

“The rise of populism  
in Europe can be  
traced through online  
behaviour...”

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## POPULISM IN EUROPE: HUNGARY

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This research is based on an online survey of Facebook fans of the Jobbik party. The results do not, therefore, necessarily reflect the views of the Jobbik party or official members of the party. Demos is an independent think tank committed to undertaking innovative research in areas of public interest. We are non-party political. Our results are set out objectively and accurately without normative judgement.

Above all, thank you to all the individuals who took time to complete our survey for the research. We hope this report presents their views accurately and without bias.

All errors and omissions remain our own.

Jamie Bartlett  
Jonathan Birdwell  
Péter Krekó  
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## A note on terminology

This paper is the first in a series of short briefing papers released in 2012 about the online support of populist political parties and street-based groups in Europe. These papers are based on a data set of 13,000 Facebook fans of these ‘nationalist populist’ parties in 12 European countries, which was first presented in the Demos report, *The New Face of Digital Populism*, released in November 2011.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout this paper, we refer to a number of different data sets:

- *Jobbik Facebook fans*: The primary data source used in the study is a survey of 2,263 Facebook fans of the Jobbik party in Hungary, collected by Demos during July and August 2011.
- *Jobbik voters*: In order to make comparisons between Jobbik’s Facebook fan base and its voter base, throughout the paper we reference a 2011 survey of 240 Jobbik voters in Hungary, collected by the Tárki Social Research Institute, and analysed by the Political Capital Institute.
- *PPAM*: In order to draw comparisons between Jobbik’s Facebook fans and the Facebook fans of nationalist populist parties in Western Europe, throughout the paper we refer to the data set collected for *The New Face of Digital Populism*. This is 10,667 Facebook fans of nationalist populist parties and movements in 11 Western European countries. We refer to these as populist parties and movements (PPAM) throughout.

## Executive summary

Over the last decade, nationalist populist parties and movements have been growing in strength across Europe. These parties are defined by their opposition to immigration and concern for protecting national and European culture, sometimes using the language of human rights and freedom. On economic policy, they are often critical of globalisation and the effects of international capitalism on workers' rights. This is combined with 'anti-establishment' rhetoric and language used to appeal to widespread disillusionment with mainstream political parties, the media and government. Often called 'populist extremist parties' or 'the new right', these parties do not fit easily into the traditional political divides.

In Hungary, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobb Magyarorszáért Mozgalom; Jobbik hereafter), is the most successful far-right party to emerge in two decades. Founded in 2003, it is now the third largest political party in Hungary. Its ideology is strongly nationalistic, combining opposition to capitalism and liberalism with anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric. The Jobbik party has been particularly effective at mobilising young Hungarians, by using online communication and messages to amplify its message, recruit new members and organise. Indeed, the online social media following on Facebook of Jobbik is greater than its official membership list. This *mélange* of virtual and real-world political activity is the way millions of people—especially young people—relate to politics in the twenty-first century. This nascent, messy and more ephemeral form of politics is becoming the norm for a younger, digital generation.

This report presents the results of a survey of over 2,000 responses from Facebook fans of Jobbik. It includes data on who they are, what they think, and what motivates them to

shift from virtual to real-world activism. In order to provide a richer picture, we have compared these results against a 2011 poll of Jobbik voters collected by the Tárki Social Research Institute, and analysed by the Political Capital Institute.

Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media website used by supporters of the Jobbik party. As of 17 January 2012, the party's official Facebook profile had 37,682 fans. For two months in the summer of 2011 we targeted adverts at individuals who were supporters of Jobbik-related groups on Facebook. On clicking the advert, individuals were redirected to a survey, which they were invited to complete. The survey and adverts were presented in Hungarian, and were then translated back into English for the purposes of this report. In total, the final data consist of 2,263 responses. The data were then weighted in order to improve the validity and accuracy of any inferences made about the online population. Although online recruitment in social research is widespread, self-select recruitment via social network sites brings novel challenges. Because this is an innovative research method with both strengths and weaknesses, we have included a methodology section in an annex to this report.

## Results

It is important to stress that Jobbik's diverse support base cannot be adequately understood through Facebook alone, and many Jobbik fans are of course not on Facebook. The party, for example, has high levels of support in parts of rural (especially north east) Hungary, which has lower Facebook penetration rates, and where voters are likely to be older and less likely to be active users of social networking sites. This data set refers specifically to Jobbik's Facebook fans—an important, but specific, sub-group of its support. It is with this important caveat that these results are presented.

These are the main results of our survey:

- *Jobbik Facebook fans are predominantly young men.* More than two-thirds (71 per cent) are male, while 64 per cent are under the age of 30 and 30 per cent were between the ages of 16 and 20. These percentages are nearly identical to those of other populist parties and movements (PPAMs), which are similar parties and groups to Jobbik in Western European countries. As one might expect, Jobbik Facebook fans are younger (64 per cent under 30) than the average Jobbik voter (28 per cent under 30).
- *A significant proportion of Jobbik Facebook fans have a university or college education.* More than one in five (22 per cent) of online supporters reported having a university degree compared with 15 per cent of Jobbik voters.
- *Jobbik Facebook fans under 30 are less likely to be unemployed than the national average.* Approximately 25 per cent of under 25s are unemployed in Hungary nationally, compared with only 10 per cent of Jobbik Facebook fans under 30.
- *Jobbik Facebook fans are keen voters and demonstrators, but not formal party members.* More than four in five (82 per cent) Jobbik Facebook fans report having voted for the party; 35 per cent have attended a demonstration or protest; while only 16 per cent were formal party members. They are less likely to be formal party members and more likely to vote and demonstrate than supporters of PPAMs.
- *The integration of Roma is Jobbik Facebook fans' top concern.* More than one-quarter (28 per cent) of Jobbik Facebook fans cited the 'integration of Roma' as their top concern. This is a significant difference from PPAMs, for whom immigration and Islam are the top concerns.

- *Jobbik Facebook fans are disgruntled but participate in democratic elections.* They display a favourable attitude to voting (only 8 per cent agreed with the statement ‘it doesn’t matter who you vote for’), lower than the proportion of members of the Hungarian general public who agreed with the statement. However, only 10 per cent agreed with the statement ‘politics is an effective way to respond to my concerns’, compared with 35 per cent of supporters of PPAMs.
- *Jobbik Facebook fans are more likely to think that violence is justified if it leads to the right outcome than PPAMs.* It is important to stress that this does not imply that they are violent: more disagreed that violence was justified than agreed it was (41 per cent vs 39 per cent). Compared with PPAMs, however, only supporters of France’s Bloc Identitaire and Italy’s CasaPound Italia were more likely to think violence justified if it leads to the right outcome.
- *Jobbik Facebook fans are pessimistic about their own future and that of their country.* Only 4 per cent of believe their country is on the right track, compared with 19 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Only 11 per cent are personally optimistic, compared with 16 per cent of Hungarians. On both these measures, Jobbik Facebook fans are more pessimistic than PPAMs.
- *Jobbik Facebook fans are more likely to be negative towards the European Union than their fellow Hungarians.* The most common response among Jobbik Facebook fans when asked what the EU meant to them was ‘the loss of cultural and national identity’ (68 per cent; just 5 per cent of the national population responded in this way).
- *Jobbik Facebook fans have higher levels of generalised trust than the national average.* One-quarter (26 per cent) say other people can be trusted, compared with 21 per cent nationally. In the PPAM data set, there were only two similar instances where populist supporters expressed higher levels of trust than the general population: among supporters of the Front National and the British National Party.
- *Jobbik online supporters have very low levels of trust in all major social and political institutions, including the government, European Union, the police, the justice or legal system and the media.* Jobbik supporters have much lower levels of institutional trust than either their fellow Hungarians or supporters of PPAMs.
- *The protection of identity, identification with the party’s values and disillusionment with mainstream politics were the three most common reasons respondents gave for being Facebook fans of Jobbik.* Men were much more likely than women to cite protection of identity and disillusionment as motivations. They were also significantly more likely than PPAMs to cite identity as a motivation for being Facebook fans (35 per cent vs 18 per cent).
- *Young supporters were more likely to cite anti-Roma and anti-Semitic sentiments as reasons for being Facebook fans of Jobbik.* One-fifth (20 per cent) of 16–20-year-olds cited anti-Roma sentiments as their reason for being a Facebook fan of Jobbik compared with just 5 per cent of respondents aged over 50.

