"Using moral political theory to understand populist politics ..."

POPULISM AND ITS MORAL SIBLINGS

Elisabeth Wehling
Jamie Bartlett
Richard Norrie

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Executive summary

Populism is on the rise across Europe. Recent elections and opinion polls bear testimony to the rapidly growing popularity of populist anti-establishment groups. While the political identity of populists can loosely be categorised as 'rightist' and 'leftist' based on their endorsement of traditionally conservative or progressive policy stances, their exact nature – and, hence, ideological pull among the electorate – remains a puzzle.

To better understand the nature of European populism, this study moves beyond policy stances and investigates the moral worldviews of populist followers by using the moral politics questionnaires, which measure endorsement of a conservative Strict Father and progressive Nurturant Parent worldview.[1]

By taking this approach, the study provides three fundamental insights about how one might morally categorise and politically respond to populist movements. First, followers of 'rightist' and 'leftist' populist groups tend to endorse primarily Strict Father and Nurturant Parent values, respectively. However, there are exceptions to this rule, which call the notion of some groups as ideologically 'leftist' and 'rightist' into question – at least in terms of their moral make-up.

Second, populist and mainstream followers on each end of the political spectrum tend to endorse the same model of morality, despite showing differences in their rhetoric and policy stances. Thus, the question of whether conservative and progressive voters support a populist or mainstream movement might largely depend on what group communicates the shared moral beliefs more effectively.

Third, some populist followers endorse both Strict Father and Nurturant Parent values, and are thus open to supporting politics in line with either worldview. Their decision to support

one political spectrum (or movement type) over the other will thus largely depend on who succeeds in addressing their moral political concerns.

1   Introduction

While being concerned with different socio-political issues and solutions, anti-establishment groups across the political spectrum tend to share what might be coined a 'populist narrative'. This narrative pits the ordinary voter against the out-of-touch political elite, with populist groups representing the former against the latter as the only authentic voice in a world of spin and self-interest.[2]

Until the last three years or so, much of the commentary on the subject was related to what is often called right-wing populism – groups endorsing positions such as opposition to immigration and multiculturalism (mostly anti-Islam) and preservation of national culture in the face of globalisation and the EU. The growth of such right-wing populist groups (including both political parties and broader movements) over the past ten years has been remarkable. They now command significant political weight in the parliaments of Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden and Latvia, and in the European Parliament. Marine le Pen secured 18 per cent of the votes in the 2012 French presidential elections and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) received 25 per cent in the 2013 UK local elections. Similarly, there was an impressive performance by right-wing populist parties in the 2014 European parliamentary elections. Front National was the strongest party in France, UKIP topped the polls in the UK, and the Danish People's Party topped the polls in Denmark.

Partly because of socio-economic and political events – such as the economic crisis – there is also a growth in what can be labelled left-wing populism: groups that share a dislike for established parties and the current political consensus among the mainstream parties (including support for the EU), instead

endorsing policy stances such as citizens and workers' rights, antagonism to global capitalism, and opposition to austerity measures and spending cuts. Rabble-rousing Communist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon secured 11 per cent in the first round vote in the 2013 French presidential elections, and Syriza in Greece beat the New Democrats in the 2015 election. In the 2013 Italian elections, Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement became the largest single party in the Italian parliament (Grillo ran a vehement anti-establishment campaign, selecting his candidates online, refusing interviews with Italian media, and communicating almost exclusively via blog). Left-wing populists also performed well in the 2014 European parliamentary elections. The previously unknown Podemos party from Spain, for instance, won 8 per cent of the domestic vote – and is currently polling even higher.

While populist movements can generally be understood as leftist or rightist, their willingness to mix traditionally conservative and progressive issue stances can make it hard to grasp their political and ideological identity. This, in turn, commonly leaves mainstream movements at a loss when formulating coherent responses and political alternatives.

To better understand what motivates followers of populist groups, this study goes beyond listing policy stances as an indicator of people's political beliefs and turns towards moral concerns as the basis of political action and identity. To this end, we undertook two survey studies across six European countries that gauged individuals' moral beliefs according to moral politics theory.[3]

Moral politics theory

Moral politics theory looks beyond issue positions as indicators of political identity, and instead focuses on the moral underpinnings of political identity – people's beliefs about what is morally right and wrong.[4]

Moral politics theory holds that individuals regularly, automatically and largely unconsciously resort to family life as a metaphoric source domain for reasoning about larger social

groups, including nations or nation communities such as the EU. Thus, people map their beliefs about ideal parenting and preferable traits in children onto ideal governance and preferable traits in citizens (consider metaphoric expressions such as the German 'fatherland', 'mother Russia' and 'mother India', and the American 'founding fathers').

The theory was developed by Professor George Lakoff in his 1997 book *Moral Politics*,[5] which distinguishes between a Strict Father and a Nurturant Parent worldview. According to the theory, conservatives tend to endorse Strict Father beliefs, progressives tend to endorse Nurturant Parent beliefs. Individuals whose positions situate them in the 'political middle', such as centrist or moderates, are frequently morally biconceptual, endorsing both worldviews at different times and with regard to different social domains or issues.[6]

The Strict Father model is grounded in the notion that the world is a competitive and dangerous place. Children must be self-disciplined, self-reliant, obedient and morally strong in order to do well. Self-indulgence and indulgence through others is seen as immoral, as it fosters weakness and dependency. Parents must set strict rules of right and wrong, and their authority is not to be questioned within the family or by outsiders. Communication is hierarchical, and rules are enforced through a system of reward and punishment. Punishment is seen as an expression of care and love ('tough love'), as it makes children strong and teaches them discipline. Competition is seen as central to a moral society, and seeking one's self-interest is seen as pro-social behaviour (if everyone seeks their interest, everyone will be better off).

When applied to politics, the Strict Father model entails a range of traditionally conservative issue positions, such as opposition to taxation and welfare, or support of military action and unilateral politics. Welfare, for instance, is seen as hindering people from becoming self-reliant and productive. And unilateral politics or military action against those who challenge the nation's values or moral authority in the world community is seen as a moral necessity.

The Nurturant Parent model is based on the belief that children are good by nature, that their goodness must be

fostered, and that this is best done through leading by example and showing empathy and nurturance. Children should learn individual and social responsibility – to care both for themselves and others. They must learn empathy, which is seen as the basis for cooperation, respect and tolerance. Communication between children and parents is respectful. Parents have to explain their rules and decisions, and children are encouraged to develop their own ideas and question parental decisions. Moreover, children should never be physically or psychologically harmed, and they must learn never to harm others. In this model, a central goal of parenting is to empower children to live a happy and fulfilled life, and to follow their individual dreams. Finally, treating children fairly means giving them what they need, not what they 'deserve'.

