"Why those who do God, do good…"

FAITHFUL CITIZENS

Jonathan Birdwell
Mark Littler

DEMOS

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Acknowledgements

The Demos Inquiry into Faith, Community and Society

This report is part of a larger project led by Stephen Timms MP and Demos exploring the role of faith in UK society and politics. It is the first in a series of three reports that will be released in 2012.

This report explores the connection between faith and civic and political engagement in the UK. The second report, due to be released in June 2012, will examine the role of faith groups in delivering public services. The third and final report, forthcoming in summer 2012, will consider the role of faith in politics.

In order to advise on the direction and content of the research we have convened an advisory committee of faith leaders, academics and politicians who are knowledgeable about the issues covered by our research. This advisory committee is chaired by Stephen Timms MP and includes the following members:

· Stephen Timms MP (chair)
· Akeela Ahmed (Muslim Youth Helpline)
· Rosie Bairwal (Catholic Association for Racial Justice)
· Hazel Blears MP (Labour MP, Salford)
· Steve Bonnick
· Sir Trevor Chinn
· Alison Coutts (Bill Hill Trust)
· Unmesh Desai (Labour Councillor, Newham)
· Mustafa Field (Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, MINAB)
· Andy Flanagan (Christian Socialist Movement)
· Lord Maurice Glasman (Labour Peer, Stoke Newington and Stamford Hill)
· James Kidner (The Coexist Foundation)
· Siobhan McAndrew (University of Manchester, British Religion in Numbers programme)

- Mark Oliver (youth worker)
- Jasbir Panesar (University of East London)
- Vikas Pota (Sewa Day)
- Nick Spencer (Theos)
- Rev Lucy Winkett (vicar, St Jame's Piccadilly)

Foreword

Rt Hon Stephen Timms MP

Imagination and generosity rooted in religious faith are a key source for the values the Labour party exists to promote and the aspirations it seeks to realise. However, the relationship between the party on the one hand, and churches and faith groups on the other, has not always been easy or comfortable. The research described in this report highlights the potential for building a much better relationship in the future.

It underlines how important it is for the party to engage with faith groups. A large reservoir of potential support for Labour's aims is to be found among those who describe themselves as religious, and among the smaller group who belong to a church or other religious organisation. 'Faithful citizens' are more active in their communities than the average, and more active politically. Far from 'the Conservative party at prayer', on a number of key issues they are likely to offer support for progressive political positions.

According to the latest wave of the European Values Study, over half the UK population describes itself as religious – 52 per cent. This may appear surprising. Ever since the 1950s, there have been frequent reports that the number attending religious worship is falling. Religious faith has been widely assumed to be the preoccupation of a small minority. This research suggests that is not the case.

The Richard Dawkins Foundation has argued that this figure overstates the importance of religion, because, even though many people describe themselves as religious, most do not in fact exhibit much orthodox belief. But it would be a mistake to conclude that religious faith is unimportant for politics in contemporary Britain. Political discourse rooted in faith continues to matter a great deal. Many people's thinking about right and wrong, and about the kind of society they want

to live in, is deeply influenced by religious faith and values instilled by faith.

From Labour's standpoint, Demos has identified a particularly interesting, large group within those who describe themselves as religious: people who take the view that there is at least some basic truth in religions other than their own. These account for 42 per cent of the UK population, as suggested by the European Values Study. They have a high propensity to volunteer for progressive causes, and a high level of interest in politics.

To look at the data in a different way, a much smaller group, 13 per cent of the UK population, say they belong to a religious organisation. (It is worth noting that this proportion is higher in the UK than in many other European countries – only 4 per cent in France and Spain and 8 per cent in Germany say they belong to a religious organisation.) Demos has found that this group does not fit the conservative Christian stereotype familiar from commentary about the USA. The context and history in the UK has been very different. Most people who belong to a religious organisation in the UK place themselves on the left of the political spectrum. They are more likely than the average to volunteer for community action and youth work, and to work voluntarily to promote women's rights, human rights and international development. They are also rather more likely than the rest of the population to be 'very interested' in politics.

The progressive cause is often cast as being in opposition to the religious one. This report, as well as recent campaigns like Make Poverty History and Stop the Traffik, shows that, in fact, in many areas they agree. Where the progressive and the religious seem to be at odds, the differences need to be explored within a creative and respectful relationship, recognising that there is a shared commitment to the common good.

Demos' findings underline the extent to which Labour can look for support among the faith communities, and expect to find activists willing to work for its cause. It has happened before. The churches were crucial in Labour's foundation and early growth. Virtually the whole of the first parliamentary Labour party came into politics through church activities. Before

the Second World War, the Anglican political philosopher Richard Tawney was Labour's key ideologist.

John Smith's Tawney lecture for the Christian Socialist Movement, published in 1993 as 'Reclaiming the ground', set out to renew Labour's engagement with the churches.[1] And, building on that, Tony Blair's success in 1997 in winning support among the churches made a big contribution to Labour's electoral landslide. In government, Labour delivered for church-inspired campaigns like Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History.

In working now to renew its policies after its election defeat, and to formulate a compelling new programme to present to the electorate, Labour can draw new energy and inspiration from engaging with faith groups. It needs their help in developing policies on the basis of the values that the party shares with them, and then in building support for those policies. The Demos work highlights the scale of the potential.

And faith group members will be key in any future, election-winning, progressive coalition. Recently, the Conservative party has courted church members vigorously to reclaim ground which it lost in 1997. For example, it has worked hard to build support among the black-led churches. For electoral purposes, it ruthlessly exploited unease in the faith communities about parts of the Equality Act 2010. Those efforts helped it achieve the largest share of the vote in the 2010 general election. In Labour, we shouldn't let that happen again.

Communities like the one I represent are characterised by high levels of participation in different faith groups. Far from leading to fragmentation, the values those diverse groups share provide a firm foundation for working together. A high level of faith group membership builds a sense of belonging to the wider community. It promotes cohesion rather than division.

Faith communities build among their members' key values – responsibility, patience, compassion, solidarity and honesty. Those values underpin many of the most hopeful developments in Britain's communities. They help build character traits in young people that enable them to succeed in education and in the world of work. Faith groups and faith-based organisations are providing activities for young people, tackling

unemployment, counselling on indebtedness, and supporting the homeless and those seeking asylum. Those values are also the foundation of the Labour movement, and they can help reconnect people with politics.

The Demos research shows the potential support for Labour among people of faith. They can make a huge contribution to Labour's values, to its policy rethinking and its organisational renewal. It is now for the party to mobilise to make that potential a reality.

Summary

People of faith are likely to be a vital base of support for any future election-winning progressive coalition. Our research suggests that religious citizens in the UK are more likely to be civically engaged and politically active than their non-religious counterparts. They are also more likely to hold progressive political values on a number of important political and economic questions at the heart of twenty-first-century policy. Despite the trend of decreasing religiosity in the UK, religion remains important to a broad range of active and engaged citizens – and so it must to politicians.

Research has been produced in recent years exploring the relationship between religion and civic activism. Much of it posits a correlation between the two phenomena, with religious practice correlated with higher levels of volunteering and participation in civic society. Faithful citizens, it is argued, are better, more active citizens, volunteering more of their time than others to improve their communities.

However, most of this research has focused on the USA. Given the USA's distinct social, political and religious context, these findings cannot be assumed to apply in the UK. Fresh empirical research is necessary to determine whether there is a relationship between faith and civic engagement in the UK. This report aims to accomplish this.

It is also commonly assumed that religious groups and individuals tend to be more active in support of conservative causes, for example, being against homosexuality and abortion. This report explores the link between religion and more 'progressive' modes of social and civic activism, including involvement with women's rights groups, international development and trade unions. It also tests the relationship between religion and progressive values through an examination

of religious adherents' attitudes to immigration, equality and other issues relevant to twenty-first-century political debates.

Research findings

The findings presented in this report are based on analysis conducted using two datasets: the UK Citizenship Survey and the European Values Study (EVS).

Over the years, the Citizenship Survey has provided evidence of there being a correlation between religion, civic engagement and a sense of belonging in the UK. Based on previous analyses, as well as original analysis conducted by Demos using the latest 2010/11 wave of the Citizenship Survey, we draw the following conclusions:

· Religious people in the UK are more likely than non-religious people to volunteer regularly in their local community, to feel a greater sense of belonging to their local community and Britain, and to have higher levels of trust in other people and social institutions. They are also more likely to feel they can influence decisions locally and nationally.
· Religious people are more likely than non-religious people to engage in volunteering in their local community, and to take decision-making roles in committees and through local leadership forums, such as being a councillor, school governor or magistrate.
· Religious people who said that their religion was very important to their sense of identity were more likely than those who said it was not important to their identity to be civically engaged and to give to charity via their place of worship.

To supplement the analyses using the Citizenship Survey, we conducted an original analysis of the latest wave of the EVS. We selected eight western European countries to comprise a western European sample, and used this western European average to make comparisons with the UK. Our findings are therefore presented for western Europe as a whole as well as the UK in particular.

We ran two analyses based on three separate religious indicators from the EVS survey. We then examined how civic engagement, political activism and political values vary across different religious 'types'.

Belonging to a religious organisation

For the first analysis, we divided respondents who said that they belonged to a 'church or religious organisation' from those who did not. More than one in ten (13 per cent) of Britons from the EVS sample reported belonging to a 'church or religious organisation', which is just above the average of 12 per cent across our European sample as a whole. This group represents the more active religious practitioners rather than citizens who would affiliate themselves with a religion or religious heritage.[2]

We found that those who belonged to a religious organisation both in the UK and across Europe were more likely to be civically engaged, to be politically active and to prioritise social democratic values on a range of indicators. While our analysis cannot demonstrate causation – in other words, that being religious *causes* someone to be more engaged – the correlation between the two phenomena is itself of interest.

Across our western European sample, those belonging to a religious organisation were more likely to volunteer for or be committed to:

· political parties
· local community action
· development and human rights issues
· environmental issues
· women's issues
· youth work

Those who belonged to a religious organisation were also more likely than those who did not to say that they are very interested in politics, to have signed a petition and participated in a demonstration.

In the UK, while the numbers are too small in some instances to draw conclusions (for example with regard to volunteering for trade unions or political parties), those who belonged to a religious organisation were similarly more likely than non-religious respondents to volunteer for local community action, youth work, development and human rights issues, women's issues and the environment. While there was no difference between categories in the percentage of respondents who had joined a boycott, signed a petition or said they were very interested in politics, those who belonged to a religious organisation in the UK were more likely to have attended a lawful demonstration.