## Implications

Our task in this report is to illuminate the phenomenon of online supporters of Jobbik and present the results objectively. We do not offer lengthy recommendations because formulating a response is a task for Hungarian citizens and politicians. We hope this research can inform that task.

It is clear that identity and its protection is a key driver of support for Jobbik. If mainstream politicians wish to appeal to the supporters of these parties, they must learn to speak about the importance of identity without resorting to xenophobia and the demonisation of persecuted minorities. The report also suggests that the Jobbik party should not be grouped together with other nationalist populist parties in Western Europe. While there are obvious similarities, the demographics, concerns and attitudes of Jobbik supporters — as well as the Hungarian context — differ in significant ways.

Jobbik's voter base is diverse: it is able to combine an appeal to rural voters as well as attract young people disillusioned with mainstream politics. This survey is concerned primarily with the latter group who are young, sizable and motivated. They are not formal members of the party, but do vote and demonstrate for the party. Like many other young people across Europe, they use online channels as a form of political engagement, information and activism. Jobbik, with its young membership and leadership, has been good at relating to this form of political involvement. It is important that other parties do the same. Jobbik has been effective at employing the language of freedom and democracy in a way that appeals to these younger supporters. However, it appears that these supporters' backing for these concepts rarely extends to left-wing groups or organisations and minorities. Encouraging a more inclusive conception of freedom that appeals to young people might be a promising way forward.

The fate of Jobbik will also rest on the current government and its policies over the coming years. For those concerned about the ideology behind Jobbik the more insidious threat may be the impact it has on the ruling Fidesz party. Similarly, the recent constitutional reforms by the Fidesz party are likely to boost the appeal of Jobbik, whose members present themselves as staunch, though selective, defenders of civil liberties and Hungarian freedoms.

# 1 Background

Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobb Magyarorszáért Mozgalom; Jobbik hereafter), has emerged as the most successful extreme right political party in Hungary since regime transition in 1989–90, following the Cold War.

Founded as a political party in 2003, Jobbik's breakthrough year came in 2009, when it won 14.8 per cent of the vote in the European parliamentary elections. In 2010, the party received more than 855,000 votes in the Hungarian national election, finishing in third place, only 2.6 per cent behind the previously governing Socialist party (Magyar Szocialista Párt or MSZP), with 16.7 per cent of the vote.<sup>2</sup>

While two elections are not enough to guarantee the party's continued success, Jobbik does appear to be growing. In 2011, Jobbik broadened its voter base more successfully than any other opposition party, registering 21 per cent support among active voters with mainstream party preferences.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, in a survey of all parties undertaken by the daily *Népszabadság*, Jobbik's party director Gábor Szabó claimed it had 12,430 formal members.<sup>4</sup> Although this is significantly fewer than the two main established parties, Fidesz and the MSZP, it is a healthy size relative to its newness — and its members are assumed to be more active as a result. Moreover, unlike many smaller parties, Jobbik has not experienced difficulties fielding sufficient candidates and collecting the necessary endorsement sheets to run in elections.<sup>5</sup>

## Party values

The Jobbik party professes to represent the interests of ethnic Hungarians, who Jobbik supporters believe are increasingly oppressed in their own country by national and international

forces. For example, Krisztina Morvai, member of the European Parliament and front-woman of Jobbik's 2009 European campaign, has argued that Hungarians have become 'Palestinians in their own country'.

Jobbik's ideology is openly anti-liberal. Supporters often reject the promotion of human rights (particularly those applied to minorities), and are frequently homophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-Roma. Yet, at the same time, the party refers to democracy and freedom as guiding principles, particularly when it suits their self-interest. Along with other Hungarian opposition parties, Jobbik was a staunch opponent of the government's draconian media law of 2010, which was criticised across Europe. However, consistent with its nationalist agenda, freedom of speech and the freedom to gather are often reserved for the ethnic Hungarian community. Its support for freedom of expression, for example, in part is a reflection of its young support base and its concern that the liberal hegemony may seek to silence radical or extreme voices. Certainly, these concerns for freedom of expression are not always universal: Jobbik recently welcomed the Government's withdrawal of the left-wing Klub Rádió's transmission frequency, and has called for similar action to be taken over the left-wing television channel ATV.<sup>6</sup>

On economic policy, Jobbik is protectionist, anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation (eg Jobbik wants to restrict multinational companies from the Hungarian economy). In its foreign policy, Jobbik is anti-European and anti-Israeli (eg they attributed the downfall of the Hungarian Florint to the Israeli-American lobby) and argues for a strengthening of ties with regimes such as Iran, Russia, China and Turkey.<sup>7</sup> As part of its anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist position, Jobbik is openly pro-Palestinian and pro-Muslim — a key difference from many Western European far-right parties, although this might in part be accounted for by the absence of a sizeable Muslim minority within Hungary.<sup>8</sup>

### Support base

During the 2009 and 2010 elections, Jobbik performed best in the least developed north eastern part of the country, where the standard of living is at its lowest and unemployment and the Roma population at its highest (an area that was a former bastion of the socialist party).<sup>9</sup> However, the voter base of Jobbik should not be regarded simplistically as the 'losers of the transition' away from communism: poor, unemployed, undereducated people with a previous preference for the socialist party.

A representative national survey in Hungary conducted by Tárki Social Research Institute in 2011 (n=3,040) contained 240 professed Jobbik voters. It was analysed by the Political Capital Institute. This revealed that they were not undereducated compared with the majority of the population; they are better off than the average; and are mostly economically active.<sup>10</sup> Jobbik's voter base is also younger than the national average (40 per cent are under 35, compared with 31 per cent nationally). Interestingly, in contrast with Jobbik's harsh, sometimes almost fundamentalist, Christian self-definition, the ratio of atheists among its members is higher than among the supporters of all other political parties. The gender gap is considerable: 66 per cent of the party's voters are males, and most of the Jobbik voters are from smaller cities. Another study, based on retrospective party preference questions and panel research, showed that Jobbik voters are predominantly either former Fidesz voters or politically inactive (undecided voters and non-voters — including first voters).<sup>11</sup> In sum, it appears that Jobbik supporters are motivated in large part by ideology and cultural considerations rather than economic ones.<sup>12</sup>

### The rise of Jobbik

Jobbik's remarkable success in such a short period of time is the result of a number of related factors. Three in particular are significant: disillusionment with existing politics; exploitation of fears relating to crime and especially perceived Roma

criminality; and making effective use of online media to reach out to younger voters. Each is discussed in turn.

#### Disillusionment with existing politics

Jobbik has benefited from general disillusionment in the post-transitional political establishment, a phenomenon that was indicated by the European Social Survey data, analysed by the Political Capital Institute).<sup>13</sup> Similar to many European countries in the wake of post-Cold War transition (especially between 1994 and 2006), Hungarian politics was dominated by two parties — MSZP and Fidesz. Fidesz, the established right-wing party, was relatively successful at appealing to far-right voters through harsh anti-communist, anti-globalisation, nationalist, and law and order rhetoric.

The rise of Jobbik was helped by a scandal involving the MSZP, which was in government at the time. In 2006, a secret speech was published in which the MSZP prime minister at the time, Ferenc Gyurcsány, admitted that continuous lying had been necessary by MSZP to secure re-election. In response, Hungary saw its worst riots in decades. These events energised the extreme right. Around that time, a number of extreme right-wing organisations, including the Magyar Gárda (see box below), Nemzeti Orsereg, Betyársereg and Vederó were founded. In the subsequent election in 2010, MSZP's share of the vote collapsed, and young voters in particular became more open to the idea that the established system, based on the rotation of power between centre-right Fidesz and centre-left MSZP, needed to be replaced with a new (and many believed radical) settlement.

#### *The Magyar Gárda*

*The Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) was established as a uniformed, police-type organisation whose stated purpose was to train its members 'physically, spiritually and intellectually'.<sup>14</sup> Though formally founded as a separate institution, the Guard was set up by Jobbik under the leadership of Party Chairman Gábor Vona.<sup>15</sup> Among its numerous proclaimed goals was the desire to show uniformed strength in*

*those areas with allegedly high rates of petty crime where the police were absent or hard to reach. In particular, the Guard was to help with crimes committed by Roma. Its political purpose was most likely to signal to the rural population that Jobbik was taking its concerns regarding crime seriously and that it would be willing to resort to radical measures to address them. They marched in municipalities with high Roma population against 'Gypsy crime', helped during floods,<sup>16</sup> donated blood<sup>17</sup> and performed charity work.*

The Guard's membership numbers rose quickly, reaching 1,000 in 2008,<sup>18</sup> though precise numbers are hard to verify.