When applied to politics, the Nurturant Parent model brings about a range of traditionally progressive policy stances such as support of welfare, opposition to a flat tax, empowerment and protection of marginalised groups, and opposition to military force.

Method
Measuring morality
Endorsement of the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent worldviews can be measured through the Moral Politics Questionnaire,[7] which measures a person's strict or nurturant beliefs either directly in relation to the family (on the Family Scale), or in relation to the socio-political domain (on the Societal Scale). To reflect these two approaches, the Moral Politics Questionnaire has a Strict Father and a Nurturant Parent subscale (see appendix), and answers are given on a seven-point Likert Scale, where participants indicate how much they agree or disagree with a moral statement. For example, consider the following statements, which are examples from the surveys. Respondents answer the extent to which they agree.

Moral Politics Family Scale:

1 'Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy.' (Strict Father)
2 'Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs.' (Nurturant Parent)

Moral Politics Societal Scale:

1 'The government shouldn't handicap citizens by making their lives too easy.' (Strict Father)
2 'Citizens should receive governmental assistance in accordance to their individual needs.' (Nurturant Parent)

Individuals who endorse the Strict Father subscale above the median and the Nurturant Parent subscale below the median are classified as morally strict. Likewise, participants who endorse the Nurturant Parent subscale above and Strict Father subscale below the median are considered morally nurturant. Finally, those who score above the median on both scales are categorised as biconceptual.[8]

Survey design

Two surveys were administered as part of this study. Survey 1 was administered to followers of populist movements across six European countries: the UK, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy. The survey consisted of the Moral Politics Societal Scale, demographic questions, and open-ended questions designed to draw out lengthy responses about participants' moral reasoning in the socio-political domain. The goal of this survey was to obtain a first overview of populists' application of Strict Father and Nurturant Parent values to the socio-political domain across a large number of countries.

Survey 2 was administered to populist and mainstream followers across three European countries: the UK, France and Hungary. This survey encompassed the Moral Politics Family Scale, demographic questions, a set of hot-button policy

questions, and open-ended questions designed to draw out lengthy responses about moral reasoning, this time directly targeting the family domain as a conceptual template for moral reasoning in the socio-political domain. The goal of survey 2 was to obtain a detailed understanding of individuals' family values as a source of their societal reasoning, to gain insight into the relationship between such values and policy stances, and to compare the worldviews held by populists and mainstreamers across the political spectrum.

Data collection

Data collection involved a survey recruitment design pioneered by Demos that uses Facebook to target supporters of specific groups.[9] Using the same techniques as in *New Face of Digital Populism* and *New Political Actors in Europe*,[10] surveys were conducted via Facebook. In survey 1, we targeted a number of populist groups from both left and right in the UK, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy. In survey 2, we targeted surveys at populist groups in the UK, France and Hungary, as well as a number of mainstream parties to offer a comparison.

Adverts and surveys were administered in each country's native language. Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media site in Europe, and populist parties have a sizeable presence on the platform. Facebook allows for adverts to be targeted at users based on their political preferences, although this is not always as precise as we would like. Targeting supporters of populist movements via traditional survey recruitment is difficult, and Facebook offers a new way of reaching these individuals. On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, setting out the details and purpose of the surveys along with an invitation to take part. There was no monetary compensation for partaking in the surveys.

Data collection caveats

This recruitment technique allows collecting a sizeable dataset from a largely unexplored group of individuals who are hard to recruit via traditional recruitment approaches. However, there are caveats to keep in mind.[11]

First, the population is self-selected. It is thus hard to control for what groups partaking individuals affiliate with and how many individuals from a given group partake. While the survey is advertised to a broad population of individuals that affiliate with political groups on Facebook, there is no control over which individuals ultimately complete the survey. Moreover, it is only possible to target groups and pages that have a presence on Facebook, which is not a comprehensive sample.

In this study, this left us with somewhat different data sets for surveys 1 and 2. For instance, we gained disproportionate numbers of responses from left- and right-wing populist followers as well as mainstream followers in some countries.

Second, this study targets individuals who follow populist and mainstream groups on Facebook, and not political actors or activists themselves. Therefore, one ought to be careful about drawing generalisations about the parties and groups in question, as survey participants must not necessarily represent the populist (and mainstream) groups in their entirety.

Third, Facebook's advertisement options do not allow the targeting of specific groups, but rather a collection of *similar* groups. Therefore, it is not possible to disaggregate respondents according to which Facebook advert reached them. Respondents are thus asked which political groups or movements they most closely affiliated with and categorised accordingly.

2 Results and analyses

Surveys 1 and 2 were largely conducted and analysed separately, although some cross-survey analyses were made. Populist and mainstream groups were placed on a left-to-right spectrum based on policy stances as well as a common public verdict about where each group lands (such as being labelled 'populist left' or 'populist-right' in public discourse).

We recognise that there is considerable disagreement about the extent to which 'populist' is an accurate way to describe parties which are in some respects quite different (for example, Golden Dawn, which is neo-Nazi party, and UKIP, which is an anti-European libertarian and pro-democracy party). We therefore use the term populist as a very loose categorisation, referring to those parties that share a very broad narrative: pitting themselves as defenders of ordinary people against out-of-touch establishment elites, from either a loosely right or left position. It is not to suggest they are all alike, nor is it to pass any value-based judgement on any of the parties involved.

Survey 1 Populists followers in the UK, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy

Survey 1 consisted of the Moral Politics Societal Scale, basic demographic questions, and a set of open-ended questions about participants' socio-political moral reasoning. The survey drew sufficient responses from followers of a diverse set of populist movements in the UK, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy.

Data collection details

In total, 5,171 people completed survey 1 (table 1). A small number were removed because they had answered less than half of the survey questions. (In order to construct the scales, and in determining where individual respondents fell on the scale, we only used respondents who had answered every scale question – hence the discrepancy between figures in table 1 and table 5.)

Table 1 **The country and movements supported by participants of survey 1**

Country	Affiliation	Final Dataset
France	Front National	206
Germany	Alternative für Deutschland	191
Greece	Golden Dawn	44
Hungary	4K!	160
Hungary	Jobbik	3,022
Italy	Five Star Movement	182
UK	UKIP	1,038
UK	BNP	111
UK	EDL	217
Total		5,171

Final dataset details

Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of basic demographics and statistics of those participants who completed the survey.