We also analysed responses to a range of value-based questions that often serve to distinguish the political left from the right in Europe. We found that those who belonged to a religious organisation in the UK were:

· more likely to place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum
· more likely to value equality over freedom
· less likely to have a negative association towards living next door to immigrants
· slightly more likely to say that those on benefits should have to take a job (rather than be able to refuse)

Exclusivists, pluralists and seculars

For the second analysis, we divided respondents on the basis of their response to two questions, from which we produced three categories of respondents: religious 'exclusivists', religious 'pluralists' and non-religious 'seculars'. A full explanation of these categories and the methodology we used, including the total numbers for each group in each country, is provided in the appendices. In short:

· Exclusivists self-identified as religious and believed that there is only one true religion.

- Pluralists self-identified as religious and believed that there is one true religion, but other religions have some basic truths, or that no one religion has a monopoly on the truth.
- Seculars did not identify as religious.

We distinguished respondents in this way to investigate how respondents' views towards other religions impact on civic engagement norms and social capital.

Across Europe, 63 per cent of respondents self-identified as religious, with 13 per cent in the exclusivist category and 50 per cent in the pluralist category. In the UK, 52 per cent identified themselves as religious, with 10 per cent in the exclusivist category and 42 per cent in the pluralist category. Thus, this group is much larger than the previous (those who 'belong to a religious organisation') and includes both active and non-active practitioners of religion.

Across western Europe, religious pluralists are the most likely group to volunteer on issues such as women's rights and youth work. In the UK, pluralists were the most likely group to volunteer on these two issues, as well as development and human rights, and the environment. UK pluralists were also the most likely group to have signed a petition and participated in a lawful demonstration.

We also found that in the UK:

- Pluralists were the group most likely to say they are very interested in politics.
- A majority of both exclusivists and pluralists placed themselves on the left side of the political spectrum.
- Pluralists were the most likely to express a positive association towards immigrants and foreign workers, and the most likely group to prioritise equality over freedom (although this latter finding did not achieve statistical significance).
- Exclusivists were the most likely group to prioritise equalising incomes over providing work incentives.

Implications

These findings underline the extent to which campaigners for social democratic political causes should be able to find support in faith communities, along with greater stocks of enthusiasm and greater willingness to participate and be involved. Too often, political parties on the left view faith groups – and those of faith in general – with suspicion, characterising them as inherently conservative. In the UK, new movements on the left have sought to reconnect faith groups with mainstream politics by taking a more positive view of the role of religion in British society. Our research provides further support for those who argue that this engagement could go further, and we argue that faith groups can play an important role in setting and upholding a progressive policy agenda. We recommend the following:

· Progressive politicians in the UK should seek to work with faith groups on the issues where our research suggests they are particularly interested and engaged, for example immigration, women's rights, international development, the environment and youth work.
· Although religious people may be more likely to volunteer, they are less likely to have meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds to their own. Efforts to encourage greater mixing between people from different backgrounds in pursuit of common goals should be highlighted and championed by politicians.
· This report provides additional support for the Demos recommendation made in *A Place for Pride* of replacing the current pen-and-paper UK citizenship test with a requirement to complete at least 16 hours of local volunteering.[3]

1   Background: are faithful citizens better citizens?

In the USA, God is alive and well. At no time is this more obvious than at election time. And while Republicans are more likely to invoke God and religion (and appeal to religious evangelicals), the obligation to faith extends across the political aisle.

In the UK, things are clearly very different. The popular example of Alastair Campbell's quip to then Prime Minister Tony Blair ('we don't do God') highlights that faith is not worn so publicly among politicians in the UK. Yet, it is still very important to many both personally and politically, and just as in the USA, this extends to politicians of all political persuasions. Despite the common perception that religion is more commonly found on the Conservative side of the Commons benches, it is important to remember that a number of those on the political left first gained experience of public service through churches and faith groups like the Christian Socialist Movement.

However, analyses of national survey data highlight the significant differences between Britons and Americans when it comes to religion. In *American Grace*, Harvard social scientist Robert Putnam and Notre Dame political scientist David Campbell highlight the findings of their Faith Matters surveys, conducted in 2006 and 2007, which represent a rich source of data on religion, politics and society. Their findings suggest that US citizens who are religious are more likely to volunteer in their local community, give to charity, be more compassionate and be more politically active and involved. However, greater numbers of religious people in the USA are more fervent, active and literal in their beliefs than in the UK. For example, over half of Britons (54 per cent) report never praying compared with just 18 per cent of Americans. Moreover, a third of Americans believe scripture is the actual word of God compared with just 9 per cent of Britons,

and Americans are almost twice as likely to attend weekly religious services.[4]

In this report we ask if the link between religious and civic engagement that exists in the USA also exists in the UK, bearing in mind the different religious landscape in the USA and greater religiosity of Americans compared with Britons. This chapter briefly highlights why this question is important and summarises some of the academic research that explores the relationship between being religious and being a good citizen.

The rise and fall of religion in 21st-century UK

Britons in general are becoming less and less religious. According to the 28th report of the *British Social Attitudes Survey* 50 per cent of Britons do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion. This compares with 31 per cent who claimed to have no religion in 1983.[5] According to the 2001 UK Census, just under a quarter of Britons (23.2 per cent) either claimed to have no religion or failed to answer the question. While a fuller reflection of the state of British religiosity will be available, when the results of the 2011 Census are published, in the meantime it suffices to say that the active practice of religion continues to decline, with responses from younger Britons suggesting a significant generational shift. According to the 2009 *British Social Attitudes Survey*, nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of 18–24-year-old Britons report not belonging to a religion, compared with 28 per cent of Britons aged 65 and older.[6] While it is true that individuals may tend to become more religious the more they age, Putnam and Campbell's research confirms that a generational change is also afoot in the USA – which, given it is starting from a position of greater religiosity, can allow us to assume that the same is probably occurring in the UK.

And yet, despite religion's apparent decline, its visibility in the media and public discourse remains high. Part of this is perhaps due to its seemingly inexorable decline; however, no single event did more to bring religion to the forefront of public life than the attacks of September 11, 2001. In the wake of these

attacks (and the further attacks and counterattacks they engendered) the debate about the incompatibility of Islam with Western societies came to dominate the airwaves and newspapers. At the same time, more Western Muslims (particularly younger generations) began to identify and practise their religion in more visible ways – driven by the attacks on Islam that followed 9/11 and the 'War against Terror', as well as broader generational adjustment to historical immigration (for example, research suggests that second and third generation immigrants, standing at a crossroads between their parents' culture and that of their adopted country, increasingly looked to Islam as an alternative identity).[7]

Many Britons continue to see faith as a moral refuge from the otherwise nihilistic, dog-eat-dog values of consumerist, capitalist democracies. The arguments of Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens only seemed to retrench people's religious views, with many recoiling at the perceived arrogance and dogmatism of this so-called 'militant' atheism. The debate about the necessity of religion's moral underpinning of society continues to rage.

The continuing importance of religion to UK politicians

Despite its decline, religion remains important to a smaller but active subset of citizens, so politicians of all parties need to be comfortable engaging with faith groups, not just as voters but also as community organisations helping to achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Following the attacks of 7 July 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair convened leaders from all faiths to unite and counter the rising tide of religious extremism and terrorism. Interfaith dialogue organisations across the country were established or bolstered, and local religious leaders were 'empowered' as gatekeepers to their communities. One criticism levelled at the Blair Government during this time was that these relationships (particularly with the Muslim community) needed to be forged from scratch because they did not exist previously.[8]

Fast-forward to 2012 and we find the Coalition Government similarly dependent on the active involvement of faith groups in the implementation of policy. Some faith groups are still very much involved in areas of countering extremism and fostering cohesion, but the current Government sees the role of faith groups and organisations as a deliverer of other services as integral to the realisation of the vision of a Big Society. This will not be without controversy, which is why the second phase of this project will look specifically at this issue.

Do faithful citizens make better citizens?

Sociologists and philosophers have long been interested in the role of religion in society: the identity it provides, its power to shape individual behaviour through shared moral codes, and its relationship with politics. While Marx famously referred to its soporific effect on 'the masses', others have taken a more positive view of its function, proclaiming it the only necessary and sufficient basis for a moral framework through which collaboration, mutual empathy and good relations are possible. Many argue that without religion's ultimate sanction, social mores would break down and amoral chaos would reign.

Over the past two decades a substantial body of empirical research has been devoted to demonstrating the connection between religion and good citizenship. This has been aided by large scale, longitudinal surveys such as national censuses, the General Social Survey in the USA, the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey (EVS), the UK Citizenship Survey (UKCS), and more recently the US Faith Matters Survey as well as the work of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. These resources provide a snapshot of which religions predominate in modern society as well as the levels and evolution of religiosity and religious practice more generally. Combining questions on religion with background questions on gender, age, education and income level – as well as other attitudinal and behavioural questions on political activism (voting, running for office, campaigning), civic engagement (giving to charity, volunteering) and moral and political values (views on homosexuality,

abortion, pre-marital sex, capitalism and economic inequality) – has allowed researchers to infer relationships between religiosity and these other factors.

Most of this research demonstrates that there is a correlation between religion and various measures associated with being a good and compassionate citizen. According to Putnam and Campbell, religious citizens are more generous than their secular counterparts with both their money and their time in volunteering (for both religious and secular causes), being more likely to take part in local civic and political life (through community organisations and committees) and to advocate for social and political reform in their local communities. Moreover, they argue that these findings hold when controlling for a range of other factors that might have an impact, including gender, age, education, race, location, income, home ownership, length of residence, marital and parental status and ideology.[9]

The point about ideology is significant. Putnam and Campbell's research suggests that faithful citizens are not simply the more visible conservative, evangelicals who are active in their crusades against abortion and gay marriage. In fact, of those more likely to be active in political and social reform, the majority do so for liberal or progressive causes. Moreover, although religiosity is correlated with being conservative, and the more religious tend to be the most active, once levels of religiosity are controlled for, faithful citizens on the left are no less generous than conservatives once their religiosity is controlled for, and in many cases they are more generous and active (for example, they are more likely to cooperate to solve community problems and volunteer more to help the sick and needy).[10] One example of a progressively active faith group is the organisation London Citizens – a short description of which is provided in box 1.

Box 1   **Portrait of faithful citizens in action: London Citizens**
London Citizens is an alliance of community organisations that advocates for progressive and social justice causes. Founded in 1996, it is now part of a larger national organisation called Citizens UK.[11] *The group primarily*

campaigns for progressive social issues such as a 'living wage' and against poor working conditions.

Based on the model of community organising espoused by the legendary American organiser Saul Alinsky, Citizens UK works through alliances of community organisations and individuals to bring social justice issues to political attention and apply the necessary levers to ensure that change happens. In doing so, community organisers rely heavily on creating and galvanising networks of supporting organisations, including schools, unions, residents' associations – and faith groups and institutions such as churches, mosques and synagogues.