The Guard phenomenon is not unique to Hungary but rather represents a form of organisation typical of the far right in Eastern Europe. East European 'guards' (another example is the Bulgarian National Guard) share the following features:

- Paramilitary-type organisations evoking the militaristic traditions of the far right
- Policy built primarily on anti-Roma prejudice
- questioning the state's law-enforcement monopoly
- Closely tied to party politics; they are created by parties and play a major role in party building (this is also why it is a mistake to compare the guards to neo-Nazi paramilitary organisations as the latter reject the entire political system and have no party affiliations — their political role is marginal)
- The Guard became increasingly radical and its former commander, István Dósa, came to resent Jobbik's dominance and the desire that the Guard stay out of politics. In 2009, the cultural association that was officially the home of the Guard was dissolved by the Budapest Metropolitan Court,<sup>19</sup> though the organisation continued to work under the name New Hungarian Guard Movement.<sup>20</sup> The court's decision, Jobbik's decreasing interest in the Guard after the party became a parliamentary force, and the internal strife in the organisation led to repeated fragmentation; now the Hungarian Guard is a panoply of organisations with similar ideologies.

### Exploiting anti-Roma sentiment

The second — and related — factor in Jobbik's success appears to be the party's successful exploitation of anti-Roma resentment, along with a broader fear of disorder and criminality in society. Jobbik has repeatedly attacked the Roma minority, which has often struck a chord with rural voters. It was by using this strategy that Jobbik was able to extend its support in north eastern Hungary.<sup>21</sup> This is important, because Jobbik supporters come from very different strata of society — in particular rural voters and young, disaffected people who are urban based, and educated. More generally, with its marked anti-crime rhetoric and the establishment of the Magyar Gárda, Jobbik has reacted to a growing societal sentiment of fear. Crime statistics fail to explain this sentiment, since they have shown improving trends overall in the past decade. However, a significant proportion of petty crime in rural areas (a disproportionate amount of which is committed by Roma) is not captured by these statistics.

### Appealing to young people by making effective use of online media

Finally, Jobbik's success has been built on a highly modernised subculture that is especially active online. As with many far right organisations before it, Jobbik has successfully created a fashionable youth sub-culture surrounding the party, comprising music bands, night clubs, fashions and festivals to accompany its ideology — much of which is transmitted through the internet.<sup>22</sup> This is partly a function of the party's youthful outlook and age. This mix of popular culture and politics is shared online, which helps recruitment among young people. Moreover, 'national rock' is very popular in Hungary. Bands such as Kárpátia<sup>23</sup> and Hungarica<sup>24</sup> have experienced genuine commercial success; the latter led the Hungarian sales record list in 2009, which further augments Jobbik's appeal among young people.<sup>25</sup>

### Prospects for growth

The extent to which Jobbik will grow in the coming years is unclear. Some population-level surveys suggest it is a distinct possibility. The sociologist Pál Tamás believes that the opinions and patterns of thought typical of right-wing extremists are widespread in the country, concluding: 'In some sense we can hardly call these extreme any more.' For example, a 2008 general population survey conducted by Tamás revealed that 75 per cent of respondents believe, 'We need a resolute leader who rules this country with an iron fist.'<sup>26</sup> Similarly, a poll conducted by the company Medián in August 2007 showed a marked decrease since 1996 in the number of those who thought that 'extremist groups with arrow cross (fascist) and anti-Semitic ideas' constitute a danger to society (down from 77 per cent to 55 per cent).<sup>27</sup> Political Capital's Demand for Right Wing Extremism Index (DEREX) has indicated that the social receptivity to prejudiced, anti-establishment rhetoric and political solutions rose dramatically after 2002.<sup>28</sup>

A realistic scenario is that Jobbik will emerge as a solid medium-sized party, which either maintains its significant levels of support or becomes even stronger as a result of its bastions in the north east. This would make it a formidable political force, which would inevitably exert a growing influence over Hungarian politics and discourse.

More broadly, Jobbik's influence is felt in the effect it has on broader political discourse, including that of the current government. Certainly, before the relationship between Jobbik and Fidesz became antagonistic on account of their political rivalry, there was considerable overlap between the personnel of the parties.<sup>29</sup> However, the relationship between Jobbik and Fidesz is complex. Although Jobbik has often voted with the government — for example over laws for cloture, where it needs opposition support — it voted against the recent constitutional reform. Where Jobbik disagrees with Fidesz, the party emphasises that opposition to Fidesz in no way represents support for the socialist party.

In more general terms, there is significant growth in the popularity of extreme right-wing media, especially online. One of the key characteristics of the Hungarian extreme right scene is a vast, mostly internet-based, media empire. Some of these media are openly fascist or neo-Nazi portals, but these are generally less popular than more moderate sites. Although there is only one portal that is explicitly tied to Jobbik, [barikad.hu](http://barikad.hu), a number of the other portals are sympathetic to Jobbik — at least one, [kuruc.info](http://kuruc.info), is allegedly maintained anonymously by Jobbik activists, and is extremely popular. There is also an extreme right web-based radio station, Szent Korona Rádió (Holy Crown Radio), which ranks in the top 10 among online radio stations<sup>30</sup>.

Despite this significant media presence and the effective use of social media and the internet to promote its views and recruit new members, there has been no study to date of Jobbik's online supporters. The next three chapters present our research into online supporters of the Jobbik movement — who they are, what they believe and how active they are in the 'real world'.

## 2 Who are Jobbik's Facebook fans?

This chapter presents the socio-economic, age and gender data of Jobbik's Facebook fans. Where possible and relevant, we present this information in the context of broader Hungarian society as well as make comparisons to similar groups in Western Europe as presented in the Demos report *The New Face of Digital Populism*.<sup>31</sup>

### Demographics

Using Facebook's own publicly available advertising tool (see methodology in the annex for details) it is possible to identify the age and gender of Facebook members for all of Hungary in addition to deriving the basic demographic information of Facebook members who express a preference for Jobbik or join a Jobbik-related Facebook group. This allows us to put Jobbik supporters in the context of the broader Hungarian population online.

Across the country as a whole, Hungarian Facebook users display a fairly even gender split, but among Jobbik's Facebook fans, 71 per cent are male and 29 per cent are female (n=27,140).<sup>32</sup> This gender imbalance towards males is something Jobbik shares with similar far-right groups across Western Europe (75 per cent male compared with 25 per cent).

Jobbik's Facebook fans also tend to be young: 64 per cent are under 30, and 30 per cent are between 16 and 20 years old (table 1). These proportions are nearly identical to the average age of PPAMs. This is not merely a result of younger people having a greater propensity to use Facebook. In Hungary as a whole, the age split is more even, with 53 per cent of Facebook members being aged below 30.

Table 1 **Age of Jobbik's Facebook fans (n=27,140 at time of survey) (national statistics in brackets)**

Age group	Jobbik total % (Hungary total %)	Western Europe PPAMs % (European total %)
16-20	30 (21)	32 (19)
21-25	22 (18)	19 (17)
26-30	12 (14)	12 (14)
31-40	20 (24)	17 (21)
41-50	9 (12)	12 (15)
51+	6 (11)	8 (13)

In an effort to establish the geographical location of Jobbik's Facebook fans we asked respondents which major city was within 50 kilometres of where they lived. Budapest had the greatest concentration of supporters (36 per cent), followed by Miskolc in the north east (9 per cent), and Debrecen (8 per cent). It is important to note that the high prevalence of membership near Budapest may be a result of the fact that urban dwellers are more likely to be internet users.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, 34 per cent of respondents said they did not live close to any of Hungary's six largest cities, reflecting the party's appeal among rural communities.