Table 2 **The age of participants of survey 1, by country**

Age	France	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Italy	UK
35 and under (male)	32	73	61	522	27	152
35 and under (female)	3	3	13	200	2	22
Over 35 (male)	134	119	315	1,708	136	1,051
Over 35 (female)	25	1	137	648	15	141

Table 3 **Statistics relating to the scale by which participants in survey 1 were classified**

Scale	n	Range	Mean	Median	Standard deviation
Strict Father Scale	4,831	15–75	47.4	47	9.9
Nurturant Parent Scale	4,703	14–70	49.8	50	8.4

Morality types

Using their scores on the Moral Politics Societal Scale, participants were classified as Strict Father (those who primarily endorse a strict model of morality), Nurturant Parent (those who primarily endorse a nurturant model of morality), or biconceptual (those who endorse both models in their moral judgement and reasoning). Statistical cut-offs were applied as detailed above (see Methodology, 'Measuring morality').

Table 4 presents the results of this classification for followers of the populist movements across all six countries, divided by left and right.

Table 4 **Left and right affiliation of participants of survey 1, by morality type**

	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Left	8.4%	58.7%	16.5%	547
Right	29.1%	20.2%	23.4%	3,660
Right, without Jobbik	37.0%	14.4%	11.7%	1,355

Table 5 gives details of the results of this classification for followers of each populist group covered in the survey.

Table 5 **Movements supported by participants of survey 1, by country and morality type**

Movement	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Alternative für Deutschland (right)	Germany	23.1%	24.4%	11.5%	156
Syriza (left)	Greece	9.5%	55.6%	17.4%	304
Golden Dawn (right)	Greece	50.0%	6.2%	9.4%	32
Front National (right)	France	73.5%	3.4%	4.3%	117
4K! (left)	Hungary	2.2%	73.1%	5.4%	93
Jobbik (right)	Hungary	24.4%	23.6%	30.2%	2,305
Five Star Movement (left)	Italy	12.9%	46.2%	29.0%	93
British National Party (right)	UK	33.3%	13.6%	4.5%	66
English Defence League (right)	UK	42.9%	9.8%	5.4%	112
UKIP (right)	UK	34.5%	15.7%	13.3%	699

Discussion

As the data show, followers of movements that are commonly perceived as politically leftist are most likely to endorse Nurturant Parent ideals: 58.7 per cent of 'left-wing populists' endorse a Nurturant Parent worldview, and only 8.4 per cent endorse a Strict Father worldview. Interestingly, 16.5 per cent are morally biconceptual, seeing validity in both moral perspectives. Likely, these individuals are open to embracing either conservative or progressive attitudes.

Similarly, followers of rightist movements tend to endorse a Strict Father over a Nurturant Parent worldview (which was more pronounced when removing Jobbik followers from the equation). In that case, 37 per cent of 'right-wing populists' endorsed strict and only 14.4 per cent nurturant ideals, while another 11.7 per cent qualified as biconceptual. When Jobbik followers, who had a remarkably large number of biconceptuals (30.2 per cent) and Nurturant Parents (23.6 per cent), were included, the picture was less discrete for right-wing populists (see table 4). Given the rightist–nationalistic nature of Jobbik's discourse and policy stances, it comes as a surprise to see the

group's followers spread so evenly across the moral spectrum. Possible reasons for this are discussed below (see survey 2 discussion).

A look at followers of specific groups in each country lends further insight into the ways in which populists across the political spectrum in Europe are distinct or unified in their societal moral beliefs.

The rightist French Front National has the highest number of Strict Fathers (73.5 per cent) and lowest number of Nurturant Parents (3.4 per cent) by far. The leftist Hungarian 4K! has the highest proportion of Nurturant Parents (73.1 per cent) and almost no cases of Strict Fathers (2.2 per cent).

Next, there are a number of groups whose followers tend to tilt towards one worldview over the other.

Among the rightist groups, this is particularly pronounced among followers of Greek Golden Dawn (50 per cent Strict Father and 6.2 per cent Nurturant Parent) and the English Defence League (42.9 per cent Strict Father and 9.8 per cent Nurturant Parent). On the left side of the spectrum, a similarly clear moral pattern emerges for followers of the Greek Syriza (55.6 per cent Nurturant Parent and 9.5 per cent Strict Father) and the Italian Five Star Movement (46.2 per cent Nurturant Parent and 12.9 per cent Strict Father).

Followers of the remaining populist movements reveal a much more diverse moral pattern, although the groups in question are broadly viewed by the public as 'rightist'. Followers of the British National Party and UKIP, for instance, consist of around a third of Strict Fathers, but have fairly large numbers of Nurturant Parents (13.6 per cent and 15.7 per cent, respectively). An even more mixed – and quite surprising – moral pattern emerges for followers of the German Alternative für Deutschland and the Hungarian Jobbik. Even though the two movements are generally considered to be part of a populist-right, their followers include a larger number of Nurturant Parents (24.4 per cent and 23.6 per cent, respectively) than Strict Fathers (23.1 per cent and 24.4 per cent, respectively). Moreover, Jobbik is the only group to have biconceptuals form its largest cluster (30.2 per cent) (other groups with a considerable number of

bioconceptuals are Italy's Five Star Movement and Greece's Syriza; both groups are considered 'leftist').

Survey 2 Populist and mainstream followers in the UK, France, and Hungary, their policy stances, and alignment of values across social domains

Survey 2 consisted of the Moral Politics Family Scale, basic demographic questions, a number of hot-button policy questions, and a set of open-ended questions about participants' moral reasoning within the family domain. The survey targeted and drew sufficient responses from followers of a diverse set of populist and mainstream groups in three European countries: the UK, France and Hungary.

The central objective of this second survey was to gain a deeper, more profound understanding of populists' core values within the family domain as a source for their moral reasoning about society and governance, to relate such basic moral beliefs to policy attitudes, and to compare the moral make-up of the populist and mainstream followers.

Data collection details

The groups below were targeted on Facebook, which resulted in 1,161 completing the survey (table 6). A small number were removed if they had answered less than half of the survey questions. (In survey 1, in order to construct the scales, and in determining where individual respondents fell on the scale, we only used respondents who had answered every question – hence the discrepancy between figures in table 6 and table 11.)

Table 6   **The country and movements supported by participants of survey 2**

Country	Affiliation	Final Dataset
UK	BNP	25
UK	UKIP	132
UK	Labour Party	48
UK	Conservatives Party	44
France	Front National	154
France	Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP)	69
France	Parti Socialiste	41
Hungary	Együtt	32
Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció (DK)	416
Hungary	Jobbik	112
Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)	60
Hungary	Jobbik	112
Hungary	Lehet Más a Politika (LMP)	28
Total		1,161

Tables 7 and 8 give an overview of basic demographics and statistics of those participants who completed the survey.