Their most high-profile and successful campaign was the fight to establish a London living wage of £8.30 an hour, and an outside London wage of £7.20 per hour. According to the Citizens UK website, the Living Wage campaign has won over £70 million of living wages and has verified over 100 companies as providers of living wages, including KPMG, Barclays and the Greater London Authority.[12] It also succeeded as getting the living wage accepted as the minimum standard for workers who will be recruited for many 2012 Olympics-related projects.

Other research suggests religiously active citizens are also more likely to enjoy a range of pro-social benefits, ranging from lower rates of criminality,[13] greater levels of trust in other people, higher levels of life satisfaction, lower levels of depression and increased life expectancy.[14]

Why are faithful citizens better citizens?

While research suggests that faithful citizens tend to be more active, generous and engaged than other citizens, it is much less clear why this is the case. A body of research suggests that what matters is not the fervency of individual belief, or particular theological interpretations, but rather the social context and networks that create and reinforce expectations.[15] Those who are involved in religious practice – frequently attending a religious

service or institution, and thus being more often around other like-minded religious people – appear to be more likely to be better citizens on the measures mentioned above.

Social capital theorists of all persuasions accept that there is a fundamental relationship between trust and civic engagement: willingness to trust other people in general serves as the essential 'glue'[16] necessary to facilitate interpersonal interactions. Religious groups foster norms of reciprocity, which are prerequisites for interpersonal trust, and thus religious involvement enhances trust. In so doing it helps to provide the framework in which successful civic engagement can take place. Based on this analysis, the growing 'civic gap' in western societies may not be due to individualistic capitalism or a growing general apathy, but may instead be the result of declining levels of religious participation.[17]

However, the extent to which other scholars accept such a causal argument between religion and civic engagement varies significantly, with many arguing that the relationship is subject to mediation and influence by a range of other variables. Professor Eric Uslaner of the University of Maryland has long argued that religious adherence may, in some circumstances, decrease trust in those outside the religious group[18] while Daniels and von de Ruhr suggest that the level of religious 'fundamentalism' inherent in a group significantly influences its adherents' willingness to trust non-members.[19] In other words, religious citizens may be more civically engaged, but it is only in support of their own communities.

Religion, political identity and engagement

A parallel stream of literature has sought to consider the relationship between religion and political engagement, which is defined as membership of a political group, support of its aims, and activity on its behalf. Much research links involvement in organised religion with social conservatism and activism on the political right.[20]

Such a picture seems logical, particularly given that the moral and ideological precepts of most religions are established

by texts that pre-date modernity and the coming of liberalism. Therefore religions often find themselves in opposition to society's changing values. On the other hand, Putnam and Campbell argue that the alignment of religions with political viewpoints (namely, evangelicals and right-wing Republicans) is a relatively recent phenomenon – a backlash against the perceived moral laxity of the 1960s.

Indeed, despite religion's adherence to fundamental core values that tend to be considered conservative, religion has also been the impetus for revolutionary social change, including the abolition of slavery and civil rights movement.[21] In Europe, religious groups have been among the most strident critics of the *status quo*, with the leaders of many religious groups frequently speaking out against government policy in defence of the socially marginal and economically excluded.[22]

Furthermore, with the emergence of so-called 'new religious movements' and the importation of less morally prescriptive Eastern religions,[23] the inviolate assumption of an ideological gap between secular society and religious communities can no longer be sustained. To declare religion's followers exclusively conservative is to paint a misleading picture.

The next chapter presents the findings from our efforts to investigate the relationship between religious faith and civic engagement in the UK. Based on new analysis of the UKCS as well as the most recent wave of the EVS, we explored the role of religion in shaping civic and political engagement in the UK and Europe, to identify the differences between 'conservative' and 'progressive' religious adherents. As we argue, despite the many differences between the UK and the USA, faithful citizens in both countries appear to be better citizens.

2 Findings: faith and civic engagement in the UK

In this chapter we present findings from the UK Citizenship Survey and the European Values Study (EVS) on the question of faith and civic engagement in the UK and eight countries in western Europe. Details about these surveys and our methods of analysis are provided in the appendices. Our findings provide further confirmation of the view that faithful citizens appear to be more active citizens on a number of measures involving progressive political values, civic engagement and political activism. Faithful citizens represent a valuable source of social and human capital for policy-makers.

The UK Citizenship Survey

The Citizenship Survey was a government-run social research tool, produced for seven years with the final wave completed in 2010/11, tasked with investigating the drivers of community cohesion and civic engagement. The survey consisted of a nationally representative sample of the adult population of England and Wales, and comprised data from 10,000 inter-views conducted over the course of a year. Additionally, there were 5,000 boost interviews with ethnic minorities, including 3,000 with Muslim respondents.[24] It allows us to investigate whether there is a positive link between religion and civic engagement, social capital and a sense of people belonging to their local community.

There are two key religious indicators used in the Citizenship Survey: religious affiliation ('how would you describe your religious affiliation?') and religious practice ('do you actively practice your religion?'). There are invariably more respondents who describe themselves as having a religious affiliation than there are of those who actively practise their

religion. According to the UK Citizenship survey, 78 per cent describe themselves as having a religious affiliation while 37 per cent describe themselves as actively practising their religion. Both measures indicate that religiosity correlates with a number of indicators of civic engagement. For ease of reading, percentages do not accompany the findings in the body of the text but can be located in the figures and charts. Where the findings are not represented in the figures, percentages are mentioned in the body of the text.

Local influence, trust and civic engagement

The 2007–08 and 2008–09 Citizenship Surveys suggest that religious people are more likely to feel a greater sense of collective efficacy and have greater stocks of social capital than non-religious people. People who actively practised a religion were more likely than those who reported not actively practising their religion (as well as those with no religious affiliation) to feel they could influence local decisions and national decisions. The fact that this effect includes decisions taken at a national level suggests that religious people experience greater levels than non-religious people of 'bridging' social capital and not just 'bonding' social capital. In other words, these respondents had access to a variety of social networks of different people and different contexts, not just those of people who are identical (for example in ethnicity or religion).

Participation in civic engagement activities also tended to be more common among those actively practising their religion (figure 1). According to the most recent analysis of the *2009–10 Citizenship Survey*, those who actively practise their religion as well as those who said that religion was important in shaping their identity were significantly more likely to participate in regular formal volunteering.[26] Interestingly, the same was true for young people aged between 16 and 25: young people who practised their religion actively were more likely to participate regularly in formal volunteering.[27]

Various analyses of Citizenship Survey data also reveal interesting differences based on ethnicity. According to the most

Extent to which religious and non-religious people feel they have local influence and engage in civic activities

Source: *2007–08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities topic report* [25]

recent analysis, the *2009–10 Citizenship Survey*, people from Asian and Chinese backgrounds reported a lower level of volunteering than those from white backgrounds, particularly for those for whom English is not their main language. This finding is relevant in light of a recent Demos report into patriotism entitled *A Place for Pride*, which suggests that volunteering is related to pride in one's local area, which in turn is related to greater feelings of national pride. The report recommends that, instead of a UK citizenship test based on 'mundane and ethereal' knowledge of British history and culture, would-be citizens should instead have to commit to at least 16 hours of voluntary community work through an accredited scheme.[28] We will return to this point in the final chapter of this report.

Another difference important to note is that while those from ethnic minority groups are less likely to participate in

regular formal volunteering overall, when they do volunteer, they are more likely to do so through the medium of religious groups (56 per cent of ethnic minorities compared with 31 per cent of white ethnicity),[29] and to do so specifically because they were motivated by their religious belief (32 per cent ethnic minority compared with 15 per cent white ethnicity). Indeed, religious institutions play a significant role in the process of integration and support for newly arrived migrants – which can entail encouraging volunteering as a way to get to know people and their new community. Some examples of this role for religious institutions will be discussed in the second phase of the Demos' Inquiry into Faith, Community and Society.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, trust in other people as well as social institutions, is linked with higher levels of social capital and participation in volunteering. As in the USA, data from the UK Citizenship Survey suggest that religious people tend to be more trusting of other people and social institutions than non-religious people (figure 2). People with a religious affiliation were more likely to say that people in general could be trusted than those with no religion. The religious practice indicator for trust in institutions was correlated with higher levels of trust in parliament, local councils and the police, as shown in figure 2.

Cohesion and belonging

In addition to civic engagement and social capital, the Citizenship Survey aims to measure community cohesion and perceptions of pride and belonging to Britain as well as one's local area. On these measures, we can also find evidence that religion is correlated with positive outcomes.

Those respondents citing a religious affiliation were more likely to feel a greater sense of belonging to their neighbourhood, local community and Britain as a whole (figure 3). They were also more likely (albeit only slightly) to have a positive view on respecting ethnic differences. People with a religion were also more likely than people with no religion to agree that their local area was cohesive.

Figure 2 **Extent to which religious and non-religious people believe others can be trusted and have trust in institutions**

Source: *2008–09 Citizenship Survey: Community cohesion topic report* and *2007–08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities topic report* [30]

Interestingly, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh people tended to have more positive views about their local area than Christian people. This finding might be related to the fact that these religions are predominantly associated with ethnic minorities, many of whom are relatively recent immigrants and thus are more likely to live in local areas that they strongly identify with (for example Tower Hamlets in east London).

Meaningful interactions

Having meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds can (in most instances) help increase acceptance of

Figure 3 **Comparing responses of people with a religious affiliation and non-religious people on community cohesion and belonging measures**

■ Religious affiliation

■ Not religious

A   Sense of belonging to the neighbourhood

B   Sense of belonging to local area

C   Sense of belonging to Britain

D   Positive view on respecting ethnic differences

E   Agree that their local area is cohesive

F   Have meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds

Source: 2008–09 Citizenship Survey: Community cohesion topic report [31]

diversity and lead to more integrated societies. However, importantly, people with no religious affiliation were more likely than those with a religion affiliation to have regular meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds (figure 3). Part of this is due to age effects: young people are more likely to mix with people from different backgrounds, and are also less

likely to be religious.[32] This has important implications for community cohesion in the UK, and interfaith understanding and dialogue. It also appears to have an impact on participation in formal volunteering: according to analysis of the *2009–10 Citizenship Survey*, mixing with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds in private places (such as in the home) is correlated with being more likely to participate in regular formal volunteering.[33]

While not directly comparable (because of methodological issues), this difference appears to contrast with the American context where research suggests that religious Americans are more likely to have meaningful contact with people from different religious traditions. Putnam and Campbell suggest that this is the reason why religious polarisation and pluralism can coincide with religious tolerance in the USA – through demystification by contact.[34]

Muslims and Hindus were less likely than Christians to have meaningful interactions with people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. This is perhaps not surprising considering the process of immigration in any country initially encourages geographical segregation, and groups with these religions are more likely to be relatively recent immigrants.[35] Drawing on lessons from the history of American immigration and religion, ensuring that people have meaningful interactions with people from different religious backgrounds is integral to fostering greater cohesion between different communities and religions. It may also encourage more active citizenship.[36]

Involvement in local leadership and decision-making roles

In addition to the above findings from previous analyses of the Citizenship Survey, we conducted original analysis to explore a possible connection between an indicator of religiosity not covered in most previous analyses ('how important is religion to your sense of who you are?') and two further indicators of civic engagement that relate to formal involvement in local leadership or decision-making roles. The first indicator includes

Table 1   **Extent of civic engagement by those practising and not practising a religious faith**

	Religious practice	
	Actively practising	Not actively practising
Have volunteered to serve as a councillor or school governor, special constable or magistrate in the past 12 months	3%	1%
Have been involved in local decision-making groups on issues such as crime, education, regeneration or local health, among others	12%	7%
Have given to charity in the last 4 months	79%	70%

Source: Demos analysis of *2010–11 Citizenship Survey*

volunteering as a councillor, school governor, special constable or magistrate, and the second, involvement in local decision-making groups on issues related to crime, education, regeneration and health.

