they should be open to any member country that is willing to accept the commitments and obligations that apply to all the other participating members. In this way a small number of EC member countries might decide to go ahead with a banking union, a savings and investment union or an energy union, and be able to do so through the EC without compromising the unity of the EU. In time an initiative started within the EC might evolve into something that the EU wishes to incorporate within its treaties. So long as it remains open to all EC members (including those who are not EU members) to remain beneficiaries on equal terms, that should be something the EC would support.

As imagined above, the EC would offer significant advantages to all of its members.

For the UK, the EC would offer a cure for the profound economic damage inflicted by Brexit and a way to grow exports and business investment so that growth in living standards can resume and spending on defence and security can be substantially increased.

For the EU, the EC would offer a way to bring the UK, Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans into closer integration with Europe and increase their commitment to European defence while not diluting the disciplines of EU treaties or unleashing an unpopular new wave of migration within the EU.

For Ukraine, the EC would offer a means of immediately anchoring its political and economic future inside Europe, while its full membership of the EU is being negotiated, and a replica of the security guarantees offered by full NATO membership.

For all of us, the EC would offer a new security alliance which does not undermine NATO or seek to accelerate the United States' detachment from it, but which is ready to provide a backstop to NATO commitments in the event that the US withdraws and through which the UK, Ukraine and Europe can assume ever greater responsibility for our mutual defence.

BUILDING ENDURING DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

For the last six decades, British voters' attitudes towards European integration have been ambivalent and unstable. The key test for any more ambitious deal is therefore whether it is able to command voters' consent and whether that consent is solid and enduring. Having been bitten once, our European partners will be reluctant to agree to a new arrangement, for which public support appears brittle or thin. They will definitely not want to sign up to something that is unlikely to survive a change of government in the UK. Nor should we.

Before Prime Minister Burnham's ministers start to negotiate a more ambitious deal, they need to understand what trade offs voters will countenance and where public support is likely to break down. So the first step they should undertake is setting up a national conversation about what issues matter most to people in rethinking our relationship with Europe, using a digital tool like Polis. This allows people not only to input their ideas but also to vote on other people's ideas which reveals the issues that are most important to people, as well as where there's consensus and where there's disagreement. It may also make sense to convene a Citizens' Assembly to investigate more deeply the most difficult trade offs and provide a sense of the priorities that should guide ministers in negotiations.

Informed by the results of these exercises, the government should draw up a negotiating mandate and commission private polling on each of the key elements as well as the whole package, so that the ministers and officials conducting negotiations have a clear idea of the space within which they have freedom to manoeuvre. The contents of the negotiating mandate and the results of the polling should remain confidential during the negotiations so that the position of Britain's negotiators is not undermined.

If the negotiations reach a successful conclusion, and result in a deal that the Prime Minister is willing to recommend to the British people, he should put a commitment to implement the deal at the heart of the Labour Party's manifesto for the next general election. The other political parties should be challenged to explain their position on the proposed deal so that voters are offered a clear choice. Although some will no doubt argue that the New Deal should be subject to a referendum, this should be resisted. If the New Deal does not involve rejoining the European Union, and therefore does not repudiate the result of the 2016 referendum, there is no constitutional or democratic reason why a referendum should be required. Any government elected on a clear manifesto commitment to implement the New Deal would have a strong mandate to do so.

CONCLUSION

This proposal for a New Deal and a European Confederation challenges many of the preconceptions that have guided the actions of every government in Britain and Europe in recent years.

It challenges the commitments made by all British prime ministers since Brexit to stay out of the European Single Market.

It challenges the European Union's historic insistence that the benefits of the European Single Market can only be shared with countries that sign up to the free movement of people.

It challenges Ukraine and other potential entrants to the European Union to accept a staging post on the way to full membership and deny their citizens the immediate benefit of agricultural subsidies or the free movement of people.

Many will ask why any of the governments involved should consider compromises that until now have always been ruled out.

My answer is clear. The world has changed and we must change with it. If we insist on sticking rigidly to the formulae that have defined our actions in the past, if we stand back and watch while two rival hegemonies tear up the rules and embark on the geopolitical equivalent of a sumo wrestling match, we will be crushed - and the prosperity and security of everyone in Britain, Ukraine and Europe will be crushed with it.

We must rise to the grandeur of the moment. We must match the ambition of our forebears. Like them, we must build new institutions and new alliances for a new era. That is the way to guarantee the security and prosperity of Britain, Ukraine and Europe for another hundred years.

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