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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Ellen Judson, Sarah A. Fisher, Jeffrey W. Howard, Beatriz Kira, Kiran Arabaghatta Basavaraj and Hannah Perry

March 2024
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Generative AI has taken the world by storm. Recent innovations in generative AI — AI systems that can produce synthetic text, image, video, and audio content — have enormous promise, enabling new forms of research and creative expression. But they also risk supercharging pre-existing risks, potentially unleashing harmful content on an unprecedented scale and with great impact. In a year in which more than half the world’s population will head to the polls, and in which violent political conflicts intensify online debates, the stakes are incredibly high.

Public facing generative AI tools have the potential to change what and how content is created, and how it enters and spreads around the online world. These changes to the information environment have particular implications for democratic integrity: in the effects they have on core democratic ideals of equality, truth and non-violence in political discourse. How far-reaching these effects will be - and how much policy attention they should capture - is contested. In this paper we set out proportional recommendations to mitigate risks and maximise opportunities of generative AI, while also supporting a broader healthier information environment.

In Action Plan 1, we consider the actions that should be urgently put in place to reduce the acute risks to democratic integrity presented by generative AI tools in the context of this year’s remaining global elections. These risks include enabling more effective gendered and racialised disinformation campaigns, exacerbating distrust in elections, and enabling the fomentation of civil unrest. We set out recommendations to (1) reduce the production and dissemination of harmful synthetic content and (2) to empower users so that harmful impacts of synthetic content are reduced in the immediate term.

In Action Plan 2, we set out a longer-term vision for how the fundamental risks to democratic integrity should be addressed. We set out the ways in which generative AI tools can help bolster equality, truth and non-violence, from enabling greater democratic participation to improving how key information institutions operate. Before this positive potential for AI can come to fruition, however, it is essential that fundamental threats of bias, inaccuracy and opacity in generative AI systems are overcome. Finally, we consider ways in which tech companies and policymakers can work together to improve the quality of an AI-driven information environment, empower citizens in democracy, and develop generative AI tools to serve the public interest.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations for public policymakers and regulators are primarily focused on the UK. Even so, the general principles of truth, equality and non-violence we defend are relevant to other jurisdictions at different stages of digital policymaking, such as the US and EU.
| WHO | RECOMMENDATIONS | REFERENCE IN MAIN REPORT
<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AI Companies</strong></td>
<td>Developers of generative AI foundation models and user applications should develop and publish much more specific policies concerning the content that users may and may not generate, especially with respect to content that undermines democratic integrity. These policies should be the explicit basis of models’ guardrails, creating a symmetry between expectations on users and on the company itself.</td>
<td>AP1.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Companies should upscale “prompt-hacking” and “red-teaming” exercises ahead of elections to help identify and mitigate model misuse, and should publish summaries of what they are doing in this regard.</td>
<td>AP1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developers of generative AI foundation models and user applications should watermark the contents produced by their tools, where it is feasible in the short term. This is likely to predominantly be feasible for the largest companies, many of whom already have watermarks embedded in their tools.</td>
<td>AP1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developers of generative AI applications for text generation should ensure their tools provide clear information to users about the potential inaccuracy of the content produced, with an explanation that these tools are not reliable sources of factual information.</td>
<td>AP1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social media platforms</strong></td>
<td>Rather than create new sui generis rules for synthetic content, platforms should double down on the enforcement of rules against harmful speech and rules about advertising on their platforms for all users, removing content that breaches their policies regardless of whether it is generated by human or machine.</td>
<td>AP1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Content-distribution platforms should require labelling synthetic user-generated content and ads, including by automatically labelling that which is produced by their own in-house tools, and by enabling users to label their posts or suggest the labelling of other posts.</td>
<td>AP1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | Ahead of elections, platforms should:  
  a. Ensure there are transparent escalation systems and clear channels of communication in place for those targeted to report harassment campaigns.  
  b. Ensure signposts are easily available to resources for further support for those targeted. | AP1.9 |

1 References refer to where this recommendation falls in the detailed Action Plans in the main body of the paper. For example, AP1.1 is Action Plan 1 Recommendation 1.
2 E.g. OpenAI has begun this work. Open AI, January 2024. https://openai.com/blog/how-openai-is-approaching-2024-worldwide-elections
3 See the Content Authenticity Initiative’s work on this. https://contentauthenticity.org/how-it-works
Social media platforms
Platforms should make data available to researchers to support independent research into the effects of AI-generated content and countermeasures such as labelling on the spread of deceptive content on their services.

UK policymakers
Policymakers should invest in independent research to monitor the volume, type and potential effects of synthetic content generated in the run-up to the current set of elections as far as possible, as well as the risks it poses to the democratic principles of Truth, Equality, and Non-violence, with findings to inform the development of effective regulatory oversight further down the line (see Action Plan recommendation 2.13).

Regulators and law enforcement
Regulators and law enforcement should assess the extent to which they could mitigate democratic risks acting within their existing mandates and issue specific guidance clarifying how existing law and policy/regulation already applies to generative AI and the democratic risks outlined here. (See, for instance, the FCC in the US taking rapid action against AI-generated robocalls).

Political parties
Political parties should develop a cross-party compact on how generative AI is to be used transparently and ethically in election campaigning. This should include a commitment to not amplifying content about any candidate or party that there are reasonable grounds to believe is materially deceptive.

TABLE 2
ACTION PLAN 2: LONG-TERM STRATEGIES TO PROTECT DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
<th>REFERENCE IN MAIN REPORT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social media platforms</td>
<td>Content-distribution platforms should conduct and publish risk assessments of the integration of generative AI tools into their services before they are integrated. (Ideally, this would form part of their duties under the Online Safety Act).</td>
<td>AP2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI Companies</td>
<td>Companies producing text generation tools should explore how to build reliable citations into their search results, enabling generative AI tools to provide links to reliable sources that can be independently checked for any apparently factual information they produce, rather than only relying on content warnings about inaccuracy.</td>
<td>AP2.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 La Trobe University. https://latrobe.libguides.com/artificial-intelligence/referencing
| **AI Companies** | Developers of AI models and applications should **put significant resources into understanding** — and explaining — the provenance of AI-generated inaccuracies and biases, and take meaningful steps to rectify these (e.g. through better curated training data, more human feedback, or more sophisticated guardrails). ¹⁰ This should broaden out from the scope of the Munich Accord¹¹ to cover harms to truth, equality and non-violence, and not only deceptive election content. | AP2.16 |
| **Both AI companies and social media platforms** | AI tool producers should **design the interfaces of their products and services to effectively communicate their product purpose and limitations to users.** | AP2.20 |
| **Both AI companies and social media platforms** | AI companies and social media platforms should **work together to deploy more interoperable watermarking solutions**, such as are being developed through the Content Authenticity Initiative technical standards, more robust, ‘maximally indelible’ watermarks and disclosure of the AI-generation of content.¹² | AP2.12 |
| **Policymakers, AI companies and social media companies** | Stakeholders should continue to **support independent research, through means such as funding and data access provision, to identify the lessons learnt from ongoing monitoring during the election period**, and integrate these learnings into the deployment of future safeguards against democratic risk. | AP2.13 |
| **UK policymakers** | UK policymakers should **impose obligations on AI companies requiring them to undertake comprehensive risk assessments, with a focus on the risks that their models and products pose to democratic integrity.** This should be enforced through meaningful audit by regulators and routes to data access for independent civil society organisations.¹³ The newly-passed EU AI Act moves in this direction, with duties on developers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risks (which can include models used for generative AI tools) to assess and mitigate these risks,¹⁴ while the Digital Services Act provides for data access to social media platform data: but the UK is far behind. | AP2.19 |
| **Policymakers, regulators, and civil society oversight bodies** | Stakeholders should **assess AI and social media companies for their efficacy post-election with regard to the actions recommended in Action Plan 1.** Such recommendations should also inform the regulatory duties and codes of practice that companies will be required to abide by and report against (e.g. codes of practice drafted by Ofcom in enforcing the Online Safety Act). | AP2.15 |
| **All stakeholders** | Industry standards should be **set within sectors through collaboration between companies, regulators and civil society organisations to define sector-leading usage rules and best practice for generative AI tools**, which companies could then be certified on the basis of their compliance with.¹⁵ | AP2.18 |