As can be seen in the breakdown provided in table 1, and similar to findings cited above, there is a relationship between a person's active religious practice and their greater involvement in local positions of leadership – such as being a councillor or school governor*** – and involvement in committees or groups engaging in decisions that affect the local area***. Those actively practising their religion were also more likely to have recently given to charity***.

Findings with a single asterisk (*) are statistically significant to the 10 per cent level; findings with a double asterisk (**) are statistically significant to a 5 per cent level; and findings with a triple asterisk (***) are statistically significant to 1 per cent. See appendix A for details.

How the importance of religious views to people's identity relates to civic engagement and charitable givin

A   Volunteering or serving as a councillor, school governor, special constable or magistrate in the last 12 months

B   Involvement in local decision making groups on issues such as crime, education, regeneration, or local health, among others

C   Given to charity in the last 4 months: overall

D   Given to charity in the last 4 months: at place of worship

Source: Demos analysis of *2010–11 Citizenship Survey*

The extent to which someone feels that religion is important to their sense of identity does not appear to have a positive impact on their civic engagement (figure 4). In fact, the group whose religious identity is not very or at all important is the most likely to volunteer as a councillor, school governor, special constable or magistrate**.

Those who say religion is important to their sense of identity are only very slightly more likely to volunteer to take

part in local decision-making compared to those who said that religion was not important to their sense of identity***. Moreover, while reporting that religion is important to one's identity is associated with giving to charity via one's place of worship***, it does not appear to have an impact on them giving to charity overall.[37] In fact, those for whom religion is not important (combining 'not important at all' and 'not very important' categories) are more likely to have given to charity overall (which may be because they are more likely to be economically better off).

How does the UK compare with western European countries?

As mentioned above, we also ran a series of analyses on the EVS in order to see if the same effects as those demonstrated in the Citizenship Survey were present, but also to place the UK in a broader context with respect to the relationship between faith and citizenship.

This section presents the findings from these analyses. A full description of the methodology is presented in appendix A.

In order to conduct the analysis, we constructed a sample of western European countries with broadly similar social, cultural and religious contexts, including: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany (West), Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We excluded northern European and eastern European countries because they have well-known social and religious differences (eg Scandinavian countries have higher levels of civic engagement on average, which would have skewed the results). We also excluded Switzerland as a non-EU member. Italy was originally included but removed because it threw up anomalous results. The 'western Europe average' in the analysis below is the average of the percentage scores for these countries. As we do not weight the country results per population size, we are using the country as the unit of analysis as opposed to the individual.

We took two approaches to the analysis of the data. First, we divided respondents according to whether they identified as belonging to a 'church or religious organisation', or not. We then

compared these two different groups against a range of questions related to civic and political engagement. These results are presented first.

Second, we divided respondents who self-identified as religious (which is different from self-identifying as belonging to a religious organisation, and includes greater percentages of respondents) one step further, based on their responses to a question about their view on the truth of other religions (see appendix A for the question and different answer options). Thus we created three categories of respondents:

- *religious 'exclusivists'*: those who identify themselves as religious and believe there is only one true religion and no other religions have claims of truth
- *religious 'pluralists'*: those who identify themselves as religious, but believe that other religions have basic truths (even if they believe there is only one true religion)
- *non-religious 'seculars'*: those who do not identify themselves as religious

A full breakdown of the numbers in each European country is provided in appendix B. The rationale behind this approach was to disaggregate religious respondents according to whether they were more fundamentalist or liberal using a relatively straightforward typology. It is also important to note that this measure has more to do with attitudes and interactions towards other religions than it does fervency of belief: Religious pluralists are not necessarily less religious than exclusivists.

One final point: we do not distinguish respondents by the religion they adhere to and thus our sample includes all religions (Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist). It is worth bearing in mind that Christianity continues to represent an overwhelming proportion of religious respondents in western Europe.

Our findings suggest that belonging to a religious organisation and being a religious pluralist are positively correlated with being civically and politically engaged across the range of indicators. However, perhaps surprisingly, religious exclusivists are also likely to hold progressive political views.

Belonging to a religious organisation

Our results further strengthen the argument that faithful citizens are more politically active, engaged and likely to volunteer. Moreover, they suggest that what is important is not fervency of belief or theological interpretation, but rather being embedded in religious communities. We must stress, however, that our findings do not prove causation between these phenomena: in other words, it is not clear that it is religion itself that *causes* someone to be more active civically, as religion could be serving as a proxy for other significant factors – such as age, income and location. Nevertheless, the existence of a consistent correlation between religion and civic engagement is significant on its own. It is worth noting as well that we include all of the findings in the charts below, but note those that achieved a certain significance level in the text and endnotes. Details of this are included in the appendix.

Civic engagement

Across our European sample we found those belonging to a religious organisation are more likely to volunteer for:

· political parties*
· local community action**
· development and human rights issues*
· environmental issues*
· youth work**
· women's issues*

In the UK, while the numbers are too small in some instances to draw conclusions, religious respondents were similarly more likely to volunteer for local community action***, youth work***, development and human rights issues***, women's issues*** and the environment*** (figure 5).

Perhaps worryingly, on all the measures of civic engagement tested we can see that the UK scores for both religious and non-religious respondents tend to be lower than the averages of our European sample. This would suggest that the emphasis on encouraging more active citizenship and

Figure 5   **Extent to which people who belong to religious organisations and those who do not participate in civic activities in western European countries and the UK**

■ Belong to a
  religious organisation

□ Belong to a religious
  organisation, UK

■ Do not belong to a
  religious organisation

■ Do not belong to a religious
  organisation, UK

A   Political parties

B   Local community action

C   Development and human rights issues

D   Environmental issues

E   Youth work

F   Women's issues

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave, 2008*

engagement should remain a priority for the UK Government. One notable exception is youth work, where UK religious respondents are much more likely than their European counterparts to volunteer to undertake youth work, and UK non-religious respondents are just as likely as European non-religious respondents.

Figure 6 **Extent to which people who belong to religious organisations and those who do not are politically active and interested in politics, in western European countries and the UK**

■ Belong to a religious organisation
■ Do not belong to a religious organisation
■ Belong to a religious organisation, UK
■ Do not belong to a religious organisation, UK

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave, 2008*

Political activism

Across western Europe, those who belong to religious organisations were more politically active, though in some instances the difference is small (figure 6). Religious respondents were more likely to say that they are very interested in politics***, to have signed a petition, and participated in a demonstration.[38]

In the UK, there were no differences between the religious and unreligious in joining a boycott, signing a petition or being very interested in politics. However, religious respondents were more likely than non-religious respondents to have attended a lawful demonstration***, as seen in figure 6. Compared with the European averages, we can see that Britons in general (both religious and non-religious) were more likely to join boycotts

Figure 7 **The social and political views of people who belong to religious organisations and those who do not, in western European countries and the UK**

- Belong to a religious organisation
- Do not belong to a religious organisation
- Belong to a religious organisation, UK
- Do not belong to a religious organisation, UK

A Do not want to live next to immigrants

B Prioritise equality over freedom

C Place themselves on the left of the political spectrum

D Prioritise individual over state responsibility

E Think that those on benefits should have to take a job

F Think that competition is good

G Prioritise equalising income over providing incentives to work

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave, 2008*

and sign petitions, but less keen on demonstrations and less likely to be very interested in politics (particularly so for UK religious respondents).

Figure 8   **Extent of civic engagement of exclusivists, pluralists and seculars, in western Europe and the UK**

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave*, 2008

Political values

Additionally, we analysed responses to a range of value-based questions that tap into the heart of the left–right political divide. The results were mixed. On many questions, the overall majority of respondents sided with what might be thought of as the conservative side of the argument. For example, this was true when respondents were asked questions around forcing someone on benefits to take a job, or whether they emphasised individual responsibility versus state responsibility.

However, our findings do not suggest that there is a bias towards conservative causes among religious respondents. In

Figure 9   **Extent of political activism of exclusivists, pluralists and seculars, in western European countries and within the UK**

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave,* 2008

fact, the opposite seems to be true. As seen in figure 7, religious respondents in our western Europe sample were equally as likely to identify themselves as left wing as right wing (49 per cent of religious respondents put themselves on the left side of the political spectrum)**. In the UK, religious respondents were even more likely to describe themselves as left wing, with 55 per cent doing so***.

Across our western Europe sample, those respondents who belong to a religious organisation appeared to be more likely to value equality over freedom compared with those who do not belong to a religious organisation (though we note that these findings did not achieve statistical significance). Interestingly, UK respondents were more freedom-loving than equality-loving when it comes to the average scores of their European peers:

Figure 10   **The views of exclusivists, pluralists or seculars on progressive political values, in western Europe and the U**

A   Do not want to live next to immigrants

B   Place themselves on the left of the political spectrum

C   Prioritise individual over state responsibility

D   Think that those on benefits should have to take a job

E   Think that competition is good

F   Prioritise equalising income over providing incentives to work

Source: Demos analysis of the *EVS, 4th wave*, 2008

Belgium, France and Portugal were the only countries where both religious and non-religious respondents were more likely to value equality over freedom.

In the UK, those belonging to a religious organisation were less likely to have a negative association towards living next door to immigrants or foreign workers: 11 per cent of religious

respondents reported not wanting immigrants as neighbours compared with 16 per cent of non-religious respondents.

On the other political values we explored, the relationship between a person belonging to a religious organisation and their prioritising social democratic values was less clear. For example, across our western Europe sample and in the UK, those belonging to a religious organisation were more likely to say that those on benefits should have to take a job if offered rather than be able to refuse it*. Moreover, both western Europe and UK religious and non-religious respondents were equally likely to report that competition was good rather than harmful*, and to stress individual responsibility over state responsibility.

Interestingly, it is worth noting that despite valuing equality over freedom, religious respondents are less keen on equalising incomes if it means taking away incentives to work.

Exclusivists, pluralists and seculars

On most measures, across both our European sample and in the UK, pluralists were the most likely group to volunteer and be civically engaged.