### Education and employment

We asked online supporters at what institution they gained their highest level of educational attainment and whether they were employed or not; 72 per cent said primary or secondary school, and 22 per cent said college or university (table 2). Surprisingly, this suggests that Jobbik's Facebook fans tend to be better educated than the average Hungarian: the higher education participation rate in Hungary is 17 per cent compared with 22 per cent among Jobbik supporters.<sup>34</sup> However, it is to be noted that this comparison is imperfect given the age demographic of Jobbik, and the overall growth of tertiary education since 1989.

When considering these results, it should be noted that 36 per cent of respondents are currently students. Moreover, 90 per

cent of supporters in the 16–20 age category had achieved no educational attainment after leaving secondary school; they may yet take a college or university place.

Table 2 **Institution at which Jobbik's Facebook fans achieved their highest educational attainment (n=2,263)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Elementary or secondary school	73	70	72
College or university	20	24	22
Postgraduate professional training institution	6	5	6

Overall, 12 per cent of Jobbik's Facebook fans are unemployed, with women and the over-30s displaying a greater tendency to be out of work (table 3). This is a significant, but not overwhelming, proportion; nationally, the current unemployment rate is 10.6 per cent; this rate would be even more similar if age was weighted to match our sample.<sup>35</sup>

Table 3 **Employment status of Jobbik's Facebook fans**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Employed	50	48	34	79	50
Unemployed	10	17	10	16	12
Student	38	30	55	0	36

Jobbik's Facebook fans are slightly less likely to be out of work than supporters of PPAM (14 per cent versus 12 per cent). However, Jobbik's Facebook fans are marginally less likely to classify themselves as 'employed' (50 per cent vs 54 per cent). This apparent discrepancy is likely to be because Jobbik's Facebook fans are more likely to be students (36 per cent vs 30 per cent) and therefore less likely to classify themselves as either 'employed' or 'unemployed'.

## Membership and involvement

To determine the extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans are involved in offline activity, we asked respondents a number of questions about their involvement with the party. Just 16 per cent of the sample said they considered themselves to be formal members of the party while 83 per cent did not.

Despite rarely being formal members, 82 per cent of respondents said that they had voted for Jobbik in the last general election. Younger respondents were less likely to have voted for Jobbik (table 4), but this may well be because some had not reached the age of majority at the time of the last national election in 2010.

Another measure of offline involvement is the extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans take part in demonstrations. More than one-third of respondents, 35 per cent, said they had taken part in a march, protest or demonstration in the last six months. This is far greater than the national average, with only 3 per cent of Hungarians having taken such action within the last 12 months.

Table 4 **Offline involvement of Jobbik's Facebook fans (n=2,263) (national statistics in brackets)<sup>36</sup>**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Formal members of Jobbik (%)	16	17	15	18	16
Voted for Jobbik in the last election (%)	80	84	78	88	82
Taken part in a march or demo last 6-12 months (%)	36 (3)	33 (2)	37	31	35 (3)

Compared with the average involvement of PPAM supporters, Jobbik's Facebook fans are less likely to be formal members of the party (16 per cent vs 32 per cent), more likely to vote for the party they support on Facebook (82 per cent vs 67 per cent) and more likely to have recently taken part in a demonstration (35 per cent vs 26 per cent).

## 3 Social and political views

We asked Jobbik's Facebook fans a number of questions about their social and political views, trust in politics and political institutions, and views about the future. Where the information is available, we have drawn comparisons with national averages based on either the Eurobarometer Survey 2011 or the European Values Study 2010, in order to make more meaningful inferences.<sup>37</sup> We also draw out comparisons with supporters of PPAMs.

### **Top two biggest concerns**

When asked to rank their biggest social and political concerns, taken from a list of 19 current issues, the most common responses from Jobbik Facebook fans were the integration of Roma and crime (table 5). No immediately comparable data are available concerning the integration of Roma, but concern about crime was far more prevalent among Jobbik's Facebook fans than among the Hungarian population as a whole (26 per cent among Jobbik Facebook fans but only 3 per cent among the general population). The third, fourth and fifth most commonly expressed concerns of Jobbik's Facebook fans were all economic in nature (table 5). This reflects Hungarian, and indeed EU-wide, worries about the current financial crisis.

Table 5 **Top 2 biggest concerns of Jobbik Facebook fans (n=2,263) (national statistics in brackets)**<sup>38</sup>

	Ranked in Top 2 concerns Total (%)
Integration of Roma	28 (N/A)
Crime	26 (3)
Economic situation	24 (21)
Unemployment	21 (29)
Rising prices	19 (58)

One of the biggest differences between Jobbik Facebook fans and supporters of PPAMs is the lack of concern about immigration and Islam among the former. When asked the same question, the foremost concern of supporters of PPAMs was immigration: on average 37 per cent of Western Europeans ranked it as a top 2 concern.<sup>39</sup> This can be compared with just 4 per cent of Jobbik's Facebook fans. The second most prevalent concern among PPAMs was Islamic extremism, which was not seen as a major issue by Jobbik Facebook fans: just 2 per cent ranked it within their top 2. It must be stressed that there are neither high levels of immigration nor significant Muslim populations in Hungary. The extent to which the underlying sentiments behind, for example, anti-Roma and anti-Islam concerns are the same in Hungary and other Western European countries is worth further research.

It is notable that Jobbik Facebook fans and supporters of PPAMs are both concerned about crime: it ranked second in priority among Jobbik supporters at 26 per cent and third in priority among Western European right-wing populist supporters at 17 per cent.

### Politics and voting

Jobbik Facebook fans were asked whether they agreed with the statement 'it does not matter who you vote for'. Only 8 per cent agreed, while the overwhelming majority disagreed with this statement (86 per cent, with 78 per cent 'disagreeing entirely').

This suggests that these Jobbik supporters have not lost faith in the democratic process completely (table 6). Moreover, they actually display a more favourable attitude to voting than supporters of PPAMs, who were twice as likely to agree with the statement (16 per cent).

Table 6 **Extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans agree that it does not matter who you vote for (n=2,263)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	3	3	2	5	3
Agree a little	4	6	4	5	5
Disagree a little	8	8	7	10	8
Disagree entirely	78	77	81	72	78

Despite this more sanguine view towards voting, Jobbik Facebook fans were much more disillusioned with politics generally than PPAM supporters. Only 10 per cent agreed with the statement 'politics is an effective way to respond to my concerns', compared with 35 per cent of supporters of PPAMs (table 7).

Table 7 **Extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans agree that politics is an effective way to respond to their concerns (n=2,263)**

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	4	4	4	3	4
Agree a little	6	6	7	4	6
Disagree a little	27	26	30	21	27
Disagree entirely	43	49	39	55	45

We also asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement 'violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome'. The response was mixed, with a significant

proportion expressing neutrality, while 41 per cent disagreed and 39 per cent agreed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, male respondents were more likely than females to agree (table 8). Jobbik Facebook fans agreed with this statement more frequently than PPAM supporters (39 per cent vs 26 per cent). Only supporters of France's Bloc Identitaire and Italy's CasaPound Italia scored higher on this measure (with 43 per cent and 47 per cent agreeing with the statement, respectively). It is important to stress that the results of this question should not be misinterpreted. Agreeing that violence is acceptable to ensure a certain outcome does not mean that Jobbik Facebook fans are more prone actually to commit violence. There are unfortunately no baseline data on this question for Hungarian or European general populations, making inferences about the relevance of the responses difficult.

Table 8 Extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans agree that violence is acceptable to achieve the right outcome (n=2,263)

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Agree entirely	19	11	20	12	17
Agree a little	23	17	24	18	22
Disagree a little	15	19	16	17	16
Disagree entirely	22	34	22	31	25

### Personal and national optimism

Jobbik's Facebook fans displayed a greater level of national pessimism than supporters of PPAMs. Only 4 per cent of Jobbik Facebook fans agree their country is on the right track (table 9), compared with 10 per cent of supporters of PPAMs. While this pessimism is reflected on a national scale — only 19 per cent of Hungarian citizens think their country is heading in the right direction<sup>40</sup> — it is far more pronounced among Jobbik's supporters.