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¹² E.g. the duties in the EU AI Act around transparency of outputs and disclosures of AI uses, as well as, https://contentauthenticity.org/; https://spectrum.ieee.org/meta-ai-watermarks; E.g. BBC, March 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news-journalism-credentials#:~:text=Like%20an%20audit%20trail%20or,where%20it%20has%20come%20from.
### Promoting Democratic Integrity with AI

| **AI Companies** | Companies should **publish the principles on which their AI tools have been designed and trained**, how this has been achieved and with what oversight (e.g. through ‘democracy-by-design’ procedures, training procedures, and independent oversight or audit procedures).  

16 E.g. DSIT, February, 2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ccf508c96cf3000c6a37a1/Introduction_to_AI_Assurance.pdf  


|---|---|
| **Funders** | Funding bodies in the public and private sector should **further incentivise the development of democratically beneficial generative AI applications**. This might be achieved, for example, by supporting a ‘Democratic Sandbox’ for companies, civic tech and civil society organisations to collaborate and experiment with developing public and open democratic AI systems or by supporting the development of generative AI tools and best practice for public interest functions such as charities and public interest news organisations.  


| **Policymakers** | Policymakers should **engage with the public deliberations on governance of generative AI** and support these to be scaled and implemented into policymaking processes.  


| **UK Regulators** | Regulators should **collaborate to produce consistent guidance for the development of industry best practice in use of generative AI**. Regulators should set out this intention in their upcoming strategic guidance requested by the UK government to be published at the end of April 2024.  

INTRODUCTION

This year is a politically momentous one, with almost half the world voting in elections. The injection of generative AI into the public domain brings with it the potential to transform our information environments and political discourse by making them more effective, more relevant, and more participatory. At the same time, risks abound: that they will become more manipulative, more confusing, and more dangerous. Synthetic content produced by generative AI poses risks to core democratic values of truth, equality, and non-violence—substantially exacerbating problems that have afflicted our digital ecosystem over the past 10 years. The question, then, is what private and public decision-makers can do to reduce those risks.

In Action Plan 1, we set out actions that AI companies, social media platforms, and UK policymakers should be doing already to reduce the democratic harms likely to arise acutely in the context of a highly politicised electoral year. These include demands for AI companies to enact more powerful safety standards for content production and model use, and for social media platforms to improve labelling of synthetic content while doubling down on enforcing their existing misinformation policies.

However, there are limitations on what can be achieved this year to safeguard imminent elections; so it is important that longer term plans are also conceived now.

In Action Plan 2, we set out longer-term systemic solutions, offering a vision toward which decision-makers should aspire after the many 2024 elections have passed. These solutions will take longer to implement, but with the payoff that they help tackle democratic challenges at a more fundamental level. As part of that vision, we also consider the ways in which generative AI might be improved so that it can constitute a force that bolsters democratic integrity instead of undermining it.

We focus on challenges to democratic discourse. Our recommendations to global technology companies for preserving truth, equality, and non-violence are, in principle, applicable internationally. We acknowledge, though, that there are distinctive challenges and risks to citizens in authoritarian regimes that merit a separate, focused treatment, beyond the scope of what we offer here.

Our recommendations for public policymakers and regulators are primarily focused on the UK. Even so, the general principles we defend are relevant to other jurisdictions at different stages of digital policymaking, such as the US and EU.

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY

In this ‘year of elections’, generative AI policy discussions increasingly focus on the risks to elections themselves, with the defence of ‘electoral integrity’ a key concern. For instance, many have worried that people’s votes could be swayed on the day by an AI-driven, highly effective, foreign disinformation campaign. But this focus is too narrow. In this paper, we focus instead on the much broader value of democratic integrity. The changes brought by generative AI have wide potential impacts across the core values that a democratic society depends on - of equality, truth, and non-violence. These are a minimum prerequisite for democratic processes and institutions - from elections to the operations of government - to be able to operate with integrity. It is these ideals that may be endangered by generative AI unless it is properly governed. New technologies should defend and promote these values, and not put them under further strain.

Why truth, equality and non-violence?

A democracy must live up to its underlying core ideals: the protection of equality, truth and non-violence. We derive these ideals from a familiar understanding of a democracy as a political association of free and equal citizens who govern themselves through reason. Although citizens may disagree about which policies are best, they work through those disagreements through public conversation. This public discourse must be genuinely equally accessible, so that people can participate freely and authentically, and different interests weighed equally. The complexity of public policy, and the scale of our societies, mean that citizens’ deliberations also include discussion of legislative candidates, chosen through voting in elections. Citizens in such a democracy respect the rights of all to vote and stand for office, and respect the outcomes of electoral

23 Further research is also needed to evaluate the size of the risk posed by AI to the perceived legitimacy of a particular electoral vote.
24 See the Electoral Commission: ‘We work to promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity’. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/about-us#:~:text=The%20Electoral%20Commission%20is%20the,process%20and%20ensure%20its%20integrity
decisions, without threats of violence. This, anyway, is a familiar and powerful vision of a democracy, and it is our starting point here.

The ideals that help to constitute this vision of democratic integrity are multiple, and there are of course many institutional and procedural requirements that democracies must meet. Here we focus on the three fundamental principles, without which further democratic principles and procedures cannot legitimately function.26

- **Equality.** We are committed to a society in which citizens regard one another as equals, affirming one another's equal right to participate and to be treated with respect.
- **Truth.** We are committed to a public conversation in which citizens and their representatives sincerely deliberate, with a shared understanding of basic facts and criteria for evaluating the truth of claims.
- **Non-violence.** We are committed to managing our disagreements through respectful engagement and voting instead of the use of force, respecting the outcomes of elections and the peaceful transition of power.

Our focus is on how these principles may be upheld or undermined through public discourse and information environments, as this is where citizens take part in political discussions; and where bad actors may seek to disrupt democratic discussions through information warfare.27 As such, we discuss the risks and opportunities arising from public-facing generative AI tools which are most likely to impact these principles by affecting what content and information is produced, shared and consumed. These tools include text generators like ChatGPT, and image generators such as Midjourney, as well as upcoming video generators such as Sora.

We consider what obligations fall on companies who develop and release these tools, which are primarily used by citizens to access or produce information (even as they have other purposes). We also consider social media platforms where such content may be shared, disseminated or amplified. These (increasingly overlapping) actors—those designing and releasing generative AI products, and those hosting content produced by those tools—are the primary addressees of our argument. We will also pinpoint what policymakers and regulators should do to hold companies to account in living up to their obligations.

**RISKS TO DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY**

Having articulated our focus on democratic integrity (beyond mere electoral integrity) and three core democratic ideals, we now ask: how might public generative AI tools pose a risk to their realisation? We are already familiar with the multifarious ways in which online content can undermine democratic integrity; after all, this has been the central complaint about social media for over a decade. Equality has been undermined through hateful online campaigns involving harassment, bullying, and other abusive speech. Truth has been under attack from varieties of mis- and dis-information. Nonviolence has been subverted through speech inciting and threatening violence against political opponents, and in attempts to thwart the successful transfer of power.

