Fixing failed states
at 3:01pm on Thursday, 22nd May 2008
Yesterday we hosted a seminar on state building with Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. Their new book Fixing Failed States calls for an integrated approach to national building, bringing together the international community, Afghani leaders and citizens themselves to re-imagine a future for this failing country.
"Fixing" Afghanistan is undoubtedly a complex undertaking and there are clearly things which must be tackled, from civil-military relations to building institutions of the state, developing public accountability to eradicating poppy. However, the problem they took issue with most was the current aid system, principally:
As far as aid money spent on expats' lifestyle, I think there ought to be a clarification on aid agencies. Surely, the salary of a UNICEF civil servant is very different from that of an OXFAM worker and exceedingly different than that of a tiny ten-person NGO. To lump NGOs together and compare their allocation of funding under the umbrella term of "aid agencies" is too simplistic.
The authors' claim that the West decides what's best is simply not true. I worked in a small NGO which was in constant contact with national NGOs and together we worked towards locally decided goals.
Lastly, the faulty 'salami' approach to funding: this certainly is a failure across the aid architecture but aid agencies are addressing their shortcomings. The UN agencies' spending process is very questionable indeed, yet steps are being made. For example, sudden breaks in the pipeline can be patched through a (very bureaucratic- I admit) process of applying for CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund) funding. This is only an example in the attempt to alleviate 'salami' spending yet CERF money has been used in humanitarian crises, by UN agencies and NGOs alike.
The current aid system is imperfect. When compared to the challenges Afghanistan faces, however, humanitarian workers are not the prime negative force in the quest to "fix" the country.
"Fixing" Afghanistan is undoubtedly a complex undertaking and there are clearly things which must be tackled, from civil-military relations to building institutions of the state, developing public accountability to eradicating poppy. However, the problem they took issue with most was the current aid system, principally:
- the waste of aid money spent on expats' extravagant lifestyle;
- the "UN agencies and NGOs" deciding what is best, on the behalf of Afghan people instead of interviewing and asking them directly;
- the "salami" approach to programme funding translates into very little money at the bottom end of the project cycle, which may be the critical phase.
As far as aid money spent on expats' lifestyle, I think there ought to be a clarification on aid agencies. Surely, the salary of a UNICEF civil servant is very different from that of an OXFAM worker and exceedingly different than that of a tiny ten-person NGO. To lump NGOs together and compare their allocation of funding under the umbrella term of "aid agencies" is too simplistic.
The authors' claim that the West decides what's best is simply not true. I worked in a small NGO which was in constant contact with national NGOs and together we worked towards locally decided goals.
Lastly, the faulty 'salami' approach to funding: this certainly is a failure across the aid architecture but aid agencies are addressing their shortcomings. The UN agencies' spending process is very questionable indeed, yet steps are being made. For example, sudden breaks in the pipeline can be patched through a (very bureaucratic- I admit) process of applying for CERF (Central Emergency Response Fund) funding. This is only an example in the attempt to alleviate 'salami' spending yet CERF money has been used in humanitarian crises, by UN agencies and NGOs alike.
The current aid system is imperfect. When compared to the challenges Afghanistan faces, however, humanitarian workers are not the prime negative force in the quest to "fix" the country.
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