Civic engagement

In our western Europe sample of countries, religious pluralists were the most likely group by a slight margin to volunteer on issues such as women's rights** and youth work* (on the other measures of civic engagement our findings were not statistically significant, though they are included in figure 8 and in the tables in appendix B).

In the UK the same was true with respect to these two issues as well as development and human rights*, and the environment** (see figure 8). Again, we can see that UK respondents (particularly religious pluralists) are much more likely to engage in youth work than their continental counterparts in our European sample.

Political activism

Across our European sample, we find that seculars are the group most likely to have joined a boycott***, signed a petition*** or attended a lawful demonstration***, with pluralists the second most likely group and exclusivists the least likely group.

The UK context presents a different picture. In the UK, pluralists are the most likely group to have signed a petition*** and to have joined a demonstration***. Again, UK respondents of all three groups are more likely than our average European respondents to join boycotts and sign petitions (figure 9).

In the UK, pluralists were the group most likely to say that they were very interested in politics***.

Political values

In both Europe and the UK, seculars are the group most likely to identify as left wing. However, in the UK, it's notable that a majority of both exclusivists and pluralists consider themselves to be on the left or centre left side of the political spectrum*** (see figure 10).

The only measure on which pluralists were most likely to be progressive related to immigration. Across Europe, exclusivists were most likely to *not* want immigrants as neighbours followed by seculars and pluralists**. The same is true in the UK** (figure 10). Our analysis also found a small effect relating to equality versus freedom, whereby pluralists were most likely to prioritise equality – however, this finding did not achieve statistical significance below 10 per cent.

Perhaps surprisingly, exclusivists were the group most likely to prioritise traditionally considered 'progressive' viewpoints on the following issues:

· *Individuals should provide for themselves and not rely on the state*: With the exception of Spain, in all countries a large majority believe that emphasis should be placed on individuals being responsible for providing for themselves (rather than rely on the state). The UK is second only to Germany in its belief that the individual is most responsible, though we note that the findings for the UK on this question did not meet our threshold for

statistical significance. Nevertheless, across western Europe, we find that exclusivists are the group most likely to prioritise state responsibility over individual responsibility**, which would traditionally be considered a 'progressive' political position.

· *Competition is good, not harmful*: Across Europe, exclusivists were more likely than pluralists to take the traditionally left-wing position that competition is harmful**.

· *Incomes should be equalised rather than people be given work incentives*: Across western Europe and the UK, exclusivists are most likely to prioritise equalising incomes over giving work incentives, followed by seculars and pluralists**.

Finally, on the question of whether those on benefits should have to take a job or should be able to refuse a job, it is even less straightforward to draw conclusions. Exclusivists are the most likely group to think they should have to take a job across Europe, while pluralists are the most likely group in the UK. Therefore both religious groups are more inclined to take a traditionally conservative view on this issue. And in doing so they are going with the grain of society, not against it: a clear majority in almost every country believes that someone on benefits should have to take a job if offered one, and the UK is more right wing on this issue than the European average, as illustrated in figure 10.

3   Conclusion and implications

This report should underline the extent to which campaigners for progressive political causes should be able to find support among faith communities as well as their willingness and enthusiasm to get involved. Those citizens who are more active in their faith communities showed greater activism as general citizens, but even those who simply identified themselves as a religious person (and not necessarily an active practitioner) also appeared to more be civically engaged on a range of measures compared with seculars. Our findings also confirm prior research and contradict the common assumption that religious citizens are more inclined towards conservative causes than non-religious citizens.

In the UK, new movements on the left, such as 'Blue Labour', have sought to reconnect faith groups and the left by emphasising the important role that faith groups play in their local communities and society more generally. London Citizens, the group profiled in the first chapter of this report, has shown the effectiveness of mobilising faith groups in pursuit of progressive policy ends – for example, their most notable campaign for a living wage.

We refrain from making detailed policy recommendations based on our findings, but discuss some implications of the research in the sections below.

Galvanising faithful citizens on progressive issues

Progressive politicians in the UK should seek to work with faith groups on the issues where our research suggests they are particularly engaged. This includes issues such as immigration, women's rights, international development, the environment and youth work. Our second report will highlight some specific

organisations working on these issues. It also applies to making an argument for the value of equality – an issue that has become pertinent in light of increasing social inequality highlighted by the Occupy Movement (and their contrasting of the richest 1 per cent and the remaining 99 per cent). Of course, this does not mean that every religious organisation is going to be supportive of movements like Occupy. But to assume that religious institutions are inherently conservative is simply wrong.

Religious figures have always intervened to pass comment and judgement on current political debates, often siding with the 'progressive' argument. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, has made public comments on issues such as the August 2011 riots, poverty and equality, and welfare reform. A few weeks before this report went to print, a coalition of bishops in the House of Lords joined forces to defeat the Government's welfare reform legislation – citing concern over its impact on those in poverty, particularly children.

Importantly, our research suggests that in many instances pluralists and exclusivists are more inclined towards progressive policy positions than seculars. Politicians on the left should be mindful that pluralists are more likely to be amenable on questions regarding equality and immigration. However, they should also realise that exclusivists are inclined towards traditionally left-wing positions on issues such as welfare provision ('state vs individual responsibility' and 'those on benefits should be allowed to refuse a job rather than be forced to take one') and income redistribution (prioritising 'equalising incomes over providing incentives to work'). It should not be assumed that religious citizens – whether pluralist or exclusivist – are conservative in their political outlook. They can serve as useful allies in the fight for progressive and social democratic policies.

Encouraging meaningful interactions

As noted from the UK Citizenship Survey, while religious people may be more likely to volunteer, they are less likely to have meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds

to their own. This is worrying from the standpoint of community cohesion and interfaith understanding.

Clearly, the more you get to know people who may be different from you, the more you begin to see them as fellow human beings, and less as stereotypes or misconceptions perpetuated by media and popular culture. This has been cited as the reason for increasing acceptance of homosexuality in society, as well as religious tolerance and pluralism that exists in the USA.[39]

The fact that religious people are less likely to have meaningful interactions is something politicians should take note of. Efforts to encourage greater mixing between people from different backgrounds – both in everyday spaces and through initiatives such as the Three Faiths Forum[40] – should be highlighted and championed by politicians. However, research suggests that the most effective interactions take place in pursuit of a common goal, for example a local community issue that affects every member of every community. These types of interactions are more important and effective than conscious 'interfaith' mixing, whereby the stated goal is to interact with people from different backgrounds.[41]

Moreover, as argued in the Demos pamphlet *A Place for Pride*, having a strong religious or ethnic identity is actually positively correlated with having a strong sense of national pride for the UK.[42] Common discourse around patriotism assumes that strong ethnic or religious identities compete with a sense of Britishness, but Demos' research suggests that they are mutually reinforcing. Interfaith initiatives like the Three Faiths Forum can help to bolster someone's religious identity, while at the same time encouraging them to mix with young people from different faiths – and thus by extension, bolster national pride and community cohesion.

Faithful volunteers

Finally, this report provides additional support for the Demos recommendation in *A Place for Pride* of replacing the current pen-and-paper UK citizenship test with a requirement instead to

complete at least 16 hours of local volunteering. As we saw from the Citizenship Survey, people from ethnic minority backgrounds, especially those who don't speak English well, are less likely to engage in formal volunteering. A new society can be intimidating for many newly arrived immigrants, and the natural tendency is to withdraw into what is known and comfortable. Requiring newly arrived immigrants to engage in local volunteering can be an effective way of encouraging them to get to know aspects of their local community they wouldn't naturally come to interact with. This can help to build language skills (assuming they volunteer outside homogenous communities) as well as confidence and a sense of local pride and cohesion. Places of worship and faith groups can act as effective places for supporting and integrating new immigrants, and as suggested by the Citizenship Survey, ethnic minorities are more likely to volunteer because of their religion and through the medium of faith groups. A citizenship test that encourages this can help to ensure that new immigrants become active UK citizens with a strong sense of British pride.

In sum, progressive politicians must consider faith groups as an essential part of their vision of a good society because many are already there, volunteering for their local community and taking part in political activism to make society and their local community better.

Appendix A Methodology

The original research presented in this report is based on Demos' analyses of two data sets: the UK Citizenship Survey and the European Values Study (EVS). We identified these two data sets as the best for our purposes of investigating the relationship between religion and civic and political engagement in the UK, and western Europe.

For this paper we conducted bivariate analyses to investigate how religiosity affected civic engagement, political activism and political values. This allowed us to highlight interesting relationships between these indicators, although it did not allow us to draw firm conclusions in respect of causation. This is acknowledged, though it is noted that this is a shortcoming of all single-point survey analysis. As such, while the relationships identified in this paper may well be causal, for our purposes it suffices to show that an association exists.

The UK Citizenship Survey

The UK Citizenship Survey was a government-run social research tool, produced for seven years with the final wave completed in 2010/11. The survey drew on a nationally representative sample of the adult population of England and Wales, and included data from in excess of 10,000 interviews conducted over the course of a year. Additionally, there were 5,000 boost interviews with ethnic minorities, including 3,000 with Muslim respondents.[43] The anonymised data are publicly available from the UK Data Archive[44] or the Economic and Social Data Service,[45] while quarterly statistical releases using the data are available through the website of the Department for Communities and Local Government.[46]

In this report we analysed the most relevant findings regarding faith and civic engagement from previous in-depth

reports based on older iterations of the Citizenship Survey –
those completed in 2007/08, 2008/09 and 2009/10.
Additionally, we supplemented these findings by conducting
original analysis on the 2010/11 wave of the survey to explore
relationships not discussed by previous analyses.

The Citizenship Survey questions pertaining to religion
that we used included:

· What is your religion even if you are not currently practising?
· Do you consider that you are actively practising your religion?
· How important is your religion to your sense of who you are?

However, for the additional analysis that we conducted on
the latest 2010/11 wave of the survey we focused on the religious
indicator *RelImp*, asking respondents how important their
religion was to their sense of identity. We used this variable
to research relationships with the following questions about
civic engagement:

· *GGroup*: In the past 4 weeks, have you given any money to
  charity in any of the ways shown on this card or through any
  other method:
  · overall?
  · in a collection at your place of worship?
· *CivAct1*: In the last 12 months, have you been (a) a local
  councillor, (b) a school governor, (c) a volunteer special
  constable, (d) a magistrate?
· *CivAct2*: In the last 12 months, have you been involved in a group
  making decisions on (a) local health services, (b) regenerating
  the local area, (c) tackling local crime problems, (d) tenants
  groups, (e) local education services, (f) local services for young
  people, (g) any other services in the local community?

We undertook bivariate analyses using the responses to
these questions to determine if any relationships existed between
a person's religion and their level of charitable giving or
engagement in the civic activities listed.