Table 7   **The age of participants of survey 2, by country**

Age	UK	France	Hungary
35 and under (male)	49	86	66
35 and under (female)	6	14	2
Over 35 (male)	210	220	490
Over 35 (female)	54	50	329

Table 8   **Statistics relating to the scale by which participants in survey 2 were classified**

Scale	n	Range	Mean	Median	Standard deviation
Strict Father Scale	1,474	15–75	48.7	49	11.4
Nurturant Parent Scale	1,406	14–70	55.8	56	8.0

Morality types

Using their scores on the Moral Politics Family Scale, participants were categorised as Strict Father, Nurturant Parent, or biconceptual. The same selection parameters as in survey 1 were applied. Table 9 presents the results of this categorisation for what is commonly considered the political 'left' and 'right' across countries, with populist and mainstream groups combined.

Table 9 **Left and right affiliation of participants in survey 2, by morality type**

	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Left	15.8%	50.3%	10.7%	525
Right	49.5%	11.9%	23.7%	455

Table 10 shows the morality patterns for the political 'left' and 'right' across European countries, divided by mainstream and populist groups.

Table 10 **Mainstream and populist left and right affiliations of participants in survey 2, by morality type**

Movement	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Mainstream left	16.1%	49.8%	11.0%	446
Mainstream right	37.4%	20.2%	23.2%	99
Populist left	13.9%	53.2%	8.9%	79
Populist right	52.8%	9.6%	23.9%	356

Table 11 presents the moral patterns for followers of each populist and mainstream group covered in the survey.

Table 11   **Movements supported by participants of survey 2, by country and morality type**

Movement	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Parti Socialiste (left; mainstream)	France	21.4%	42.9%	21.4%	28
Front National (right; populist)	France	68.8%	3.6%	16.1%	112
UMP (right; mainstream)	France	37.3%	13.7%	23.5%	51
DK (left; mainstream)	Hungary	13.8%	49.8%	11.0%	319
Együtt (left; populist)	Hungary	3.1%	62.5%	9.4%	32
MSZP (left; mainstream)	Hungary	23.9%	50.0%	2.2%	46
LMP (left; populist)	Hungary	28.6%	39.3%	10.7%	28
Jobbik (right; populist)	Hungary	35.3%	17.6%	20.0%	85
Labour (left; mainstream)	UK	29.7%	37.8%	16.2%	37
Conservative (right; mainstream)	UK	39.4%	18.2%	27.3%	33
UKIP (right; populist)	UK	50.5%	11.0%	33.9%	109
British National Party (right; populist)	UK	60%	5.0%	15%	20

Discussion

Examining the populist and mainstream data together (table 9) shows that groups on the political left tend to endorse Nurturant Parent (50.3 per cent) over Strict Father (15.8 per cent) ideals, while groups on the right of the spectrum show the opposite pattern, endorsing Strict Father (49.5 per cent) over Nurturant Parent (11.9 per cent) ideals. Groups on the right show a larger proportion of biconceptuals (23.7 per cent) than those on the left (10.7 per cent).

A comparison of mainstream and populism followers on the left and right across countries (table 10) reveals that left-leaning mainstreamers and populists endorse nurturant over strict values, while right-leaning mainstreamers and populists endorse strict over nurturant values.

At the left end of the spectrum, the two groups display an almost identical moral pattern. Nurturant values are endorsed

for populists (53.2 per cent) and mainstreamers (49.8 per cent), while strict ideals play a more peripheral role for populists (13.9 per cent) and mainstreamers (16.1 per cent). Moreover, both groups show a low percentage of biconceptuals (populists: 8.9 per cent; mainstreamers: 11 per cent). This is what the moral politics model would predict.

When it comes to the right end of the spectrum, a fairly different picture emerges. Here, populists tend to be more one-sided in their moral outlook than mainstreamers. While right-wing mainstreamers are quite evenly distributed across the three moral types (strict: 37.4 per cent; nurturant: 20.2 per cent; biconceptual: 23.2 per cent), populist right wingers clearly endorse strict (52.8 per cent) over nurturant (9.6 per cent) values (while still holding 23.9 per cent biconceptuals).

Table 12 **Morality types, by movement supported by participants in survey 2**

Movement	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Parti Socialiste (left; mainstream)	France	21.4%	42.9%	21.4%	28
Front National (right; populist)	France	68.8%	3.6%	16.1%	112
UMP (right; populist)	France	37.3%	13.7%	23.5%	51
DK (left; mainstream)	Hungary	13.8%	49.8%	11.0%	319
Együtt (left; populist)	Hungary	3.1%	62.5%	9.4%	32
MSZP (left; mainstream)	Hungary	23.9%	50.0%	2.2%	46
LMP (left; popular)	Hungary	28.6%	39.3%	10.7%	28
Jobbik (right; populist)	Hungary	35.3%	17.6%	20.0%	85
Labour (left; mainstream)	UK	29.7%	37.8%	16.2%	37
Conservative (right; mainstream)	UK	39.4%	18.2%	27.3%	33
UKIP (right; populist)	UK	50.5%	11.0%	33.9%	109
British National Party (right; populist)	UK	60%	5%	15%	20

A moral close-up of each of the targeted groups (table 12) sheds further light onto the ways in which populist and mainstream followers are unified – or separated – by the gist of their moral beliefs.

For those on the left, the Hungarian left populist party Együtt is the party most likely to endorse nurturant values (62.5 per cent) over strict (3.1 per cent). The Hungarian LMP, also considered a leftist populist party, is more evenly spread out across moral types, with 39.3 per cent nurturants, 28.6 per cent stricts, and 10.7 per cent biconceptuals. Of leftist mainstream parties, the Hungarian DK and MSZP show the highest proportions of nurturants (49.8 per cent and 50 per cent respectively) compared with stricts (13.8 per cent and 23.9 per cent) and biconceptuals (11 per cent and 2.2 per cent). In comparison, the French Parti Socialiste has 42.9 per cent nurturants, 21.4 per cent stricts, and 21.4 per cent biconceptuals. Other leftist mainstream parties, such as the British Labour Party, distribute even more evenly across the three types.