Table 9 Extent to which Jobbik's Facebook fans agree that Hungary is on the right track (n=2,263)

	Ranked in Top 2 Total (%)
Agree entirely	1
Agree a little	3
Disagree a little	19
Disagree entirely	66

Table 10 Whether Jobbik Facebook fans think things will get better or worse for them personally in the next 12 months (n=2,263) (national statistics in brackets)<sup>41</sup>

	Ranked in Top 2 Total (%)
Better	11 (16)
Worse	58 (29)
Same	29 (54)

Jobbik Facebook fans were personally pessimistic, and pessimistic about the future of Hungary: 11 per cent believe that the next 12 months will be better for them personally (table 10), and only 4 per cent believe Hungary is on the right track (table 9). On both measures Jobbik Facebook fans are more pessimistic than supporters of PPAMs, of whom 10 per cent believe that their country is on the right track; and 26 per cent believe that the next 12 months will be better for them personally.

It should be noted, however, that Hungarian citizens generally have particularly low levels of personal optimism: only 16 per cent believe this year will be better than last, compared with an EU average of 26 per cent. Moreover, Jobbik respondents over the age of 30 are significantly more pessimistic: 71 per cent believe that the next 12 months will be worse than last, compared with 51 per cent of under-30s.

### Attitudes towards the European Union

The attitudes of Jobbik Facebook fans towards the European Union are, for the most part, negative. When asked to specify what the EU means to them personally, the most common response was ‘loss of cultural and national identity’ (68 per cent), followed by ‘freedom to travel, study and work’ (56 per cent), ‘waste’ (53 per cent), ‘bureaucracy’ (48 per cent), ‘unemployment’ (48 per cent) and ‘more crime’ (43 per cent) (table 11).

Comparing these responses to those given by their compatriots in the European Union-wide Eurobarometer survey, Jobbik Facebook fans are significantly more likely than the general population to harbour negative feelings towards the EU. When asked what the European Union meant to them, the top six answers given by Hungarians in the Eurobarometer survey were ‘freedom to travel, study and work’ (45 per cent), ‘unemployment’ (24 per cent), ‘the Euro’ (23 per cent), ‘democracy’ (22 per cent) and ‘peace’ and ‘cultural diversity’ (both 19 per cent). Only 5 per cent cited ‘loss of cultural identity’, 13 per cent cited both ‘waste of money’ and ‘bureaucracy’, and 14 per cent cited ‘more crime’. Jobbik Facebook fans placed a higher value than supporters of PPAMs on the freedom to travel, study and work provided by the EU (56 per cent vs 38 per cent). (The tendency of Jobbik supporters to place greater value than supporters of PPAMs on these freedoms may be a result of their relative novelty for Hungarian citizens.)

Table 11 Attitudes of Jobbik Facebook fans towards the European Union (n=2,263) (national statistics in brackets)<sup>42</sup>

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
Loss of cultural and national identity <sup>43</sup>	67	69	67	70	68 (5)
Freedom to travel, work and study <sup>44</sup>	57	54	57	55	56 (45)
Waste <sup>45</sup>	53	55	53	55	53 (13)
Bureaucracy	48	50	47	51	48 (13)
Unemployment	47	51	48	48	48 (24)
More crime	43	44	44	43	43 (14)

### Trust in institutions and people

We asked Jobbik Facebook fans about their levels of general trust in other people. Overall, the majority of respondents felt that people could not be trusted generally (table 12) with female respondents and those below 30 years of age slightly more likely to respond in this manner. Surprisingly, however, when compared with the Hungarian population as a whole, respondents were more likely than their compatriots to trust people (26 per cent vs 21 per cent). This seemingly elevated level of trust may arise because there is less diversity in general in Hungary than in other Western European countries, and Jobbik supporters are more likely to live in homogenous communities of other ethnic Hungarians— even if Roma communities are nearby. While on the whole supporters of similar groups in Western Europe were more likely to trust people (33 per cent), there were only two similar instances where populist supporters expressed higher levels of trust than the general population: the Front National (27 per cent) and France in general (19 per cent), and the British National Party (32 per cent) and Britain (31 per cent).

Table 12 **Extent to which Jobbik Facebook fans agree that people can be trusted (n=2,263) (national statistics in brackets)**<sup>46</sup>

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Under 30 (%)	Over 30 (%)	Total (%)
In general most people can be trusted	26	26	23	33	26 (21)
In general most people cannot be trusted	40	50	44	39	42 (79)

We also asked about levels of trust in public institutions. We found a marked difference between the views of Jobbik Facebook fans and those of the general public (table 13). Jobbik Facebook fans were less likely to trust the specified institutions in every case. Trust in the mainstream media (3 per cent), the Hungarian Government (5 per cent) and the European Union (9 per cent) were particularly low.

Table 13 **Extent to which Jobbik Facebook fans and the Hungarian general public trust institutions (n=2,263)**

Institution	Tend to trust		Tend not to trust	
	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%) <sup>47</sup>	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%)
Government	5	48	91	45
European Union	9	62	88	30
Trade unions	26	31	68	54
Army	45	57	50	28
Police	27	60	70	37
Judiciary and legal system	15	53	82	43
Religious institutions	35	51	60	37
Political parties	12	22	84	72
The press	3	39	92	52

Jobbik Facebook fans were less likely than supporters of PPAMs to trust every one of the specified institutions: government (5 per cent vs 20 per cent), EU (9 per cent vs 14 per cent), trade unions (26 per cent vs 29 per cent), army (45 per cent vs 65 per cent), police (27 per cent vs 62 per cent), the judiciary and legal system (15 per cent vs 60 per cent) and the press (3 per cent vs 12 per cent). The police score in particular may reflect the widespread anger among the extreme right about the police's role in the 2006 demonstrations.

## 4 Why do people support Jobbik online?

While the preceding chapter begins to provide some indication of why Jobbik Facebook fans are drawn to the party, we also wanted to ask respondents to explain what motivates their support in their own words. Respondents were asked in an open-response question why they supported the party; 473 individuals responded to the question. Below we present the most common reasons given by respondents in order of how frequently they were mentioned.

### **Reasons for Jobbik Facebook fans supporting the party**

#### **Identity**

Respondents were classified in the identity category when they referred to a love of Hungary, commitment to the preservation of traditional Hungarian national and cultural values, or representation of the interests of 'real' Hungarians when asked about their reasons for supporting Jobbik.

Just over one-third (35 per cent) of respondents said they supported Jobbik for reasons related to identity. Male respondents were significantly more likely to mention identity as a reason for supporting Jobbik than female respondents (40 per cent vs 24 per cent), but there was no clear correlation between the people who supported Jobbik for reasons related to identity and their age.

Respondents often perceived Hungarian cultural and national values as being under threat. For some, Jobbik seemingly provides a means to counter this menace: 'There is only one thing in my life that I can say is truly my own: my home country. Jobbik fights those who would destroy it.'

### Group values

Respondents classified in this category were those who cited, in general terms, the values, principles, norms, beliefs, aspirations or ideas of Jobbik as reasons for supporting the party.

One-third (33 per cent) of respondents supported Jobbik because of its group values. Male respondents referred to group values less often than females (27 per cent vs 46 per cent). There was no clear correlation between the tendency to give group values as a reason for supporting Jobbik and their age.

Some respondents specified that it was the radical nature of the party's message that prompted them to support Jobbik: 'Because of the principles that other people regard as extreme.'

### Disillusionment

Respondents were placed in the disillusionment category when they said they supported Jobbik because of their disenchantment with major political institutions, the political elite or the general direction of their country.

Just over one in ten (12 per cent) of respondents said their reason for supporting Jobbik was disillusionment. Men were twice as likely as women to mention disillusionment (14 per cent vs 7 per cent). Younger respondents tended to refer to disillusionment slightly less often than older respondents: 11 per cent of respondents under the age of 30 did so, compared with 15 per cent of those over 30.

Some respondents' explanations for supporting Jobbik suggested they had turned to the party as a last alternative after losing faith with mainstream political parties: 'I thought this party might turn out to be better than all the others.'

### Integrity

The integrity category covered those respondents who supported the party because they admired Jobbik's honest, straight-talking and courageous approach and those who believed party supporters were consistent in their convictions. This category differed from the disillusionment category in that it required respondents to speak of Jobbik in a positive light, instead of merely displaying a lack of faith in other organisations.

One in ten (11 per cent) of respondents (an equal proportion of men and women) mentioned integrity as a reason for supporting Jobbik. Older respondents were more likely to refer to integrity: 15 per cent of over 30s did so, compared with 9 per cent of under 30s.