The European Values Study

The EVS is a 'large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey' that was started in 1981 as a research project investigating how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society. It claims to be the 'most comprehensive research project on human values in Europe'.[47] We analysed the latest wave of the survey (2008), which covered over 70,000 people across 47 European countries and regions. The EVS is also the source of a larger, global survey known as the World Values Survey, whose network of social scientists has carried out nationally representative surveys of over 97 societies constituting 90 per cent of the world's population.[48]

Like the Citizenship Survey, the EVS includes a range of questions on faith, religious practice, and civic or political engagement. Our analysis focused on two primary religious indicators, derived from the responses to the questions:

· Do you belong to a religious organisation or church?
· Independently of whether you go to church or not, do you consider yourself a religious person?

We also employed another religious indicator, which is discussed below.

For our first analysis, we compared the first religious indicator (identifying those who said they belonged to a religious organisation or church versus those who did not) to a range of items relating to respondents' level of civic engagement, their extent of political activism, and their political and moral values. It is worth noting that there is a potentially problematic issue with wording for this question: some respondents – particularly those of non-Christian faiths – may have failed to translate this question into belonging to a mosque, temple or synagogue. Nonetheless, we chose this indicator over that of 'attendance at a religious institution', which does not take into account the variance in practice habits and traditions between different religions, particularly in respect of frequency of attendance at a place of worship (e.g. actively practicing Muslims may attend mosque more frequently on average – through prayer five times a day – than active Christian practitioners attend church, or Hindus attend temple).

For the second analysis, we took those who has answered yes to the second religious indicator – whether they consider themselves a religious person – and further sub-divided them depending on their views about the extent to which there is only one true religion. In the EVS, respondents were asked to choose the statement that best described their view from the following options:

1 There is only one true religion.
2 Although there is only one true religion, other religions have some basic truths as well.
3 All religions have some basic truths: there is no one true religion.
4 None of the great religions have any truths to offer.

Respondents who described themselves as religious and did not agree that other religions have some truths (those who answered 1 to the above) were classified as religious exclusivists. Those who describe themselves as religious but were willing to admit that no one religion has a monopoly on the truth (those who answered 2 or 3 to the above) are classified as religious pluralists. Those who did not consider themselves religious are classified as seculars. We stress that these terms are indicative, and do not mean to imply that exclusivists are more fervent in their beliefs or traditional in their views. In fact, it is perfectly possible that a pluralist is very passionate and fervent in their beliefs, and would still describe him or herself as traditional.

We use this second analysis as a means of further disaggregating religious respondents according to their outlook. Creating a more sophisticated index of religiosity would be of interest in future research, but for our purposes the use of a threefold typology to distinguish the religious from the unreligious and the religious by outlook was sufficient.

Pan-western European sampling

As mentioned above, the EVS covers up to 47 European countries. For this project, we selected nine western European countries in order to construct a pan-western European sample.

The countries selected comprise Austria, Belgium, France, Germany (West), Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. We originally included Denmark and Italy but the findings on those two countries were consistently anomalous and so we decided to exclude them. We decided to exclude Eastern European and Northern European countries based on well-known differences of social and religious context. For example, research consistently shows significantly higher levels of civic engagement among Scandinavian countries, which would have skewed our results. We also excluded Switzerland because of concerns over its diversity (it is the only country for which the survey is provided in three languages) and because it is not a member of the European Union.

We conducted bivariate analyses employing religious indicators alongside indicators of civic engagement, political activism and political values for each country, before averaging the country-specific percentages to produce a single 'western European' mean score. This approach employs the country as the unit of analysis rather than the individual.

We treated those crossing the 10 per cent threshold as statistically significant reportable results. This threshold was chosen as a commonly employed standard in policy research and applied social psychology. As the existing literature gave us a strong indication as to the directionality of the relationship between religion and civic and political engagement, we felt justified in halving significance scores to reflect the one-tailed nature of our hypotheses.[49] Full information on each analysis, including standard deviations and Chi-square test p-value significance scores for each country on each question, are provided in tables in appendix B.

Appendix B Results tables

Breakdown for the EVS survey

Table 2 **Number of respondents who belong to a religious organisation, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	Total
Austria	200	13	1,296	1,496
Belgium	94	6	1,412	1,506
France	60	4	1,438	1,498
Germany (West)	169	8	1,903	2,072
Ireland	170	31	380	550
Netherlands	522	34	1,021	1,543
Portugal	84	5	1,453	1,537
Spain	66	4	1,428	1,494
UK	205	13	1,353	1,558
Western Europe sample totals (incl UK)	1,570	12	11,684	13,254

Note: Respondents were asked 'Do you belong to a church or religious organisation?' (Q5aB).

Table 3   **Number of respondents who were exclusivist, pluralist or secular, by country**

		Exclusivist	Pluralist	Secular	Total
Austria	Count	125	791	518	1,434
	%	8.7	55.2	36.1	100.0
Belgium	Count	82	782	631	1,495
	%	5.5	52.3	42.2	100.0
France	Count	81	559	844	1,484
	%	5.5	37.7	56.9	100.0
Germany (West)	Count	126	432	435	993
	%	12.7	43.5	43.8	100.0
Ireland	Count	188	472	302	962
	%	19.5	49.1	31.4	100.0
Netherlands	Count	140	847	537	1,524
	%	9.2	55.6	35.2	100.0
Portugal	Count	468	798	257	1,523
	%	30.7	52.4	16.9	100.0
Spain	Count	325	491	644	1,460
	%	22.3	33.6	44.1	100.0
UK	Count	197	838	952	1,987
	%	9.9	42.2	47.9	100.0
Western Europe average (incl. UK)	Count	2,122	7,905	5,738	15,765
	%	13.5	50.1	36.4	100.0

Country scores for EVS analyses
Volunteering to work for a trade union

Table 4a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work for a trade union, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value[50]
Austria	3	2	24	2	0.369
Belgium	3	3	23	2	0.1355
France	2	4	22	2	0.116
Germany (West)	3	2	7	0.8	0.044
Ireland	3	6	5	2	0.0685
Netherlands	20	4	27	3	0.040
Portugal	8	12	33	2	0.000
Spain	0	0	11	0.8	0.242
Western Europe average		4		2	0.127
Standard deviation (SD)		4		1	
UK	3	1	1	0.1	0.0005

Table 4b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work for a trade union, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	1	0.7	18	2	8	2	0.197
Belgium	3	3	10	1	13	2	0.122
France	1	1	12	2	11	1	0.1905
Germany (West)	1	0.7	5	1	4	1	0.4425
Ireland	2	4	4	4	2	2	0.347
Netherlands	1	0.7	24	3	20	3	0.124
Portugal	6	2	18	2	17	5	0.0175
Spain	1	0.3	1	0.2	9	1	0.029
Western Europe average		2		2		2	0.1835
SD		1		1		1	
UK	0	0	3	0.4	1	0.1	0.151

Volunteering to work for a political party

Table 5a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work for a political party, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	12	6	28	2	0.001
Belgium	4	4	22	2	0.028
France	3	5	13	0.9	0.0005
Germany (West)	3	2	9	1	0.0905
Ireland	6	13	6	3	0.0015
Netherlands	23	5	17	2	0.000
Portugal	13	19	21	1	0.000
Spain	0	0	18	1	0.1845
Western Europe average		7		2	0.0385
SD		6		1	
UK	2	0.8	7	0.5	0.2505

Table 5b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work for a political party, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	3	2	25	3	12	2	0.3135
Belgium	0	0	14	2	12	2	0.2015
France	0	0	9	2	7	1	0.1025
Germany	1	0.7	6	1	5	1	0.408
Ireland	8	15	7	6	3	3	0.011
Netherlands	3	2	21	3	17	3	0.454
Portugal	2	0.6	16	2	12	3	0.0225
Spain	4	1	3	0.6	11	2	0.1595
Western Europe average		3		2		2	0.209
SD		5		2		1	
UK	2	1	3	0.5	5	0.6	0.211

Volunteering to take part in local community action

Table 6a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to take part in local community action, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	7	4	10	0.8	0.0005
Belgium	12	13	21	1	0.000
France	4	7	28	2	0.0045
Germany (West)	1	0.8	2	0.2	0.1345
Ireland	9	18	11	5	0.0005
Netherlands	38	8	27	3	0.000
Portugal	17	25	30	2	0.000
Spain	2	3	5	0.4	0.0005
Western Europe average		10		2	0.0175
SD		8		2	
UK	15	6	15	1	0.000

Table 6b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to take part in local community action, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	4	3	11	1	1	0.2	0.0055
Belgium	0	0	24	3	9	1	0.0235
France	1	1	14	3	17	2	0.319
Germany (West)	1	0.7	2	0.5	0	0	0.1405
Ireland	1	2	14	13	7	7	0.0245
Netherlands	6	4	38	5	21	3	0.215
Portugal	8	2	25	3	12	3	0.4015
Spain	1	0.3	4	0.8	2	0.3	0.188
Western Europe average		2		4		2	0.1645
SD		1		4		2	
UK	5	3	18	3	8	0.9	0.0035

Volunteering to work on development and human rights issues

Table 7a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work on development and human rights issues, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	6	3	10	0.8	0.002
Belgium	6	6	16	1	0.000
France	5	9	12	0.8	0.000
Germany (West)	1	0.8	7	0.8	0.4945
Ireland	1	2	3	1	0.332
Netherlands	40	8	25	2	0.000
Portugal	13	19	14	1	0.000
Spain	6	9	10	0.7	0.000
Western Europe average		7		1	0.1035
SD		6		0	
UK	11	4	7	0.5	0.000

Table 7b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work on development and human rights issues, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	1	0.8	9	1	7	1	0.4225
Belgium	0	0	16	2	6	1	0.066
France	0	0	10	2	7	0.8	0.0635
Germany (West)	3	2	2	0.5	2	0.5	0.0405
Ireland	1	2	1	1	2	2	0.414
Netherlands	9	6	39	5	17	3	0.0285
Portugal	7	2	11	1	8	2	0.2425
Spain	4	1	6	1	4	0.6	0.207
Western Europe average		2		2		1	0.1855
SD		2		1		1	
UK	2	1	10	2	5	0.6	0.065

Volunteering to work on environmental issues

Table 8a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work on environmental issues, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	9	5	31	2	0.0405
Belgium	6	6	23	2	0.0005
France	3	5	15	1	0.002
Germany (West)	1	0.8	13	1	0.278
Ireland	5	11	5	2	0.003
Netherlands	27	6	53	5	0.286
Portugal	10	14	24	2	0.000
Spain	0	0	9	0.6	0.2635
Western Europe average		6		2	0.109
SD		5		1	
UK	9	4	22	1	0.009