The immediate problem with generative AI, then, is not that it unleashes a completely new set of harms with which we are wholly unfamiliar (though it may produce new harms in the future). The pressing risk, instead, is that it leverages the computational power of advanced machine learning systems to supercharge pre-existing problems—making it cheaper to produce and propagate harmful content, making much of this content more impactful than it would otherwise be, and (increasingly) powering creative forms of manipulation.28 To be sure, a great deal of synthetic content is innocuous, or even beneficial, at least in its effects on audiences.29 Our concern is with the subset that is decidedly neither.

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26 These values have corollaries enshrined in regulation in the UK: for instance, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) affirms their role in ‘enforcing and upholding the laws that safeguard everyone’s right to fairness, dignity and respect’, and the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful to discriminate against or harass individuals based on protected characteristics.


28 A Lords Committee report on LLMs notes that ‘the most immediate security concerns from LLMs come from making existing malicious activities easier, rather than qualitatively new risks,’ , though concludes that the threat of disinformation, hallucinations, deepfakes means that a ‘reasonable worst case scenario’ would be the integrity of the election being called into question. Communications and Digital Committee, February 2024. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldcomm/54/5402.htm , p.39 and p.42

29 There are, to be sure, distinct concerns about data privacy or intellectual property; these surely matter, but they are not democratic concerns.
We are already seeing signs that generative AI is affecting our democratic politics. In Slovakia, pundits speculate whether a deepfake about a politician two days before the national vote ended up swaying the election.\(^\text{30}\) In Pakistan, an imprisoned Imran Khan was unable to communicate with his voters, so his team deployed a deepfake instead.\(^\text{31}\) In Argentina's elections, AI-generated images have been ubiquitous.\(^\text{32}\) In the U.K., manipulated audio of Keir Starmer depicted him berating and cursing at his team.\(^\text{33}\) In the Republican primary in New Hampshire, nearly 25,000 “robocalls” to voters used faked audio of President Biden enjoining them not to vote.\(^\text{34}\) And in the Indonesian election, Midjourney and ChatGPT were deployed in Prabowo Subianto's campaign to create campaign imagery and send tailored messages to voters.\(^\text{35}\)

The potential for generative AI to undermine democracy is significant: from the ability of generative AI to produce realistic audio and video which can effectively deceive or confuse voters at scale, to risks of violence.\(^\text{36}\) The World Economic Forum’s report on global risks ranked dis- and mis-information as the greatest short-term risks.\(^\text{37}\) And even just the awareness of these risks, experts have warned, means that citizens may be less trusting of reliable information and be more easily swayed by claims of AI-based electoral interference.\(^\text{38}\)

However, many of the concerns are still theoretical and beyond anecdotes, not yet widely borne out.\(^\text{39}\) The likelihood of these risks eventuating in actual election interference, information chaos or widespread real-world harm, is greatly contested.\(^\text{40}\) Other risks to democracy persist, meaning that although we may see greater AI-powered disinformation, this is unlikely to greatly worsen our existing information disorder, which is already driven by powerful actors successfully using their platforms and conventional tools.\(^\text{41,42}\) Experts warn that AI panic, in an already fraught year for political trust and stability, could do more harm than good especially if what that attention is focused on high-profile generative AI cases rather than the existing information threats causing the widest risk.\(^\text{43}\)

If we overlook the risks of AI, we risk playing into the easily weaponized narrative that our democratic institutions are fragile,\(^\text{44}\) and focus limited political will on bringing in ineffective and potentially harmful policies to tackle a disinformation bogeyman.\(^\text{45}\) If we underplay them, however, we risk losing the window in which to take preventative action to safeguard our democratic processes and principles against the exploitation of AI by bad actors - a common failing in digital policymaking.\(^\text{47}\) There is much we still do not know about

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36 Such risks are discussed in more detail below. See also: Yusupovych, S., February 2024. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/reflection-assessing-aia-borne-risks-integrity-2024-us-yusupovych-e1cpe/
47 This uncertainty about how best to protect democracy mirrors the wider debate about AI - whether we should focus on preventing possible long-term existential risks, or immediate, real-world harms caused by AI and whether focusing on one means the other will be inevitably overlooked by policymakers. Hanna, A. and Bender, E.M. August 2023. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/we-need-to-focus-on-ais-real-harms-not-imaginary-existential-risks/; Farrell, H., December 2023. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/12/12/ais-big-rift-is-like-a-religious-schism-says-henry-farrell
the capabilities or uses of these technologies, and we must be willing to adapt our responses as new evidence comes to light along the way.48

In the midst of uncertainty, in this paper we seek to offer a middle way, navigating between the horror of AI doom and the comfort of complacency. Our recommendations are intended to be proportional to the level of risk: suggesting low-lift proposals that could reduce risks without significant negative consequences, and more substantial interventions for much higher risks. We include recommendations for challenging the harms of synthetic content which would also have positive ramifications for reducing risks of other information harms.

48 With thanks to Felix Simon, pers. comm. 2024
Generative AI threatens to increase extant risks to democratic integrity at a critical moment in the electoral cycle. Despite the inherent uncertainty in many of these risks and what countermeasures will necessarily be the most effective, it is reasonable to demand that relevant actors work to reduce them. We will discuss risks to each of the democratic values raised above: equality, truth, and nonviolence. We’ll set out the current action being undertaken by key players, and where immediate improvements could be made within the next few months. These do not constitute a comprehensive plan to eliminate risk, but a minimum standard of action that actors can reasonably be asked to pursue.

RISKS TO EQUALITY

Generative AI risks supercharging the production of various forms of hateful speech, understood as content that attacks the equal standing of all citizens (usually, the equal standing of historically oppressed groups). Hateful speech often takes the form of disinformation, spreading defamatory lies against groups and their members.49

Generative AI poses a risk that such identity-based disinformation attacks targeting marginalised groups are made easier and more scalable. Such attacks potentially may also be more credible50 and invasive.51 The use of generative AI tools to create deepfakes (i.e. fabricated audiovisual content) is a particularly noxious mechanism of gendered and racialised disinformation campaigns. For instance, women politicians and journalists are disproportionately targeted through the creation and sharing deepfakes of intimate images.52

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49 This is central to the analysis of hate speech in Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
These can then be spread with the aim of demonising, sexualising or humiliating their targets - and disproportionately affecting Black women and women from other minoritised groups. Among its various harms, such content affronts democratic equality by attacking the equal status of these citizens and making it more difficult for them to participate in public life.