The picture that emerges for rightist parties is somewhat different. The French populist movement Front National has the highest proportion who endorse strict (66.7 per cent) over nurturant (3.6 per cent) ideals. Followers of the British National Party show 60 per cent strict and 5 per cent nurturant values; followers of UKIP show 50.5 per cent strict and 11 per cent nurturant ideals (as well as a rather large percentage of biconceptuals: 33.9 per cent). While mainstream groups on the political right align with the general pattern of endorsing strict over nurturant values, their followers consist of Strict Fathers and biconceptuals to similar degrees. Followers of the Conservative Party in the UK, for instance, are divided into 39.4 per cent Strict Fathers and 27.3 per cent biconceptuals. Similarly, the conservative UMP in France has 37.3 per cent Strict Fathers and 23.5 per cent biconceptuals.

Jobbik followers again present somewhat of a moral outlier compared with the rest of the data. While the largest proportion of followers endorses primarily Strict Father ideals (35.3 per cent), there is a considerable number of Nurturant Parents (17.6 per cent) and biconceptuals (20 per cent). These results for

Jobbik are similar to those in survey 1. While a separate investigation would be necessary to establish the reasons for this, we can sketch out a tentative and caveated explanation. First, the data show that not just Jobbik followers but Hungarian parties as a whole are more prone to endorse Nurturant Parent ideals and/or be biconceptual. In survey 1, followers of the left-wing populist group 4K! consisted of a far higher percentage of Nurturant Parents (73.1 per cent) than any other populist groups in the six targeted countries. Moreover, survey 2 results placed the Hungarian left-wing populist group Együtt at the top of the list of those who endorse nurturant but not strict ideals. One possible factor in this tendency is that Hungary is the only post-Soviet country in the study. While communism, for several reasons, should not be understood as rooted in Nurturant Parent morality per se, it does pull on a number of core nurturant values. Moreover, over a third of Hungarians who completed the survey were 35 years old, and thus experienced communism for at least ten years.

Moral alignment across domains

As surveys 1 and 2 were administered to similar (but not identical) individuals across Europe, it is possible to investigate the degree to which individuals' family and social ideals align with each other among populism followers.[12] Surveys 1 and 2 provided relevant data on a set of four groups: the French Front National, the Hungarian Jobbik, and the British UKIP and British National Party (participants were not identical across the surveys, but followers of the same groups). Table 13 shows the results of the comparison.

Discussion

The data confirm there is a general alignment of moral beliefs across the family and societal domain. Followers of the French Front National, for instance, endorse Strict Father principles (73.5 per cent in the societal and 68.8 per cent in the family domain), and it is equally unlikely for them to endorse nurturant

Table 13 **Moral alignment across family and societal domains**

Societal Scale

	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Front National	France	73.5%	3.4%	4.3%	117
Jobbik	Hungary	24.4%	23.6%	30.2%	2305
BNP	UK	33.3%	13.6%	4.5%	66
UKIP	UK	34.5%	15.7%	13.3%	699

Family Scale

	Country	Strict Father	Nurturant Parent	Biconceptual	n
Front National	France	68.8%	3.6%	16.1%	112
Jobbik	Hungary	35.3%	3.6%	16.1%	85
BNP	UK	60.0%	5.0%	15.0%	20
UKIP	UK	50.5%	11.0%	33.9%	109

principles in either domain (around 4 per cent for each). Jobbik followers spread similarly evenly across strictness, nurturance, and biconceptualism in both domains. Populist followers of UKIP and the British National Party show a similar pattern, although they display more strictness in their reasoning about family life (50.5 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively) than in their societal reasoning (34.5 per cent and 33.3 per cent, respectively).

Policy endorsement

One of the objectives of survey 2 was to investigate the relationship between the deeply held moral concerns and policy attitudes of populist followers. To this end, a wide array of hot-button issues was targeted in the survey: views were sought on taxation of the rich, privatisation of healthcare, taxing corporations for CO_2 emissions, gay marriage, military action against Iran, criminalising abortion, restricting welfare for jobseekers, increasing military spending, minimising the power and influence of the European Parliament, and support for a

Figure 1 **Policy support by morality type**[14]

referendum on EU membership (see appendix for policy questionnaire). Answers were given on a five-point Likert Scale, with higher numbers indicating greater support for the proposed policy. Items were analysed using multivariate linear regression.[13] Figure 1 shows the predicted scores for populists based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression modelling.

Discussion

Overall, the relationship between moral worldview and policy stances is aligned with results from other investigations.[15] However, differences in policy stances between Strict Fathers, Nurturant Parents and biconceptuals are rather small. The largest disagreement lies with the issues of welfare, military spending, and EU parliament powers: those who endorse strict

principles tend to be against welfare, for military spending, and for a minimisation of EU parliament powers, while those who endorse nurturant ideals show the opposite pattern of positioning. This pattern is in line with the two moral models.

Welfare
In the Strict Father model, welfare is seen as an immoral form of governance. For one, it indulges those who are already morally weak (those who are not economically successful). Moreover, it takes away their chance to develop strength by suffering through the consequences of their weakness and disincentivises the necessary willpower to succeed in life. Thus, in the strict moral worldview, providing job seekers with (too much) welfare is an immoral use of authority. In the Nurturant Parent model, in contrast, welfare is seen as a moral form as governance as it provides people with what they need.

Military
The Strict Father model implies a good–evil dichotomy: there are good and evil forces in the world, and it is a government's moral mandate to defend its citizens against evil. In order to do so, one needs a strong military. In the Nurturant Parent model, in contrast, it is the mandate of authorities to protect people against harm. Warfare is seen as a form of harming people (eg in the form of killing civilians), and a minimisation of military strength across countries is seen as moral governance.

EU parliament powers
In the Strict Father model, it is seen as immoral to meddle in the lives of those individuals, or nations, who are their own moral authority – who are self-disciplined, self-reliant, morally strong, and so forth. Therefore, extensive EU parliament powers could be seen as fostering immoral meddling with one's national moral authority. The Nurturant Parent model, in contrast, emphasises cooperation and empathy with other individuals and nations, which makes populist groups' followers who endorse this moral model less likely to focus on small in-groups and more likely to support larger political units with governing powers.

While the above provides an interesting first insight, further in-depth investigations are needed to shed light onto the ways in which moral worldviews and policy stances among populism groups' followers across Europe intersect.

Open-ended questions responses to surveys 1 and 2

As part of surveys 1 and 2, a number of open-ended questions designed to draw out lengthy descriptions about moral reasoning were administered. These questions tackled either the societal (survey 1) or family (survey 2) domain.

One goal of administering these questions was to generate a corpus of written language data on the moral reasoning of the targeted groups (available from the Voices of Discontent website). Responses were analysed manually to determine whether the answers mirrored reasoning in line with the Strict Father or Nurturant Parent models, or indicated endorsement of both (were biconceptualist). Open-ended questions in survey 2 were as follows:

1 How should a good child behave?
2 In your opinion what makes a bad child?
3 What moral principles should children be raised by? (What are the attributes of 'right' and 'wrong' ways to run a family?)