Unsurprisingly, many responses linked integrity with disillusionment:

*[I support Jobbik] because I am fed up with hypocritical parties that line their own pockets and govern only with a view towards satisfying the business circles close to them, while they only deceive the people. We need a party that shows strength and dynamism, while it is not tied to any interest groups, and which furthermore is committed to the spirit and ideology of Hungarians rather than the euro or the dollar. I found this in Jobbik.*

*[I support the party] because only Jobbik can help address the problems in Hungary today. Everyone's trust in politicians has been shaken, and Jobbik has restored our confidence.*

The party's straight-talking reputation was sometimes linked to the perception that it champions the causes of the poor and vulnerable:

*Jobbik is bold enough to express its views and asserts its will come hell or high water. It represents the interests of the common folk and not those of the middle and upper strata. It helps people in trouble.*

### Anti-Roma

Respondents were classified in the anti-Roma category when they expressed antipathy towards people of Roma descent.

Overall, 11 per cent of Jobbik's online supporters cited anti-Roma reasons for supporting the party. Respondents aged between 16 and 20 years old were far more likely than older respondents to express anti-Roma sentiment: 20 per cent did so, compared with just 5 per cent of respondents over the age of 50. Female respondents were slightly more likely than their male counterparts to have supported

Jobbik because of their aversion to the Roma (13 per cent vs 10 per cent).

Criticisms of the Roma community were often crude: ‘To clean up, make order in this country. Where I live the Gypsies kill people for a few pennies.’

However, some respondents rebutted the presumption that Jobbik’s supporters are typically racist: ‘I am not a racist; I have Gypsy and Jewish friends. Jobbik is also not racist.’

#### **Anti-Semitism**

Respondents were placed in this category when they included anti-Semitic remarks in their responses to our question asking them why they supported Jobbik.

Just 4 per cent of respondents made anti-Semitic references. Respondents in the 16–20 age bracket were far more likely than any other age category to express anti-Semitism: 9 per cent did so, compared with between 0 and 3 per cent in all other age brackets. Males and females displayed a similar propensity to make anti-Semitic comments.

Anti-Semitic remarks often reverted to Jewish stereotypes and conspiracy theories:

*I don't like to live my life in the knowledge that my country has been torn to pieces and I hope to be able to do something to change this. I also don't want the Jews to buy up my home country for next to nothing.*

*Because I hate the bloody Jews and the hypocritical sort of people.*

#### **Economics**

Respondents were classified in the economics category when they said they supported Jobbik for economic reasons and were concerned about such matters as tax policy, unemployment, poverty, government bailouts, trade policy and income redistribution.

Just 3 per cent of respondents fell within this category. Women were more likely than men to say they supported Jobbik for economic reasons (5 per cent vs 2 per cent) and

8 per cent of respondents aged over 50 mentioned economics in their answers. This was twice as often as any other age category.

Despite only a small proportion of respondents giving economics-related reasons for supporting Jobbik, a number made oblique references to the current financial crisis: ‘Because I believe that this is the only party that can free Hungary from her debts.’

#### **Anti-Islam, anti-immigration and anti-EU**

Respondents were classified in the anti-immigration category when they explicitly professed concern or anger about rising immigration and its effects; in the anti-Islam category when they criticised Islam, Muslims or Arabs; and in the anti-EU category when they criticised the European Union and/or the decisions made by EU institutions. Less than 1 per cent of Jobbik supporters fell within any one of these categories.

#### **Other**

Some 14 per cent of respondents supported Jobbik for reasons other than those listed above and were classified in the ‘other’ category.

### **Comparing Jobbik Facebook fans to PPAMs**

In *The New Face of Digital Populism*, we asked supporters of PPAMs the same question (why they decided to support the party or group), and there were a number of similarities in their responses to those of Jobbik supporters. Jobbik respondents were almost equally likely to mention group values (33 per cent vs 39 per cent), integrity (11 per cent vs 9 per cent), disillusionment (12 per cent vs 14 per cent) and economics (3 per cent vs 4 per cent).

Nevertheless, there were some key differences. Jobbik Facebook fans were significantly more likely to say they supported the party for identity-related reasons than supporters of PPAMs (35 per cent vs 18 per cent); they were also more likely to do so than supporters of any individual Western European party or group. Anti-Roma sentiment was

a far more significant motivating factor for supporting Jobbik. Less than 1 per cent of supporters of PPAMs, compared with 11 per cent of Jobbik Facebook fans, had joined a party because of its anti-Roma stance. Although anti-Semitism was less pervasive among Jobbik respondents than anti-Roma sentiment, it was still cited with far greater frequency (4 per cent) as a reason for supporting Jobbik than by supporters of PPAMs (less than 1 per cent).

Supporters of PPAMs were far more likely to cite anti-immigrant sentiment (18 per cent) and anti-Islam sentiment (10 per cent) as a reason for joining a party. In contrast, less than 1 per cent of Jobbik Facebook fans were classified in either category.

## 5 Comparing Jobbik Facebook fans and voters

This chapter explores one of the key questions facing social scientists over the coming decades: what is the relationship between online and offline support for political movements? In order to answer this question, we created two tests. First, we compared our Facebook sample with a 2011 representative omnibus survey conducted by the Tárki Social Research Institute, which contains a considerable size of Jobbik voters (n=240), analysed by the Political Capital Institute. Second, we ran a simple cross tabulation analysis to examine any significant differences between Jobbik Facebook fans who said they were formal party members and Jobbik Facebook fans who said they were not formal party members or had ever demonstrated for Jobbik. We did not run the same analysis on Jobbik Facebook fans who voted for the party because the proportion of those who did not was too small.

### Comparing Jobbik Facebook fans with Jobbik voters

While the samples are not directly complementary, comparing data of Jobbik voters with those of Jobbik Facebook fans yields some useful insights into the extent to which online and offline Jobbik supporters differ. Overall, the characteristics of the two groups are very similar, but there are some notable differences between them.

#### Age and gender

Jobbik's Facebook fans are younger than other Jobbik voters: while respondents under the age of 30 comprise 64 per cent of Jobbik online supporters, they make up just 28 per cent of Jobbik offline voters (table 14). When interpreting these

statistics, however, it must be borne in mind that Hungarian Facebook users are far younger than the Hungarian population as a whole. Moreover, the Demos survey differed from the Tárki survey, in that the former included individuals between the ages of 16 and 18, while the latter did not. Nevertheless, this should prove worrying for those who are concerned about the growth of Jobbik in Hungary, as our research points to the party attracting a significant number of young potential voters.

The gender imbalance is very similar in the two samples: 66 per cent of the party's voters are males, compared to 71 per cent among Jobbik's Facebook fans.

Table 14 **Age groups of Jobbik Facebook fans and Jobbik offline voters compared with general Hungarian public**

Age group	Facebook fans (n=27,140)		Voters (n=240)	
	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%)	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%) <sup>48</sup>
16-20 or 18-20 <sup>49</sup>	30	21	6	5
21-25	22	18	12	8
26-30	12	14	10	9
31-40	20	24	27	20
41-50	9	12	17	16
51+	6	11	28	43

### Education and employment

Jobbik's Facebook fans are more likely than other Jobbik supporters to have had a university or college education: 22 per cent of online supporters had done so, compared with 15 per cent of other Jobbik voters (table 15). This contrast is even starker when those online respondents who cited postgraduate professional training as their highest level of educational attainment are taken into account (28 per cent vs 15 per cent). The proportion of respondents who classified themselves as students was much higher among Jobbik

Facebook fans (36 per cent) than Jobbik voters (11 per cent). This difference might be explained, at least in part, by the younger composition of Jobbik's Facebook supporters. Unemployment levels were slightly higher among Jobbik online supporters than their offline counterparts (12 per cent vs 9 per cent).

Table 15 **Institution at which Jobbik Facebook fans and Jobbik voters had achieved their highest educational attainment, and their employment status<sup>50</sup>**

Education	Facebook fans (n=2,263)			Voters (n=240)		
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Elementary or secondary school	73	70	72	83	87	85
College or university	20	24	22	17	13	15
Postgraduate professional training institution	6	5	6	—	—	—
Employment	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Employed	50	48	50	64	49	59
Unemployed	10	17	12	7	11	9
Student	38	30	36	12	9	11
Other <sup>51</sup>				17	32	22

### Trust in people and institutions

Both sets of respondents displayed similar levels of trust in other people: 26 per cent of Jobbik Facebook fans agreed that most people could be trusted, compared with 22 per cent of Jobbik voters (table 16).