Specific risks to Equality include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content being used to harass political candidates/their supporters.</td>
<td>Non-consensual intimate deepfakes of women in public life being shared - creating pornographic or private images. Synthetic content invoking harmful stereotypes. Racial stereotypes being reproduced in AI-generated imagery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatbots offering highly personalised how-to templates for harassment. Gendered and racialised disinformation campaigns becoming supercharged.</td>
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**RISKS TO TRUTH**

Generative AI risks supercharging the production of various forms of misinformation, including malicious disinformation, about political issues, candidates, and processes. One risk is that generative AI will produce, or be maliciously weaponized to produce, convincing falsehoods. Content that is partly true but nevertheless highly misleading is usually even more convincing. Such misinformation undermines Truth by inhibiting citizens from sharing a common reservoir of factual information to underpin their public deliberation—especially (but not only) in the run-up to elections.
Specific risks to *Truth* include:

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<th>EXAMPLE</th>
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| False or misleading synthetic user generated content or ads about election processes, including when/where/how to vote (especially concerning if scaled). | Chatbot giving wrong information in response to queries about elections.⁶⁵  
Spread of synthetic content or ads purporting to show that the election was ‘rigged’ (particularly in the US).⁶⁶  
Chatbots ‘hallucinating’ - creating highly plausible information which is presented as factual but is false and has no basis in reality. |
| False or misleading synthetic content or ads about political candidates or parties, either to undermine or bolster support for them (which could have significant effect if viral content occurs at key moments in electoral cycle). | Deepfakes purporting to show politicians engaging in abusive behaviour.⁶⁷  
Deepfakes showing politicians confessing to crimes.⁶⁸  
Deepfakes of politicians doing positive things to garner greater support, such as fake meetings with constituents of a certain demographic.⁶⁹ |
| False or misleading synthetic content or ads about topics on which elections are being fought. | Non-existent newspaper articles referenced by chatbots.⁷⁰  
Deepfakes of journalists.⁷¹ |
| Targeted campaigns that serve different facts to different individuals / groups.⁷² | Using generative AI to generate different adverts to better persuade people with different personality traits.⁷³ |
| Widespread distrust or scepticism in response to pervasive synthetic content.⁷⁴ | Growing distrust of elections and officials.⁷⁵ |

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⁶⁸ For example, a deepfake of a Slovakian political party leader involved him “confessing” to electoral fraud just days before the election, which his rivals won: Meaker, M. October 2023. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/slovakia-election-deepfakes Farid, H. https://farid.berkeley.edu/deepfakes2024election/


⁷⁰ For example, ChatGPT has hallucinated Guardian articles that never existed: Moran, C. April 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/apr/06/ai-chatgpt-guardian-technology-risks-fake-article


⁷³ For a study of the potential use and effectiveness of generative AI in political micro-targeting, see Simchon, A. et al (2024). https://doi.org/10.1093/panse Nexus/pgae035


RISKS TO NON-VIOLENCE

Generative AI also poses a threat to the value of Non-violence. It can be used to produce targeted threats of violence, seeking to intimidate people from voting, seeking public office, or expressing their point of view. And it can also be used to produce effective incitements to violence—especially pernicious in the context of contested elections, where the risks of street violence are high.

Specific risks to Non-violence include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content suppressing voting through intimidation.</td>
<td>Robocalls seeking to suppress or intimidate voters imitating a credible source.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content inciting violent political protest.</td>
<td>Mobs protesting legitimacy of an election.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content glorifying violence or dangerous organisations.</td>
<td>Chatbot producing content using themes found in extremist propaganda.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chatbots designed specifically to produce violent racist content.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We now outline how companies and other actors should respond to these risks in the near term. Our recommendations come in two buckets: (1) how to reduce the production and dissemination of harmful content; (2) how to empower users so that harmful impacts are reduced.

PROTECTING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY FROM AI: REDUCING THE PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION OF HARMFUL CONTENT

Current state of affairs

Many of the risks set out above are partly addressed by policies and practices adopted by major online content-distribution networks like large social media platforms. These platforms generally already prohibit certain kinds of harmful misinformation, exclusionary speech (including hate speech, bullying, and harassment), nonconsensual intimate image sharing, and speech threatening or inciting violence.80 Social media companies also commonly set out how their policies apply to AI-generated content (such as TikTok, which allows synthetic media of public figures only if it doesn’t break any other content policies).81

For their part, developers of generative AI foundation models and public-facing user applications also already have prohibitions on some categories of content that users should not generate, and have restrictions and guardrails against usages which might cause harm.82 Measures include refusing to provide information, such as electoral information,83 or blocking specific prompts,84 meaning that if a user requests certain kinds of content concerning a named person – such as a celebrity or politician - the tool may refuse to generate synthetic content.

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84 Midjourney. https://docs.midjourney.com/docs/community-guidelines
it. Ahead of the elections specifically, major tech companies have committed through the Munich Accord to collaborate on tackling deceptive AI electoral content through better risk assessment, developing more effective provenance and detection technology, and improving transparency.\textsuperscript{85}

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### Improvements to be made

Although user rules and guardrails are already in place across the major AI models, these are not fool-proof. Rules setting out acceptable user behaviour are useful for norm-setting, deterrence, and potentially taking action against violators, but are currently insufficiently developed and defined.\textsuperscript{86} There is nothing like the vast array of rules that we see concerning social media platforms’ content moderation systems, yet the basic aim - harm prevention - is broadly the same. Indeed generative AI’s current rules are much closer to the kind of crude, simplistic rules platforms had in the 2000s and early 2010s. In pursuing these changes, companies need to learn from the vast experiences of trust-and-safety teams within social media companies.\textsuperscript{87}

While we recognise that the extensive rules developed by social media platforms may not be possible in the immediate short term for AI companies, even minimal clarifications would be an improvement on the status quo.

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### AP1.1:

Developers of generative AI foundation models and user applications should develop and publish more specific policies concerning the content that users may and may not generate, especially with respect to content that undermines democratic integrity. These policies should be the explicit basis of models’ guardrails, creating a symmetry between expectations on users and on the company itself.\textsuperscript{88}

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Technical guardrails are often introduced retrospectively after vulnerabilities are found and exploited by bad actors. This has significant limitations. For example, widely shared deepfake images of Taylor Swift were revealed to have been created by a community on 4Chan who were (successfully) trying to get around existing blocks, by using different prompts or misspelling names.\textsuperscript{89} Post hoc improvements do not alleviate the general risk of increasingly sophisticated prompt injection.\textsuperscript{90} Although red-teaming is widely employed by AI developers, ensuring that these exercises are focused on specific democratic threats, as well as opening them up to greater public scrutiny,\textsuperscript{91} would help further reduce risks.

Even with a conscientious effort by companies to improve guardrails, current technological limitations mean that some harmful content is bound to get through – especially due to malicious use. Moreover, open-source LLMs can still be used to develop generative AI tools that are publicly available with none of these guardrails; and tools can be explicitly developed which are designed and marketed as lacking substantial content guardrails.\textsuperscript{92}

It should therefore be expected that some such content will find its way to the main forums of digital discourse, namely social media platforms, where it can be circulated and amplified.\textsuperscript{93} This is why a multipronged approach to addressing threats from generative AI is needed. There is no one silver bullet solution.

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\begin{itemize}
  \item[86] For example, OpenAI has rules against “generating or promoting disinformation [and] misinformation” but this is never defined; see OpenAI. https://openai.com/policies/usage-policies. This stands in stark contrast to the elaborate specifications of what kinds of misinformation is disallowed by the major social media platforms; e.g. Meta. https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/misinformation.
  \item[87] This is something the UCL Digital Speech Lab has already advocated. Digital Constitutionalist. https://digi-con.org/how-should-we-regulate-llm-chatbots-lessons-from-content-moderation/
  \item[88] E.g., OpenAI has begun this work: OpenAI. https://openai.com/blog/how-openai-is-approaching-2024-worldwide-elections
  \item[91] Open AI, September 2023. https://openai.com/blog/red-teaming-network
  \item[93] Barrett, P.M. et al, February 2024. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6cf958f8370af3217d4178/t/65cfdd6c0b2733710e9e96b0/1708121452365/NYU+CBHR+Election+2024_Feb+16+UPDATED.pdf
\end{itemize}
The emerging risk of generative AI constitutes a unique opportunity for platforms to revisit their content moderation practices. They should ensure that their policies are clear, comprehensive, and consistent, including policies on harmful misinformation, intimate images, exclusionary speech, and violent content. They should also review advertising rules, including those governing political advertising, to ensure they are fit for purpose. The key to success, in our view, lies not in creating new policies banning generative AI content, but rather in doubling down on the enforcement of rules against harmful content, regardless of whether it was generated by humans or machines. If a deepfake is objectionable because it conveys misinformation, it is this fact—rather than the technology that produced it—that is the reason for removing it. The harm of misinformation, after all, does not hinge on its provenance (which in any case is often very difficult to decipher). 