Likewise, open-ended questions in survey 1 read as follows:

1 What are the actions or characteristics that make some citizens moral or immoral?
2 How should a good, moral citizen act?
3 What is the right way of governing a society? (What moral principles, for example, should guide the writing of laws?)

Before reviewing any of the data on the open-ended questions, survey 1 data from France and survey 2 data from the UK were chosen as case study data. The data were analysed by native speakers in the original language of each survey. For each, three analysts independently coded participants' responses to

categorise them into one of four categories, Strict Father, Nurturant Parent, biconceptual, or neither. Classifications were licensed only if at least two annotators produced the same result.

Because of the relatively small number of left-wing populists who answered this question, we have focused only on the supporters of right-wing populist movements. Therefore, this exercise should be considered as a useful analysis of open-ended text answers, which can offer some additional texture to the results above.

Survey 1 data (case study 1)

There were 234 participants who answered the open-ended questions in survey 1 from France (populism only); we identified 141 answers as right-wing populist, which we subjected to analysis. The following cases exemplify the ways in which participants responded:

1 What are the actions or characteristics that make some citizens moral or immoral?

Not respecting French laws; when you know [that] you're not going to be punished by the justice system, you'll do anything! (Strict Father)

They don't respect others. (Nurturant Parent)

2 How should a good, moral citizen act?

[By] respecting secularism, the law and the rules. (Strict Father)

Listening, watching, analysing, understanding. (Nurturant Parent)

Participants' responses largely paralleled the results observed in the analyses made above. Followers of right-wing groups tended to produce more statements in line with Strict Father (57) than Nurturant Parent (8) beliefs (table 14).

Table 14   **The morality types of participants in survey 1**

	Right-wing populist (n = 141)
Strict Father	57
Nurturant Parent	8
Biconceptual	8
Neither	64
No inter-coder agreement	–

Survey 2 data (case study 2)

There were 219 participants who answered the open-ended questions in survey 2 (both mainstream and populist in the UK); we identified 125 answers as politically right, 34 as left, and 34 as neither. As above, since the majority of participants were rightist, this initial analysis of since the collected data again focused on right-wing populists. The following cases exemplify the ways in which participants responded:

1 How should a good child behave?

   [Be] respectful of others and obey the rules. (Strict Father)

   With kindness, and sensitivity and love. (Nurturant Parent)

2 In your opinion what makes a bad child?

   Disobedient, unruly, immoral, selfish, loud. (Strict Father)

   There is no such thing as a 'bad' child, only children who are self-seeking and/or exhibitionist, or who bully others mentally or physically. (Nurturant Parent)

3 What moral principles should children be raised by (what are the attributes of 'right' and 'wrong' ways to run a family)?

Consideration and empathy for others are paramount. Children should also be encouraged to develop tolerance of differences and a social conscience. (Nurturant Parent)

Table 15 **The morality types of participants in survey 2**

	Right-wing populist (n = 125)
Strict Father	73
Nurturant Parent	21
Biconceptual	23
Neither	8
No inter-coder agreement	–

Participants' responses to open-ended questions about their moral reasoning somewhat mirror the results we have seen thus far. Followers of right-wing groups tended to produce more statements in line with Strict Father (73) than Nurturant Parent (21) beliefs (table 15).

3 General discussion

There has been an upsurge in populism in Europe over the past years, and while populist groups can be categorised as principally 'left-leaning' or 'right-leaning', their exact ideological nature – and, thus, their ideological appeal to the electorate – remains difficult to grasp.

This study moved beyond policy stances and rhetoric as indicators of the identity of populist groups, and concentrated instead on the moral worldviews at the foundation of populist movements, investigating the values of populists' followers across six European countries. To this end, two comprehensive survey studies were administered using the moral politics questionnaires,[16] which measure individuals' endorsement of a moral Strict Father or Nurturant Parent worldview.[17]

Results show that, overall, followers of right-wing populist groups tend to endorse a Strict Father model, while those of left-wing populist groups tend to endorse a Nurturant Parent model. Moreover, a notable tendency towards biconceptualism (active endorsement of both worldviews) was observed among followers of right-leaning groups, indicating that the populist groups in question might be generally open to embrace either conservative or progressive policies. This was also observed in the analysis of the open-ended questions.

Aside from observing these general tendencies, this study's morality-based categorisation of populist followers sheds light onto ideological commonalities as well as differences between followers of European populist movements.

Among the targeted rightist populist groups, for instance, followers of the French Front National show the strongest endorsement of Strict Father values (73.5 per cent). In comparison, the Greek Golden Dawn holds 50 per cent and the English Defence League 42.9 per cent Strict Fathers (all groups

have low numbers of Nurturant Parents). Among the targeted leftist groups, followers of the Hungarian 4K! show the highest proportion of Nurturant Parents (73.1 per cent). In comparison, the Greek Syriza holds 55.6 per cent and the Italian Five Star Movement 46.2 per cent Nurturant Parents (all groups have low numbers of Strict Fathers).

While the pairing of 'rightist' groups with strict and 'leftist' groups with nurturant beliefs generally held true, some interesting exceptions to this pattern surfaced, bringing into question the classification of these groups as part of the populist 'right' or 'left' when considering their overarching moral political outlook or ideology.

British National Party and UKIP followers, for example, held about a third of Strict Fathers, but in addition held somewhat large numbers of Nurturant Parents (13.6 per cent and 15.7 per cent, respectively). Moreover, the German Alternative für Deutschland and the Hungarian Jobbik, both of which are generally considered part of a European 'populist-right', counted more Nurturant Parents (24.4 per cent and 23.6 per cent, respectively) than Strict Fathers (23.1 per cent and 24.4 per cent, respectively), and biconceptuals formed the largest proportion of Jobbik followers (30.2 per cent).

The study also found some interesting commonalities and differences between populist and mainstream followers. Results showed that (as predicated) left-leaning mainstreamers and populists endorse nurturant over strict values, while right-leaning mainstreamers and populists endorse strict over nurturant values. However, while populist and mainstream groups on the left show a fairly homogeneous moral pattern, groups on the right show differences, with mainstreamers holding 37.4 per cent Strict Fathers and 20.2 per cent Nurturant Parents and populists holding 52.8 per cent Strict Fathers and 9.6 per cent Nurturant Parents (biconceptualism is at around 23 per cent for both groups).