Table 16 Whether Jobbik Facebook fans and Jobbik voters think that in general most people can be trusted<sup>52</sup>

Education	Facebook fans (n=2,263)			Voters (n=240)		
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
In general most people can be trusted	26	26	26	19	27	22
In general most people cannot be trusted	40	50	42	52	50	52

Direct comparison between the two data sets over the level of trust they place in public institutions is difficult because of differences in the description of each of the institutions used in the respective studies (see individual notes related to table 17). Nevertheless, it is clear that both groups display similarly high levels of institutional mistrust (table 17).

Table 17 Whether Jobbik Facebook fans and other Jobbik voters trust public institutions<sup>53</sup>

Institution	Facebook fans (n=2,263)			
	Tend to trust		Tend not to trust	
	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public <sup>54</sup> (%)	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%)
Government/parliament <sup>55</sup>	5	48	91	45
Police	27	60	70	37
Judiciary and legal system <sup>56</sup>	15	53	82	43
Political parties/politicians <sup>57</sup>	12	22	84	72

Institution	Voters (n=240)			
	Tend to trust		Tend not to trust	
	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public <sup>58</sup> (%)	Jobbik supporters (%)	Hungarian public (%)
Government/parliament	14	26	73	58
Police	24	39	60	41
Judiciary and legal system	21	35	64	47
Political parties/politicians	6	12	85	74

**Variation between online and offline supporters**

In *The New Face of Digital Populism*, we ran a series of logistic regressions to determine what background and attitudinal characteristics were more likely to inspire online activists to get involved in the ‘real world’ through voting, becoming a formal party member, or attending a street demonstration or protest. For this report we ran the same analysis using cross tabulations with Jobbik Facebook fans to give a general sense of how different types of Jobbik Facebook fans were involved in different types of offline activity. As presented in chapter 2, 82 per cent voted for Jobbik, 16 per cent are formal party members and 35 per cent have attended a street protest or demonstration. Because the proportion of Jobbik online supporters who have voted for Jobbik is so high the sample of non-voters is too small to make relevant comparisons. We were therefore unable to run this analysis on the question of voting, but the analysis pertaining to demonstrations and formal party membership are presented below.

**From Facebook to the streets**

Jobbik demonstrators were slightly more likely than non-demonstrators to be male (73 per cent vs 70 per cent) and also slightly younger: 68 per cent of demonstrators compared with 62 per cent of non-demonstrators were under 30. They were also less likely to be unemployed than non-demonstrators (9 per cent vs 14 per cent).

There were some small variations between demonstrators' top concerns and those of non-demonstrators. Demonstrators were more concerned about crime: 30 per cent ranked it as one of their top two concerns, compared with 23 per cent of non-demonstrators. Meanwhile, non-demonstrators were slightly more likely than demonstrators to be concerned about the economic situation (25 per cent vs 22 per cent), rising prices (20 per cent vs 15 per cent) and out of touch politicians (19 per cent vs 15 per cent).

The strongest difference between Jobbik demonstrators and non-demonstrators was the extent to which they were party members: demonstrators were far more likely than non-demonstrators to be formal party members of Jobbik (28 per cent vs 9 per cent). Whether formal party membership requires or entails participation in demonstrations, or demonstrating leads to formally joining the party, is unclear.

### **From Facebook to card-carrying party member**

Although only a small number (16 per cent) of Jobbik's Facebook fans consider themselves formal members of the party, it is still informative to examine the differences between Jobbik members and non-members. As with Jobbik demonstrators and non-demonstrators, there were many similarities between the two groups: the gender split was very similar (70 per cent of members and 71 per cent of non-members were male) and they were equally likely to be unemployed (12 per cent).

There were, however, some small but important differences as well. Members of Jobbik were slightly older than non-members (40 per cent over 30, compared with 35 per cent of non-members) and tended to have lower levels of personal optimism: 7 per cent of Jobbik members felt that the next 12 months would be better than the last year for them personally, compared with 12 per cent of non-members. Members tended to be more pessimistic about their country: 85 per cent of non-members thought that Hungary was heading in the wrong direction, compared with 92 per cent

of members. Finally, as mentioned above, Jobbik members were significantly more likely to have taken part in a demonstration in the last 6 months: 61 per cent had done so compared with just 7 per cent of non-members.

## Annex

# Methodology

The methodology employed for the collection and analysis of these data is set out in detail in *The New Face of Digital Populism*.<sup>59</sup> We therefore limit this section to Jobbik specific issues.

### Data collection

For *The New Face of Digital Populism*, we collected data from Facebook fans of nationalist populist political parties or street based movements drawn across Europe. We ran a Facebook advert targeted at fans of all parties and/or party leaders' Facebook pages over the summer of 2011. Each advert invited Facebook fans of the group in question to click on a link, which redirected them to our online survey.

Our campaign ran over a three-month period, with no single advert being available for more than six weeks. On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, which set out the details and purpose of the survey along with an invitation to take part. The size of target population varied from country to country, depending on the size of the Facebook membership of the group in question. Table 18 gives the details of the data collected for the survey on Jobbik.

Table 18 **Data collected for survey on Jobbik**  
(Date of survey: Jul–Aug 2011)

	No of specific Facebook interest groups targeted	Size of population targeted	No of unique impressions	Total Facebook link clicks	Total survey responses	Final data set
Jobbik Party	6	27,140	6,700,928	6,384	2,533	2,263

The ‘unique impressions’ column lists the number of unique occasions the advert was displayed on the target audience’s Facebook sidebar. The variation in these figures is a result of both the target population size and the number of adverts from other companies that may have been running simultaneously. The click per impressions ratio was relatively stable, at around 1 per cent.

The click to survey completion ratio was under 50 per cent. This non-response rate may be the result of some respondents deciding not to take part in the survey on reading the consent form. Our method to correct for non-response rates is discussed in the full methodology available in *The New Face of Digital Populism*. The size of the final data set was lower than the number of surveys completed because we removed incomplete surveys.

### Data analysis and limitations

We decided to use Facebook principally because the site is a popular mode of communication for supporters of many of the groups and parties we surveyed.

In order to increase the predictive validity of our results, we applied a post-stratification weight, using the known demographics of the online population to correct the sample’s balance of gender and age in line with the makeup of the group as a whole. To do this, we gathered background data on the composition of Jobbik’s Facebook group membership using Facebook’s advertising tool (which is freely available for any user to access). We gave each participant a weighted value on the basis of the prevalence of their demographic profile (age and gender) in the population at large. Although we achieved demographic representativeness—which can correct for systematic age or gender related bias—it is possible certain attitudinal self-selection biases exist, because this was a self-select survey. It is with this caveat that the results are presented.

While the use of a post-stratification weight is an improvement on the use of unweighted data, it cannot be automatically claimed as a reliable basis for making inferences

about the offline group. The use of social network surveys is subject to a well-known technical and methodological critique focusing on the nature of self-entry interest classification on Facebook, the lack of content reliability on social networking sites, and the lack of internet access and usage in the broader population, all of which are capable of biasing the results of the survey.

Therefore, we take care not to claim, at any point in the text, that our sample represents or reflects the official views of the group, or indeed of its offline membership. This is why we have compared our results to Tárki Social Research Institute 2011 survey work, in order to give a richer picture.

Throughout the paper, we compare the Jobbik results to the pan-European study results presented in *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

In chapter 2, the gender and age of each of the groups in question were collected directly from the publicly available Facebook group level data using the advertising tool mentioned above. This provides the most accurate results on the Facebook membership for each group. Results related to education, employment and involvement in the group are based on our weighted results.

In chapter 3 we give weighted results, and provide comparative data where it is available from the 2010/11 Eurobarometer survey. Where the questions are not worded identically, or there were additional answer options, this is expressly identified.

Chapter 4 is based on the analysis of an open text question about why individuals joined the group in question. This open question allowed respondents to answer as they wished. A Hungarian translator coded the responses. We reviewed the content of the responses and created nine categories for the responses, together with a category ‘other’. Responses could fall into multiple categories. We removed data relating to respondents who were not supporters of Jobbik.