Existing platform policies that target generative AI content are largely confused. Social media policies also require rapid detection and enforcement to be effective. Measures such as breaking search functions in response to specific threats can be a useful firebreak, but are frequently implemented only after an incident has become widespread. Platforms must also ensure that they have sufficiently well designed content moderation systems overall, as well as trained and supported human content moderators to ensure that their policies are being enforced accurately and transparently.

The EU has taken a lead on this in publishing draft guidelines for consultation already under the DSA on protecting the integrity of elections. In the UK, however, protecting democratic integrity online does not fall under the remit of a sole regulator, with Ofcom responsible for Online Safety (where the content is illegal or harmful to children), the ECHR responsible for equalities, the Electoral Commission responsible for regulating campaign finance, law enforcement responsibility (when conduct constitutes a criminal offence), and responsibility for AI regulation (once instituted) distributed amongst regulators. As such, there is a need for regulators, cross-regulatory bodies such as the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum and relevant Government departments and law enforcement to work together to ensure that what obligations currently exist for these new technologies under the various different regulatory authorities - especially those with newer mandates - is clear both to companies and to the public.

\[94\] With thanks to Kyle Taylor, pers. comm., 2024

\[95\] Dad, N. February 2024. [Link](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nighat-dad-3a937173_2024election-globalvote-activity-7164029505626447872-7Ui?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop)

\[96\] Michael, C. November 2023. [Link](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/nov/15/facebook-ads-2020-election-rigged-stolen-instagram-policy#:~:text=Biden%2C%20was%20stolen.-,Meta%20will%20now%20allow%20political%20advertisers%20to%20say%20past%20elections,or%20future%20elections%20are%20legitimate)

\[97\] Meta has faced criticism from the Oversight Board on their policies being 'incoherent'; Oversight Board 2023. [Link](https://www.oversightboard.com/decision/FG-WGBY1Y13, citing public comments the UCL Digital Speech Lab submitted to the Board).

\[98\] Reuters, January 2024. [Link](https://www.theguardian.com/music/2024/jan/28/taylor-swift-x-searches-blocked-fake-explicit-images)


AP1.4: UK policymakers should invest in independent research to monitor the volume, type and potential effects of synthetic content generated in the run-up to the current set of elections as far as possible, as well as the risks it poses to the democratic principles of Truth, Equality, and Non-violence, with findings to inform the development of effective regulatory oversight further down the line (see Action Plan 2.13).

AP1.5: Regulators and law enforcement should assess the extent to which they could mitigate democratic risks acting within their existing mandates and issue specific guidance clarifying how existing law and policy/regulation already applies to generative AI and the democratic risks we outlined here. (See, for instance, the FCC in the US taking rapid action against AI-generated robocalls).

PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY WITH AI

Even if an individual piece of synthetic content seems harmless when taken on its own (such as a deepfake of a politician doing something silly, or piece of LLM-generated text that contains a minor mistake about some policy issue) the growing prevalence of such content may cause citizens to doubt the accuracy of any content they encounter, or the reliability of any source of information. This is one of the primary risks of information disorder: the confusion over authenticity and provenance of information means citizens are not equipped to access reliable information.

This ‘degradation of the information environment’, as the UK Government refers to it could lead to even more widespread scepticism and distrust, even of accurate information and reliable sources. Such distrust is readily exploitable by bad actors, including those wanting to deny actual events or promulgate conspiracy theories. Moreover, it can undermine the kind of evidence-based deliberation and decision-making necessary to democracy and the confidence in democratic processes that is required for peaceful decision-making and transitions of power. We must empower citizens to deal with a more confusing information environment during an electoral period.

Current state of affairs

Some of the large social media companies manage this broader kind of informational risk by prebunking misinformation, or by verifying content (usually with the support of a third-party fact-checker). If content is found to be false or misleading, a warning label is appended, together with links to accurate information. The offending content can also be de-amplified to reduce its reach. Although fact-checking alone cannot solve the harms of disinformation, it provides audiences with more context and resources to enable them to interact with and assess the information.

Meta recently announced their new labelling policy, which is illustrative of the direction in which all companies should move (some others, including TikTok and YouTube, have already done so). Meta applies “Imagined with AI” labels to images created by its own AI tools. It also puts visible marks on its images, as well as invisible watermarks (and identifying metadata) within the image files themselves. Accordingly, when such content shows up on platforms, it can be (more) easily identified as synthetic. Meta reports that they are building tools to help them identify synthetic content produced by other companies’ tools. It is now working

107 Meta currently exempts politicians from fact-checking; some of us have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake: Fisher, S., Kira, B., Arabaghatta Basavaraj, K. and Howard, J. February 2024. https://doi.org/10.54501/pts.v02.170
to label synthetic content created by other companies that shows up on its platforms. Disclosing realistic uses of AI in political advertising is also required.

AI companies also currently often include information on the reliability of their tools, such as through the suggested activities they prompt, or through warnings they display.

**Improvements to be made**

In enacting recommendation (6), content-distribution platforms should implement a standardised, blanket labelling regime for all synthetic content: most straightforwardly, content produced by their own in-house AI tools should be clearly marked as AI-generated. This is particularly important for realistic audio, visual, and multi-modal content, as this information will allow users to engage with it in a more informed and empowered way.

It will be difficult to enforce labelling of other synthetic content, as detection of AI-generated content is not highly accurate. However, even without effective enforcement, it is valuable for users be to given tools to enable them to add labels to their own content regarding the provenance of content at the point of posting - or flag content they see as potentially Al-generated. This will help, we think, to promote healthy norms regarding synthetic content.

**AP1.6:** Content-distribution platforms should require labelling synthetic user-generated content and ads, including by automatically labelling that which is produced by their own in-house tools, and by enabling users to label their posts or suggest the labelling of other posts.

The labelling effort should be assisted by developers of AI foundation models and applications, who should implement watermarking protocols for the contents generated using their tools. In many cases watermarked synthetic media can then be identified by content-distribution platforms and labelled as AI-generated. We recognise that current watermarking is not completely effective and can be evaded, disguised or removed by those determined to do so, and this should be a priority for longer-term technological development (see Action Plan 2).

**AP1.7:** Developers of generative AI foundation models and user applications should watermark the contents produced by their tools, where it is feasible in the short term. This is likely to predominantly be feasible for the largest companies, many of whom already have watermarks embedded in their tools.

Another important site of empowerment is within the interface of chatbot tools, which users might use to search for relevant information about political issues, candidates, and elections. Here it is vital that chatbot interfaces communicate their limitations—and their unsuitability for political research—to users.

111 Gemini Google, 2024. https://gemini.google.com/app
113 Alongside the platform-focused recommendations we put forward here, an earlier report by Demos, prepared in collaboration with Cavendish and entitled ‘Generating democracy: AI and the coming revolution in political communications,’ makes a complementary set of recommendations concerning political campaigners’ approach to generative AI: https://demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Generating-Democracy-Report-1.pdf.
114 On a similar model to X’s Community Notes feature. See X, 2024: https://help.twitter.com/en/using-x/community-notes
118 Content Authenticity Initiative, 2024. https://contentauthenticity.org/how-it-works
This campaign of user empowerment should be reinforced by trusted public bodies, civil society groups and journalists, who should identify reliable sources of information and encourage citizens to use these to check the accuracy of the content they encounter. Citizens should also be encouraged to seek out information proactively, rather than relying too heavily on information that may have been narrowly targeted toward them.