Given these results, followers of populist groups across Europe might be morally more diverse than is indicated by their grouping as 'rightist' and 'leftist'. Moreover, the parallels in moral reasoning between populist and mainstream followers

suggest that they are drawing on populations who have similar overarching moral worldviews within their countries. Therefore, groups that communicate their moral ideals more clearly and effectively will generate the stronger cognitive pull among those citizens who share their moral worldview. This is true also for those populism followers who are biconceptual (endorse both moral worldviews); depending on what morality model is evoked in their minds as a template for political reasoning and decision-making, they might support more conservative, morally strict or progressive, morally nurturant policies.

Appendix

1 Demographic questions, Survey 1 and 2

1. What is your gender? (M/F)
2. How old are you?
3. What is your religion? (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, None, Other)
4. What is your highest qualification level? (Completed primary school or less, secondary school, higher education, vocational training)
5. What is your employment status? (Employed full time, employed part time, unemployed, student or full-time education, retired, other)
6. With which of these groups do you most identify? (…)
7. What is wrong with politics in your country?
8. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

2 Moral Politics Societal Scale
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Disagree/somewhat disagree/neither agree nor disagree/ somewhat agree/agree)

Strict Father Subscale

1. While citizens of other nations must not be one's concern, within the US, everyone should look after each other.
2. The government must instill obedience in its citizens.

3 When the government speaks, Americans ought to listen respectfully.
4 The government shouldn't handicap its citizens by making their lives too easy.
5 Unlawful behaviour must be punished sufficiently.
6 Government authorities should not allow citizens to talk back to them.
7 People must always be on time.
8 Sometimes the government needs to practice 'tough love' to ensure its citizens follow the right path.
9 Citizens need to be disciplined in order to build character.
10 People must understand that people get what they deserve.
11 Citizens must be disciplined through strict rules and laws.
12 It's fine for citizens to have secret dealings and hide things from the government. (Reverse item.)
13 When in doubt, the government should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Reverse item.)
14 At times it's okay for citizens to disobey the government's laws. (Reverse item.)
15 Sometimes it's okay to let bad behaviour in citizens go unpunished. (Reverse item.)

Nurturant Parent Subscale

1 Citizens will be happy if the government encourages them to follow their curiosity.
2 People in America should learn to understand others' needs and attend to them.
3 Citizens must learn to see the world through other people's eyes.
4 I'd would rather see America work cooperatively with other nations than be in competition with them.
5 In order to truly take care of its citizens, the government needs to be empathic.
6 Governing means nurturing the true nature of each citizen.
7 Americans should receive governmental assistance in accordance to their individual needs.

8 The government should empower its people as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams.
9 Caring for others is not a central aspect of being American. (Reverse item.)
10 Americans shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of citizens from other nations. (Reverse item.)
11 Tending to the needs of those in other nations is not the responsibility of Americans. (Reverse item.)
12 It's not critical for people to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Reverse item.)
13 Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not an important part of being American. (Reverse item.)
14 It's not important for the government to explain to its people why it set certain rules and laws. (Reverse item.)

3 Moral Politics Family Scale

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Disagree/somewhat disagree/neither agree nor disagree/ somewhat agree/agree)

Strict Father Subscale

1 While other people must not be one's concern, within a family, everyone should look after each other.
2 Obedience must be instilled in children.
3 When grownups talk children ought to be quiet.
4 Parents shouldn't handicap their children by making their lives too easy.
5 Bad behaviour in children must be punished sufficiently.
6 I will not have my child talk back to me.
7 Children must always be on time.
8 'Tough love' is required to raise a child right.
9 Children need to be disciplined in order to build character.
10 Children must be taught that people get what they deserve.

11 Children must be disciplined through strict rules at home.
12 It's fine for children to have secrets and hide things from their parents. (Reverse item.)
13 When in doubt, parents should err on the side of lenience rather than strictness. (Reverse item.)
14 At times it's okay for children to disobey their parents. (Reverse item.)
15 Sometimes it's okay to let bad behaviour in children go unpunished. (Reverse item.)

Nurturant Parent Subscale

1 Children will grow up to be happy adults if parents encourage them to follow their curiosity.
2 Children should learn to understand others' needs and attend to them.
3 Children must learn to see the world through other people's eyes.
4 I rather see my child play cooperatively than play competitively.
      In order to truly nurture children one needs to be empathic.
      Parenting means nurturing the child's true nature.
5 Siblings should receive parental support in accordance to their individual needs.
6 Parents should empower children as much as possible so that they may follow their dreams.
7 Knowing how to care for others is not a central thing for a child to learn. (Reverse item.)
8 Children shouldn't feel obligated to care about the well being of people they do not know. (Reverse item.)
9 Tending to the needs of others is not a sign of responsibility in children. (Reverse item.)
10 It's not critical for children to learn to take the perspective of others into account. (Reverse item.)
11 Learning to understand others and accepting them for who they are is not important for children to learn. (Reverse item.)
12 It's not important for parents to explain to their children why they set certain rules and limits. (Reverse item.)

4 Open-ended questions
Societal domain (survey 1):

1 How must one act in order to be a good and moral citizen?
2 What actions or characteristics turn people into bad, immoral citizens?
3 What's the right way to govern a society (what moral principles should guide the policy making of a nation)?

Family domain (survey 1):

1 How should a good child behave?
2 In your opinion what makes a good child?
3 What moral principles should children be raised by (what are the attributes of 'right' and 'wrong' ways to run a family)?

5 Policy items
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(Disagree/somewhat disagree/neither agree nor disagree/ somewhat agree/agree)

1 Increase income taxes for wealthier citizens.
2 Privatise health care.
3 Pass legislation that taxes corporations for emitting carbon dioxide into the air.
4 People of the same-sex should not be allowed to marry.
5 Use military force (eg, airstrikes) to force Iran to terminate its nuclear weapons programme.
6 Make having an abortion illegal.
7 Stop paying welfare to those who do not find a job after six months.
8 Increase the amount of money spent on the military.
9 There should be a referendum on leaving the European Union.
10 Minimise the power of the European Parliament and keep Brussels from interfering with national legislations.