In Chapter 5, in order to make comparisons between Jobbik’s Facebook fan base and its voter base, throughout the paper we reference a 2011 representative poll undertaken by

the Tárki Social Research Institute (n=3,040), containing a considerable sample of Jobbik voters (240). This was processed and analysed by Political Capital Institute in Budapest. In the sections concerned with the relationship between offline and online activity of Jobbik supporters, we ran a cross tabulation analysis, in which we compared those Facebook fans who claimed to be party members against those who did not; and those Facebook fans who had protested or marched in the previous six months compared with those who had not. The sample size was too small to undertake a logistic regression.

### **Ethical considerations**

We conducted this research according to UK ethics. As this research focused on adolescents over the age of 16, no Criminal Records Bureau check was necessary; consequently, none was sought. Similarly, it was not necessary for us to obtain informed consent from participant parents or guardians as Social Research Association ethics guidelines suggest such clearance should not be sought and is not required when investigating participants aged over 16. We sought and gained individual informed consent from all participants, who agreed to a consent statement presented at the start of the survey — failure to sign acceptance of this statement prevented them from participating further in the research. Although we targeted the survey only at people aged over 16, a small number of individuals stated they were under 16 when responding to the question about age. We immediately deleted data relating to these people.

We stated on the Facebook advert that we were representing Demos, and were undertaking a survey of Facebook members of the group in question. On clicking, the participant was redirected to the survey landing page. On that page we pointed out that leaders of each group had been informed about the survey. Before running the survey, Demos emailed each of the groups in question to let them know about the survey. On the landing page we also stated that we would be letting the party in question know about the results before they were made public. Before release, we

emailed the parties and groups in question with the results where it pertained to their members.

We did not brief participants fully on the study's aims before completing the survey in order to avoid the exhibition of demand characteristics. We provided only a broad overview of the research at the start of the survey, and gave more detailed information on the project's aims only after the last question had been completed. We provided the contact details of the lead researcher to all participants to cover the eventuality that they had questions not covered by the debrief notes, but few participants made use of it.

We told participants that they could withdraw from the research at any time before completion as part of a preface presented alongside the consent statement. Later we reminded them of this right when they completed the survey via a paragraph in the debrief notes, offering the possibility of immediate withdrawal via a check box. No participants opted to withdraw in this way.

We observed ethical and legal considerations relevant to the storage and handling of data; all data were kept digitally encoded in an anonymous format, and we didn't store any data capable of identifying any participants.

We prepared for the eventuality that the research uncovered information with serious security implications, particularly relating to participant support for violence; we took precautions to absolve the researcher of moral responsibility towards the disclosure of information to agents of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the survey did not ask for precise details of acts of violence or illegal political protest. In order to preserve participant confidentiality (the deliberate exclusion by data capture systems of IP addresses) we removed from the researcher the means to identify and incriminate individual participants.

## Notes

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- 32 Of respondents to our survey, 74 per cent were male and 26 per cent were female ( $n=2,263$ ); we weighted this result to reflect the gender split of Jobbik's total Facebook membership.
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- 36 The Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who answered 'yes' to the question: 'Have you taken part in a political march, protest, or demonstration in the last six months?' The European Social Survey (Round 5) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who answered 'yes' to the question: 'During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you taken part in a lawful public demonstration?'
- 37 European Commission, Eurobarometer surveys, Standard Eurobarometer 74, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm) (accessed 18 Jan 2012).
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- 39 Bartlett et al, *The New Face of Digital Populism*.
- 40 Demos survey respondents were asked the question, 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Hungary is on the right track.' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'agree entirely', 'agree a little', 'disagree entirely', 'disagree a little' or 'neutral'. Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) respondents were asked, 'At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction in Hungary?' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'things are going in the right direction', 'things are going in the wrong direction', 'neither the one nor the other' or 'don't know'. The Eurobarometer figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'things are going in the right direction'.
- 41 Both Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) respondents were asked the question: 'Will the next 12 months be better, worse or the same when it comes to your life generally?'
- 42 Both Demos survey respondents and Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) respondents were asked the question: 'What does the European Union mean to you personally?' Both sets of respondents were allowed to select multiple options.
- 43 The Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'loss of cultural and national identity'. Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'loss of cultural identity'.
- 44 The Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'freedom to travel' or the option 'study and work anywhere in the EU'. The Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected 'freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU'.

- 45 The Demos survey figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'waste'. Eurobarometer (Spring 2011) figure provided is the percentage of respondents who selected the option 'waste of money'.
- 46 Demos survey respondents were asked the question: 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In general, most people cannot be trusted.' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'agree entirely', 'agree a little', 'disagree entirely', 'disagree a little' or 'neutral'. The Demos survey figures provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 'disagree entirely'/'disagree a little', or selected 'agree entirely' or 'agree a little'. The national statistics provided are drawn from the European Values Study (4th wave). Respondents who took part in the European Values Study asked the question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'most people can be trusted', 'cannot be too careful' or 'don't know'. The European Values Study figures provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 'most people can be trusted and 'cannot be too careful'.
- 47 Demos survey respondents were asked: 'To what extent do you trust the following: [institution].' Eurobarometer (Autumn 2010) respondents were asked: 'For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. [institution].' In each case respondents selected either 'tend to trust' or 'tend not to trust'.
- 48 Eurostat, 1 Jan 2010.
- 49 The figures provided for the Demos survey are for the age group 16–20 years. The figures provided for the Political Capital Institute Survey are for the age group 18–20 years.
- 50 When asked to specify their highest level of educational attainment, 'postgraduate professional training' was not an option available to respondents in the Political Capital Institute survey.
- 51 The 'other' category included respondents on retirement, maternity leave, child care, housekeeping and so on. When asked to specify their employment status, 'other' was not an option available to Demos survey respondents.
- 52 Demos survey respondents were asked: 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In general, most people cannot be trusted.' Respondents were able to select any one of the following options: 'agree entirely', 'agree a little', 'disagree entirely', 'disagree a little' or 'neutral'. The Demos survey figures provided are the percentages of respondents who selected 'disagree entirely' or 'disagree a little', or selected 'agree entirely' or 'agree a little'. Political Capital Institute survey respondents were asked to provide a figure from 0 to 10 on a scale where 0 indicated 'cannot be too careful' and 10 indicated 'most people can be trusted'. The figure provided for 'tend to trust' is the percentage of respondents who answered 6–10 and the figure provided for 'tend not to trust' is the percentage of respondents who answered 0–4.
- 53 Demos survey respondents were asked the question: 'To what extent do you trust the following: [institution].' Respondents were able to select either 'tend to trust' or 'tend not to trust'. Political Capital Institute survey respondents were asked to provide a figure from 0 to 10 on a scale where 0 indicated 'no trust at all' and 10 indicated 'complete trust'. The figure provided for 'tend to trust' is the percentage of respondents who answered 6–10 and the figure provided for 'tend not to trust' is the percentage of respondents who answered 0–4.
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- 56 The Demos survey asked respondents about trust in the 'judiciary and legal system' while the Political Capital Institute survey asked respondents about trust in 'the legal system'.
- 57 The Demos survey asked respondents about trust in 'political parties' while the Political Capital Institute survey asked respondents about trust in 'politicians'.
- 58 The Hungarian public figure is derived from Political Capital Institute fieldwork (Apr–Jun 2011) (n=2,950).
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Nationalist populist parties and movements are growing in support throughout Europe. These groups are known for their opposition to immigration, their ‘anti-establishment’ views and their concern for protecting national culture. Their rise in popularity has gone hand-in-hand with the advent of social media, and they are adept at using new technology to amplify their message, recruit and organise.

One such party is the Jobbik party in Hungary — the most successful far-right party to emerge in two decades. Founded in 2003, it is now the third largest political party in Hungary. Its ideology is strongly nationalistic, combining opposition to capitalism and liberalism with anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric. The Jobbik party has been particularly effective at mobilising young Hungarians, using online communication.

This report presents the results of a survey of over 2,000 Facebook fans of Jobbik and includes data on who they are, what they think, and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world activism. It also compares the Jobbik party with other similar parties in Western Europe, shedding light on the growing online support of Jobbik, and the relationship between their online and offline activities. This report is the first in a series of country specific briefings about the online support of populist parties in 13 European countries, based on our survey of 13,000 Facebook fans of these groups.

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