**AP1.8:** Developers of generative AI applications should ensure their tools provide clear information to users about the potential inaccuracy of the content produced, with an explanation that these tools are not reliable sources of factual information.

Users can also be empowered to protect themselves and others from potential AI-driven increases in online attacks during a politically volatile period.

There remains a risk that some harms still fall between policy cracks. Traditional strategies for dealing with political disinformation, such as labelling or fact-checking, are insufficient to combat the harms of emotive, harassing or sexualised disinformation. To manage acute risks more effectively, downstream interventions to flag harmful AI-generated content to platforms by those who are being harmed by it should be improved, beyond current reporting systems which are often slow, inconsistent and opaque.

**AP1.9:** Ahead of elections, social media companies should:

- a. Ensure there are transparent escalation systems and clear channels of communication in place for those targeted to report harassment campaigns.
- b. Ensure signposts are easily available to resources for further support for those targeted.

There are significant time pressures in achieving our recommendations comprehensively. However, one thing that could be very realistically achieved is for the political parties to start to set the norms and show leadership in protecting democratic integrity.

In the current absence of reliable automated labelling, it is crucial that democratic actors support these transparency efforts of their own accord. Political parties and candidates, in particular, should ensure that their own use of generative AI tools is clear to the public - not only disclosing when they are required to (e.g. in political ads), but taking active steps to demonstrate transparently how they are using these tools, and ensuring they do not contribute further to information disorder.

**AP1.10:** Political parties should develop a cross-party compact on how generative AI is to be used transparently and ethically in election campaigning. This should include a commitment to not amplifying content about any candidate or party that there are reasonable grounds to believe is materially deceptive.

Finally, there is one step that can be taken by social media platforms in the short term that can help support the protection of democratic integrity.

To return to labelling, we recognise that it is not a panacea. The fact that content is AI-generated does not make it deceptive, and the fact it is not AI-generated does not make it reliable. It is worth investigating -

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especially given that many platforms are adopting labelling already - what effects transpire from labelling with regard to citizen trust.\textsuperscript{122} There is a risk that inconsistent labelling practices could compound informational confusion.\textsuperscript{123} However, we favour a provisional presumption in favour of labelling on the grounds that it increases the information available to citizens about the content they are consuming, with the proviso that ongoing research into labelling is necessary.

**AP1.11:** Social media platforms should **make data available to independent researchers** to support research into the effects of AI-generated content\textsuperscript{124} and countermeasures such as labelling on the spread of deceptive content on their services during an electoral cycle.


\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} With thanks to Felix Simon, pers. comm., 2024
ACTION PLAN 2
PROTECTING AND SUSTAINING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY IN THE LONG TERM

In this section, we consider longer term risks to the ideals of democratic integrity, as well as the opportunities that generative AI could offer to democracy.125 Since generative AI is emerging at a time when democratic resilience is low,126 it is especially important to take the opportunity to shore up core democratic principles. We also consider what fundamental risks or blockers exist to generative AI upholding those principles, which will need to be addressed in order for the opportunities to be realised.

Action Plan 1 presented the minimum actions we should expect from stakeholders in response to urgent and acute risks this year. In Action Plan 2, we turn to what expectations we should have for stakeholders to deliver on democratic integrity over the longer term.

We do not repeat the recommendations in Action Plan 1 for reasons of brevity, but they are not, for the most part, one-off recommendations. We stress that our recommendations in Action Plan 1 should be undertaken on an ongoing basis or periodically, with some developments which we set out here. In this way, risks to democracy can continue to be mitigated effectively as technologies and politics co-evolve.

There are inherent limitations to the recommendations we set out in Action Plan 1. One, most notable, is an accountability deficit.127 In the short-term, there is limited action that policymakers and regulators are able to take to ensure company adherence, due to the length of legislative processes, the need to draft codes of practice to implement even imminent or existing legislation, and limitations to regulators’ existing mandates. There is therefore at least a need for civil society, the public and policymakers to call for companies to take these steps to demonstrate the appetite for future scrutiny.

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127 With thanks to Kyle Taylor, pers. comm. 2024
There are also steps which require a greater level of technological development to be fully implemented: such as the integration of more sophisticated labelling or watermarking technologies.

Finally, there is evidence to be gathered and lessons drawn which we simply do not know yet. What risks genuinely are the most prominent or harmful will become apparent through the election period itself.

As such, in addition to the recommendations above, we recommend, with a long-term lens:

**AP2.12:** AI companies and social media companies should work together to deploy more interoperable watermarking solutions, such as are being developed through the Content Authenticity Initiative technical standards, and more robust, ‘maximally indelible’ watermarks and disclosure of the AI-generation of content.¹²⁸,¹²⁹

**AP2.13:** UK policymakers, AI companies and social media companies should continue to support independent research, through means such as funding and data access provision, to identify the lessons learnt from ongoing monitoring of synthetic content generated during the election period and the risk it poses to the democratic principles of truth, equality and non-violence. These learnings can then be integrated into the deployment of future safeguards against democratic risk.

**AP2.14:** AI companies developing applications for text generation should explore how to build reliable citations into their search results, enabling generative AI tools to provide links to reliable sources that can be independently checked for any apparently factual information they produce, rather than only relying on content warnings about inaccuracy.¹³⁰

**AP2.15:** UK policymakers, regulators, and civil society oversight bodies should assess AI and social media companies for their efficacy post-election with regard to the actions recommended in Action Plan 1. Such recommendations should also inform the regulatory duties and codes of practice that companies will be required to abide by and report against (e.g. codes of practice drafted by Ofcom in enforcing the Online Safety Act).

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¹²⁸ This recommendations builds on Action Plan 1 Recommendation 9
¹²⁹ See the duties in the EU AI Act around transparency of outputs and disclosures of AI uses, as well as, https://contentauthenticity.org/; Evan Harris, D. and Norden, L. March 2024. https://spectrum.ieee.org/meta-ai-watermarks; see e.g. Halford, C., March 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news-journalism-credentials#:~:text=Like%20an%20audit%20trail%20or,where%20it%20has%20come%20from.
¹³⁰ La Trobe University, 2024. https://latrobe.libguides.com/artificial-intelligence/referencing
CHALLENGES FOR EQUALITY

Generative AI models are trained on datasets which lead to those tools replicating and amplifying the biases of that data: and measures to try to combat this problem so far have been limited in effect. Challenges that must be overcome include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHALLENGE</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased use of generative AI tools sees the biases in those tools being replicated and amplified, entrenching stereotypes and biased narratives.</td>
<td>Image generators producing disproportionately fewer images of women or of Black people, or tending to portray white people or men in response to prompts of higher-paying jobs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface level fine tuning to address bias, can compound rather than challenge bias.</td>
<td>Image generators producing ‘diverse’ images of historically - and relevantly - undiverse groups, such as Nazi soldiers. Text generators refusing to take a stance on clear or settled ethical issues, or suggesting there is no right answer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Astroturfing’ (i.e., generating mass sham expressions of opinion) facilitated by AI</td>
<td>Legislators failing to distinguish between genuine and fake enquiries from constituents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EQUALITY

In order for any opportunities to be realised, at a minimum the long-term risks of AI highlighted above would need to be addressed. Without a demonstration from AI companies and other relevant stakeholders that these risks can be adequately mitigated, pursuing opportunities will not be successful and could even be actively harmful.