Table 8b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to work on environmental issues, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	1	0.8	29	4	11	2	0.0415
Belgium	0	0	15	2	13	2	0.186
France	0	0	7	1	10	1	0.3035
Germany (West)	2	1	4	1	8	2	0.2585
Ireland	3	6	8	8	3	3	0.16
Netherlands	4	3	48	6	27	4	0.0755
Portugal	5	2	18	2	10	3	0.279
Spain	1	0.3	2	0.4	6	0.9	0.2305
Western Europe average		2		3		2	0.192
SD		2		3		1	
UK	0	0	17	3	16	2	0.05

Volunteering to take part in youth work

Table 9a **Number of respondents who have volunteered to take part in youth work, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	11	6	18	1	0.000
Belgium	9	10	63	4	0.0125
France	1	2	10	0.7	0.174
Germany (West)	8	6	26	3	0.021
Ireland	6	13	9	4	0.009
Netherlands	63	13	58	5	0.000
Portugal	12	17	32	2	0.000
Spain	1	2	10	0.7	0.211
Western Europe average		9		3	0.0535
SD		6		2	
UK	28	11	42	3	0.000

Table 9b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to take part in youth work, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	3	2	22	3	4	0.8	0.0205
Belgium	0	0	44	6	28	5	0.0285
France	1	1	6	1	4	0.5	0.1635
Germany (West)	5	4	19	5	7	2	0.0275
Ireland	4	8	12	11	6	6	0.2125
Netherlands	16	11	71	9	27	5	0.0005
Portugal	7	2	23	3	13	4	0.2715
Spain	0	0	3	0.6	7	1	0.091
Western Europe average		4		5		3	0.102
SD		4		4		2	
UK	6	4	39	6	25	3	0.003

Volunteering to take part in women's issues

Table 10a **Number of participants who have volunteered to take part in women's issues, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	15	8	23	2	0.000
Belgium	2	2	19	1	0.267
France	2	4	3	0.2	0.000
Germany (West)	4	3	20	2	0.2535
Ireland	5	11	3	1	0.0005
Netherlands	24	5	11	1	0.000
Portugal	11	16	19	1	0.000
Spain	2	3	11	0.8	0.024
Western Europe average		7		1	0.068
SD		5		1	
UK	10	4	9	0.6	0.000

Table 10b **Number of respondents who have volunteered to take part in women's issues, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	7	5	25	3	6	1	0.0055
Belgium	1	1	16	2	4	0.6	0.047
France	1	1	4	0.7	0	0	0.011
Germany (West)	4	3	14	3	5	1	0.052
Ireland	1	2	10	9	2	2	0.0155
Netherlands	6	4	17	2	10	2	0.0805
Portugal	4	1	16	2	11	3	0.1275
Spain	3	1	8	2	2	0.3	0.023
Western Europe average		2		3		1	0.0455
SD		2		3		1	
UK	1	0.7	14	2	4	0.5	0.003

Joining boycotts

Table 11a **Number of respondents who have joined a boycott, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	24	13	109	9	0.015
Belgium	17	18	138	10	0.0055
France	10	18	226	16	0.179
Germany (West)	14	12	112	13	0.099
Ireland	15	10	38	10	0.0005
Netherlands	45	10	137	13	0.0025
Portugal	5	7	92	6	0.025
Spain	2	4	98	8	0.235
Western Europe average		12		11	0.07
SD		5		3	
UK	45	14	205	14	0.169

Table 11b **Number of respondents who have joined a boycott, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	6	5	68	9	53	11	0.000
Belgium	3	3	75	9	74	12	0.000
France	4	5	63	12	163	19	0.000
Germany (West)	7	5	43	11	71	18	0.000
Ireland	6	4	47	11	34	11	0.000
Netherlands	8	6	81	11	88	15	0.000
Portugal	8	3	54	7	29	8	0.000
Spain	11	4	17	4	71	12	0.000
Western Europe average		4		9		13	0.000
SD		1		3		4	
UK	9	5	103	27	141	29	0.001

Signing petitions

Table 12a **Number of respondents who have signed a petition, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	119	61	587	47	0.0005
Belgium	62	66	828	59	0.159
France	45	80	970	67	0.0205
Germany (West)	83	68	489	55	0.002
Ireland	84	56	208	55	0.044
Netherlands	249	53	562	53	0.307
Portugal	17	25	395	27	0.381
Spain	39	64	509	40	0.001
Western Europe average	698	57	4,548	50	0.115
SD		16		12	
UK	212	63	959	63	0.000

Table 12b **Number of respondents who have signed a petition, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	46	38	416	54	219	45	0.000
Belgium	26	29	442	56	416	68	0.000
France	38	49	355	66	610	70	0.000
Germany (West)	58	45	244	60	228	56	0.000
Ireland	64	41	250	58	167	55	0.000
Netherlands	55	39	397	52	345	58	0.000
Portugal	52	16	220	27	129	35	0.000
Spain	77	29	172	40	292	47	0.000
Western Europe average	416	32	2,496	51	2,406	56	0.000
SD		10		12		12	
UK	82	46	516	68	602	61	0.000

Participating in lawful demonstrations

Table 13a **Number of respondents who have participated in a lawful demonstration, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	35	18	195	16	0.279
Belgium	36	38	398	28	0.054
France	32	57	651	45	0.0725
Germany (West)	29	24	230	26	0.3
Ireland	21	14	56	15	0.1685
Netherlands	80	17	255	24	0.0005
Portugal	9	14	216	15	0.037
Spain	30	48	521	38	0.0835
Western Europe average		29		26	0.1245
SD		17		11	
UK	66	20	204	14	0.0065

Table 13b **Number of respondents who have participated in a lawful demonstration, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	10	8	107	14	104	21	0.000
Belgium	9	10	217	27	205	34	0.000
France	15	19	223	42	437	51	0.000
Germany (West)	13	10	97	61	130	32	0.000
Ireland	12	8	80	19	46	15	0.000
Netherlands	12	9	166	22	155	26	0.000
Portugal	30	9	113	14	76	21	0.000
Spain	60	21	158	35	318	49	0.000
Western Europe average		12		29		31	0.000
SD		5		16		13	
UK	20	11	126	17	130	13	0.002

Table 14a **Number of respondents who are very interested in politics, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	52	26	250	19	0.024
Belgium	23	24	98	7	0.000
France	11	19	176	12	0.008
Germany (West)	35	27	204	22	0.0765
Ireland	24	16	33	9	0.000
Netherlands	66	14	186	17	0.0195
Portugal	7	10	86	6	0.01
Spain	6	9	108	8	0.036
Western Europe average	224	18	1,141	12	0.022
SD		7		6	
UK	41	12	165	11	0.000

Table 14b **Number of respondents who are very interested in politics, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	19	15	175	22	104	20	0.000
Belgium	5	5	71	9	45	7	0.000
France	10	13	63	12	112	13	0.000
Germany (West)	31	23	98	23	94	22	0.000
Ireland	22	13	52	12	26	8	0.002
Netherlands	9	6	114	15	125	21	0.000
Portugal	15	5	51	6	27	7	0.000
Spain	13	4	27	6	71	11	0.000
Western Europe average	124	9	651	13	604	14	0.000
SD		7		7		6	
UK	17	9	91	12	91	9	0.000

Having a negative association towards immigrants

Table 15a **Number of respondents who would not want to have immigrants or migrant workers as neighbours, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	31	16	304	24	0.0065
Belgium	4	4	92	7	0.189
France	1	2	61	4	0.185
Germany (West)	6	6	71	9	0.161
Ireland	13	11	45	12	0.3695
Netherlands	67	14	146	14	0.4545
Portugal	9	13	110	8	0.049
Spain	3	5	61	4	0.456
Western Europe average		9		10	0.234
SD		5		7	
UK	36	11	246	16	0.009

Table 15b **Number of respondents who would not want to have immigrants or migrant workers as neighbours, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

	Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	34	27	136	18	155	31	0.000
Belgium	9	10	54	7	33	5	0.113
France	14	18	20	4	27	3	0.000
Germany (West)	21	16	25	7	29	8	0.0015
Ireland	36	26	39	11	32	11	0.000
Netherlands	23	17	119	16	65	11	0.0125
Portugal	22	7	46	6	47	13	0.000
Spain	27	9	16	3	20	3	0.000
Western Europe average		16		9		11	0.016
SD		7		6		9	
UK	36	20	100	13	165	17	0.013

Comparing value placed on freedom and equality

Table 16a **Whether respondents place more value on freedom or on equality, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

		Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Freedom	111	58	612	49	0.0105
	Equality	69	36	496	40	
Belgium	Freedom	38	41	615	44	0.3915
	Equality	53	57	749	53	
France	Freedom	20	36	590	41	0.3055
	Equality	33	60	813	57	
Germany (West)	Freedom	55	44	506	58	0.0035
	Equality	53	43	311	35	
Ireland	Freedom	55	41	190	55	0.0065
	Equality	69	51	136	40	
Netherlands	Freedom	242	51	707	67	
	Equality	229	48	334	32	
Portugal	Freedom	15	23	547	39	0.019
	Equality	43	66	734	52	
Spain	Freedom	26	41	713	52	0.059
	Equality	33	52	607	44	
Western Europe average	Equality	52		44		0.0091
	Freedom	42		51		
SD			11		10	
UK	Freedom	182	57	866	58	0.0255
	Equality	131	41	534	36	

Table 16b **Whether respondents place more value on freedom or on equality, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Freedom	60	48	378	50	245	50	0.000
	Equality	50	40	336	44	172	35	
Belgium	Freedom	47	52	327	42	275	45	0.172
	Equality	41	45	436	56	320	52	
France	Freedom	31	41	229	43	344	40	0.4285
	Equality	43	57	299	56	498	58	
Germany (West)	Freedom	82	63	220	55	228	56	0.279
	Equality	42	32	149	37	150	37	
Ireland	Freedom	84	59	201	50	132	48	0.132
	Equality	51	36	173	43	125	45	
Netherlands	Freedom	72	52	462	60	399	66	0.008
	Equality	65	47	294	38	196	33	
Portugal	Freedom	125	41	264	34	159	44	
	Equality	154	51	454	58	153	43	
Spain	Freedom	143	49	234	51	344	53	0.374
	Equality	134	46	207	45	286	44	
Western Europe average	Freedom average		51		48		50	0.174
	Equality average		44		47		43	
SD			9		8		9	
UK	Freedom	99	60	425	57	564	59	0.3865
	Equality	60	36	287	38	344	36	

Being on the left side of the political spectrum

Table 17a **Number of respondents who put themselves on the centre left or left side of the political spectrum, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	95	60	723	67	0.007
Belgium	48	54	879	66	0.01
France	29	54	899	68	0.004
Germany (West)	44	40	504	64	0.000
Ireland	30	24	120	43	0.000
Netherlands	192	43	566	57	0.000
Portugal	19	43	739	70	0.000
Spain	38	70	920	76	0.136
Western Europe average	495	49	5,350	64	0.0195
SD		14		10	
UK	156	55	751	62	0.0125