OLS regression analysis of policy attitudes

Table 16   **OLS regression analysis of policy attitudes**

| | Dependent variable | | | |
	Tax rich	Privatise health	Tax CO_2	Gay marriage
Strict	0.183	0.21	0.061	0.016
Nurturant	0.237	0.207	0.346	0.317
Biconceptual	0.093	0.288	0.362	-0.041
Populist	-0.284	-0.001	0.102	-0.076
Right-wing	-1.115	0.382	-0.445	0.176
Male	-0.057	-0.166	-0.17	-0.309
Employed	-0.091	-0.099	-0.025	-0.049
Other activity	0.04	-0.209	0.0001	-0.079
Age 26–35	0.021	-0.325	-0.397	1.192
Age 36–45	0.278	-0.207	0.456	0.748
Age 46–55	0.277	-0.348	0.245	0.896
Age 56–65	0.071	-0.002	0.067	1.287
Age 66–75	0.12	0.1	0.049	1.281
Age 76 plus	0.025	-0.394	-0.126	1.491
Vocational education	0.088	0.0001	0.141	-0.479
Higher education	-0.177	0.162	-0.133	-0.07
Christian	-0.035	-0.226	0.06	0.037
Other religion	-0.131	-0.182	-0.442	0.038
Hungary	0.5	0.647	0.026	-0.731
UK	0.316	-0.526	-0.444	-0.515
Strict*populist	0.642	-0.044	-0.091	0.755
Nurture*populist	0.129	-0.514	-0.39	0.12
Bicon*populist	1.099	-0.484	0.15	0.584
Constant	3.841	2.417	4.098	2.67
Observations	849	844	844	843
R2	0.212	0.115	0.135	0.136

Reference categories are: 'neither', 'mainstream', 'female',
'unemployed', '16 to 25', 'school education', 'non-religious', 'France'

Iran marriage	Abortion illegal	Restrict welfare	Military spending	EU parliament	EU referendum
0.434	0.407	0.868	0.613	0.631	0.373
0.028	-0.245	-0.206	-0.277	0.042	-0.16
0.311	-0.105	0.428	0.406	0.421	0.463
0.331	-0.092	0.105	0.148	0.847	0.691
0.031	0.615	1.558	0.811	0.367	0.851
-0.229	0.168	0.186	0.077	0.051	0.106
-0.145	0.16	0.066	0.387	-0.625	0.069
-0.398	0.037	0.148	0.446	-0.403	0.137
0.445	0.354	0.013	-0.132	0.446	-0.359
-0.409	-0.037	0.044	-0.081	0.222	-0.087
-0.357	-0.171	-0.003	-0.094	0.39	0.126
-0.026	-0.08	0.224	-0.186	0.325	0.092
0.177	-0.162	0.373	-0.027	0.303	0.148
0.433	0.27	-0.142	-0.274	0.161	0.099
-0.173	-0.055	0.281	0.199	-0.112	0.006
-0.102	-0.075	-0.131	-0.083	-0.115	0.061
0.35	0.353	0.21	0.178	-0.01	0.064
-0.048	0.148	0.074	-0.135	-0.293	-0.356
-0.164	0.748	0.159	-0.104	0.584	-0.546
-0.118	0.154	-0.747	0.926	1.407	0.926
-0.273	0.177	-0.296	0.016	0.049	-0.331
-0.576	0.377	-0.303	0.03	-0.357	-0.157
-0.673	0.484	-0.106	0.037	0.028	-0.153
2.806	0.801	1.823	1.252	2.086	1.959
845	829	832	834	742	832
0.073	0.162	0.400	0.432	0.381	0.537

Notes

1   G Lakoff, Moral Politics: How conservatives and liberals think, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996; G Lakoff and E Wehling, The Little Blue Book: The essential guide to thinking and talking democratic, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012; E Wehling, 'A nation under joint custody: how conflicting family models divide US politics', doctoral thesis, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 2013; E Wehling et al, 'A moral house divided', in preparation.

2   See T Bale, 'Keep off UKIP's territory – Europe's lesson for the Tories', *Guardian*, 4 Mar 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/04/keep-off-ukip-territory-europe-tories#ixzz2UgqKxQo0 (accessed 27 Jan 2015).

3   Lakoff, Moral Politics.

4   Ibid.

5   Ibid.

6   See for example Lakoff, Moral Politics; Lakoff and Wehling, The Little Blue Book; Wehling, 'A nation under joint custody'; E Wehling and G Lakoff, The Public Brain and its Moral Whisper, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, forthcoming; Wehling et al, 'A moral house divided'.

7   Wehling, 'A nation under joint custody; Wehling et al, 'A moral house divided'.

8   Individuals who score below the median on both subscales are labelled as 'neither'; we found a considerable number of participants to fall into this category. Future research could investigate the moral templates employed by these individuals.

9   J Bartlett, J Birdwell and M Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism, London: Demos, 2012.

10 Bartlett et al, New Face of Digital Populism; J Bartlett et al, New Political Actors in Europe: Beppe Grillo and the M5S, London: Demos, 2013.

11 For an in-depth discussion of the method's strength and weaknesses, see Bartlett et al, The New Face of Digital Populism.

12 We merely report correlational observations.

13 Variables were analysed using multivariate regression analysis in order to see how they varied by the different moral types. The policy in question was regressed on moral type with controls. An interaction term between moral type and populist identification was added to allow testing such an interaction. Statistical significance was not tested for effects, since that testing is usually applied where there is random probability sampling (statistical significance seeks to test the likelihood the effects found may have been caused by chance, which is not possible to determine if there is probability sampling, because effects can also be due to biased samples).

14 Controlling for age, gender, education, employment, country and religion. Effects are those for someone who is aged between 16 and 25, male, Christian, right-wing, living in France, with a school education.

15 Lakoff, Moral Politics; Wehling, 'A nation under joint custody'; Wehling et al, 'A moral house divided'.

16 Wehling, 'A nation under joint custody'; Wehling et al, 'A moral house divided'

17 Lakoff, Moral Politics.

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Anti-establishment populist parties and movements, both left and right, have become a force to be reckoned with in many European countries. From Syriza in Greece to the Front National in France, there is growing support for parties which offer an alternative vision from the mainstream parties.

This report offers a new way to analyse anti-establishment populist parties and movements: by analysing the underlying moral frames and attitudes of populist supporters through Moral Politics Theory based on the work of the US academic George Lakoff. By conducting Moral Politics Questionnaires with over 5,000 online supporters of populist parties across Europe, the respondents' worldviews are gauged and examined in relationship to policy stances, family values, and moral beliefs.

The research finds that the moral beliefs and attitudes of supporters of anti-establishment populist often have the same model of morality as supporters of mainstream parties, despite showing differences in rhetoric. Thus the question of whether conservative or professive voters supports a populist or mainstream party might depend on these moral beliefs are communicated. *Populism and its Moral Siblings* sets out new ways to understand and engage these voters.

Dr. Elisabeth Wehling leads neuroscience, behavioural and cognitive-linguistic research on ideology, politics and language at the International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley. Jamie Bartlett is Director of the Centre for the Analysis of Social Media at Demos. Dr Richard Norrie is a researcher at Demos.