However, generative AI may hold the promise of improving equality, by reinforcing equal regard, equal rights, and equal respect—and also by enabling more people to participate fully in the democratic process.

Specific opportunities for Equality include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITY</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content that empowers marginalised individuals or groups.</td>
<td>Large language models that provide contextualising historical facts concerning social inequalities. Large language models that engage in educational conversations without burdening members of that marginalised group to do so.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generative AI tools that widen democratic participation.\textsuperscript{141}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generative AI tools that widen democratic participation.\textsuperscript{141}</th>
<th>Large language models that facilitate written exposition and translation between languages, supporting communications among citizens, and with their democratic representatives.\textsuperscript{142}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generative AI used by political candidates to better understand data about their constituents and constituencies.\textsuperscript{143}</td>
<td>Audio-visual tools that allow users to create high quality content without specialist skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generative AI used to facilitate public deliberation.\textsuperscript{144}</td>
<td>Civil society organisations representing marginalised groups are able to upscale through AI-enabled efficiencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHALLENGES FOR TRUTH**

Let us imagine that, in the future, AI-generated content comes to constitute a large proportion—perhaps even most—of the content we encounter (and, in turn, that generative AI models too increasingly ingest other synthetic content as input). We will want to ensure that this synthetic content is accurate, at least in contexts where users are expecting to receive facts. The content should also be relevant, informative, and clear, taking account of the user’s needs.

**CHALLENGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHALLENGE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of low-quality AI content pervades information ecosystem.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXAMPLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI-generated content driving up advertising revenue for junk news sites makes it harder for quality news to compete.\textsuperscript{145}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing use of AI weakens rather than bolsters the news industry.\textsuperscript{146}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing use of AI in content production risks increasing error and hallucination rates, and reducing audience trust.\textsuperscript{147,148}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in diversity of content.\textsuperscript{149}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRUTH**

Insofar as AI-generated content has the properties of being relevant, informative, and clear, taking account of the user’s needs—and is widely recognised to have them—citizens can feel increasingly confident in the information environments they inhabit. This, we think, would help ground a public conversation in which people deliberate sincerely, with a shared understanding of basic facts and criteria for establishing the truth of claims.


\textsuperscript{142} Ibid


\textsuperscript{144} Collective Intelligence Project, 2024. https://cip.org/alignmentassemblies; Mowbray, A., February 2024. https://blogs.bath.ac.uk/irpblog/2024/02/22/how-ai-could-help-citizens-assemblies-make-well-informed-decisions/\textsuperscript{144}


\textsuperscript{147} Longoni, C. June 2022, https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3531146.3533077


Specific opportunities for Truth include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITY</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accurate and helpful synthetic content about political candidates / parties, political processes and policies which enable more productive political discourse.</td>
<td>Personalised images or videos, showing a user how to fill out the specific ballot they will receive in their constituency race. Large language models that identify gaps, errors, and inconsistencies in the statements of political candidates or parties. Large language models that summarise legislative processes, laws, public opinion, or constituent feedback. Large language models specially tailored to provide citizens advice services. Independent and public interest news organisations are able to upscale delivery with the same resources, and enable more high-quality information to be produced and disseminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AI-generated re-framings of targeted campaign materials.</td>
<td>Large language models that reproduce campaign materials to present the topics from different perspectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHALLENGES TO NON-VIOLENCE

There are challenges relating to nonviolence which must be addressed over the medium to long term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHALLENGE</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Models proliferate hate speech.</td>
<td>Chatbots producing content containing slurs or conspiracy theories. 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent and convincing content is easier to create and amplify, and more difficult to fact-check.</td>
<td>AI amplifies existing risks of provoking social unrest or inciting violence (especially in already inflammatory situations) as seen in earlier social media cases concerning the genocide against the Rohingya 160 and violence between communities in Leicester 161. Environments in which atrocities can be perpetrated are worsened through increased disinformation. 162. Human counterspeech replaced with less effective AI-driven counterspeech. 163.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

151 See, for example, the Money Saving Expert ChatGPT, July 2023: https://www.moneysavingexpert.com/pressoffice/2023/ai-say--ai-say--ai-say--martin-lewis--mse-launch-revolutionary--/
153 Ibid
157 Al Journalism Lab, 2024. https://www.journalism.cuny.edu/j-plus/ai-journalism-lab/
OPPORTUNITIES FOR NON-VIOLENCE

There could also be scope to support non-violence with the aid of generative AI, helping citizens to manage their disagreements through respectful engagement and voting instead of the use of force.

Specific opportunities for Non-violence include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITY</th>
<th>EXAMPLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic content that encourages respectful engagement.</td>
<td>Large language models that suggest more reasonable / less combative rephrasing of threatening or uncivil speech.(^{164})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

Currently, generative AI applications can be unreliable, with inaccuracies arising from poor quality data or “hallucinations” (whereby the AI generates novel falsehoods). They can also produce misleading content, due to biased input data or “sycophancy” (whereby the AI prioritises what the user seems to want over what is accurate). Although applications of generative AI technologies are proliferating rapidly, it is not clear that there has yet been much attention from policymakers on how they could be used to actively support democratic deliberation and decision-making.

The algorithms underpinning today’s leading content-distribution platforms seem unlikely to systematically surface and boost the kinds of synthetic content that would support and strengthen democratic norms in public discourse. Instead, they tend to focus on user engagement, often promoting content that is attention-garbingly uncivil or polarising, rather than making any constructive contribution to democratic discourse. There has been significant work into how platforms could be improved: but not yet widespread adoption from companies who still deploy engagement-maximising systems.\(^{165}\)

Although there is widespread consensus on the kinds of general measures needed to improve AI, there is a patchwork of regulatory efforts around generative AI applications and the foundation models on which they are built. The UK government’s emerging process guidance and AI assurance guidance includes recommendations on risk assessments,\(^{166}\) monitoring for vulnerabilities, and auditing training datasets and monitoring biases arising from models.\(^{167,168}\) The AI White Paper consultation response sets out the intention for further research, evidence-gathering and advice from specific regulators, but no regulation has yet come in.\(^{169}\) The UK’s Online Safety Bill has been passed, which will affect platforms’ duties around illegal content and enforcing their terms of service, but what specific measures that will require of platforms is still under consultation.\(^{170}\)

The EU has made significant strides in these directions through the EU AI Act, which has recently passed the European Parliament. The Act includes transparency requirements for providers of general-purpose AI models, of which large language models which power tools such as generative AI chatbots are a subset. These require transparency about technical documentation,\(^{171}\) copyright adherence and publishing a summary about the training data used\(^{172}\) (with some exceptions for open-source models).\(^{173}\) Models which carry ‘systemic risk’ - which could include risks to democratic processes, democratic values and human rights, or

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\(^{166}\) DSIT, February 2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65cfcf508c96cf3000ca371a/Introduction_to_AI_Assurance.pdf
\(^{169}\) Ofcom, 2024. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/information-for-industry/roadmap-to-regulation
give rise to bias or discrimination, also have more substantial risk assessment and mitigation duties.

Where general-purpose AI systems are intended to be public-facing and used by the public - such as generative AI tools - they must be clearly described as an AI system. Generative AI tools must also mark their outputs as ‘artificially generated or manipulated’, as far as is reasonably technically feasible. Deployers of generative AI tools to create deepfakes, must also disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated. Deployers of these tools to create text published ‘to inform[] the public on matters of public interest’ must do the same, unless there is human editorial oversight and responsibility in place. These obligations will be supported by Codes of Practice on how they should be met.