Table 17b **Number of respondents who put themselves on the centre left or left side of the political spectrum, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Left	51	57	440	65	299	70	0.000
	Right	38	43	232	35	131	30	
Belgium	Left	56	69	452	61	412	70	0.000
	Right	25	31	290	39	174	30	
France	Left	43	66	275	55	602	75	0.000
	Right	22	34	226	45	204	25	
Germany (West)	Left	41	37	220	61	252	68	0.000
	Right	70	63	139	39	119	32	
Ireland	Left	40	34	141	42	108	49	0.000
	Right	78	66	192	58	114	51	
Netherlands	Left	50	40	360	50	336	59	0.000
	Right	76	60	365	50	235	41	
Portugal	Left	148	65	393	68	203	75	0.002
	Right	80	35	186	32	67	25	
Spain	Left	134	55	293	73	507	87	0.000
	Right	109	45	107	27	78	13	
Western Europe average	Left	563	53	2,574	59	2,719	69	0.0005
	Right	498	47	1,737	41	1,122	31	
SD			14		10		10	
UK	Left	78	56	348	56	499	65	0.001
	Right	61	44	276	44	269	35	

Believing in individual rather than state responsibility

Table 18a **Number of respondents who believe that people should take individual responsibility and not rely on the state, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	148	74	929	73	0.028
Belgium	58	61	880	63	0.451
France	46	84	970	68	0.056
Germany (West)	108	82	744	82	0.41
Ireland	107	69	280	73	0.002
Netherlands	270	56	695	66	0.0005
Portugal	42	66	1,054	73	0.152
Spain	31	49	700	52	0.227
Western Europe average	810	68	6,252	69	0.148
SD		12		9	
UK	278	81	1,232	80	0.005

Table 18b **Number of respondents who believe that people should take individual responsibility and not rely on the state, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Individual	86	66	569	73	377	75	0.000
	State	44	34	213	27	127	25	
Belgium	Individual	51	56	478	60	406	66	0.0005
	State	40	44	313	40	206	34	
France	Individual	46	61	386	72	576	67	0.003
	State	30	39	149	28	288	33	
Germany (West)	Individual	116	88	338	81	331	79	0.0005
	State	16	12	81	19	89	21	
Ireland	Individual	121	73	322	73	235	74	0.008
	State	45	27	117	27	83	26	
Netherlands	Individual	70	51	493	64	383	63	0.027
	State	68	49	281	36	221	37	
Portugal	Individual	200	63	610	76	266	73	
	State	115	37	190	24	98	27	
Spain	Individual	148	52	248	55	322	50	0.223
	State	138	48	203	45	327	50	
Western Europe average	Individual	838	64	3,444	69	2,896	68	0.033
	State	496	36	1,547	31	1,439	32	
SD			12		9		9	
UK	Individual	145	78	629	81	790	79	0.107
	State	40	22	145	19	208	21	

Table 19a **Number of respondents who believe someone on benefits should be forced to take a job if offered one, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	151	75	935	73	0.2265
Belgium	70	74	978	69	0.192
France	40	73	703	49	0.0025
Germany (West)	96	74	704	78	0.17
Ireland	113	76	234	63	0.000
Netherlands	323	68	741	70	0.184
Portugal	46	68	785	55	0.0595
Spain	48	77	767	56	0.002
Western Europe average	887	73	5,847	64	0.1045
SD		4		10	
UK	257	76	1,120	73	0.0005

Table 19b **Number of respondents who believe someone on benefits should be forced to take a job if offered one, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Take	99	76	593	75	348	68	0.000
	Refuse	32	24	193	25	163	32	
Belgium	Take	70	74	548	69	427	70	0.1085
	Refuse	24	26	241	31	186	30	
France	Take	44	58	304	57	391	45	0.007
	Refuse	32	42	230	43	473	55	
Germany (West)	Take	121	92	322	78	301	72	0.000
	Refuse	11	8	91	22	116	28	
Ireland	Take	105	65	277	64	203	65	0.000
	Refuse	57	35	154	36	108	35	
Netherlands	Take	94	67	535	69	415	69	0.328
	Refuse	46	33	238	31	189	31	
Portugal	Take	242	77	540	67	218	60	0.000
	Refuse	72	23	265	33	143	40	
Spain	Take	179	63	293	64	317	48	0.000
	Refuse	106	37	162	36	338	52	
Western Europe average	Take	954	71	3,412	68	2,620	62	0.0555
	Refuse	380	29	1,574	32	1,716	38	
SD			11		7		10	
UK	Take	134	73	588	77	711	71	0.0795
	Refuse	49	27	179	23	284	29	

Table 20a **Number of respondents who think competition is good vs harmful, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	156	79	995	79	0.2975
Belgium	77	82	989	71	0.2555
France	42	75	926	65	0.0295
Germany (West)	113	88	791	88	0.0045
Ireland	116	78	274	75	0.023
Netherlands	354	75	808	77	0.1115
Portugal	43	64	1,112	78	0.023
Spain	37	63	872	65	0.0665
Western Europe average	938	76	6,767	75	0.1015
SD		9		8	
UK	288	85	1,298	85	0.065

Table 20b **Number of respondents who think competition is good vs harmful, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Good	94	73	629	81	382	77	0.000
	Harmful	34	27	148	19	117	23	
Belgium	Good	61	69	580	74	419	69	0.181
	Harmful	27	31	208	26	188	31	
France	Good	45	60	378	71	535	62	0.0325
	Harmful	30	40	152	29	326	38	
Germany (West)	Good	122	92	363	88	358	86	0.3345
	Harmful	10	8	51	12	57	14	
Ireland	Good	115	74	344	80	239	77	0.009
	Harmful	41	26	88	20	70	23	
Netherlands	Good	98	70	582	76	460	77	0.035
	Harmful	42	30	179	24	141	23	
Portugal	Good	249	80	613	77	275	76	0.001
	Harmful	63	20	181	23	86	24	
Spain	Good	185	68	316	71	391	60	0.0025
	Harmful	88	32	130	29	259	40	
Western Europe average	Good	969	73	3,805	77	3,059	73	0.0745
	Harmful	335	27	1,137	23	1,244	27	
SD			10		6		9	
UK	Good	147	82	646	84	840	84	0.113
	Harmful	32	18	123	16	155	16	

Table 21a **Number of respondents who prioritise equality over work incentives, by country and whether or not they belong to a religious organisation**

	Belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Do not belong to a religious organisation	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	163	83	1,051	83	0.364
Belgium	34	37	688	49	0.0835
France	24	44	802	56	0.313
Germany (West)	87	69	673	74	0.016
Ireland	78	52	199	53	0.3645
Netherlands	203	42	426	40	0.016
Portugal	34	49	792	55	0.144
Spain	39	62	805	59	0.4725
Western Europe average	662	55	5,436	59	0.2215
SD		15		14	
UK	183	55	819	54	0.07

Table 21b **Number of respondents who prioritise equality over work incentives, by country and whether they are exclusivist, pluralist or secular**

		Exclusivist	% of total	Pluralist	% of total	Secular	% of total	Chi-square test p-value
Austria	Equality	105	85	630	81	428	85	0.000
	Incentives	18	15	146	19	73	15	
Belgium	Equality	53	59	346	44	316	52	0.007
	Incentives	37	41	444	56	296	48	
France	Equality	37	49	287	54	499	58	0.142
	Incentives	38	51	247	46	364	42	
Germany (West)	Equality	113	87	280	68	311	75	0.000
	Incentives	17	13	133	32	104	25	
Ireland	Equality	84	55	249	58	172	55	0.029
	Incentives	70	45	183	42	141	45	
Netherlands	Equality	67	47	300	39	246	41	0.086
	Incentives	75	53	471	61	355	59	
Portugal	Equality	179	56	432	54	203	56	0.000
	Incentives	138	44	373	46	158	44	
Spain	Equality	163	58	254	57	407	62	0.029
	Incentives	118	42	195	43	250	38	
Western Europe average	Equality	801	62	2,778	57	2,582	60	0.0365
	Incentives	511	38	2,192	43	1,741	40	
SD			15		13		14	
UK	Equality	109	61	370	49	570	58	0.018
	Incentives	71	39	391	51	415	42	

Notes

1   J Smith, 'Reclaiming the ground', Tawney lecture, 20 Mar 1993.

2   It is also important to clarify that this group includes those who are formal members of a religious institution, as opposed to those who actively practise their religion but would not describe themselves as belonging to a specific institution or organisation. Thus, we are talking about a small portion of British society and a minority proportion of British citizens who would describe themselves as religious or of a religious tradition.

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10 Ibid.

11 See www.citizensuk.org/ (accessed 8 Feb 2012).

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25   DCLG, *2007–08 Citizenship Survey: Empowered communities topic report*, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government, 2009, www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1345295.pdf (accessed 8 Feb 2012).

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31   DCLG, *2008–09 Citizenship Survey: Community cohesion topic report*.

32 DCLG, *2009-10 Citizenship Survey: Community spirit topic report*, London: Dept for Communities and Local Government, 2011, www.communities.gov.uk/publications/corporate/statistics/ citizenshipsurvey200910spirit (accessed 8 Feb 2012)

33 DCLG, *Community Action in England*.

34 Putnam and Campbell, *American Grace*.

35 DCLG, *2008–09 Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and charitable giving topic report*.

36 Putnam and Campbell, *American Grace*.

37 Although this latter finding did not achieve statistical significance.

38 These latter two findings are slightly above the threshold for statistical significance at 11 per cent and 12 per cent respectively, but we report them anyway with this caveat.

39 Putnam and Campbell, *American Grace*.

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50   As noted in appendix A, the Chi-square test p-value scores reported in these tables have been halved to reflect the one-tailed nature of our hypothesis. In other words, the strong indication from previous research on a link between religious and civic engagement indicators allows us to be more confident about the findings and thus to halve the significance scores.

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Religiosity has always been closely associated with conservatism: the Church of England is sometimes described as 'the Conservative party at prayer'. In the United States, the Republican party and the religious right have become increasingly interdependent, but a similar trend has not occurred on this side of the Atlantic. This report, based on original analysis of the Citizenship Survey and the European Values Survey, investigates the different relationship between religion and politics in the UK and Europe.

The report presents two key findings. First, religious people are more active citizens – they volunteer more, donate more to charity and are more likely to campaign on political issues. Second, and more counter-intuitively, religious people are more likely to be politically progressive. They put a greater value on equality than the non-religious, are more likely to be welcoming of immigrants as neighbours and when asked are more likely to put themselves on the left of the political spectrum.

Based on this, *Faithful Citizens* recommends that progressive politicians should work with faith groups on issues which they are particularly engaged, including immigration, women's rights, international development, the environment and youth work. Faith group members, the report argues, will be key to any future, election-winning, progressive coalition.

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