However, uncertainty remains at the EU level as well: there remain legislative steps to go through before the Act is officially law, and similar dependencies on Codes of Practice (as for the OSB) remain, with a significant time lag before rules come into effect and enforcement might begin.

As encouraging as these developments are, we remain currently in a period of uncertainty, and the gap in democratic control leaves us with a market that is unlikely to support the development of public-interest AI tools.

PROTECTING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY FROM AI

Improving the quality of an AI-driven information environment

Developers of AI should orient their models and applications towards producing more accurate content in contexts where users are seeking factual information—including, especially, when they want to know about electoral processes, political entities, and policy issues. In doing so, developers will need to extend their efforts to understand and minimise AI-generated inaccuracies and biases—particularly given the risk that these feed further generative AI models, promulgating the harmful content in a vicious circle.

**AP2.16:** Developers of AI models and applications should put significant resources into understanding — and explaining — the provenance of AI-generated inaccuracies and biases, and take meaningful steps to rectify these (e.g. through better curated training data, more human feedback, or more sophisticated guardrails). This should broaden out from the scope of the Munich Accord to cover harms to truth, equality and non-violence, and not only deceptive election content.

Turning to the content-distribution platforms, these would ideally move towards algorithmic designs that are both engaging—so that citizens want to use the platforms—and supportive of democratic principles—so that users can participate in civil discussion there. (It is worth noting that fostering such an environment will involve removing the all-too-likely onslaught of AI-generated spam and junk.)

**AP2.17:** Content-distribution platforms should conduct and publish risk assessments of the integration of generative AI tools into their services before they are integrated. (Ideally, this would form part of their duties under the Online Safety Act.)

News organisations in particular have made early strides in setting usage policies for their internal use of generative AI tools in creating content,\footnote{Maher, B., November 2023. https://pressgazette.co.uk/publishers/nationals/telegraph-generative-ai-guidelines-policy-copyright/} and have also begun to take a stand against their content being scraped by AI companies to train their AI tools,\footnote{Milmo, D., September 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/sep/01/the-guardian-blocks-chatgpt-owner-openai-from-trawling-its-content#:~:text=The%20Guardian%20blocks%20ChatGPT%20owner,intelligence%20(AI)%20%7C%20The%20Guardian} which may create a market for quality information needed to produce more robust and reliable generative AI tools.\footnote{Demos, December 2023. https://demos.co.uk/research/drivers-of-digital-discord-how-news-media-and-social-media-drive-online-discourse-and-pathways-for-change/; Irwin, L. February 2024. https://thehill.com/policy/technology/4492468-google-paying-independent-publishers-test-unreleased-generative-ai-platform/#:~:text=Google%20has%20announced%20it%20will,for%20receiving%20analytics%20and%20feedback}


**AP2.18:** Industry standards should be set within sectors to define sector-leading usage rules and best practice for generative AI tools, which companies could then be certified on the basis of their compliance with.\footnote{McNulty, L, February 2024. https://www.cityam.com/the-notebook-the-city-has-to-unite-against-the-risks-of-generative-ai/; Demos, January 2024. https://demos.co.uk/research/generating-democracy-ai-and-the-coming-revolution-in-political-communications/} These should be developed through collaboration between companies, regulators and civil society organisations.

**AP2.19:** UK policymakers should impose obligations on AI companies requiring them to undertake comprehensive risk assessments, with a focus on the risks that their models and products pose to democratic integrity. This should be enforced through meaningful audit by regulators and routes to data access for independent civil society organisations.\footnote{Albert, J. December 2022. https://algorithmwatch.org/en/dsa-data-access-explained/} The newly-passed EU AI Act moves in this direction, with duties on developers of general-purpose AI models which meet the threshold for posing systemic risks (which can include models used for generative AI tools) to assess and mitigate these risks,\footnote{European Parliament, March 2024. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/dokeo/document/TA-9-2024-0138_EN.html} while the Digital Services Act provides for data access to social media platform data: but the UK is a way behind.
PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY WITH AI

As technical understanding improves, producers of these tools have a duty to ensure that their users can understand the ways in which they can best be used as well as their shortcomings.192 This goes beyond simple product warnings. If products are marketed as enabling users to search for information, users may assume that results are surfaced in a similar way to a search engine. If conversations have the visual and linguistic appearance of talking with an agent, users may naturally infer that the ‘ghost in the machine’ is something like a human. A better approach would be to embed helpful signals in how tools and their outputs are described, presented, and marketed.

This extra clarity would mean that a greater diversity of generative AI tools which served different purposes would be safer for the public to engage with. In a world in which the risks of an incorrect answer are huge, generative AI tools must be limited in what answers they can reply - with guardrails put in so that they avoid offering strong views, or pronouncing on uncertain facts - which in some cases, can end up compounding rather than challenging harms.193 With a more empowered public, however, who are better able to navigate using these tools, more space is opened up for generative AI tools with different purposes and limits and which communicate in different ways.

AP2.20: AI tool producers should design the interfaces of their products and services to communicate effectively their purpose and limitations to users.

Public Interest Generative AI

We would also like to see the development of democratically beneficial applications, such as large language models that present alternative perspectives or framings of arguments, or audio-visual tools that make complex information easier to understand.

AP2.21: Funding bodies in the public and private sector should further incentivise the development of democratically beneficial generative AI applications194 (e.g. by supporting a ‘Democratic Sandbox’ for companies, civic tech and civil society organisations to collaborate in and experiment with developing public and open democratic AI systems; supporting the development of generative AI tools and best practice for public interest functions such as charities and public interest news organisations).195

AP2.22: AI companies should publish the principles on which their AI tools have been designed and trained — and how this has been achieved, with what oversight (e.g. through ‘democracy-by-design’ procedures, training procedures, and independent oversight or audit procedures).196

Some AI companies are attempting to tackle the more fundamental problem with bias and harmful outputs, namely by changing what AI models should be being trained to optimise for. Steering the direction of generative AI development in a more pro-social direction, to ensure the outputs are more likely to respect

196 DSIT, February 2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65ccf508c96cf3000c6a37a1/Introduction_to_AI_Assurance.pdf
democratic ideals, is itself a process which needs democratic input to make it more likely to succeed. We are supportive of projects already being undertaken by AI companies and civil society to investigate how to determine what values should drive AI development in a participatory and democratic way. These projects are, however, voluntary, nascent, and the outcomes are in no way binding on AI companies to improve their practices or affect their development.

Ultimately, this will need to be supported by government action. There are many steps governments and regulators could take to support a vibrant information environment—from investing in media literacy to increasing support for sustainable public interest journalism.

**AP2.23:** Regulators should **collaborate to produce consistent guidance that can govern the development of industry best practice in use of generative AI.** UK regulators should set out this intention in their upcoming strategic guidance to be published at the end of April 2024.

**AP2.24:** UK policymakers should **engage with public deliberations on governance of generative AI and support these to be scaled and implemented into policymakers processes.**

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**CONCLUSION**

2024 is set to be a year of significant political and technological change, with tech companies scrambling to assure the public their products are safe (enough) to participate in - or control - the election information ecosystem. In the midst of a patchwork of different regulatory expectations globally, there are simple steps - imperfect, but necessary - which can help mitigate the acute risks to equality, truth and non-violence from synthetic content. The longer-term vision, beyond this heightened political horizon, is for a future in which positive political and technological change mutually reinforce each other, through digitising democracy and democratising digital. Policymakers need to collaborate with the public to come up with answers to how values and tech can and should interact, before the technology - and those who control it - come up with the answer for us.

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201 https://www.fastcompany.com/91022817/act-now-on-ai-before-its-too-late-says-unescos-ai-lead
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